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1 
International migration and  
national development: 
An introduction to policies  
in sub-Saharan Africa 
Annelies Zoomers, Aderanti Adepoju 
& Ton van Naerssen 
Introduction 
This book focuses on achieving a better understanding of the implications of 
international migration for national development. It is written from the perspec-
tive of the sending countries in the South and with an emphasis on sub-Saharan 
Africa. Its purpose is two-fold: to explore current perceptions in the countries of 
origin of the links between international migration and national development, 
and also to examine current trends in policy making, aimed at minimising the 
negative effects of migration, while optimising the development impact. What 
are the dominant view and policy initiatives in the different countries of sub-
Saharan Africa? How do these relate to migration policies in other regions of 
the world? And how can migration help as a strategy for poverty alleviation?1  
                                                 
1  This research project focuses in particular on international labour migration – the movement 
of non-nationals or foreigners across national borders for purposes other than travel or short-
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For a long time, policy makers paid little attention to migration. In develop-
ment cooperation attention was paid mainly to the encouragement of local 
development and, where attention was paid to migration, it was generally 
viewed as an opposite pole to development: outmigration was regarded as an 
expression of poverty, and development projects were intended to contribute to 
the reduction of outmigration. Moreover, international migration was consid-
ered as brain drain, to the detriment of development in the South.  
This situation has recently changed (Farrant et al., 2006; GCIM, 2005; IOM, 
2001; United Nations, 2006; World Bank, 2006). There are various reasons why 
international migration is now high on the agenda. On the one hand, it is a 
consequence of increasing problems within the multicultural societies in the 
receiving areas, combined with a fear of ‘invasion’. For instance, on 1 Septem-
ber 2006 the website of the Dutch Algemeen Persbureau (APB, General Press 
Agency), carried the report: 
There seems to be no end to the explosion of migrants from Africa. In the past two 
days over 800 migrants have arrived in the Canary Isles. 9,000 have already been 
intercepted in 2006. In August their number was higher than in the whole of 2005. 
There is an increasing impression that migrants are streaming in from all sides and 
that there is a growing need to check migration flows.  
Whereas the emphasis was initially placed on restrictive (and anti-migrant) 
policies, there now appears to be a shift towards selective policies (including 
experimenting with circular migration). Because of the increasing ageing of the 
population in the receiving countries, there is a growing realisation that a call on 
migrant labour will have to be made in the not too distant future. 
Another, more positive, reason why more attention has recently been paid to 
migration is the growing conviction that international migration cannot be seen 
in isolation from development, and that, with the right policies, migration can 
make an important contribution to development (Zoomers 2006).  
With regard to the question of whether international migration can or cannot 
contribute to sustainable development and to combating poverty, there are at 
present two opposing views (de Haas, 2003, 2005; Tamas & Palme, 2006). 
According to the optimists, international migration offers good possibilities. 
They point in the first place to the remittances which are seen as a new or 
additional source of finance for development. According to estimates of the 
World Bank (2006), these remittances amounted to no less than 167,000 million 
                                                 
 
term residence. Little attention will be paid to other groups, such as refugees, internationally 
displaced persons and/or asylum seekers, although it is difficult in practice to make a 
completely clear division. 
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dollars in 2006, which is more than the total amount of official development aid 
for the same period. Remittances are estimated to benefit some 500 million 
people, or 8 per cent of the world population. Through remittances, migration 
has a direct effect on the reduction of poverty: an increase of 10 per cent in a 
country’s share of international migrants leads to a 2 per cent decline in ‘one 
dollar a day’ poverty (Adams & Page, 2003; Ratha, 2003; Sander & Maimbo, 
2003). In addition to the financial remittances, a positive value is also attributed 
to social transfers (the flow of information and ideas): countries of origin are 
said to benefit from brain gain, not to mention the positive effects of the return 
of newly-skilled migrants. Migration is also viewed as a positive factor, because 
it leads to a balance in the supply and demand dynamics in the labour market, 
and because international labour migration is expected to contribute to the 
elimination of inequality and lead to a better distribution of the advantages of 
globalisation (van Nearssen et al., 2007). Migration is seen as impacting 
positively upon all stakeholders – evidenced by the fact that sending countries 
and the migrants themselves benefit, because migrants find jobs, develop their 
skills, earn money and remit part of it to their countries of origin, while destina-
tion countries benefit from the skills and labour they receive from migrants 
(Adepoju, 2006; Lucas, 2005). 
Alongside the optimists, there is a group of pessimists who particularly 
emphasise a number of negative aspects and threatening dangers. They point to 
the fact that international migration can lead to conflicts in the host countries, 
and also stress particularly the negative consequences for the areas of origin, 
especially the loss of labour and intellect. They point out that it is generally the 
best and the brightest, the young, able-bodied people who leave first. Where 
migrants do decide to return to their home country, they say, this is mainly a 
reflection of failure. Return migrants are likely to be the old, sick and unsuc-
cessful, and skills brought back are unlikely to be of much help in countries of 
origin. The poorest, with the worst training, and the disabled, without networks, 
therefore remain behind and those who fail are the first to return. This has 
unavoidable negative effects in the sending region. To the extent that these are 
compensated by money transfers, a high measure of dependency is created. In 
addition conflicts can easily occur between migrants and non-migrants, and 
undesirable patterns of regional inequality arise since migrants tend to originate 
from particular areas within countries.2  
Although there are these opposing views, a growing consensus is now 
emerging that, although international migration does not automatically lead to 
                                                 
2  See for example the chapters on Morocco, Indonesia and India in van Naerssen, Spaan & 
Zoomers (forthcoming 2007).  
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favourable effects, it can contribute to development and poverty reduction, 
provided an appropriate and consistent policy is pursued (UNFPA, 2004). Inter-
national organisations (UN, IOM, ILO etc.) and national governments of 
numerous countries are now actively involved in maximising the link between 
international migration and national development. There are many different 
initiatives aimed at streamlining international migration and the achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and governments of sending and 
receiving countries are increasingly involved in streamlining their attempts to 
manage migration in the optimum directions.  
However, much of what is happening today is taking place on the initiative 
of the receiving countries in the North, and is possibly dominated by their wish 
to control or restrict migration, and to protect their borders. Little is known 
about how governments in the sending countries perceive migration, whether 
they see international migration as a positive or negative force in their attempt 
to achieve national development, and about what kind of policy initiatives are 
currently being taken to optimise development impact while restricting negative 
consequences. 
The state of the art 
In order to achieve a better understanding of the perception of migration and 
current policy initiatives in countries of origin, we invited a selected group of 
experts from sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America and Europe to 
participate in an expert meeting, held in Nijmegen, Netherlands, in August 
2006. The meeting was attended not only by academic researchers, but also by 
government officials and representatives of diaspora and migrant community 
associations. During the meeting we dealt with a wide variety of questions, 
including the views of sending countries with respect to the rapid outmigration 
of skilled and unskilled labour; the perception of sending countries about the 
impact of remittances; the advantages and disadvantages of temporary and/or 
circular migration in comparison to those of ‘permanent’ migration; perceptions 
about return migration and how this is linked to national development; and the 
implications of international migration for national development and poverty 
reduction strategies. In this section we present an overview of the debates at the 
meeting. 
The participants at the meeting agreed that migration is multidimensional 
and cannot be reduced to simple causalities. The root causes of migration are 
complex and can be traced to poverty, lack of employment opportunities, espe-
cially for the youths, and a feeling of dismal economic and political prospects. 
The failure of many states in the South to foster democracy, transparency and 
popular participation has intensified poverty and emigration pressure. At the 
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same time, globalisation, improvement in means of communication, and some 
Northern-initiated policies (trade, agricultural subsidies, structural adjustment 
programmes) have inadvertently forced people to consider migration as an 
option – in order to survive. 
The bulk of migration is taking place within the South, such as labour 
migration from many African countries to neighbouring states. This South-
South migration is also taking place among the world’s demographic giants, as 
can now be seen in the emerging Latin America-Asia and Asia-Africa connec-
tions. More attention needs to be paid to this hitherto little-acknowledged 
dimension. 
Migration policy in sub-Saharan Africa appears to be a relatively new field. 
Despite the fact that migration is an old topic, and that much research has been 
done during the last decades, it is not a consolidated policy field – not even in 
the case of experienced ‘diasporic states’ such as the Philippines, Mexico, 
China and India, the Caribbean to the UK, or Turkey to Germany.  
To the extent that African countries deal with migration, the agenda is very 
diverse and is unfolding only gradually. While some countries are preoccupied 
with issues of human trafficking, others are exploring how to make a more 
productive use of remittances and of the contributions the diaspora can and do 
make to home-country developments. Yet others are focusing on the problems 
related to transit migration, or are concerned with questions such as how to deal 
with the human rights of citizens abroad, including aspects of reintegration of 
their nationals forced to return. There are clearly also important differences in 
the way countries deal with problems of ‘brain drain or brain gain’: some coun-
tries are actively involved in considering how to retain people, or how to bring 
them back, whereas others are actively trying to locate and lure their experts 
into strategic positions, in order to generate development benefits at home. 
An interesting topic is how governments could mobilise diasporas, and what 
roles diaspora organisations can and do play in development. Much emphasis 
tends to be given to how to increase the flow of remittances (for example by 
reducing the transaction costs) and to encouraging collective remittances for 
development purposes. Attention should, however, also turn to ‘attracting 
foreign investment’ – as is happening in China – and on how to create employ-
ment (with special attention to the youth) in order to make policy regarding 
mobilising diaspora’s remittances more development-relevant.  
In devising policies and programmes, it is also important that diaspora 
organisations – as well as local governments, donors and NGOs – do not lose 
sight of the interests of local migrant entrepreneurs. Remittances might compete 
with local interests and even cause employment losses; thus it is important to 
create an enabling environment for investments in general, not only for mi-
grants. There is also the risk that migration might generate forms of inequalities 
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(regional, local, religious, gendered) which would have the unintended conse-
quence of failing to contribute to social development. 
Donors see migrant and diaspora organisations as potential agencies for a 
more active role in development cooperation, based on the belief that migrants 
are well-informed about their home countries and are therefore considered 
‘capable’ of contributing to development processes through projects in their 
areas of origin. Looking at migrants’ organisations from the perspective of the 
country of origin, however, shows all kinds of complications: not only in the 
Philippines but also in China, India and other countries with a huge diaspora, 
such projects are coming in from many directions and diverse sources. It is not 
clear then how these projects should be incorporated into national development 
strategies, or how they should become part of poverty alleviation strategy 
papers (PRSPs) and processes of decentralisation, or how to guarantee that they 
will reflect local priorities. 
The flow of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa is very low (in comparison 
with to Asia and to Latin America), and only a relatively small group of coun-
tries – the group with considerable diaspora – is able to benefit from them. To 
the extent that remittances are sent home, this will often be at the benefit of a 
few core regions, with a bias in favour of some groups. How should govern-
ments of sending countries then use these remittances for stimulating national 
development? And what are the implications for countries not connected to 
remittance flows? There is much debate about how to reduce transaction costs, 
but what about reducing the costs of migration, such as the transportation of 
migrants and the huge costs of communicating by telephone that many poor 
migrant families find themselves confronted with. 
Migration is a dynamic process, and it is important to better understand 
causalities and new trends. In destination countries, emphasis has been on 
strengthening the capacity for border control – a strategy to control international 
migration more effectively, to restrict the number of irregular migrants. There is 
an increasing surveillance of migrants – including those who arrive for family 
reasons or for legitimate work – due to the fear of their overstaying, and 
undocumented migrants are increasingly criminalised. Some of the Southern 
destination countries (Nigeria, South Africa, Botswana, and Senegal) are 
developing ‘Northern’ agendas and responses (restrictive policies, xenophobia, 
etc.). 
As a direct response to more restrictive policies in the destination countries, 
migration routes are becoming diversified, complicated and more dangerous. 
Migrants are forced to hire smugglers and traffickers, or other brokers, in order 
to cross borders, and are spending longer periods of time ‘in transit’ – yet little 
attention is given to the problems of transit in policy debates. Migration to the 
North (for example to the Netherlands) should not too readily be considered as a 
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‘final destination’, but should realistically be seen as a ‘conduit’ or ‘transit’, as 
migrants move further (for example in the direction of the UK or even the 
USA).  
Current images (migrants on boats arriving at the coast of Spain, and so on) 
create a ‘fear of invasion’ in the North. They do not provide people in the South 
with realistic information about the risks of migration or how to avoid them, nor 
do they provide people from the North with an adequate recognition of the 
(potential) benefits that may accrue from migrants. More attention needs to be 
given to the importance of images and information – including the role of the 
media – in managing migration. There is also an urgent need to incorporate 
migration into educational curricula, to help promote a better understanding of 
the roles migrants can play in the development of countries of origin and desti-
nation, and also to create space for migration researchers to become more 
actively involved in policymaking.  
Policy issues 
Migration needs to be tackled as a global issue. It is no longer logical to make 
distinction between countries as being sending, receiving or transit, since many 
countries have to deal with all these three dimensions at the same time. Its 
dynamics and interconnectivity can best be appreciated when migration is 
perceived as a system, rather than focusing only on specific flows such as 
South-North migration. 
Among the major policy issues are the following: 
Circular migration: Circular migration is being flagged as a win-win situa-
tion provided that sufficient attention is given to how to prevent brain drain and 
stimulate brain gain. The circular migration debate is presented as a strategy for 
coping with urgent labour needs in the destination countries of the North. The 
possibilities of also using circular migration as a solution to the urgent labour 
needs in the South should be systematically explored. In that context, the free 
circulation of workers in sub-regions should be promoted, while at the same 
time recognising and working to combat the limitations of existing guest-
worker models of circular migration in the North. 
Remittances: Remittances are private transfers to families to alleviate 
poverty, and governments of receiving countries should endeavour to provide 
an enabling environment to facilitate their productive use. To strengthen the 
development impact of remittances, the costs of migration (recruitment fees and 
documentation), the cost of remitting, and the costs of loans should be reduced, 
while also creating a more facilitating investment environment, by reducing 
bureaucratic bottlenecks in business registration and multiple tax regimes. 
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Migration of skilled professionals and ethical recruitment: Emigration of 
skilled professionals hampers the attainment of MDGs, especially in the health 
sectors of poor countries. The direct recruitment of professionals undertaken by 
countries of destination through unfair competition should be discouraged. At 
present the North decides how many workers to recruit, and from where, and 
often unilaterally selects the best workers in the international market. 
The countries of destination should be promoting a shared responsibility 
with the countries of origin concerning local needs in terms of professionals 
(education and training, and research infrastructure) and in the spirit of co-
responsibility, should be helping foster local development of the countries of 
origin, to reduce poverty and create domestic employment. 
The ‘compensation’ for the brain drain may take the form of supporting 
projects involving professionals going back to sending countries for short 
periods to work in public structures, special programmes, education, and so on. 
There is also a clear need to promote bilateral (and/or regional) agreements for 
the mutual recognition of titles and accreditation. 
Diaspora: The countries of origin should invest more in strengthening 
linkages with their diaspora communities, involving and promoting all migrant 
associations overseas, and offering cooperation and assistance to well-estab-
lished NGOs managing the diaspora philanthropy locally and trans-nationally. 
They should also be avoiding unnecessary taxes and bureaucratic delays. Best 
practices should be documented and officially recognised. They should also 
provide infrastructural facilities and concrete opportunities for overseas nation-
als to invest in their home country, and should promote the active involvement 
of local communities, to strengthen the self-development potential. Countries of 
origin should develop and implement reintegration programmes for returnees, to 
foster the possibilities of investment and entrepreneurship. The countries of 
destination could help to facilitate such processes, for instance by supporting 
diaspora-development linkages through co-development programmes.3 
Governance of migration: Countries of origin and destination should 
promote migration governance, including providing data, monitoring, assistance 
and protection of migrants. Migration policies are international by definition 
and should be discussed at regional, bi-regional and multilateral levels in order 
to establish common standards of protection, and promote policy coherence in 
migration management. Countries should take responsibility for preventing 
rights violations such as trafficking and xenophobia, and more attention should 
be paid also to the impact of images – such as the streets of European cities 
being ‘paved with gold’ – and the media. An institutional framework for 
                                                 
3  See for example Abad et al. 2005 (in Spanish). 
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dialogue, consultation and cooperation among all stakeholders in migration 
matters should be promoted at local (national), sub-regional, regional, inter-
regional and global levels.  
Organisation of the book 
The chapters of this volume are either selected from the presentations given 
during the expert meeting referred to above (Mozambique, Botswana, Senegal, 
the Philippines, Mexico, China), or are based on one of the field missions 
(Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria) that were part of the larger research project on 
international migration and national development.4 The focus for the chapters is 
the development of a coherent international migration policy that can contribute 
to the fight against poverty, and encouraging policy makers to pay more atten-
tion to migration. 
This introductory chapter presents a general overview of the issues as these 
appear currently in the international migration debate in the context of sub-
Saharan Africa. It gives a summary of the conclusions that were the result of an 
expert meeting on the same subject, and presents an overview of the other 
chapters in this volume. 
In Chapter 2, Adepoju explores how migration can help sub-Saharan Africa 
to contribute to development. While stressing that migration poses real policy 
difficulties, it is his conviction that migration has immense potential for 
migrants, and for countries of origin and of destination, and that, if well 
managed, migration can be a win-win-win situation for all constituents. He 
presents a broad overview of how sub-Saharan African governments address the 
issues of migration policy and management – currently a very heterogeneous 
situation which in many cases has not yet resulted in any coherent policies. The 
future benefits – and the development impact of migration – will very much 
depend on the willingness and ability of governments to facilitate ‘free labour 
mobility’, and collaboration in sub-regional economic organisations. Such 
benefits will also depend on factors such as agreements for combating irregular 
labour migration and trafficking, the ethical recruitment of skilled professionals, 
policies for encouraging the return and retention of skilled migrants, the role of 
the diaspora in the development of countries of origin, and the role of migrant 
remittances and incentive regimes in promoting productive domestic investment 
(as well as their potential for addressing emigration pressure at places of origin). 
He also stresses that much will depend also on the wider migration context, 
                                                 
4  See ‘Acknowledgements’ in this volume. 
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showing that the real challenge will be to develop an international framework to 
manage migration comprehensively.  
Adepoju continues, saying that migration policies should take into account – 
rather than ignore – the logic of the labour market and limits to regulation 
(IEMed, 2004). Improving the economic situation in immigrants’ countries of 
origin is crucial both to retain skilled nationals still in the country and to stimu-
late the return of those needed for development at home. This calls for coopera-
tion between rich countries and labour-exporting poor countries, to help sub-
Saharan African governments enhance economic growth, generate employment, 
and reduce poverty amongst their populations – with the potential effect of 
actually curtailing emigration to rich countries. The chapter concludes by 
stressing the need for mutually beneficial trade regimes, South-South and 
South-North collaboration in the capacity-building of officials, research and 
improved migration-related data systems, and other examples of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation agreements. 
Similar conclusions, but less optimistic, and stressing the need for a more 
active role for African governments are drawn by Oucho in Chapter 3 where he 
focuses on the ‘quartet of migration issues’: brain drain/brain gain, the diaspora, 
remittances and return. He stresses that ‘there is more rhetoric and action’ in the 
current situation, and that among the issues that need to be taken up by African 
governments is the lack of bilateral agreements between the countries of origin 
and the countries of destination – to make sure that migration will contribute to 
development in Africa. Other issues are fiscal changes necessary in African 
countries to stimulate the inflow of remittances (which nowadays benefits only 
a few African countries, namely those with well-established links with destina-
tion countries in the North); problems related to brain drain (where the brain-
gain becomes brain waste in countries of destination, it can in no way become a 
gain to the African countries); restrictions on attracting back human capital 
(converting brain drain into brain gain) to stimulate development in the conti-
nent; the lack of Africa-based research to generate information for formulating 
policy in countries of heavy emigration; the lack of informed policy and 
programmes emanating from the policies in most African countries; the failure 
of African countries to engage the Washington Consensus, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and other international organisations in meaningful roles 
for the quartet in their development agenda; and the inability of the New Part-
nership for African Development (NEPAD) to move beyond rhetoric to spon-
soring tangible activities to ensure a positive contribution regarding the African 
brain drain and gain.  
While making a distinction between different types of diasporas, Oucho 
highlights four important strands of utilisation of the African diaspora in 
development. These are partnership of countries in the Mediterranean region, 
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French initiatives in the field of co-development in a number of ex-colonies, the 
Cotonou Agreement – a framework initiated by the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries – and a number of IOM5 initiatives aimed at strengthen-
ing the development potential of migrants’ associations (including MIDA and 
TOKTEN). According to Oucho, information about international migration is so 
patchy and uncoordinated that it does not influence development in Africa. At 
the same time, he stresses that in order for African countries to benefit from 
migration, priority should be given to exploring a number of challenges: 
African countries should focus on anticipating (new) possibilities for circular 
migration (while considering the introduction of a ‘brain tax’ to be paid by 
countries of destination); factoring African emigration into WTO trade talks, 
including Mode 4 of the Doha Round; paying more attention to virtual return 
(instead of physical return), as long as skilled migrants have no compelling 
reasons to return; critically reviewing how remittances can contribute to 
national development (which will not occur automatically); and experimenting 
with policies (e.g. dual citizenship) in order to stimulate diaspora migrants to 
invest in the development of their countries of origin, while taking care that 
migration is incorporated in PRSPs and mainstream policies. The author con-
cludes that the onus is on African countries to prescribe viable solutions for the 
region – rather than depending on the countries of the North and international 
organisations, and the aggressive encroachment of the emerging Asian eco-
nomic powerhouses. 
South-South migration: Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Botswana 
The following chapters deal with migration perceptions and policy initiatives in 
specific countries, showing the huge diversity in the current situation – which is 
not always visible from the destination countries (since they usually have a 
view ‘tunnelled’ by South-North migration). We focus first on countries whose 
migrants do not normally arrive in the northern countries, because the dominant 
migration flow is directed at southern destinations. Examples are Burkina Faso 
(Chapter 4) and Mozambique (Chapter 5). These two countries also have in 
common the fact that they are among the poorest countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa and that international migration is directed mainly at neighbouring coun-
tries (rather than towards northern destinations). Burkina Faso and Mozambique 
are both characterised by a considerable diaspora, but the majority of these live 
in the neighbouring countries and the stream of remittances is relatively small in 
comparison to the flows coming from northern destinations. Their governments 
                                                 
5  The International Organization for Migration. 
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are involved in dealing with poverty and domestic matters rather than focusing 
on issues appearing on the international migration agenda. 
In Chapter 4, Broekhuis clearly illustrates the gap that exists between the 
international migration agenda and ‘local’ matters of concern in the field of 
migration. Topics of special interest in Burkina Faso include rural exodus and 
urbanisation; the living conditions of returnees and repatriates; internal migra-
tion and access to land; remittances; international migration and the spread of 
diseases, and conventions and migration legislation in the West African region. 
Long-distance mobility and migration have a lengthy history in West Africa, 
and migration has a positive connotation in all circles of society. Migration is 
seen as a free choice – remittances being presented as an important factor for 
improving living conditions. 
At the moment, the Burkina Faso government is mainly involved in dealing 
with internal and South-South migration. Migration to neighbouring countries is 
still a more important issue in the migration debate than migration to Europe 
(France, Italy) and the United States. The country has to deal with substantial 
internal migration streams, resulting in agrarian colonisation and urbanisation, 
which both require particular policy attention. The most important migration 
issue in recent years has been the forced return of Burkinabé migrants from 
Côte d’Ivoire and its consequences for the country as a whole and for the 
returnees in particular. 
The re-entry of returnees has fuelled a national discussion about access to 
land, and reintegration, while at the West African level the debate centred 
around the regulation of informal migration and how to secure the migrants’ 
rights. At the same time, however, the Burkina Faso government hopes the 
country can profit more from international migration to northern countries and 
points to the example of India as an exporter of highly qualified labour. Ac-
cording to officials, the ageing populations in Europe offer possibilities for 
Africans on the European labour market, and temporary South-North migration 
can favour fundamental productive investments and knowledge transfer. The 
risk of a brain drain is recognised, but this has not yet been translated into 
policy measures. In fact, the attitude of the government is ambivalent in this 
matter. Adequate knowledge of the future needs of labour markets in the North 
was not apparent during the discussions the author had while on an academic 
mission to the country. The authorities seem to be inadequately informed 
regarding the ageing of northern populations, and a possible resulting growth in 
demand for labour in Europe. The government’s efforts in the field of mobilis-
ing the Burkinabé diaspora are still in their infancy. With the aid of the IOM, 
the first phase of a project in this area is near completion, so that an overview of 
qualified Burkinabé who live abroad and are willing to utilise their skills and 
knowledge in Burkina Faso will be available. 
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A similar situation is found in Mozambique (Chapter 5). Raimundo 
describes how, from this country too, internal migration and South-South 
migration are the dominant migration flows (there is not much migration to 
Europe or other northern destinations). International migration from Mozam-
bique consists of a massive regional exodus to southern African countries, espe-
cially South Africa, but also to Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Malawi, and here too 
migration is not a new phenomenon. People have always moved in times of 
need, and in different directions (which formed part of different natural 
regions). In the case of Mozambique, population movement was especially high 
during the period of armed conflict (1976–1992). With migration flows contrib-
uting to urbanisation, and an orientation towards southern destinations, Mozam-
bique is increasingly playing a role as receiving country (not only from Nigeria, 
and the African Great Lakes region, but also from China, Pakistan and 
Lebanon). People from China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Lebanon and Ethiopia are 
increasingly using Mozambique as a gateway to South Africa. The Mozambique 
government has not yet succeeded in developing policies for attracting back – or 
benefiting from – people in diaspora, nor has it developed a policy for control-
ling transit migration. A strong limitation to implementing suitable migration 
policies is the lack of data. 
Finally, the case of Botswana (Chapter 6) shows how South-South migration 
can be ‘reversed’ while contributing to economic development ‘at home’. 
Searching for a way to diversify and supplement their incomes, Batswana 
people had, for a long period of time, migrated to South Africa to be employed 
in the mines. This was usually done on a part-time basis (circular migration). 
Gwebu shows how international migration towards South Africa had positive 
development impacts when the Botswana was poor – migration was central to 
contributing to state revenues through the payment of taxes, and customs and 
excise on remitted goods. However, there was a down-turn in emigration rates 
once the country’s economic fortune changed with the discovery and exploita-
tion of diamonds. Preceded by a period of large-scale migration to South Africa, 
Botswana succeeded in becoming an ideal economic development model – with 
a buoyant economy, honest bureaucracy, democracy and political stability – 
which went hand in hand with a ‘reversal of migration’.  
Botswana has started to become an immigration area, attracting people from 
abroad, while experiencing rapid economic growth. At the same time however, 
along with an improvement of the socio-economic wellbeing of the population, 
there is a growing inclination among the better off to move in a northern direc-
tion (the UK and the US). This kind of international South-North migration is 
perceived as a risk for Botswana’s development potential, given the detrimental 
effects of brain drain (having especially negative implications for the medical 
sector). According to Gwebu, priority should be given in migration policy needs 
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to interventions aimed at promoting circular migration as a means to stop brain 
drain. In addition, also in the light of the declining labour recruitment to mines, 
Botswana needs to pursue and intensify its efforts to create more local employ-
ment opportunities, in order to cater for the returning migrants and to retain any 
potential ones.  
South-North migration and diasporic states: Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya 
There is also another category of countries, however, with considerable South-
North migration and ‘diasporic states’ with considerable migrant populations 
overseas. Their national governments are actively searching for ways of opti-
mising the benefits of international migration. Many of these countries play 
important roles as destination areas for South-South migration within their 
regions. Examples are Senegal (Chapter 7) and Nigeria (Chapter 8), and also 
Kenya (Chapter 9) and Botswana (Chapter 6). Many of these countries are 
actively involved as a partner in all kinds of agreements and partnerships that 
are currently underway. 
According to Wabgou in Chapter 7, Senegal is one of the countries to have 
addressed the migration of its people as a foreign and public policy issue, and to 
have started dealing with these migration flows as a global reality in Africa, 
Europe and America. Through a number of bilateral agreements, the govern-
ment has begun taking steps to promote migration policies, and to improve 
cooperation in migration management, as well as in the facilitation of move-
ment across borders in Africa. It has become increasingly obvious to policy 
makers that migrations from Senegal, both to other African countries and to the 
industrial countries and the mega-cities of the North, are related to global 
processes which go beyond modern nation-states, which are based on concepts 
and borders. In Senegal, prioritised themes related to international migration 
include migration and development, irregular migration as a result of more 
restrictive policies in the destination countries, brain drain and brain gain, and 
problems related to transit migration. In their attempt to implement migration 
policies, the government has focused on the need for administrations at local, 
provincial and national levels to improve the domestic investment environment, 
to help promote the productive use of remittances, to lower customs duty, taxes 
and fees on specific imported products and services, and to improve informa-
tion-sharing, data building and access and management on migration.  
Wabgou shows that some important issues have not yet been included in 
these agendas, in spite of government actions in these fields, and that there is 
still much to do. This includes boosting productive activities through remit-
tances; training and giving support to immigrants who wish to return; involving 
immigrants and the Senegalese elite in projects of cooperation; and creating 
favourable conditions of life and work for potential migrant populations and 
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returned migrants – this last involving education and job creation strategies in 
rural and urban areas, as a local alternative to international migration.  
Also in Nigeria, Africa’s demographic giant, the government is well under-
way in developing migration policies while trying to benefit from the diaspora 
overseas (Chapter 8). On the basis of a field mission, de Haas describes how 
Nigeria witnessed a ‘reverse migration transition, transforming itself from a net 
immigration to a net emigration country’. Nigerians have increasingly emi-
grated to countries such as Ghana, Cameroon, and particularly the wealthy 
economies of Gabon, Botswana and South Africa (Adepoju, 2004), in addition 
to northern destinations such as Europe, the US and the Gulf states. At the same 
time, however, Nigeria has also remained a migration destination: Most non-
ECOWAS foreigners have to obtain a visa to enter Nigeria, and Nigeria plays 
an important role as destination area within the region (just as Senegal, Ivory 
Coast etc. also do). According to de Haas, Nigeria has pursued a largely laissez 
faire policy, and it has actively intervened only in the case of trafficking.  
It is relatively recently that Nigeria has become actively involved in 
developing policies in other sub-fields of migration. Since European countries 
started to put pressure on Nigeria to collaborate in the re-admission of irregular 
migrants, the Nigerian state seems to have embarked upon more active emigra-
tion policies through negotiating immigrant quotas in countries of the North, in 
exchange for collaboration with re-admission. Nigeria is actively involved in 
exploring how to get its diaspora involved in national development, and how to 
keep immigration under control. Current policy efforts illustrate the types of 
bottlenecks that African governments have to deal with while trying to 
strengthen the link between migration and development. These involve using 
the diaspora in national development. Security and trust, as well as an environ-
ment conducive to development and investment, are important conditions for 
being successful in involving diasporas in home development. Problems of 
trafficking and illegality can be solved only with close collaboration between 
the sending and receiving countries (recognising that protection of the rights of 
foreign immigrants in Nigeria should improve – just as the situation of Nigeri-
ans emigrants overseas should).  
In Kenya – a leading refugee hosting state throughout the 20th century – the 
government is increasingly active in controlling migration and trying to 
optimise its development benefit while minimising its negative implications 
(Chapter 9). Rutten and Muli describe how Kenya developed into a source, 
transit, and destination country for men, women, and children trafficked for 
forced labour and sexual exploitation. Destinations are the Middle East, other 
African nations, Western Europe, and North America for domestic servitude, 
enslavement in massage parlours and brothels, and manual labour. Current 
policy initiatives focus on dealing with the refugee and trafficking issues, but 
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increasing attention is also being given to how to control immigration (transit 
migration); and how to strengthen the role of the diaspora in national develop-
ment. The introduction of an International Jobs Office and new mechanisms to 
transfer remittances from the Kenyan diaspora back home should be mentioned 
in this respect.  
The ‘experienced’ migration states: The Philippines, Mexico and China 
There are only a few countries in the world that have considerable experience in 
‘managing migration’ and knowledge of how to use diasporas as a motor for 
development. Using the lessons learnt in these countries could help sub-Saharan 
Africa in successfully optimising positive results while minimising negative 
implications. Examples of ‘experienced’ migration states are the Philippines, 
Mexico and China, and it is in this final part of the book that we make a com-
parative analysis of sub-Saharan Africa with Asia and Latin America, trying to 
find out what lessons can be learned.  
The Philippines (Chapter 10) is an example of an ‘experienced’ migration 
state, having celebrated in 2006 a century of international labour migration. 
Baggio shows how, during the past thirty-five years in particular, millions of 
Filipinos have left the country to seek greener pastures overseas, dispersed from 
the United States to Saudi Arabia, the EU, and many other destination areas. In 
the course of time, the Filipino state, and also civil society, has developed 
various mechanisms for maximising the benefits of international migration (in 
particular the economic impact of remittances) while also minimising its cost. 
Among the fields that seem crucial for increasing the development impact of 
international migration, is the need to build a strong and vibrant domestic 
economy: exporting labour cannot substitute for a long-term plan to reduce 
unemployment through the generation of domestic jobs. Governments have 
critical roles to play in creating a sound economic and political environment so 
that the remittances and skills of overseas workers can be properly used. In 
addition there is much concern about how to protect Filipino workers overseas 
(how to monitor these people’s movements and conditions of work, and how to 
protect migrant’s rights), and how to deal with social problems (partly related to 
the preponderance of female migrants). Attention is given to other matters such 
as how to facilitate (re-)integration after return, and how to streamline and 
coordinate the efforts of the thousands of Filipino migrants’ organisations all 
over the world, to contribute to ‘national’ development. 
In Chapter 11, Marchand focuses on the case of Mexico, which also has a 
long migration history and where governments and civil society have become 
very much involved in policies and programmes aimed at improving the 
development impact of international migration. During the past century, large 
numbers of people have left Mexico, but here the diaspora is not dispersed, but 
 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 17 
  
concentrated in the United States. In comparison to the Philippines, the diaspora 
is more settled (less mobile and less temporary), which means that Mexican-
Americans are in relatively better circumstances for organising themselves as an 
important political role-player, with the potential to influence the political 
agendas of both the US and Mexico. Together, Mexico and the US are therefore 
increasingly developing into a transnational space, and policies and social 
action aimed at maximising the benefits and minimising the negative impact are 
increasingly driven from two sides (the US and Mexico – diaspora and those 
‘left behind’).  
In the past decade many efforts were made by the US to ‘close the border’ 
with Mexico, and all kinds of measures were taken to keep migrants out. These 
measures were not very effective: what the increased controls accomplished was 
not so much reducing the flows of Mexican migrants into the US, but rather 
ensuring that once migrants had crossed the border they would stay in the US 
for extended periods of time, because circular migration had become increas-
ingly costly and too risky. In Mexico, migrants are nowadays considered 
‘heroes’ and the Mexican state is giving much priority to establishing close 
relations with Mexicans in the US. Current attempts to co-finance development 
projects on the basis of remittances and governments funds show how difficult 
it is for civil society and the state to collaborate (due to a lack of trust) to make 
the development projects economically feasible. 
The chapter on China (Chapter 12) shows how people have been involved in 
international migration for centuries, and how overseas Chinese have played an 
important role as bridges between China and the outside world. Leung shows 
how, since China adopted its reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s, 
overseas Chinese and foreigners of Chinese origin have played an indispensable 
role in China’s efforts to cooperate and have exchanges with foreign countries. 
This has involved introducing large amounts of overseas funds, entering the 
international market, and selling home-made goods to all parts of the world. 
Here the attention has not been so much on ‘remittances’ (as was the case in the 
Philippines and Mexico); much more importance is given to the ‘entrepreneu-
rial’ interest of people overseas in making investments in their ‘home country’. 
The Chinese case is a good illustration of how diasporas can play a role, not 
only as a source of direct investment, but also as a marketing channel for selling 
products manufactured in the home country. Cultural factors (language etc., and 
also cultural policies) seem to have helped as a marker for excluding foreign 
investors and keeping business opportunities reserved for the Chinese diaspora. 
The Chinese state has played an important role in stimulating resourceful over-
seas Chinese to invest and/or to return, and in exploiting what is seen as ‘brain 
power stored overseas’.  
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Compared to the policies in the three forgoing cases of countries with 
substantial diasporas overseas, policies to optimise the impact of international 
migration on development ‘at home’ in sub-Saharan Africa are indeed in their 
infant stages. As the contributions in this volume show, African governments 
and civil society actors need to develop clear views on the role and impact of 
international migration. Some countries have no policy at all; others differ in 
addressing such diverse aspects as brain-drain, trafficking, control of migration 
and – what we consider a key issue – improving the domestic investment 
climate. Bilateral and multilateral agreements are important tools in dealing 
with these issues. 
In Chapter 13, Zoomers and Adepoju give a general overview of different 
types of migration in relation to the potential of countries, making distinctions 
between countries with South-North migration, countries with South-South 
migration, and diasporic states. This classification makes clear that, where 
migration is concerned, it is no longer sufficient to divide the world into origin- 
and destination-regions, connecting them with arrows to indicate migrant and 
capital flows. There is a wide variety of ways in which countries are incorpo-
rated into the migration system, and this has direct consequences for the possi-
bilities of profiting from migration. Diasporic states and countries with directed 
South-North migration generally find themselves in a relatively favourable 
position, while countries with South-South migration appear to be increasingly 
faced with fresh restrictions. 
Zoomers and Adepoju indicate the heterogeneity and dynamics of migration 
routes, showing a number of recent trends indicating that the world has 
‘shrunk’. Compared with in the past, people are now much better able to bridge 
great distances in a short time and to maintain intensive contact with their areas 
of origin, and important changes have taken place in the composition of 
migration flows as a result. At the same time, in reaction to restrictive policies 
of the North, changes have occurred in the manner of travel, and new transition 
zones and migration hubs have arisen between places of origin and destination. 
There seems to have been a rapid increase in human trafficking and illegality, 
and migrant’s lives seem to have become more vulnerable. Zoomers and 
Adepoju conclude by giving an overview of issues that are central to today’s 
migration agenda, analysing this from the perspective of the various sending 
countries.  
The book is concluded by Chapter 14 (Zoomers and Adepoju), which gives a 
summary overview of current policy initiatives. Although attempts have been 
made by policymakers to maximise the positive impact of international migra-
tion or to restrict its negative implications, most sending countries in sub-
Saharan Africa do not yet have well-established policies in this regard. It is a 
new policy field and there is a wide variety of topics which very much depend 
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on the particular position of countries. The authors show that there is some 
overlap between the ‘migration and development’ agendas of northern and of 
southern countries – increasing the flow of remittances, combating human 
trafficking, improving border controls, stimulating brain gain, etc. – but this is 
very much dependent on the country under consideration, and within the South 
there are considerable conflicts of interests between countries. At the same time, 
however, it is shown that consistent migration policies could contribute to 
combating poverty. The book is concluded with a number of concrete policy 
recommendations. 
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2 
Perspectives on international  
migration and national development 
in sub-Saharan Africa 
Aderanti Adepoju 
Introduction 
In the twenty-first century, sub-Saharan Africa has come to a crossroads 
economically, politically and demographically. It is a region of contradictions: 
rich in resources, its peoples are becoming poorer by the day. Efforts by several 
countries to restructure their economies and open their markets to share in the 
global economy have been disappointing. Recurrent internal instability and 
conflicts have spurred disruptive population displacements. Wars and civil 
unrest generate migrants and refugees as political destabilisation severely 
erodes the meagre developmental progress of the post-independence decade 
(Adepoju, 2001). Sub-Saharan Africa is thus a region of diverse migration 
circuits − as origin, destination and transit for labour migrants, undocumented 
migrants and refugees, and of brain circulation for professionals. These migra-
tions take place predominantly within the region. 
In this region, completely grounded in poverty, emigration pressure is com-
pounded by demographic dynamics, unstable politics, endemic ethno-religious 
conflicts, persistent economic decline and environmental deterioration. From an 
apparently bright future during the era of independence and into the early 
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1970s, through the deteriorating economic and political conditions of the late 
1970s and ’80s, to the perception in the 1990s of a dismal future (see below), 
many Africans now see migration as their last hope for improving their living 
standards (Adepoju, 2006b).  
Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced all types of migration configurations – 
from, within and outside the region. Distinctive forms of migration characterise 
the various sub-regions: labour emigration from western and central Africa to 
developed countries and the Gulf States; refugee flows within eastern Africa; 
labour migration from eastern and many southern African countries to South 
Africa; and clandestine migration in West and East Africa. All these are 
changing dynamically. 
The migration configuration is extremely complex. Traditional patterns of 
migration are feminising, migration destinations are diversifying, and migration 
of entrepreneurs is replacing labour migration. In addition, brain circulation 
within, is slowly supplanting brain drain from, the region. Trafficking in human 
beings, the changing map of refugee flows and the role of regional economic 
organisations in fostering free flow of labour, complete the circuit (Adepoju, 
2004a). 
The countries of sub-Saharan Africa face daunting challenges arising from 
complex and dynamic migratory trends − including the emigration of skilled 
and unskilled persons, both male and female − that compromise the possibility 
of attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). There are at the same 
time opportunities with regard to huge migrants’ remittance flows and the 
diaspora’s role in national development.  
This chapter presents a broad overview of perspectives, best practices and 
lessons learnt with respect to migration and development policy coherence − or 
the lack of it; migration management through bilateral and multilateral coopera-
tion agreements; the role of migrant remittances and incentive regimes in 
promoting its productive domestic investment; diaspora transnational activities; 
and co-development programmes and their potential for addressing emigration 
pressure at the origin. The focus is on specific examples of how sub-Saharan 
African governments address the issues of migration policy and management 
(promoting managed migration through bilateral and multilateral agreements 
and preventing irregular labour migration); migration and development (co-
development programmes, promoting the ethical recruitment of highly skilled 
persons, initiatives to attract back and retain qualified nationals, measures to 
reduce the cost of remittance transfers); and sub-regional economic integration 
for intra-regional labour mobility. The paper concludes by stressing the need for 
mutually beneficial trade regimes, South-South and South-North collaboration 
in capacity-building of officials, research and improved migration-related data 
systems. 
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The setting for migration 
The dominant migration in sub-Saharan Africa is rural-to-rural and for many it 
has also served as an alternative to rural-urban migration. In addition, the 
distinction between internal and international migration is blurred by the close 
cultural affinity between homogeneous peoples on opposite sides of national 
borders – situations in which migrants regard intra-regional migration as an 
extension of internal movement. The limited prospects of, and options for, 
internal migration in the face of deepening poverty and socio-economic insecu-
rity have transformed some of the migration that would otherwise have taken 
place only internally into replacement migrations within urban areas, sequen-
tially emerging as emigration across borders to more prosperous countries 
(Adepoju, 2006a). 
The region’s fragile ecosystems are also forcing populations to migrate to 
coastal regions. Many marginalised farm labourers, pressured to abandon work 
and life in the rural areas, migrate to the cities, or even to neighbouring coun-
tries, simply in order to survive. Unstable and lowly-paid local jobs help explain 
why migration persists in the region in the face of worsening urban unemploy-
ment. 
Political instability resulting from conflicts is a strong determinant of migra-
tion in the region. The political landscape in the region is unstable, unpredict-
able and volatile. Dictatorial regimes often target, harass and intimidate stu-
dents, intellectuals and union leaders, spurring the emigration of professionals 
and others. The loss of state capacities and the breakdown of states, rooted in 
the precarious democratisation process, the vacillating effects of structural 
adjustment programmes, and human insecurity have also prompted a variety of 
migratory movements, including refugee migration (Adekanye, 1998).  
Sub-Saharan Africa has been a theatre of internecine warfare for the past 
three decades. From 1969 to 1990, seventeen of the world’s recorded forty-three 
civil wars which caused major refugee populations were in Africa, including 
‘high intensity’ civil wars in Angola, Liberia and Mozambique. In Sudan, 
Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Burundi, ethnic tensions played visibly 
important roles in such conflicts. Disagreements between ethnic groups with 
respect to access to political power and resources have resulted in a variety of 
responses, including emigration, internal displacements and exile. The turbulent 
and unstable political situation has aggravated rapidly deteriorating socio-
economic conditions. Repressive totalitarian regimes which divert scare 
resources from development activities to military expenditures, coupled with 
inconsistent policies, have scared investors and stifled development (Adekanye, 
1998). In Angola, Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone, basic infrastructure 
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in schools, hospitals and homes were devastated by war, and family members 
scattered far and wide.  
Macro-economic adjustment measures, widespread poverty and human 
deprivation, the deteriorating quality of life of the population and an excruciat-
ing external debt have also constrained development efforts in the region. Until 
the debt burden of twenty-five of the twenty-nine most heavily-indebted poor 
countries was eased by the end of 2005, the capacity to mobilise resources for 
socio-economic development, and to generate employment for the youth, was 
severely constrained by debt-servicing that swallowed nearly two-thirds of 
export earnings. 
The gloomy picture painted above is far from static. In the last five years 
there have been remarkable developments in the economic and political arenas. 
The bright signals are nevertheless mixed. Many countries – Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo − are more stable, although 
Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, and Sudan’s Dafur are currently embroiled in crisis. 
Many others – Ghana, Zambia, Angola, Gabon, Nigeria, and South Africa – 
attained growth rates of 6 per cent or more in recent years, thanks, in some 
cases, to the high prices of minerals in the world market, as well as to increased 
aid. Yet many people remain poor, living on less than a dollar a day – a situa-
tion that has remained static since the 1990s − while other regions have 
advanced by leaps and bounds (UN, 2006b).  
Many who work are in the informal sector with low earnings. Investments in 
the booming oilfields and mines create few jobs, unlike in farming, services and 
factories. Even South Africa, the region’s economic giant, suffers from an 
unemployment rate of over 25 per cent. The problem lies with boom-and-bust 
cycles. Unlike in other world regions, no progress had been made towards 
reducing extreme poverty by half by late 2005, in line with MDG targets. 
Rather there has been a deterioration or reversal in many countries and if 
prevailing trends continue, the target of reducing hunger by half may not be 
attained by 2015, except perhaps in Ghana and Mauritius (The Economist, June 
24, 2006: 48). 
In this already the world’s poorest region, the perception of a dismal domes-
tic economic future has triggered an outflow of emigrants, both male and 
female. Poverty, crises, worsening economic, political and social conditions and 
widespread unemployment have contributed to the sustained exodus of both 
skilled and unskilled persons in regular and irregular situations on a scale not 
experienced before, to various countries within and outside the region. Women 
− single and married – are also migrating independently in search of secure jobs 
in rich countries, as a survival strategy to augment dwindling family income and 
are redefining traditional gender roles within families and societies. 
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Is there, or can there be, a coherent migration policy? 
Migration is currently at the centre of a debate, and of disagreement, between 
rich and poor countries. Governments and citizens in rich or relatively rich 
countries are worried about irregular migrants, the overstaying of temporary 
admissions, the abuse of asylum systems, and especially the tangle of repatriat-
ing unsuccessful applicants.  
Poor countries argue that rich countries need, but do not welcome, immi-
grant workers who do the unglamorous, low-paying manual jobs which indige-
nous people are increasingly reluctant to take up. Low-skilled immigrant 
workers, and many others who have ‘deskilled themselves’ as a survival 
strategy, help sustain jobs, not only those that are dirty, dangerous and poorly-
paid, but also in other areas. Indeed without these immigrants some services 
could not function.  
Immigrants are often accused of depressing the wages for locals, but this 
accusation is not as simple as it sounds. In reality, migrants bring with them 
their energy, fresh ideas and entrepreneurship. Similarly, the argument that 
immigrants constitute a drain on social services – on education and health in 
particular – seems to be exaggerated and is not always borne out by the facts 
(Adepoju, 2003; Heran, 2004). Many irregular immigrants, employed in several 
sectors of the economy, are exploited and vulnerable, and are often compelled 
to accept jobs irrespective of risk, physical demands, low and irregular wages, 
and long or unsociable working hours. 
Migration and development policies might have a better chance of succeed-
ing if both sides of the migratory space − circumstances in the country of origin 
and of that of destination − were taken into account. Indeed a critical ingredient 
in the formulation of a coherent migration-friendly policy is an understanding of 
the dynamics and underlying factors of migration both at the sub-Saharan 
African countries of origin, and at the destinations − mainly rich countries 
belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Motives for migration are often misinterpreted, and the contributions 
migrants make to development are trivialised, resulting in persistent suspicion 
between migrants and their host societies. In general, migrants are a selected 
population compared to the non-migrant populations of their societies of origin: 
they are healthier, better-educated, more enterprising, with sufficient funds to 
defray the costs of travel, while their settlement can be softened by diaspora and 
other similar networks. But the positive aspects of migrants as agents of 
development are rarely acknowledged. 
It is now being realised that, although migration poses real policy difficul-
ties, it has immense potential for countries of both destination and origin, as 
well as for the migrants themselves. The real challenge is how to develop an 
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international framework to manage migration through comprehensive policies. 
With increased globalisation, rich countries promote and supply an easier flow 
of capital, goods and services, while at the same time restricting the movement 
of labour supplied by poor countries. Rich countries nevertheless need migrants 
− to meet labour shortages in highly skilled areas, especially information 
technology and health services sectors, to cope with the long-term trend of 
ageing populations, and (as has already been said) to fill unskilled jobs that 
locals do not want to take on. Faced with rising domestic unemployment among 
‘underutilised’ workers, rich countries are increasingly more selective, opting 
mainly for migrants with skills (UN, 2005; Farrant et al, 2006). These increas-
ing restrictions on regular migration merely result in a rise in irregular migra-
tion. 
Many poor sub-Saharan African countries regard emigration as a way of 
reducing domestic unemployment, the more so in that it also boosts revenue 
into the country through migrants’ remittances. Nevertheless, these countries 
are worried about the detrimental effects of the loss of skilled workers, espe-
cially doctors and nurses, on achievement of the MDGs. They are equally aware 
that excruciating poverty, unemployment, low wages for workers, conflicts and 
persecution prompt people to leave their home countries to become refugees, 
asylum seekers and labour migrants. They lament the fact that, even after 
pursuing World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes, few jobs 
have been created and, in the decade 1994−2004, for example, the number of 
workers living on less than a dollar a day increased by 28 million in sub-
Saharan Africa (ECA, 2005). 
Agriculture is sub-Saharan Africa’s main employer, but incomes and 
productivity levels are low, and the few jobs being created are in the informal 
economy. The situation is made worse by the region’s disadvantaged position in 
international trade, where rich countries protect their farm sectors through 
subsidies, guaranteeing their farmers prices higher than on world markets, thus 
making it difficult for poor African farmers to compete. African trade ministers 
argue that the high tariffs and technical barriers to trade cost sub-Saharan 
African countries about US$20 billion yearly in lost exports.  
The agricultural protectionist policies of the European Union (EU) and the 
USA – especially farm subsidies on cotton in the USA – which artificially spur 
the level of local production and depress world prices, impoverish millions of 
Africans. The USA spends more subsidising 25,000 cotton farmers than it does 
on its entire aid budget for Africa, and paid US$4 billion in subsidies on a crop 
worth US$3 billion, even though the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled 
that the subsidies were illegal. The immediate impact was a loss of 
US$301 million by African exporters, with Burkina Faso, Mali and Benin each 
losing about 2 per cent of their GDP growth. Peasant farmers, especially cotton 
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producers, in these three countries are abandoning rural areas and migrating to 
urban unemployment, thus becoming potential emigrants. The new WTO rules, 
which took effect in January 2005, ended the quota system that had provided a 
ready market for textiles from poor African countries, and has already cost sub-
Saharan Africa an additional 250,000 jobs, leaving more than a million family 
members in many countries (Lesotho, South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritius, 
Zambia, Madagascar, Tanzania, Malawi, Namibia, Kenya) without stable 
incomes (UN, 2006b). 
The clamour by African leaders to achieve mutually beneficial trade 
relations with richer countries is tied to deepening poverty. This growing 
poverty frustrates economic reform and efforts to improve living conditions, 
stimulate economic growth, and generate employment opportunities. It is in this 
context that African countries have, through ongoing negotiations at the WTO, 
been pressing industrial nations to drop barriers to the free movement of labour 
(UN, 2006b). They maintain that freer migration would be a quick means of 
increasing their benefits from globalisation. The challenge is to develop policies 
that are acceptable to both poor and rich countries, and also spur global 
economic growth. 
The African Union’s Strategic Framework for a Policy on Migration (AUC, 
2004), the draft African common position on migration and development (AU, 
2006) and the Road Map for Action on Labour Migration and Development 
(ILO, 2006) serve as the basis for a comprehensive discourse of migration 
dynamics and an appropriate platform for mainstreaming migration into 
development activities at national, sub-regional and regional levels in sub-
Saharan Africa. The African Union’s (AU) Strategic Framework covers key 
areas relating to labour migration (national labour migration policies, regional 
cooperation and harmonisation of policies, regional economic integration); 
border management; irregular migration; human rights of migrants; internal 
migration; migration data collection and data exchange; migration and 
development (brain drain, remittance transfers and Africans in the diaspora), 
and inter-state cooperation and partnerships. The Road Map is the outcome of 
the Africa-Europe inter-regional dialogue on labour migration for integration 
and development, and maps out ways in which labour migration contributes to 
development and regional integration. The common African position on migra-
tion and development is designed to ensure that Africa’s concerns are properly 
reflected at the Africa/Europe dialogue and other international fora. These 
concerns would be such as those regarding the adverse consequences of the loss 
of its skilled manpower on the region’s development agenda.  
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Sub-regional economic organisations and intra-regional labour 
mobility 
The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, and its Final Act framework for establishing 
sub-regional cooperation unions are more relevant now than they would have 
been two decades ago. As envisaged, these will serve as building blocks in a 
functionalist and gradualist approach towards a continent-wide economic 
integration that would facilitate intra-regional labour mobility, and promote 
self-reliant development in the region. This is so because the proposed African 
Economic Community (to be established by 2025) commits nations to taking 
the measures needed for the gradual attainment of the free movement of people, 
and for ensuring migrants full enjoyment of their residence and settlement 
rights. These goals were reinforced by the adoption in 2001 of the New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) charter and the establishment a year 
later of the African Union. However, except for the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 
rated the performance of these unions as ‘low’ − based on progress made in 
regional integration, including the free movement of persons (UN, 2004).  
The ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the Right of 
Residence and Establishment, of May 29th 1979, remains a benchmark in sub-
Saharan Africa as it sets out standards for liberalising the intra-community 
mobility of labour. The rights of entry, residence and establishment were to be 
progressively established within fifteen years from the date at which the proto-
col came into force (i.e. by 1994), but this has not been achieved. The meeting 
of heads of state and government, held in Abuja at the end of March 2000, 
aimed at creating a borderless sub-region, and abolished mandatory residence 
permits. The granting of the maximum 90-day period of stay to ECOWAS 
citizens by immigration officials at entry points took effect from April 2000. 
The ECOWAS passport is to serve as a symbol of unity and will progressively 
replace national passports over a transitional period of ten years. Lately, in June, 
2006, ECOWAS was transformed into a commission, and vowed to tackle the 
problem of youth unemployment and stem emigration in clandestine situations 
to rich countries. 
Economic unions in sub-Saharan Africa tend to be dominated by the econo-
mies of a single country, and movements of people have been directed to a 
limited number of countries within these unions – Botswana and South Africa 
in southern Africa, Gabon in central Africa, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria in West 
Africa. The prosperity of these countries was built by migrant labour – cocoa 
and coffee plantations in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, mines and agriculture in 
South Africa, forestry and oil fields of Gabon. Resource-rich but labour-short 
countries – such as Botswana, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire – rely heavily on immi-
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grant labour: about 28 per cent of Côte d’Ivoire’s population are foreign born 
and one quarter of the workers in Gabon are foreigners, from countries both 
inside and outside Africa.  
Nationals of Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria – the economic and demographic 
giants in West Africa – feared that the Free Movement of Persons Protocol 
would open the doors wide to a barrage of immigrants from the sub-region. A 
similar fear, entertained by South Africa, Botswana and, ironically, Zimbabwe, 
led to the watering down of the original 1997 protocol to one entitled ‘The 
Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons in SADC’, which was recently signed 
after countries serially advanced selfish reasons for delaying the signing of the 
1997 protocol. The initial six-month visa-free entry period was reduced to three 
months, and states reserved the right to enter into bilateral agreements with 
other states in respect of conditions of entry of immigrants (Oucho & Crush, 
2001). Zambia, too, refused to sign, fearing an influx of migrants from the DRC 
(which was admitted to SADC in 1998).  
Agreements for combating irregular labour migration and 
trafficking  
Over the past decade, several initiatives have emerged which aim at fostering 
improved migration management through cooperation, capacity-building and 
dialogue. For instance, in 2002, as part of the Berne Initiative, Portugal signed a 
series of bilateral and multilateral agreements on immigration with some of its 
former colonies – Angola, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Principe – to facilitate 
the entry of immigrants in regular situations and also to help prevent irregular 
migration. Belgium and the DRC also initiated a common plan of action against 
clandestine migrants; both countries’ experts conducted working sessions in 
Kinshasa and Brussels, contributing enormously to a reduction of the phenome-
non. The Immigrant Voluntary Return Programme from Spain that took off in 
September 2003 focused on immigrants at risk: those with integration problems, 
and the victims of trafficking. Beneficiaries are entitled to training for when 
they are to return home, are given a free plane ticket and seed money at their 
destination to help them reintegrate ‘at home’. Other bilateral agreements with 
Nigeria (2001), Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Mauritius (2003) have focused on 
the management of migratory flows through the repatriation of irregular immi-
grants in humane conditions, and their readmission at home (see Adepoju, 
2004b). 
Human rights advocates and NGOs have brought into the limelight the 
unwholesome human trafficking in the region. They have also pressurised 
national governments on related matters, for instance domesticating the interna-
tional laws on the rights of the child, and other victims of trafficking. The 
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ECOWAS Political Declaration and Action Plan against human trafficking 
(2001) commits West African governments to ratify and fully implement 
relevant international instruments for strengthening laws against human 
trafficking, as well as those protecting trafficked victims, especially women and 
children, preventing and prosecuting traffickers, and protecting the rights of 
victims. The common Platform of Action, adopted by officials from West and 
Central African countries in Libreville in 2002 strengthened cooperation among 
governments in fighting trafficking and established transit and reception centres 
for repatriated children. As a follow-up, Benin, Mali, Gabon and Nigeria have 
established inter-ministerial committees to address the issue of child trafficking 
(Adepoju, 2005a). 
Emigration of professionals  
At independence, sub-Saharan African countries invested heavily in education 
to train nationals to fill the gaps created by departing colonialists, education 
being regarded as the main vehicle for rapid development. Within a generation, 
these countries were able to produce professionals (recently including IT 
specialists), building on the foundation of science and maths courses. However, 
education has expanded faster than the absorptive capacity of these countries’ 
economies. The small private sector and the bloated public sector have absorbed 
few graduates, resulting in graduate unemployment. Many students sponsored 
to do post-graduate studies in technology, science and engineering abroad have 
stayed away at the end of their studies. Emigration of highly qualified profes-
sionals from Uganda, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Zambia to South Africa 
and to outside Africa in the 1970s intensified in the ’80s and ’90s, with 
qualified persons moving to Europe, North America and the oil-rich Middle 
East (Adepoju, 2005b).  
The global migration market allows developed countries to select – unilater-
ally and freely – who should be admitted, what skills combinations and income 
profiles they should have, when they should be admitted, and for how long. All 
this without reference to the countries of origin that have invested human capital 
in the form of these migrants.  
Highly skilled emigrants, though a small proportion of those emigrating, cost 
their countries in a variety of ways. Sustained emigration of professionals poses 
a critical problem of replacement of the skilled émigrés. An immediate impact 
is the lack of capacity to undertake cutting-edge research. In addition, it creates 
in tertiary institutions a huge vacuum of experienced leaders for the develop-
ment and training of manpower for a variety of activities, as well as the loss 
involved in the training of younger cohorts. In many countries of the region, 
students are now being churned out without the requisite rigour in learning. 
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In particular, the large exodus of doctors and other health workers has 
impacted negatively on the training of new doctors and on the quality of health 
services delivery, in Nigeria (whose top medical specialists work in Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, as well as thousands in the USA), South Africa (where 
people are unwilling to serve in rural areas, and white doctors, fearful of the rise 
in domestic crime, and attracted by higher incomes, have emigrated to Canada, 
Australia, the USA and the UK), and Zimbabwe (where about 60 per cent of 
doctors have moved to Botswana and South Africa as their country’s economy 
has collapsed) (Adepoju, 2003). 
Official statistics indicate that 16,000 highly-skilled South Africans emi-
grated between 1994 and 2001, but the real numbers may be larger as some 
emigrants have retained their names on local professional registers (OECD, 
2005). Other sources indicate that between 70 and 100 doctors emigrate from 
South Africa every year, and about 10 per cent of hospital doctors in Canada are 
South Africans (The Economist, 13 August 2005). The number of South African 
nurses in the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) rose sharply, from 599 in 
1988/99 to 1460 in 1999/2000, then to 2114 in 2001/2002. This has been occur-
ring even as the local healthcare situation, especially in respect of HIV/Aids 
infection, is worsening, and the previously declining rate of under-5 mortality 
has reversed in many parts of the region. It is believed that about half of the 
South Africans living in rich countries – technicians, engineers, doctors and so 
on – have tertiary-level degrees. The acute shortage of doctors has forced the 
South African government to recruit foreign doctors, especially from Zimbabwe 
and Cuba, the latter to work in the under-served rural areas where newly quali-
fied doctors have since 1999 had to participate in community services (Adepoju, 
2005b). This example can be multiplied.  
Poor countries thus pay the price of producing human capital for use by 
richer countries while their own development goals are severely constrained by 
the outflow of scarce skilled manpower (UN, 2006a). Rich countries are acting 
independently, by luring specialists from Africa and other poor regions through 
schemes such as the USA’s Professional, Technical and Kindred programme, 
the UK’s Highly Skilled Professional Recruitment, and recently, France’s three 
year ‘talent’ work permit for highly skilled professionals, Germany’s Green 
Card scheme and so on (The Economist, 6 May 2006: 29). African leaders argue 
that the importation of skilled manpower from poorer into rich countries is but a 
short-term solution to the problem of acute skills shortage; in the long-term the 
solution lies in improving training and educational opportunities in the North. 
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Ethical recruitment of skilled professionals 
The Code of Practice for the international recruitment of health workers, 
adopted by Commonwealth health ministers in 2003, provides governments 
with a framework within which international recruitment of health workers 
should take place. Intended to discourage the targeted recruitment of health 
workers from countries which are experiencing shortages, and to safeguard the 
rights of recruits and the conditions relating to their profession in recruiting 
countries, the Code emphasises that recruitment of health care workers should 
be transparent. It encourages fairness and recommends that recruiters should not 
seek to recruit health care workers who have any outstanding obligation to their 
own countries, and must furthermore provide full and accurate information to 
potential recruits. The Code also states that governments recruiting from 
Commonwealth countries should consider ways of facilitating the return of 
those recruited, and establish training programmes to enable those who return to 
do so with increased skills. Other elements of the Code include: ensuring that 
recruits fully understand their contracts; that specific requirements should be 
made known to recruits; and that Commonwealth countries should explore and 
pursue additional strategies for retaining trained personnel (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2003). 
In effect, the Code affirms the principles of transparency, fairness and 
mutuality of benefit when rich countries are recruiting health workers. It frowns 
on the ‘poaching’ of poor countries’ scarce health professionals – and other 
professionals – who are also in short supply in their home countries, especially 
since sustained recruitment of such personnel threatens the viability of crucial 
health programmes. Indeed, ‘haemorrhaging of health professionals from 
African countries is easily the single most serious human resource problem 
facing the health sector today’(Scott et al, 2004: 174). The loss of trained 
professionals has, for instance, severely limited the ability of health workers to 
combat the HIV/Aids epidemic or achieve any substantial progress in malaria 
eradication, and attainment of the MDGs. Yet the leaders of sub-Saharan 
African countries seem helpless, caught between the right of individual profes-
sionals – doctors and nurses – to choose to migrate in the face of overwhelming 
push-pull factors, and the critical local need for such personnel. Moreover the 
feasibility of the Code depends on rich countries adhering to a voluntary agree-
ment; at the moment Africa spends over US$4 billion a year on the salaries of 
foreign development assistance experts tied to aid – instead of utilising the 
skills of local experts. 
It took criticism of the UK by someone of the stature of Nelson Mandela (in 
1997) for the aggressive and unethical recruitment of nurses for that country’s 
Department of Health (DOH) to issue guidelines to all NHS employers in 
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November 1999 urging them to refrain from actively recruiting in third world 
countries, especially in South Africa and the Caribbean. This led to some 
decline in the number of nurses registered from these countries, although NHS 
trusts were not prevented from accepting unsolicited applicants from overseas. 
In addition, the guidelines did not apply to the private sector or to recruitment 
agencies, but in September 2001 a more detailed code of practice was issued 
which included guidance on working with recruitment agencies and reiterating 
that NHS trusts should not recruit in developing countries (identified only in 
early 2003) unless the DOH had a formal agreement with a particular country 
(Buchan & Dovlo, 2004). 
The problem with ethical codes, though, lies with their enforcement. The 
DOH Code of Practice and associated developments are in fact intended to 
make international recruitment more effective. The bilateral meeting of health 
ministers within the context of the South Africa-United Kingdom Bilateral 
Forum reflects a recognition of the challenges facing sub-Saharan Africa in 
respect of the emigration of health professionals from South Africa.  
Examples of bilateral or multilateral efforts to promote guidelines for the 
ethical recruitment of migrant workers, and to explore mutually beneficial 
approaches to ensure an adequate supply of educated and skilled health person-
nel, are rare in sub-Saharan Africa. The South Africa-UK Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Reciprocal Educational Exchange of Healthcare Concepts 
and Personnel of October 2003 promotes the recognition of qualifications of 
South African health professionals and enables them to work for a specified 
period in organisations providing NHS services in the UK. They then return 
with newly-acquired skills and experience. In return, over eighty UK health 
professionals are working in South Africa’s underserved rural areas (Adepoju, 
2004b). 
Role of the diaspora in the development of countries of origin 
Migration in sub-Saharan Africa is a linked emigration-diaspora-return contin-
uum. Sub-Saharan transnational communities rarely sever ties with home, and 
regard their sojourn away as temporary, the ultimate aim being to return home 
eventually, even if only on retirement. This is manifested in the investment 
portfolios of these migrants. The people of the diaspora are active in political 
advocacy – especially in Nigeria and Ghana – and in charity and cultural 
exchange. Their associations help new arrivals adapt and insert themselves into 
labour markets, and they mobilise members’ capital for community develop-
ment projects ‘at home’.  
Ghanaians who live abroad have become sources of financial flows and 
technology transfer, and also serve as a bridge into the country for international 
34 ADEPOJU 
 
 
ideas, investment and capital. Members of the Ghanaian diaspora in the UK are 
also actively involved in modernising the democratic process, for example 
gaining concession for its members to vote in national elections.  
Nigerian diaspora organisations have been established and a skill audit is 
being conducted in Europe, the Americas and other African countries with large 
concentrations of Nigerians. An annual summit of the Nigeria diaspora is held 
in Abuja to transfer expertise in technology, in agro-business, IT and so on. In 
Nigeria as well as in Ghana, a group of professionals have returned home to 
participate in the new political dispensation and are serving in key political 
offices in commerce and industry. 
Diaspora organisations are increasingly investing in projects in their home 
countries. An example is the MIDA-Ghana project for strengthening the 
Ghanaian health sector: migrants from Ghana in the Netherlands (in collabora-
tion with the Ghanaian and Netherlands embassies) have developed strategies to 
involve Ghanaian health professionals in the Netherlands and the UK in sup-
porting the implementation of health-sector reform in Ghana. In another initia-
tive, a group of Nigerian doctors in the USA is engaged in setting up state-of-
the-art hospitals in selected locations in Nigeria to cater for the health needs of 
nationals who would otherwise have to seek treatment abroad at exorbitant cost.  
In 2002, several organisations active in home development activities in 
France merged into a national platform – the Forum des Organisations de 
Solidarité Internationale Issues des Migrations – to provide members with 
relevant information and training, and to facilitate dialogue and co-operation 
with organisations abroad, as well as with civil society, and local and national 
authorities. Migrants’ associations encourage Beninoise doctors resident in 
France – there are more Beninoise doctors practicing in France than in Benin – 
to engage in voluntary work in Benin for one month each year. This is an initia-
tive worth promoting, and even extending to other professions. Such practice 
would also be beneficial to countries like Malawi where more of its doctors are 
practising in Manchester, UK than in their own country, and Ghana where about 
60 per cent of its doctors have emigrated to practise in rich countries (Adepoju, 
2006c).  
Building networks between diaspora scientists and their colleagues at home 
enables these professionals to contribute to the development of home countries 
without residential relocation, but the stiff immigration policies of rich countries 
deny many scientists the flexibility of relocation. Given favourable working 
conditions, many skilled professionals in the diaspora would prefer to return 
home to contribute to the development of their countries.  
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Policies for encouraging the return and retention of skilled migrants 
Leaders in Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda are exploring strategies to attract 
nationals back, to contribute to local development. They have held meetings 
with their nationals in the diaspora, encouraging them with offers of incentives 
to return. But leaders must also address the ‘push’ factors that spurred the brain 
drain in the first place, and provide returnees with places to work in environ-
ments conducive to productivity, and with due reward for their efforts.  
Migrants may have acquired skills and capital that can be productively 
invested back home but these skills may not match available job opportunities. 
In this context, we need more evidence-based research on lessons learnt from 
the Return and Reintegration of Qualified Nationals in Africa document, 
produced by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2004), that 
facilitated the return, retention and reintegration of about 2000 professionals for 
country-of-origin development. 
A number of initiatives have been launched to attract skilled professionals 
back to Africa and to utilise their expertise through networks. These initiatives 
include the Digital Diaspora Network Africa launched in mid-2002, the South 
African Network of Skills, the Research and Development Forum for Science-
led Development in Africa, and the African Foundation for Research and 
Development. Their main focuses are: to reverse the loss of highly-skilled 
professionals in short supply in the region; to target expatriate graduates in 
medicine, education and engineering (South Africa); to identify Africans in the 
diaspora interested in returning home to offer their skills for country-of-origin 
development; and to relocate professionals from countries experiencing crisis to 
other countries where they can be productively engaged. Such initiatives should 
be supported by those rich countries that are currently haemorrhaging the region 
of its skilled professionals, and by development partners. Such appeals, already 
launched by South Africa to Canada and the UK, should be heeded globally. 
Many African emigrants hope to return home at the nearest opportunity – 
providing that the conditions there are acceptable. Informed by this scenario, 
some foreign international corporations in Europe have launched programmes 
to recruit Africans in the diaspora to work in their firms in Africa. The Transfer 
of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals project aims to persuade Malians 
established abroad to return, at least temporarily, and thus contribute to national 
development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has paid 
for 133 Malians to return as consultants to teach and do research in local univer-
sities.  
The Homecoming Revolution, an online initiative, encourages and assists 
South Africans living abroad to return home, backed up by financial and 
business services from the country’s First National Bank. The Ghana Home-
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coming Summit (2001) focused on enhancing dialogue and exploring opportu-
nities for productive relations and for identifying ways of tapping into the 
acquired capacities of Ghanaians living abroad, for the creation of national 
wealth. In 2002 the Ghana Dual Citizenship Regulation Act allowed Ghanaians 
to keep their Ghanaian citizenship after obtaining the citizenship of another 
country. The Non-Resident Ghanaians Secretariat, set up in May 2003, pro-
motes links with Ghanaians abroad and encourages them to return. The Repre-
sentation of the People Amendment Bill extends voting rights to Ghanaians 
domiciled overseas. 
Senegal and Mali have taken steps to facilitate the emigration and return of 
nationals resident abroad and to promote remittance-sending by these emigrants. 
In Senegal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad was set re-
structured in 1993 to enhance the welfare of nationals abroad, including their 
repatriation and rehabilitation. Emigrants are thus encouraged to be actively 
involved in the socio-economic development of Senegal. Mali created a ministe-
rial-level post to conduct public relations visits to help receiving countries appreci-
ate the peculiar situation prompting the emigration of Malians. It also informs 
potential Malian emigrants regarding job and residence requirements in receiving 
countries. Consular positions have been expanded in the major receiving countries 
to deal with the return of nationals, and emigrants are encouraged to send money 
home regularly. Such information on rules and regulations guiding entry, 
residence and employment abroad is useful to potential emigrants in sending 
countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Burkina Faso, 
Mali, Senegal, Zaire, Ghana, and so on.  
Overall, a major challenge facing sub-Saharan Africa is how to retain, effec-
tively utilise, and attract back the rare skills of its nationals, which are required 
for national development. Initiatives aimed at identifying and attracting back 
skilled professionals – engineers, medical doctors, professors, scientists, infor-
mation technologists and the like – and utilising their expertise for national 
development should be encouraged and supported by development partners and 
rich countries. Political leaders courting nationals to return home must also 
address the internal factors that prompted the brain drain. Remittances may help 
offset its negative effects, but they do not compensate for losing the contribu-
tions that these skilled emigrants could have made through training and the 
transfer of expertise to younger cohorts at home.  
Migrants’ remittances for productive investment 
Migrants’ remittances are a major source of income in many sub-Saharan 
African countries, especially Burkina Faso, Ghana, Eritrea, Lesotho, Mali, 
Senegal, Somalia, Burkina Faso and Cape Verde. Remittances have been rising 
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steeply and now parallel export earnings and official development assistance 
(ODA) (Ghosh, 2006; Azam and Gubert, 2005). They help sustain and enhance 
the livelihoods of poor resident members; they pay, in particular, for basic 
health care services; they pay education fees for siblings; they are used for 
investing in real estate, and for enhancing agricultural production through 
improved irrigation schemes and other agricultural inputs – as in Mali and 
Senegal – and they are used for improving basic infrastructural facilities 
through hometown associations. In addition, alleviating poverty among poor 
households has multiplier effects within local communities and within the 
economy of the country as a whole. 
Migrants also foster ‘social’ remittances by way of ideas and social capital. 
These can affect attitudes towards human rights, women’s rights, the value 
given to girls’ education and to women’s employment.  
The discourse in sub-Saharan Africa is now about how to make remittances 
work productively for poor recipients, communities and countries. For a long 
time, certain economists have held that remittances are being used for conspicu-
ous consumption, and that they fuel inflation and aggravate inequalities. These 
notions should, in the African context, be viewed in terms of the following 
considerations: migration in the region is essentially a household decision-
process and, increasingly, a survival strategy. Emigration of poor people has 
sometimes been funded through cooperative assistance or outright loans, and 
remittances are designed initially to repay such loans.  
In poor communities that lack the basic services normally provided by 
government, the pressing needs are for better housing, for funds to pay for 
school fees, textbooks and uniforms, and for access to basic health services – all 
of which migrants’ remittances supplement or pay for. Migrants work hard to 
earn their money and should be free to spend it to fulfil their most pressing 
needs and those of their families. The investment portfolio of international 
migrants conforms to those of internal migrants and non-migrants, except that 
for the former the volume of investable funds is substantial. Many migrants 
harbour the ambition of ultimately returning home and investing in trading, or 
in refurbished or new buildings (the construction industry in the region is labour 
intensive, generating jobs and incomes for masons and family members).  
Let us take Senegal as an example: the estimated 2.5 million emigrants sent 
about US$618 million home in 2004: a third of the national budget, excluding 
informal transactions. The government acknowledges the role of these migrants’ 
investment in the building of schools and hospitals. Another example is Ghana, 
where the Central Bank of Ghana estimated that US$1.2 billion in remittances 
flowed into the country in 2004 – and the total may be much higher if money 
remitted through informal channels is added to the amount. Such remittances 
are critical to the economy because they are the second most important source 
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of foreign exchange after exports, and also have an important distributive effect 
because they reach poorer rural areas and women (Mutume, 2005; Bump, 
2006). 
The governments in Ghana, Senegal, Mali and Kenya promote migrants’ 
remittances for investment, and use their embassies to disseminate information 
on domestic investment opportunities to their nationals abroad. The rapid 
upsurge in the remittances of Ghanaians in the diaspora since 2003 is, in part, a 
response to their government’s favourable (tax and related) incentive-based 
policy environment. These funds were invested in real estate or used to set up 
micro-enterprises and build clinics and schools. When the Ugandan government 
implemented measures permitting residents to open foreign currency accounts 
locally, private transfers to the country increased from US$80 million in 1991 to 
US$415 million in 1996. In October 2002, deposits in foreign exchange 
accounts made up about 28 per cent of all deposits in the country (Sander and 
Maimbo, 2003). France’s annual aid to Mali of US$50 million is about the same 
as the amount remitted by Malians resident in France – to support health clinics, 
build schools, repair roads, and invest in small business enterprises in their 
home communities. 
Many migrants use mainly informal channels to remit money. High transac-
tion costs and the risk of apprehension and deportation discourage them from 
using official channels. To send money home, irregular migrants – vulnerable, 
exploitable, and insecure – opt for informal, trust-based human courier systems, 
and networks of traders. This process avoids exchange rate fluctuations and 
overcomes the bottleneck of poor accessibility to remote rural areas where 
recipients live. Indeed, Senegalese emigrants use the indigenous, trust-based 
traditional human courier system, called the Kara International Exchange, as 
well as a network of traders, visiting relations and associates, to send money 
home.  
All stakeholders – governments, financial institutions, regulatory agencies, 
hometown associations, migrant communities, researchers and development 
institutions – should work in concert in exploring opportunities and minimising 
obstacles for sending remittances, and in particular in lobbying for low-cost 
transfer services and less stringent regulations, in order to increase the micro-
meso-macro level productive use of this source of financial aid. In a welcome 
development, some banks in France are now offering a special transfer scheme 
to Senegal, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire, with significantly lower fees than private 
money courier services, but this does not overcome the problems of possible 
deportation faced by irregular immigrants to that country. 
Policy research is needed on how best to make remittances work produc-
tively for poor recipients (individuals, households and communities), as lever-
age for poverty reduction, without increasing dependence, and how to reduce 
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the reliance of rural dwellers (the majority of sub-Saharan Africans) on remit-
tances. It is in this context that we need to be aware, and investigate systemati-
cally, the behaviour of second-and third-generation immigrants, who are less 
likely to send remittances or to retire ‘home’.  
While development partners, international financial institutions – especially 
the World Bank and the IMF – researchers, and policy makers are showcasing 
the huge remittance flows, which are essentially private transfers (Ghosh, 2006; 
Sorensen, 2004; Azam & Gubert, 2005), we should not be tempted, as seems to 
be the discourse in some quarters, to identify remittances with development 
funding, or to see them as a substitute for such aid. In reality, few countries 
have unfettered access to such remittances. The exception is Lesotho, which 
entered into a bilateral agreement with South Africa in the 1970s to ensure that 
its nationals working in South African mines remitted 60 percent of their 
earnings through the bank in a compulsory ‘deferred payment scheme’ 
(Adepoju, 2003).  
We should also not forget that emigrants suffer isolation, endure unsociable 
working hours, and are alienated from their partners and their children. This last 
often results in marital and family disruptions, especially in the case of female 
independent migrants. Many migrants, males as well as females, endure job 
dissatisfaction as a result of under-usage of their skills, and face long-term 
prospects of skills loss which can result in problems of reinsertion into domestic 
job markets when they return home when they are older.  
Our enthusiasm about remittances, their volume, and usefulness, should 
therefore not distract us from the need to refocus attention on the various levels 
of trauma that migrants face at destination – at personal, family and community 
levels. 
Co-development schemes 
The Cooperative Efforts to Manage Emigration initiative, a project set up 
between France and some of its former colonies, focuses on how countries of 
origin, transit, and destination can work together to coordinate migration 
movements and reduce emigration pressures. As President Jacques Chirac told 
the France-Africa Summit in Mali in December, 2005, ‘Together, Africans and 
Europeans, we have a duty to dismantle the illegal immigration networks, 
behind which hides an appalling and mafia-like traffic … Together, we must 
encourage co-development and enable Africans to enjoy decent conditions for 
living and working in their own countries.’ (UN, 2006b: 16).  
Mali, Comoros and Senegal have been targeted by France for ‘co-develop-
ment’, to link migration and development policies. A Mali-France Consultation 
on Migration was established in December 2000 as a bilateral discussion at 
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ministerial level, to foster closer cooperation between migrants’ source and 
destination countries. Under the terms of this agreement, representatives of the 
two countries meet yearly to deal with issues relating to the integration of 
Malians who want to remain in France, with co-management of migration flows 
to allow migrants to circulate between their home countries and abroad, and 
with cooperative development in core emigration localities in Mali. The 
programme targets aid in core emigration regions, helps build infrastructure, 
stimulates job creation, supports education, health care and infrastructure 
development and income generation. Malians abroad are mobilised for their 
country’s economic development through small enterprises. The programme has 
also helped some migrants to return voluntarily and become self-supporting – 
the cost of repatriation is being used to encourage voluntary return in a more 
humane manner while also providing livelihood for returnees, who are mostly 
unskilled workers. A year into the programme, only about five hundred such 
immigrants had agreed to return voluntarily to Mali in exchange for US$3600 
each, to start businesses in agriculture, hairdressing, importing used auto parts, 
sewing traditional clothes, and so on. Two years on, 80 per cent of the partici-
pants were still in business (Magoni, 2004). This example, though limited in 
both coverage, scope and number of participants, could be expanded and repli-
cated elsewhere.  
Institutional capacity for managing migration  
In most sub-Saharan African countries, the institutional capacity required to 
manage migratory flows and for effective policy formulation and implementa-
tion is weak, and needs to be strengthened through the training and retraining of 
key officials. Capacity-building of officials – customs, immigration, police and 
security – to allow them to deal efficiently with the managed movement of 
persons and the rights and obligations of migrants, is most crucial and urgent 
and should be a continuing process.  
The training of officials in host and origin countries, the exchange of infor-
mation, and the functioning of networks should be institutionalised to replace 
on-going ad hoc arrangements. The role of personnel presently acting as border 
control and security officials has to be transformed (partly) into that of migra-
tion management. Training should include ways of identifying people in need of 
international protection, and respect for the rights of migrants and refugees, in 
accordance with international norms and conventions. In this respect, the 
Network of Migration Research in Africa (NOMRA) can play a leading role in 
the capacity-building of researchers and officials. 
Greater institutional strengthening will require human and financial resource 
input. Cooperation between the North and sub-Saharan African governments is 
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crucial in combating irregular migration and trafficking in persons, the more so 
because strict immigration policies in developed countries actually fuel markets 
for trafficking and smuggling and irregular migrations. In the same vein, coop-
erative research and information-sharing between countries of origin, transit and 
destination, and increased operational contact between law enforcement 
authorities to share information on smuggling routes and methods of interdic-
tion should be encouraged (Adepoju, 2005a).  
Where do we go from here? 
Globalisation and ‘liberation’ contain severe contradictions, and have, for a 
variety of reasons, not benefited sub-Saharan Africa, since it has not been 
optimally incorporated into the global economy. Tariff regimes have been 
lowered, and free trade promoted, but with no corresponding inflow of foreign 
direct investment to stimulate job creation and with little or no impact on labour 
migration (UN, 2006a, 2006b). Globalisation implies free movement of capital 
and information, yet the movement of persons is still curtailed.  
Migration is increasingly becoming part of the global process – aided by 
communication and information flows – and can no longer be handled solely 
within a regional set-up. International migration will become more important in 
the future as prospects for internal and intra-regional migration are increasingly 
limited – indeed are shrinking – as a result of generalised poverty, unemploy-
ment, inadequate land tenure, and socioeconomic insecurity. This strongly 
indicates a need for the development of a comprehensive framework and a co-
ordinated implementation of policies and programmes, to help stimulate 
domestic employment and prevent large-scale migration.  
Their long-standing debt burden has dramatically reduced the capacity of 
sub-Saharan African governments to mobilise resources for development. 
African leaders strongly believe that the international community has a respon-
sibility to help promote sustainable development and strategies that could 
alleviate poverty in the region and hence forestall pressures for emigration. 
Although migration in sub-Saharan Africa is mainly South-South, the 
collapse of some traditional receiving countries implies additional pressure in 
the near future on Europe’s borders by desperate job seekers. Countries that 
were once immigrant-receiving (Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire) have metamorphosed 
into migrant-sending countries. Since the late eighties, traditional labour-
importing countries (such as Côte d’Ivoire) and attractive destinations for 
migrants (Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe) have experienced endemic 
political and economic crises, which also spur out-migration of their nationals. 
That pressure is building up but could be eased by putting in place mechanisms 
that would allow for more regular immigration as a means of improving both 
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the lives of immigrants themselves, and, through their remittances, the lives of 
those left behind. This is also compatible with intervention programmes aiming 
to reduce the emigration pressures at the source regions. 
Determined to force their way into Europe, irregular migrants are expending 
tremendous resources, both physical and financial. Sub-Saharan African 
governments should tap into these resources and support these youths in self-
employment rather than allowing them to perish in the desert or the sea, as 
many do, in a desperate search for the illusory Golden Fleece. Governments, in 
partnership with the private sector and civil society, must put poverty issues at 
the top of the political agenda and mobilise and strengthen self-help capacities 
and individual initiatives at local level. 
Disadvantageous terms of trade for sub-Saharan Africa’s primary products 
and the deteriorating agricultural sector provoke different patterns of migration: 
traditionally directed to the cities, but increasingly to other countries. Agricul-
tural subsidies in the USA and Europe have had a negative effect on the income 
of over ten million farmers and their families in Benin, Kenya, Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Togo and Ghana, forcing most of these people to migrate to the 
cities, in a desperate bid for survival. Having mutually beneficial trade relations 
with rich countries is a key strategy for improving living conditions, stimulating 
economic growth, and generating employment opportunities. 
Sub-Saharan African governments want migrant-receiving OECD countries 
to explore avenues for regular temporary migration – as a means of reducing the 
option for irregular migration by desperate youths. They should also investigate 
the consequences and costs of policing irregular migration. These governments 
need to channel development assistance into job-creation projects, in order to 
make investments in social capital pay off. Policies for alleviating poverty and 
creating employment for the teeming unemployed youth should be the corner-
stone of the region’s development agenda, aligned with mechanisms for a stable 
macro-economic environment favourable to growth, to generate employment 
opportunities and foster enterprise and self-sustaining livelihoods in the region.  
The report of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM, 
2005) introduced three important elements into the migration discourse, namely 
development, demography, democracy – the 3Ds. African leaders lament the 
fact that their efforts to restructure their economies, liberalise trade and open up 
their markets have been disappointing, as these efforts have not been rewarded 
in terms of better access to world market, nor in the form of increased foreign 
direct investment. Many sub-Saharan African countries are on course in their 
efforts to democratise the political space, but nationals are impatient because the 
dividends of democracy seem still to be out of reach. 
In most of sub-Saharan Africa, rapid population growth intensifies poverty 
and hence emigration pressure. The human and financial resource capacities of 
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sub-Saharan African countries need to be reinforced to manage their demo-
graphic dynamics, generate employment and moderate migratory pressures. All 
too often we concentrate on economic and political aspects and policies, 
ignoring the crucial demographic dimension. Sub-Saharan Africa’s rapidly 
growing population places tremendous strains on the development process, and 
creates conditions for migration through its linkages with unemployment and 
potential labour force growth.  
Economic integration offers a long-term prospect for stimulating intra-
regional labour mobility. Recent efforts to create a borderless ECOWAS should 
be replicated by other sub-regional economic groupings. These economic units 
should be revamped to play a larger role in the management of intra-regional 
labour migration, and to provide viable local and regional alternatives to migra-
tion to Europe. National laws should be harmonised through regional and sub-
regional treaties to address the rights of residence and establishment of 
migrants, and other obligations of the host countries. 
Dialogue and cooperation between the North and sub-Saharan Africa is 
generally weak. An integrated and comprehensive approach to migration 
management policy development and implementation should involve all part-
ners engaged in the migration policy arena – the government sector, the private 
sector, civil society, trades unions, employers’ organisations, migrants’ associa-
tions, and the media – to promote close collaboration between and among these 
divergent constituencies, which often have conflicting interests. Greater 
dialogue, and a more consultative approach could help balance the interests of 
sending and receiving countries and of migrants themselves. 
Sub-Saharan Africa leaders insist that rich countries have a moral responsi-
bility to assist programmes for the orderly return and reintegration of migrants, 
especially of skilled professionals whose expertise has been productively 
utilised in those rich countries, although the initial human capital investment 
was borne by their home countries. These leaders are bemused by fresh attempts 
by the UK, France, and Germany – among others – to institute special schemes 
for recruiting professionals from poor countries, including sub-Saharan Africa. 
Instead of such schemes, rich governments and international organisations 
should be helping these poor countries participate effectively in, and benefit 
appropriately from, world trade and global markets.  
Improving data 
Information on migration within, from and to sub-Saharan Africa remains 
patchy and needs to be upgraded. Migration data management is crucial to the 
formulation of relevant and comprehensive migration policies and programmes. 
Of special significance is the potential role of migration observatories in 
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providing governments and other stakeholders with reliable and harmonised 
migration-related information. Such observatories, when established, could be 
linked to the Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on Interna-
tional Migration and ultimately to the European Migration Network. Their aim 
would be to provide a comprehensive picture of the origin-transit-destination 
migration system. The collection of up-to-date information on migration across 
borders will have to be factored into the data-gathering procedures, by supple-
menting conventional censuses with special collaborative border survey data 
collection, timely analysis, wide dissemination and intelligent use. 
Conclusion 
Migration from and within sub-Saharan Africa features diverse configurations, 
although it is essentially a continuum of internal, intra-regional and interna-
tional circulation. As migration grows in volume, most countries support a 
whole range of simultaneously occurring types of migration, serving at a single 
time as origin, transit and destination for labour migrants, migrants in regular 
and irregular situations, brain drain from the region, and brain circulation of 
professionals within it. 
The sub-Saharan region is burdened with poverty, unemployment and socio-
economic insecurity, which have drawn more and more people into circular 
migration or into temporary migration to a variety of destinations. Some of the 
migration that would otherwise take place internally is now likely to emerge as 
sequential intra-regional and international migration – after replacement migra-
tion to urban areas. Consequently, the migration configuration in the region has 
become extremely complex. Emigration of skilled health and other profession-
als, huge remittances flows, and the diaspora’s role in country-of-origin 
development, coupled with trafficking in human beings, irregular migration and 
a changing map of refugee flows, are the key migratory configurations that must 
reorient policy directions in the coming decades.  
A major development issue in sub-Saharan Africa is the productive 
employment of the millions of educated youths who scramble for work, and the 
region is likely to be one of the largest sources of potential emigration in the 
future. The capacity of sub-Saharan African governments to generate viable 
employment for its youths is weakened further by the limited size of internal 
markets, and especially by the disadvantages imposed on these countries by the 
new era of globalisation. Poverty alleviation and employment generation for the 
teeming unemployed youth should be the cornerstone of the region’s develop-
ment agenda, and governments should institute incentive-based tax regimes to 
attract migrants’ remittances and ensure their productive, employment-generat-
ing investment. They should channel development assistance into poverty 
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alleviation and job creation projects, to make constructive use of investments in 
social capital.  
Political leaders are increasingly interested in promoting migrant remittances 
for investment purposes, and are using their embassies to disseminate informa-
tion on domestic investment opportunities to their nationals abroad. But migrant 
remittances do not compensate for the potential contribution of skilled 
emigrants through training and the transfer of expertise to younger cohorts at 
home.  
A major challenge now facing the region is how to retain, attract back and 
effectively utilise the rare skills of its nationals, as is required for national 
development. Initiatives aimed at identifying and attracting back skilled profes-
sionals and at utilising their expertise for national development, should be 
encouraged and supported by development partners and rich countries. African 
transnational communities rarely sever ties with home, but political leaders 
courting nationals to return with offers of incentives must also address the push 
factors that spur the brain drain, so that returnees can work in environments 
conducive to productivity, with reward for effort.  
Bilateral and multilateral agreements between countries sending and receiv-
ing migrants should address the issue of depleting sub-Saharan Africa of its 
scarce skilled-manpower resources. It is important that the residential laws of 
rich countries be made flexible, to give skilled professionals from the South the 
opportunity of relocating without losing their residence rights in those countries.  
Peace and stability are prerequisites for investment, development and 
employment-generation. Both richer and poorer countries should make con-
certed efforts to resolve the contagious conflicts of the region. Good governance 
can help curtail skills flight and the self-exiling of the intelligentsia. 
In many countries, the institutional capacity required to manage migratory 
flows, and for effective policy formulation and implementation, needs to be 
strengthened through capacity-building of officials. The key role of trade 
relations, and especially the short and long term effects of bilateral and multilat-
eral trade agreements on migration, is not yet appreciated by many migration 
stakeholders and should be explicitly recognised while conducting trade nego-
tiations.  
Rich countries should factor into their development programmes cooperation 
with sub-Saharan African countries at both bilateral and multilateral levels, and 
should work with or through vibrant diasporic associations active in develop-
ment projects at home, as well as with financial institutions, to reduce migrants’ 
remittance transfer costs and risks – costs for those sending through the formal 
system, and risks for migrants in irregular situations using formal courier 
systems, which might result in their being apprehended and deported. 
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Most important is the need to systematically remove the high tariffs and 
technical barriers to trade that cost the region billions of dollars yearly in lost 
exports – exports that would provide the much-needed revenue for development 
and employment-generation, and thus reduce emigration pressure. Rich coun-
tries should open their markets to goods produced from sub-Saharan Africa: 
goods whose manufacture is labour-intensive and job-creating, which in turn 
stimulates economic growth.  
Policy dialogue is a useful mechanism for engaging all stakeholders in 
matters of migration management, and this must be institutionalised. It is 
important that migrants’ associations be included in this process – dialogue and 
consultative approaches could help balance the interests of all concerned. 
Migration in sub-Saharan Africa remains, however, largely regional, and its 
problems should be addressed within the framework of NEPAD, which aims to 
strengthen regional economic groupings and play a larger role in the manage-
ment of intra-regional labour migration. For sub-Saharan African countries that 
remain ambivalent regarding the principle of free movement of persons, and 
reluctant to modify domestic laws and administrative practices, now is the time 
to align national laws with sub-regional treaties, to facilitate intra-regional 
labour mobility, and the establishment and settlement of migrants. Lessons 
learnt from ECOWAS in creating a borderless sub-region should be replicated 
by other sub-regional organisations. 
To conclude, while posing real policy difficulties, migration has immense 
potential for migrants, countries of origin and of destination, and, if well 
managed, migration can be a win-win-win situation for all constituents. The real 
challenge is how to develop an international framework to manage migration 
comprehensively. As the World Congress on Human Movements and Immigra-
tion report emphasised, migration policies will be ineffective where they ignore 
the logic of the labour market and limits to regulation (IEMed, 2004). Improv-
ing the economic situation in immigrants’ countries of origin is crucial both to 
retain skilled nationals still in the country, and to stimulate the return of those 
needed for development at home. This calls for cooperation between rich countries 
and labour-exporting poor countries, to help sub-Saharan African governments 
enhance economic growth, generate employment, and reduce poverty amongst 
their populations – with the potential effect of actually curtailing emigration to 
rich countries.  
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African brain drain and gain,  
diaspora and remittances:  
More rhetoric than action 
John Oucho 
Introduction 
International migration has become an integral part of globalisation. A scenario 
being popularised, though not unanimously accepted, is ‘migration without 
borders’ (MWB) which, ideally, would increase the free movement of people 
(Pecoud & de Guchteneire, 2005). To this end, Andreas and Snyder (2000, 
quoted in Pecoud & de Guchteneire, 2005) argue that migration is now structur-
ally embedded in the economies and societies of most countries because once 
both sending and receiving countries become dependent upon the phenomenon, 
it is unstoppable. In addition, in this era of globalisation, states face a dilemma 
because borders must be business-friendly, remaining open to international 
trade or tourism. As Castles (2004: 860, in Pecoud & de Guchteneire, 2005) 
contends, ‘migratory movements, once started, become self-sustaining social 
processes’. These are developments that the countries of destination in the 
North have recognised as they attempt to control immigration from the coun-
tries of the underdeveloped South. Despite these developments, African 
countries and institutions dwell on debating the pros and cons of brain drain and 
brain gain, diaspora, remittances and return migration in the context of national 
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as well as regional (read African) development, the countries being long on 
rhetoric and theorising, but short on tangible action programmes. 
This chapter surveys symptomatic instances of the stock and flows of each 
member of the ‘migration quartet’ − namely brain drain/brain gain, the diaspora, 
remittances, and return − and then considers how African countries of emigra-
tion could best manipulate these four issues in their development agenda 
through appropriate actions rather than engaging in perpetual rhetoric. Among 
the issues that need to be analysed are the lack of bilateral agreements between 
the countries of origin and the countries of destination – to streamline proper 
utilisation of the quartet in Africa. Other issues are fiscal changes necessary in 
African countries to stimulate the inflow of remittances; attracting back ‘brain 
drain’ (converting it into brain gain), as well as others from the diaspora, to 
stimulate development in the continent; the lack of Africa-based research to 
generate information for formulating policy in countries of heavy emigration; 
the lack of informed policy and programmes emanating from the policies 
current in most African countries; the failure of African countries to engage the 
Washington Consensus, the World Trade Organisation and other international 
organisations in meaningful roles for the quartet in their development agenda; 
and inability of NEPAD to move beyond rhetoric to sponsoring tangible activi-
ties to ensure a positive contribution regarding the African brain drain and gain, 
and the roles of the diaspora and remittances in the region’s development. The 
chapter concludes that the onus is on the African countries to prescribe viable 
solutions for the region – rather than depending on the countries of the North 
and international organisations, and the aggressive encroachment of the emerg-
ing Asian economic powerhouses. 
The quartet on everyone’s lips  
Ordinary as well as scholarly discussions on international migration in or about 
Africa dwell on the so-called quartet of brain drain/brain gain, the diaspora, 
remittances and return. That much of the discussion relies on data from the 
countries of destination suggests that little is known about the perspectives of 
African countries involved with the quartet1. This section sheds light on each of 
                                                 
1  Previous North-based investigations of international migration include the UK House of 
Commons International Development Committee (see HCIDC, 2004); research on migration 
and poverty sponsored by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the 
IOM and the World Bank; Sweden’s Expert Group on Development Issues–EGDI (see Lucas, 
2005); and the Global Development Network (GDN). The report of the Global Commission 
on International Migration (GCIM) makes recommendations of interest for countries of both 
origin and destination (see GCIM, 2005). The African Union (AU), unlike its predecessor, the 
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the four, avoiding detail that is easily available in the literature, including a 
growing number of informative websites.  
Brain drain – conceptual and data issues 
Definitions of brain drain or skilled emigration are generally imprecise, both 
conceptually and in terms of data sources. The lack of reliable data is caused 
mainly by the inability of countries of origin to keep records of their emigrants 
(Skeldon, 2005). While developing countries often consider it a loss (although 
in certain cases a blessing in disguise) when the most well-informed people 
emigrate, developed countries contend that it reduces unemployment problems 
in the countries of origin, thereby constituting a ‘safety valve’ (Glaser, 1978: 
xxii). McDonald and Crush (2002: 6–7) advocate using the term ‘the skilled’ 
because the term ‘skilled’ includes people who have worked their way up the 
corporate ladder, those with their own successful businesses, and those who 
play a critical role in the public sector. Iredale (1999) prefers the term ‘skilled 
migration’ which encompasses brain drain, transitory or permanent movements 
of professionals, and job transfers. The Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD–SOPEMI, 1997: 21) prefers the term ‘highly 
skilled workers’, which includes degree holders or those with extensive experi-
ence in a given field or its equivalent. Recently, the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) has sought to reverse the brain drain and 
convert it into ‘brain gain’, as well as to involve the African diaspora in Africa’s 
development.  
It is surprising that the exact interpretation of brain drain by countries of 
origin in the underdeveloped South is unclear, which means that the concept 
denotes what the countries of destination in the developed North define it to be. 
What is interpreted in scholarship as ‘brain drain’ from the perspective of the 
North could be a blessing in disguise for those African countries of origin which 
are finding it increasingly difficult to engage skilled and highly educated 
nationals in productive sectors of their economies.  
Reasons for emigration 
Reasons for the emigration of highly skilled individuals range from breakdown 
of political and economic order to the globalisation of education (Skeldon, 
2005). For example, Adepoju (2001, quoted in Tevera & Crush, 2003: 4) cites 
                                                 
 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), is taking international migration more seriously than at 
any time in the past, though it is too early to pronounce on the results of the AU’s efforts.  
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economic and demographic imperatives such as immigrants’ taking advantage 
of the demographic deficit occasioned by an ageing population in the North, and 
the employment of immigrants either in ‘3-D’ jobs (demeaning, dirty or 
dangerous) or in specialised jobs often at much lower wages or salaries 
(author’s emphasis).2 Through colonial ties, metropolitan powers have been out-
sourcing ‘designer immigrants’ from other countries, who opt for training that 
would increase their ability to migrate (Skeldon, 2005). African countries could 
exploit these African-North ties to obtain data on their emigrants, in terms of 
attributes such as number, economic activity and destination (both general and 
particular). 
Brain gain: the new African vogue  
The literature on brain gain underlines its benefits. These include the contribu-
tion of the diaspora regarding increased trade, remittances, knowledge, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and the skills acquired in the countries of destination 
(Lucas, 2005, quoted in Schiff, 2005: 201). Schiff (2005: 203), however, 
cautions that claims about the size of brain gain in traditional countries of 
migrant origin, and its impact on welfare and growth there have been greatly 
exaggerated – the fact that brain gain is smaller than has been indicated in the 
literature should induce countries of origin to investigate both the assumed and 
actual contribution of this so-called brain gain. Needing investigation are 
indications that there is a smaller human capital gain than previously thought; 
and that the various negative effects on other sources of externalities,3 such as 
human capital, welfare and growth, have not been taken into account. These are 
areas crying out for research – because African countries too readily believe 
what they hear from the developed North about ‘massive positive impacts’ of 
brain gain for them. Where the brain drain becomes brain waste in countries of 
destination, it can in no way become a gain to the African countries. Again, 
research is relatively silent on African brain drain in instances where it has 
become brain waste – a situation of specialists being exploited in foreign lands 
without the knowledge of their countries of origin.  
                                                 
2  A detailed analysis of emigration dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa, based on elaborate 
research, is contained in A. Adepoju (1998) as well as other sub-regional analyses in 
Appleyard (1998). 
3 The effects – good or bad – of a certain action or decision on people who did not have a 
choice in the matter (who were “external” to the action or decision), and whose interests were 
not taken into account. 
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Migrants’ remittances 
From a study done by the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), it 
appears that by the late 1990s only Egypt (coming 3rd), Morocco (6th), Algeria 
(14th), Nigeria (16th) and Tunisia (20th) were among the top twenty recipients 
of 88 per cent of migrant remittances in the world (UNDP, 1999: 27). The 
picture portrayed suggests that even the much-touted North-to-Africa remit-
tances benefit only a few African countries, namely those with well-established 
connections with the destination countries in the North.4 
Migrants’ remittances from the North to developing countries currently rank 
second to foreign direct investment (FDI) and exceed official development 
assistance (ODA). Globally, the largest recipients of remittances are India, 
Mexico and the Philippines – a function of the number of emigrants, their 
earnings and their willingness to remit part of their income. In Africa, Morocco 
and Egypt currently head the list of recipients (Martin, 2004). In 1975 to 1999, 
most of the African remittances received were in North African countries – 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia; recipients in Western Africa included Senegal, 
Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin and Cape Verde, and to a smaller extent 
Ghana, Togo and Niger. Those in southern Africa were Madagascar and 
Lesotho (World Bank, 2001, quoted in Oucho, 2003: 226). Sander & Maimbo 
(2003) suggest that the flow of remittances reflects the patterns of migration to 
Europe and the Middle East. They estimate that in the past decade North Africa 
received 72 per cent of total remittances to Africa, followed by East Africa 
(13%), southern Africa (7%), West Africa (5%) and central Africa (less than 
1%); but the estimates made by Ratha (2003, quoted in Sander & Maimbo, 
2003) for 1990 to 2001 were slightly different: 72 per cent for North Africa, 14 
per cent for West Africa, 8 per cent for southern Africa, 6 per cent for East 
Africa and 0 per cent for central Africa. Among the top twenty recipients of 
remittances (as percentage of GDP) were Lesotho (26.5%), Cape Verde 
(13.6%), Morocco (9.7%) and Uganda (8.5%).  
Of the regional economic communities (RECs) in sub-Saharan Africa, 
workers in Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries 
generated the highest volume of remittances, followed by those in the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS) and the East African Community (EAC) 
                                                 
4  There is an increasing number of aid agencies (e.g. DFID, USAID), organisations and 
country-specific websites on migrant remittances; in Africa, the latter include Rwanda 
Development Gateway, Ghana Web, Nigeria.com, Kenya Web, etc. that can contain 
invaluable information; and the website Livelihoods Connect is a ‘must read’ on this topic. A 
newsletter of the Accelerated Micro-enterprise Advancement Project (AMA) by USAID and 
DFID provides useful updates. 
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(Sander & Maimbo, 2003). In the period 1994 to 1999, net remittances to the 
ECOWAS countries fluctuated from US $589 million in 1994, peaking at 
US $1839 million in 1997, and declining to US $1511 million in 1999 
(Tiemoko, 2003). From these figures, it is clear that migrants’ remittances are 
highly unpredictable, and tracing them from time to time can be tedious and 
hardly cost-effective. As migrants’ remittances develop the countries of origin, 
their impact needs to be investigated in those countries on the basis of specific 
variables at individual recipient, household, community and macro-economic 
levels. 
Sander & Maimbo’s (2003) study acknowledges the fact that, throughout 
Africa, financial and monetary policies and regulations have created barriers to 
the flow of remittances and their effective investment. For instance there has 
been restrictive licensing of money transfer services, and the environment for 
investment is unattractive: corruption is rife, there is poor infrastructure, and 
governments of recipient countries do not appreciate the nature and extent of 
investments likely to occur from remittances. These shortcomings constrain the 
role of remittances as investment capital despite the liberalisation of many 
national economies from the time that the era of structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) two decades ago, SAPs pemitting increased inflow of 
remittances and eased their utilisation by the recipients. Nevertheless, proper 
accounting of the utilisation and impact of remittances is still not happening in 
most receiving countries, since the vast volume of remittances goes to individu-
als and households, and seldom to communities. 
In Solimano’s (2001) view, there are four schools of analytical literature on 
the reasons motivating remittances. These are: the altruistic motive or liveli-
hoods school which considers remitting to be an obligation to the household; 
the self-interest motive, which bases a migrant’s decision to remit on his or her 
economic and financial self-interest; the implicit family contract I, focusing on 
loan repayment, and considering remitting from the family perspective, not an 
individual’s; and the implicit family contract II, based on the contract between 
the migrant and those at home. At the macro-economic level, five broad groups 
of variables determine remittances, namely economic activity in the host 
country; economic activity in the home country; economic policies and institu-
tions in the home country; general risks in the home country; and investment 
opportunities in the home country (Spatafora, 2005, quoted in Ghosh, 2006: 47). 
In exploring the impact of remittances in Africa, it is necessary to establish 
which of these – or which combinations of them – obtain, as well as to ascertain 
their magnitude and value in individual countries. Equally important is meticu-
lous analysis of the macro-economic environment in both countries of origin 
and destination.  
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The African diaspora and development 
Despite the concept ‘diaspora’ having become commonplace, it does not have a 
standard definition, its meaning varies according to individual countries to suit 
their conditions and to accommodate those with legitimate claims to be thus 
dubbed.5 In reality, Africans in the diaspora consist of several categories: the so-
called ‘victim’ diaspora trafficked in the slave trade, itself a heterogeneous 
group; those in diaspora as a result of taking permanent residence or naturalisa-
tion, having been part of the brain drain or non-returning African students; and 
the recent category of ‘green carders’ joined in family reunification by family 
members. Thus, it is overly simplistic to treat the African diaspora as one 
cohesive group of Africans outside the continent who look to the content as 
their ‘homeland’ with which they all maintain (or wish to maintain) cultural, 
economic and political ties.  
This sub-section highlights four important strands of utilisation of the 
African diaspora in development. These are: partnership of countries in the 
Mediterranean region, a French overture to its immigrants’ countries of origin, a 
framework initiated by the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and 
the role of migrants’ associations.  
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)  
This partnership between members of the European Union (EU) and twelve 
Mediterranean countries, was launched in late 1994, and formally inaugurated 
in Barcelona in November 1995 (in what has become known as the Barcelona 
Process). It has three main objectives: (a) to establish a common Euro-Mediter-
ranean area of peace and stability based on fundamental principles including 
respect for human rights and democracy (political and security partnership); (b) 
to create an area of shared prosperity through the progressive establishment of a 
free-trade area between the EU and its partners, and among the Mediterranean 
partners themselves, accompanied by substantial EU financial support for 
economic transition within the partners’ countries, as well as for social and 
economic consequences of this reform process (economic and financial partner-
ship); and (c) to develop human resources, and to promote understanding 
between cultures and a rapprochement between the peoples in the Euro-
Mediterranean region, as well as to develop free and flourishing civil societies 
                                                 
5  Ghosh’s (2006: 106, note 51) reference to the Indian government’s definition of diaspora is 
instructive: [a person in the Indian] diaspora is ‘a person of Indian origin residing abroad and 
an individual who was born in India or has at least one grandparent or parent born in 
undivided India.’ 
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(social, cultural and human partnership). The EMP is a European initiative 
consisting of twelve Mediterranean partners in the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia (Maghreb); Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the 
Palestine Authority, Lebanon, Syria (Mashrek); Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. 
Libya enjoys an observer status.6 
Co-operation and co-development 
The concept of co-development was initiated by France to encourage collabora-
tion with the countries of emigration in establishing programmes and projects 
that would benefit immigrants and stem the flow of potential immigrants. A 
good example is the Mali-France Consultation on Migration, launched in 
December 2000. It aims to integrate Malians who wish to remain in France, to 
co-manage migration flows, and to introduce co-operative development in 
emigration areas of Mali.7 This gesture by France led to about 500 unauthorised 
Malians in France returning voluntarily in exchange for CFA (the local 
currency) 2.5 million (US$ 3600), and on arrival open businesses relating to 
agriculture, and providing a variety of services (Martin and Weil, 2002). It 
exemplifies the virtues of collaboration between a former metropolitan power 
and its former colony in injecting mutually agreed development in the latter. 
Furthermore, the French co-development approach seeks to target ODA at 
emigration areas in all francophone Africa, with government support supple-
menting the migrants’ contributions already referred to – a radical departure 
from the EU strategy to withdraw ODA from countries that are insufficiently 
co-operating with destination countries, especially in the return of unauthorised 
migrants (Martin and Weil, 2002).  
There exists in Senegal the Union of Local Initiatives for Co-development 
(UNILCO), founded by Senegalese representatives and expatriates and dedi-
cated to the economic development of the country. UNILCO helps the Senegal-
ese diaspora to participate in developing their homeland, raising the standards of 
living of their relatives and assisting individuals or groups willing to start 
businesses or social services in Senegal through clarifying, formulating and 
disseminating their projects.8 
                                                 
6  http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/htm, accessed June 3, 2004.  
7  A significant development since its inception has been the issuing of 25 000 visas to Malians 
in 2001 – compared with 7000 in 1997. This has reduced the fraudulent acquisition of visas. 
8  See http://perso.club-internet.fr/unilco/summary.htm, accessed June 6, 2004  
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The Cotonou Agreement 
On 23 June 2000, the EU and the 77-member ACP signed the Cotonou Agree-
ment (CA) aimed to reduce – and eventually eradicate – poverty by promoting 
sustainable development, capacity-building and integration of the ACP coun-
tries into the world economy. In the context of the scale of migration from the 
ACP countries to Europe, the CA drew attention to labour migration, calling 
for: (a) respect for the human rights of migrants who reside legally in CA-
signatory countries; (b) strategies to tackle the root causes of the massive 
migration flows, through supporting the economic and social development of 
the countries from which migrants originate and through training ACP nationals 
and improving access to education for their students in the EU; and (c) regula-
tions to counter irregular migration, through bilateral agreements that facilitate 
the return and re-admission of all nationals found in irregular situations. As a 
form of migration management, the CA has far-reaching ramifications for 
African members of the ACP with nationals residing in the EU: it draws 
attention to international migration and international trade and is probably 
geographically the most extensive South-North agreement that touches on these 
issues.  
Migrants’ associations 
Migrants’ associations have proliferated in all countries of destination, partly to 
receive new migrants and partly to stimulate development in the migrants’ 
countries of origin. These associations (for example Home Improvement 
Unions) have participated in the whole spectrum of national development in 
Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana, to name but a few, and illustrate the contribution 
they could make once governments of the recipient countries decide to work 
closely with them. In Kenya, the once-vibrant social welfare organisations, most 
of them operating along ethnic lines, stimulated community-level development 
before the government proscribed them at the turn of the 1980s (Oucho, 1996). 
African female migrants in France, and elsewhere in Europe, through their 
association Initiatives des femmes africaines de France et d’Europe (IFAFE) 
have embarked on a variety of economic co-operation. Founded in 1993 and 
reconstituted in 1996, IFAFE has brought together 23 member associations 
(IOM, 2005, quoted in Ghosh, 2006: 82), exemplifying the role of migrant 
associations in homeland development initiatives. Instances of migrants’ asso-
ciations mobilising funds for home development include the ‘Migration and 
Development’ association established in 1986 by immigrants in France from the 
Maghreb region (Ghosh, 2006: 86).  
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Return migration  
There is overwhelming evidence from the literature that most first-generation 
migrants expect to return to their home or move to another chosen country at the 
end of their sojourn. Successful returnees participate in the development of their 
homeland – provided the socio-economic and political environments permit it. 
Return migration constitutes the final of the ‘three Rs’after the first two 
(recruitment and remittance) have been realised. Unfortunately, return migration 
has been largely disregarded in the migration literature, receiving systematic 
attention only since 1973 when economic crisis set the stage for it (Ammassari 
& Black, 2001:17).  
Scholars specify different reasons for return migration precisely because 
there are different types of return migrants. To Arowolo (2000: 61) there are: 
those returning to a rehabilitation centre or a newly-created settlement in the 
wake of war or natural disaster; those returning to areas of origin who cannot 
identify their earlier home setting; and those born abroad, including some 
whose place of origin is technically not the place to which they now find them-
selves attached as ‘derivative return migrants’. The participation in homeland 
development of those in these categories is predictably as varied as they are. 
Moreover, some returnees are those who were unsuccessful at their destinations 
and who, therefore, are more likely to be a burden on returning home. Return 
may also have been an aspect of ‘homecoming’ after a long-awaited political 
independence of the home country, as happened with Namibians (Arowolo, 
2000: 69) in 1990 or South African exiles in 1994; a derivative of this has been 
the return of nationals as the democratic space opens in African countries during 
the second wave of democratisation. There are returnees who are easily reinte-
grated into the homeland society and those for whom reintegration becomes so 
difficult that they either embark on yet another episode of emigration or become 
resigned to the unbearable situation.  
Cerase (1974, quoted in Ammassari & Black, 2001: 22) identifies four 
categories of return migration: the return of failure after a ‘traumatic shock’ 
upon arrival and inability to adapt to the new environment in the destination; the 
return of conservatism, involving migrants who maintain links with their origins 
and eventually return after residing in a destination for some time; the return of 
motivation, involving those who return with some new and treasured values, 
ideas and skills which they wish to apply on returning to their home countries 
(potential ‘agents of change’ in the latter); and the return of retirement of those 
who have terminated their working careers and who return to their home 
countries as a matter of course.  
Unfortunately this classification of Cerase’s omits refugees – Africa’s 
greatest liability (Oucho, 2002) – refugees who return either as a result of 
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refoulment (being driven back) or voluntarily after conditions improve in their 
countries of origin. Returned migrants or refugees and asylum seekers could be 
a great asset to their countries of origin. Workers from abroad often return with 
the skills and discipline needed to raise productivity: they can provide the 
energy, ideas and entrepreneurial vigour needed to start or expand businesses at 
home (Martin, 2004).  
The existence of different categories of return migrants implies that institu-
tions engaged in returning migrants may be dealing with only a small propor-
tion or a particular type of eligible returnees. For example, the IOM and the 
UNDP have been limiting themselves to returning skilled migrants; and 
NEPAD envisions doing the same thing, as it desires to reverse the African 
brain drain and convert it into brain gain, and to deploy the African diaspora in 
the continent’s development.  
We now draw attention to return some programmes that have become com-
monplace in Africa and in which the hand of the North can easily be discerned. 
IOM initiatives  
Following the outcry from countries of the South that brain drain was crippling 
their development efforts, the UNDP and the IOM embarked on a return migra-
tion scheme known as the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals 
(TOKTEN). Although the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(ECA) and the IOM entered into a TOKTEN pact in the 1970s, the results were 
far from impressive. Success stories of UNDP-supported TOKTEN include the 
payment of 133 Malians to return to their country as consultants to help teach 
and do research (Martin and Weil, 2002). Even when the IOM came up with the 
Return of Qualified African Nationals scheme (RQAN) to replace TOKTEN, it 
did not make a significant impact on African countries. Although the IOM has 
been providing financial incentives to return migrants in all the return schemes, 
it has failed to excite many prospective returnees, or even to convince the large 
number of Africans abroad to embrace the opportunities offered. The most 
recent undertaking by the IOM is the Migration for Development in Africa 
(MIDA), which aims to build relationships between host countries and countries 
of origin, to foster the positive effects of migration for their mutual benefit, and 
to limit the negative effects of brain drain; it is a form of co-development.  
African governments, on the other hand, have not collaborated much with 
the IOM in this vital activity. Return schemes have failed for several reasons. 
First, the conditions that sparked brain drain have deteriorated rather than 
improved in the emigrants’ countries of origin: doctors and nurses find run 
down health programmes with obsolete or unrepairable equipment; teachers 
return to find schools with poor learning environments and grossly lacking in 
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basic facilities; university lecturers are confronted with intolerably large classes, 
lack of equipment and poor research facilities, including lack of research funds; 
and returning migrants with capital and entrepreneurial skills cannot afford to 
invest in a risky economic environment. Their immediate reaction is predict-
able: they simply take off on yet another emigration. Secondly, the public 
service, which is targeted to benefit from return migrants, sign the provisions of 
their agreements with the IOM or other parties but hardly adhere to them. Third, 
even those returning to retire find a shocking homecoming where relatives 
expect gifts from them rather than being open to collaborate in whatever inno-
vations might be appropriate. These are just some of the reasons for the failure 
of return migration schemes.  
The NEPAD vision 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the latest institution 
of hope in the Africa-North relations, aspires to develop the region’s human 
resources (a) by reversing the brain drain and turning it into ‘brain gain’; (b) by 
building and retaining the region’s human capacities; and (c) by developing 
strategies for utilising the skills of Africans in the diaspora for the development 
of the region. NEPAD intends to achieve these three objectives by creating 
political, social and economic conditions that could attract back brain drain 
migrants; by establishing a reliable data base on the brain drain and the African 
diaspora; and by ensuring the utilisation of African experts abroad in NEPAD-
designed projects.  
Sadly, the NEPAD vision makes too many assumptions, and also raises 
some questions: If in the first place African countries do not even have records 
of their own brain drain, how does NEPAD expect to ascertain the volume, 
destinations and characteristics of the region’s skilled emigrants? What is 
NEPAD’s depth of knowledge of the size and diversity of the African diaspora, 
its successive generations and its geography? And what has Africa or NEPAD 
done to benefit from the public relations ‘pilgrimage’ of the US-based African 
diaspora to the home continent during the last decade? The NEPAD scheme 
requires immediate and carefully designed research for policy formulation 
before the Partnership can propose any meaningful programmes within the 
continent. Analysis of the African diaspora (apart from that in the United States 
suggests that it is sizeable in France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Spain and Canada, and the leading sources of the African diaspora include 
Morocco, Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria (Oucho, 2004). In these countries, and 
indeed many more countries (such as Mali, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia), 
strong networks between the diaspora and non-migrants exist and point to the 
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value of engaging the diaspora in development. Surprisingly, African countries 
have not exploited such networks to engage them in the development process. 
Challenges facing African countries 
Wherever discussions centre on African brain drain, brain gain or diaspora, 
African governments frequently behave as if migrants will be swayed by politi-
cal rhetoric that often ignores policies based on good research or accurate data. 
The North persists in prescribing solutions to developmental issues for African 
countries rather than allowing the latter to determine their own courses of 
action, or, better still, evolving bilateral arrangements with the countries of 
destination. It is time that the AU set up a bureau responsible for all aspects of 
emigration from Africa, either emulating or modifying the EU model that has 
elaborated policy, research and other programmes. The AU should look more 
broadly into all forms of intra-African migration, working closely with RECs 
that will eventually merge to form the African Economic Community (AEC). 
Movements of people and knowledge 
As Africa has lost – and continues to lose – its professionals and its highly 
educated, it should embrace work already underway in the European Union. An 
article by Louise Ackers (2004) should reach the corridors of African Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) who have yet to go full throttle on issues 
pertaining to brain drain. They should realise that the so-called brain drain 
actually amounts to brain circulation, given that most moves are no longer 
single permanent moves as was the case in past decades; rather, they reflect the 
present circumstances, where the flow of ideas, remittances and eventual return 
to the countries of origin dominate the migration of skills and knowledge. 
Distinctive features of skilled emigrants – the whole spectrum from under-
graduates or doctoral students to ‘research stars’, or from junior scientists to 
their experienced counterparts – should be ascertained (Ackers, 2004).  
Is it time for the Bhagwati tax? 
The famous ‘Bhagwati tax’, which was presumably proposed in the light of 
Asian emigration, seems to make much sense for African countries which have 
produced a sizeable brain drain in the wake of the Asian flood. Economist 
Jagdish Bhagwati (1976a, 1976b) called for a tax to be paid by countries of 
destination to countries of origin as legitimate revenue from their emigrants. His 
principal argument is that increased mobility of highly-skilled individuals 
occurs in spite of their tendency to retain their origin-country citizenship and 
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associated rights (including the right to vote), thus the failure to tax emigrants 
amounted to ‘representation without taxation’ for the country of origin. Thirty 
years down the line, Bhagwati’s ‘taxing the brain drain’ thesis has stood the test 
of time (Wilson, 2005) and today is perhaps more relevant than ever.  
Although a ‘brain-tax’ makes much economic sense, it stands the risk of 
mismanagement in African countries where it begs one crucial question: does it 
make sense for such a tax to be paid to the origin country only to be embezzled 
the same way foreign aid and grants have been in most sub-Saharan African 
countries? If the argument is that skilled emigrants are well trained and there-
fore constitute a loss of human resources, several fuzzy areas require further 
exploration. Among these are: where the training of the ‘brain drain’ migrant 
took place, who funded it, what additional training was available after the initial 
education/training, and so on. Before considering taxation of emigrants, 
governments of the countries of origin must of necessity reach some accommo-
dation with the taxable groups to streamline issues such as the proportion of 
taxable income, benefits accruing to the taxed individuals, their investment 
prospects and so on.  
Why not factor brain drain and brawn drain in the WTO agenda? 
The time is opportune for factoring African emigration into WTO trade talks, 
not least Mode 4 of the Doha Round which makes provision for temporary 
migration of workers in the service sector, and a variant of which could be 
broadened to include African scholars and professionals of all kinds; and 
African footballers and other African sportsmen and women who are easily 
granted citizenship in the developed North and in the oil-rich Gulf States. Also 
necessary on the WTO negotiations is African brain drain now being exploited 
without proper origin-destination arrangements. 
Return migration: Physical and/or virtual? 
Return of brain drain is one area which African countries now take as a given. 
Yet, as Skeldon (2005: 15) argues, there must be something for skilled 
emigrants to return to in the country of origin – at the very least a stable 
environment in which the returnee can make a living. Where economic down-
turn and political instability persist, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, skilled 
emigrants have no compelling reasons to return. Indeed, their return is likely to 
render them ‘brain waste’ and destitute, which would be ironic since they had 
just escaped destitution in the countries of destination. There are instances of 
some returnees who turn out to be mere sycophants of the political establish-
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ment. Such returnees cannot be expected to make any input into development 
on return because they are already too compromised to provide impartial expert 
advice.  
Armed with viable data, African countries and institutions such as the AU, 
RECs and NEPAD should design appropriate return schemes, either comple-
mentary to or different from the IOM- or UNDP-prescribed frameworks in 
which they have had little or no say. In this information age, African countries 
should pay greater attention to virtual return, instructive instances of which now 
take place in Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea.9  
Actual versus presumed impact of remittances 
Remittances are viewed by most African countries as providing the greatest 
hope for development: for individual migrants’ relations, households, and 
communities as well as for the national economies. However, before attempting 
to factor migrant remittances into development, the policy arena needs closer 
scrutiny. To this end, the Director of Research of the Bank of Ghana proposes 
some incentives for the country, a typical remittances-attracting African 
economy. These incentives include lowering transfer costs of remittances (by 
lowering the fees levied, and by offering more favourable exchange rates), 
reducing the risks involved in the transfers and offering more attractive invest-
ment alternatives. Further, he calls for the creation of appropriate savings 
services for migrants and their families from three perspectives: ‘repatriable’ 
foreign currency accounts, foreign currency denominated (remittance) bonds, 
and savings certificates denominated in foreign currency (Addison, 2004), 
though the situation might have changed since then. Where trans-national 
corporations with stronger financial muscle are bringing large amounts of 
money into a country, individual migrants’ remittances would not be seen as 
having a significant effect in the development arena. Thus, the environment of 
exchange control, which has dominated African economic reforms, needs to be 
critically reviewed to enhance predictable inflow and prudent investment of 
remittances.  
To many African countries, migrant remittances are seen as a means of 
eradicating poverty. Unfortunately, this presumption may hold in certain 
circumstances and not in others. There has not been a critical assessment of the 
impact of remittances on national economies because most of the empirical 
                                                 
9  Details of national virtual return efforts and schemes can be found on particular websites on 
the Internet. The best examples are Ghanaian, Nigerian and Ethiopian experts in diaspora who 
are linked to some projects in their countries, to which they contribute or provide expert 
advice from their stations in the countries of immigration. 
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evidence is pitched at the levels of individual recipients or households, and 
seldom at community or national levels. African countries, individually or 
through NEPAD should commission the kind of work that applies the Frame-
work for Assessing the Impact of Remittances (FAIR) on poverty (Chimhowu 
et al., 2003). African countries need to pay attention to the authors’ caution that, 
‘Remittances alone are unlikely to lift people out of poverty: rather it is their 
interplay with other economic, social and cultural factors which determine the 
scale and type of impact remittances can have on poverty reduction’ 
(Chimhowu et al., 2003). In addition, African countries need to take an interest 
in the findings of migration and poverty research supported by the Department 
for International Development (DFID) at the Development Research Centre on 
Migration, Globalisation and Poverty at the University of Sussex. Most impor-
tantly, they should acknowledge – based, for instance, on Solimano’s (2001) 
literature survey – that motivations to remit will vary and cannot be generalised 
in the way most analysts in the public domain have tended to do. Also, in these 
days of gender equality and empowerment of women, it is necessary to appreci-
ate that male migrants are more likely to remit because of self-interest, whereas 
female migrants generally remit out of altruism or livelihood (de la Cruz, 1995, 
quoted in Chimhowu, 2003).  
Studies on the impact of remittances are often conducted at the places of 
origin of the remittances – using notably The Balance of Payments Yearbook 
published by the IMF, and OECD data – which evidently does not elicit the true 
impact at their destinations in the developing world, a strand of investigation 
necessary in Africa. There is need to acknowledge that migrants’ remittances 
are but part of other transfers reported by the IMF, the ILO and other organisa-
tions.10 Moreover, a substantial proportion of remittances are sent through infor-
mal channels, resulting in under-reporting of the actual amounts. That the cost 
of remittances charged by money transfer organisations (MTOs) might discour-
age remitters is an issue that recipient countries should look into with a view to 
reaching bilateral arrangements with the MTOs.  
                                                 
10  Lucas (2005) draws data from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 2002 and UN (2002) 
that classify remittances into three categories: ‘workers’ remittances’ or ‘current remittances’ 
(from migrants staying abroad for one year or more); ‘compensation of employees’ – ‘labour 
income’ prior to 1993 (from persons staying abroad for less than one year); and ‘migrants’ 
transfers’ (lumped as ‘capital transfers’), consisting of flows of goods and financial assets 
linked to the migrants’ cross-border movements. It is likely that most African countries lump 
all these categories as ‘migrant remittances’ and misconstrue them as all coming from their 
emigrants and others in the diaspora 
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Diaspora and dual citizenship 
Reviewing national constitutions to institute dual citizenship for migrants is a 
desirable dispensation for African governments. While the opponents of dual 
citizenship argue that it fosters conflicting loyalties, its proponents see it as an 
opportunity to get the best out of both worlds and to let its beneficiaries vie 
between two different settings depending on the changing fortunes. To Wucker 
(2006), the benefits of dual citizenship in the United States include the promo-
tion of American goods and political leadership abroad, the nostalgic tendency 
of wanting to make things better in the countries of origin and the realisation, as 
in one’s dual relationship with parent and spouse, that an individual is bound by 
nature and choice respectively, loving both equally. African countries must 
therefore define their interpretation of the diaspora carefully, as there is other-
wise likely to be a lack of consistency regarding this concept.  
The involvement of those in the diaspora in developing their countries of 
origin differs from country to country and according to fluctuations in economic 
conditions. The cases of Scottish and Irish diasporas are instructive for Africa, 
with considerable diversity. The Scottish diaspora are not all keen on contrib-
uting to the Scottish economy mainly because they are professionals who left 
Scotland voluntarily and do not see their country as suitable for investment. In 
contrast, the Irish diaspora who were poor and unskilled, and were pushed into 
exile by the English, take pride in their new-found ability to liberate Ireland 
economically (Economist, October 20, 2001, quoted in Balasubramanyam, 
2004). As these contrasting features also occur in African countries, they need 
detailed documenting to inform policy on the deployment of those in diasporas 
in national development. It is also time that African countries examined the 
relevance or otherwise of the involvement of diaspora migrants in the develop-
ment of their countries of origin. This could be in the transfer of technology and 
of knowledge and skills; in direct investment in locally-owned firms; in assum-
ing top managerial positions in foreign-owned firms in their countries of origin; 
and in taking account of the tendency of foreign firms to deter rather than 
promote technological progress in the local (home) economy (Findlay, 1978). 
Currently the involvement of those in Indian and Chinese diasporas in their 
home countries partly accounts for economic buoyancy of these two economies.  
African organisations with clout: RECs, the AU and NEPAD  
Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the AU and NEPAD all have an 
important role to play in the African-North brain drain and the reverse brain 
gain, as well as in the contribution of the diaspora and remittances to develop-
ment of the continent. In June 2006, for instance, the member states of the 
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) met in Accra, 
Ghana, where they set up a commission to determine how best to limit youth 
emigration to the developed North. This was a move in the right direction and 
should be emulated by other African RECs. It is perhaps more sensible than 
implementing the protocol on free movement of persons in which no African 
REC has made major strides. The SADC member states have formalised the 
management of migration through the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa 
(MIDSA), which was established in November 2000, principally to match 
immigration and refugee law (Klaaren and Rutinwa, 2004). Unfortunately, there 
is not much to show from the MIDSA initiative. ECOWAS has also made some 
significant strides in migration discourse and programmes at the level of Heads 
of State and Government. 
The two pan-African organisations, the AU and NEPAD have the potential 
to develop better-focused programmes and to play a more proactive role in 
international migration than hitherto. It is suggested that the AU should place on 
doorsteps research findings, REC initiatives and other developments pertaining 
to international migration issues which affect the African continent as well 
African-North interrelations. This pan-African organisation should evolve 
strong working relations with the EU and emulate Asian and Latin American 
developments relating to intra-and inter-continental migration. Despite its 
establishment five years ago, NEPAD has very little to show in international 
migration. It should assemble practitioners of African migration to help it 
formulate more pragmatic programmes and thus put rhetoric to rest once and for 
all.  
The dearth of data in Africa 
It should be fairly easy for African countries to keep track of their nationals who 
return either physically or virtually, particularly when the countries acknowl-
edge the presence and contribution of returnees. Perhaps the greatest problem 
facing informed insights regarding the quartet is the dearth of data. The problem 
begins with estimation of brain drain in the countries of destination without the 
countries of origin even endeavouring to collaborate in the exercise. A very 
pertinent question is, how do African countries make claims about their citizens 
whose numbers, characteristics, destination and welfare they know nothing or 
very little about? Moreover, African countries cannot ascertain whether their 
‘brain drain’ truly reflects that nomenclature, or whether it takes the form, 
rather, of brain waste or brain circulation at the destinations. Much less, if 
anything, is known about the African diaspora as a whole, or of those who 
belong to successive generations. For African countries to succeed in engaging 
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their brain drain and diaspora in homeland development, they will have to 
design appropriate means to not only to woo these people back, but also to 
appreciate the services that the emigrants can provide once they have returned. 
A major shortcoming relates to data relating to the sources, volume and value of 
migrant remittances over and above money transferred through established 
MTOs. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that information on the quartet is so patchy and uncoor-
dinated that it does not influence development in Africa in the way that is 
commonly believed. Brain drain will intensify unless African countries elimi-
nate the conditions that discourage the human resources most likely to spear-
head development in the region. Conversion of the African brain into brain gain, 
and engagement of the diaspora in the continent’s development, requires more 
than rhetoric; it requires well-designed research in areas including the likes and 
dislikes of successive generations of emigrants; bilateral arrangements between 
countries of emigration and countries of destination, including in the NEPAD-
G8 initiatives; and a proactive stance of African RECs, the African Union and 
NEPAD. At the moment, virtual return might be more appealing to African 
emigrants than calls for physical return, since that is riddled with problems.  
The stage for these efforts should of necessity be within Africa, and not 
depend on overtures from the North or from the more aggressive Asian coun-
tries such as China and Japan who are keener than previously to enter into pacts 
with Africa. At the moment, the quartet analysed in this chapter provides scope 
for Africa’s development but only when it is well harnessed for that purpose. At 
policy level, African countries should revisit their Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers and the Millennium Development Goals to incorporate those aspects of 
international migration that these policy documents have failed to recognise. 
The growing interest in proper utilisation of the quartet in Africa’s development 
provides a ray of hope for a continent which is not poor in resources but poor in 
taking advantage of opportunities.  
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4 
Experiences with international 
migration, new policy directions  
and viewpoints from Burkina Faso 
Annelet Broekhuis 
This chapter is based on materials collected during a mission to Burkina Faso, 
organised by ‘International Migration and Development, Viewpoints and Policy 
Initiatives from the Countries of Origin’, a joint project of Radboud University 
and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
In July 2006 two hundred participants, representing all levels of government 
and agencies linked with migration issues, as well the private sector, civil 
society and the Burkinabé diaspora assembled in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 
to discuss the country’s main migration issues and policies. The organisation of 
the symposium ‘Migration and Development’ was in the hands of the Conseil 
National de la Population (CONAPO), which falls under the Ministry for the 
Economy and Development, and the Institut Supérieur des Sciences de la 
Population (Higher Institute for Population Science), a research centre linked to 
the University of Ouagadougou. Two United Nations organisations, the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), took part as well. During the symposium the participants were 
invited to discuss the country’s major official matters of concern in the field of 
migration. Prepared reports and keynote speakers delivered input for the debates 
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on the subjects of poverty, rural exodus and urbanisation, the living conditions 
of returnees and repatriates, internal migration and access to land, remittances, 
international migration and the spread of diseases, and finally conventions and 
migration legislation in the West African region.  
The subjects selected for the symposium illustrate that the migration 
phenomenon in Burkina Faso is linked to the strategy of poverty reduction and 
focuses on the causes and effects of internal and regional (African) migration. 
During the symposium, attention shifted somewhat to additional subjects: 
south-north migration, brain drain, living conditions of Burkinabé abroad, and 
the use of their skills and competences to facilitate development in their home 
country. The difference in orientation between the major issues formulated in 
the first instance and the additional topics discussed during the symposium 
suggested a new orientation in response to topics highlighted as major issues in 
the international migration debate. 
This chapter explores the context of the migration debate in Burkina Faso 
and focuses on its policy intentions and achievements. We start with an over-
view of the migration history and then discuss features of migration patterns. 
Burkinabé migration patterns and characteristics 
Long-distance mobility and migration – read as synonyms for international 
migration – have a lengthy history in West Africa, and population groups living 
within Burkina Faso’s territory are known for their high degree of spatial 
mobility. According to several studies (Skinner 1965, Gallais, 1967; Riddell, 
1981) migrants and traders from various societies travelled and migrated 
between different agro-ecological zones, across the Sahara and between the 
towns along the desert borders, long before the region was incorporated into the 
trade system of Western European powers. The direction of this movement was 
between regions and towns in the interior of the continent. In colonial times 
migration flows were directed coastward, where colonisers had established their 
strongholds and developed their most important economic interests. The various 
West African micro-regions were incorporated into the world economic system 
in different ways, and as a result of the local economic and social systems they 
became poles of attraction or repulsion for migrants (Amin, 1974). Cities along 
the coast, as well as regions where cash crops were grown for international 
markets – such as banana, coffee and cocoa in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire – 
became favourite migration destinations for people in search of work from the 
interior regions such as the Mossi Plateau and other districts, located in what 
now is known as the country of Burkina Faso. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, Côte d’Ivoire became the leading 
migrant host country. Increasing numbers of Burkinabé labourers contributed to 
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the growth of cash crop production in this country and to its economic progress. 
As a result, 56 per cent of the foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire were Burkinabé of 
origin, representing 14.6 per cent of the total population in 1998. According to 
Zourkaléini (2005), flows between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire continued to 
dominate the Burkinabé international migration pattern during the period up to 
2000: 60 per cent of the returnees who entered Burkina Faso came from 
neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, and between 1970 and 2000 Côte d’Ivoire was the 
country of destination for 90 per cent of its emigrants. The Tabou events of 
1999 and the unstable political situation in Côte d’Ivoire since 2002 slowed 
down this migration flow and the net migration between Burkina Faso and Côte 
d’Ivoire became negative. 
Although less dominant, the migration flow between Burkina Faso and Côte 
d’Ivoire is still noticeable, but other destinations have emerged during recent 
decades. Compared to other West African countries such as Senegal and Ghana, 
the emigration from Burkina Faso turned to intercontinental destinations 
relatively late. In West Africa the neighbouring countries of Mali and Niger 
host numerous Burkinabé, as do further away Senegal and Gabon. In addition, a 
flow to the north and northeast to Arab countries has become significant: some 
thousands of Burkinabé try to earn a living in Libya, Sudan, Chad and Saudi 
Arabia. 
Most European countries have a small Burkinabé community within their 
borders. France as a francophone country is a favourite destination, including 
for students, thanks to French grants. Available scholarships also take 
Burkinabé to other remote destinations such as China, Russia, Cuba and Syria.  
Migration to Italy, dating from the 1980s, has developed its own dynamic. 
The total Burkinabé migrant stream terminating in a number of Italian cities 
seems to be composed of several minor chain-migration flows, a fact that 
illustrates the importance of networks in international migration (Wouterse, 
2006). In particular the Bissa community, residents from the central-eastern and 
southern part of Burkina Faso, migrate to Italy, although this group is 
represented strongly in Gabon as well. 
Despite Burkina Faso’s long history as a country of emigration and its huge 
emigration flows, mainly to other (neighbouring) West African countries, 
internal rural-rural and rural-urban migration flows are substantial and of 
increasing importance. The general censuses – excluding that of 2006, the 
results of which are not yet available – showed that internal migration within 
rural areas is far more important than migration to urban areas (CONAPO, 
2006a), but recent case studies do not always confirm this tendency (Wouterse, 
2006). This dominant rural-rural orientation applied to the internal Burkinabé 
migration as well as to (international) migration to Côte d’Ivoire, and underlines 
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again the importance of the agricultural sector in the subsistence base for the 
Burkinabé and as a way of earning a living. 
According to the data from the 2000 survey of the Unité d’Enseignement et 
de Recherche en Démographie (UERD), during the 1980s and 1990s urban-
rural migration also occurred. A close examination shows that this out-migra-
tion from urban areas was not only a result of deteriorating economic conditions 
in Burkina Faso’s urban centres – a consequence of structural adjustment 
programmes – but was also a result of the amelioration of rural conditions 
through a greater provision of education services and better prices for (some) 
cash crops (Beauchemin, 2006). This finding underlines the negative correlation 
between rural development and migration. 
In general it has been stated that international migration from Burkina Faso 
is temporary and partly circular. From the large numbers of Burkinabé who 
have lived for some generations in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire (CONAPO, 
2006b), it can be concluded that this fact does not always hold true. However, 
the UERD survey illustrates that the young men who migrated to Côte d’Ivoire 
were indeed circular migrants. These migrants were mainly young and unedu-
cated men who had been working in the agricultural sector before their depar-
ture. They stayed abroad on average for two years before returning to their 
home villages. Over time, the village of origin has lost much of its importance 
as a destination for returnees. Migrants to other countries more often had an 
urban rather than a rural background, and were unemployed before their depar-
ture (Beauchemin et al., 2005; Zoukaléini, 2005). 
The strong tradition of migration of the Burkinabé can be explained mainly 
by the country’s position in colonial history – that of a supplier of labour – but 
it is linked to natural, economic, social, political and cultural factors as well. 
Burkina Faso is still one of the poorest countries of the world, with an economy 
based mainly on agricultural production. Due to harsh environmental conditions 
(droughts, less fertile land) and a low level of technological development, this 
agricultural sector is unable to absorb the continuously increasing population 
numbers. As a result, migration makes up an essential part of the survival 
strategy of many poor farming households in every region of the country. In 
particular in the poorer, that is, the dryer, regions where the risks of harvest 
shortfalls are high, farming households use migration to diversify their income 
strategies and thus diminish income shocks (Aube & Ndiaye, 2005; Wouterse, 
2006). 
Traditionally the decision on (international) migration has been a matter for 
the family. According to the new economics theory of labour migration, it was 
who the family decided which member should go. Nowadays migration can also 
be an individual decision, in particular in cotton-growing regions, and for sons 
of later spouses. Prices for cotton have declined and young men who were used 
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to having access to cash now have to look elsewhere to earn it (Dakuyo, inter-
view 2006). Sons from the first wife migrated as a result of family discussions, 
while sons from the youngest wife (the last wife is said to be the man’s favour-
ite, but her children have the lowest position in the extended family) take the 
decision to migrate more individually (Sawadogo, interview 2006). 
Opportunities for migration, however, are not equal for everyone. For 
wealthier households it is easier to find sufficient money to pay for the journey. 
Normally long distance migration routes are covered one step at a time. 
Migrants work during their journey to pay for the next stage. Even so, one 
needs money to start. A recent in-depth study in four villages (Wouterse, 2006) 
illustrates that inter-continental and intra-continental migration have to be seen 
as two different strategic household decisions. Households with intercontinental 
migrants belong to the (relatively) wealthiest socio-economic group, and 
migration to Europe is part of their wealth-accumulation strategy. Those house-
holds were in a position to deal with entry barriers linked with capital-intensive 
economic activities. Households involved in intra-continental migration, on the 
other hand, have access to fewer forms of livelihood capital and their decision 
to migrate is a response to push factors. For this group, migration has to be 
understood as part of a consolidation or survival strategy. ‘Eat away’ migration 
is part of the way they save household expenses. Wouterse’s survey (2006) 
illustrated quite clearly the advantages of having a member of the family in one 
of the developed countries.  
Returning migrants 
The sudden repatriation of Burkinabé from Côte d’Ivoire in 1999 and 2002/3 
confronted Burkina Faso with the problem of receiving huge numbers of return-
ees in a limited period of time. According to official estimates, some 365,000 
repatriates crossed the border to flee from the hostilities. Apart from all kinds of 
practical issues that had to be solved, such as how to feed and lodge all those 
former or new compatriots, this event caused a shock in Burkinabé society. At 
the same time it encouraged official bodies to consider some fundamental 
questions, such as how to absorb and integrate such a large group of incoming 
migrants without disturbing the existing social system, and how to maintain 
social cohesion; and how should the migrants’ access to natural resources, in 
particular land, be arranged? In other words, who can make claims? 
Many temporary and permanent continental migrants – in particular those in 
Côte d’Ivoire – worked in the rural sector. After their (usually forced) return 
they are mostly interested in working in this sector again (CONAPO, 2006b). 
Only 7000 people out of the enormous incoming group of repatriates could be 
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helped by government agencies, in particular by the Comité National de 
Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation (CONASUR –the National Committee 
for Emergency and Rehabilitation Assistance), assisted by UNICEF and the 
World Food Programme (WFP) during the so-called Bayiri operation (Zongo, 
2003; Maboni, interview 2006). Other returnees established themselves inde-
pendently in towns, yet others went to the villages of their ancestors, but a 
substantial number tried to find land to cultivate. This process had already 
started before the disturbances of 1999.  
Migrants who lived with their next of kin (wife and children) for longer 
periods abroad do not often invest in productive activities in Burkina Faso. A 
minority invest in housing, some help their parents with agricultural equipment, 
or purchase livestock. In fact a migrant has, in the case of a continued sojourn 
elsewhere, few possessions in his home village. A successful migrant is one 
who is able to maintain a social network by occasionally sending some money 
to their place of origin, or taking it with them during a visit every two or three 
years. ‘Les principales dépenses concernent les salutations et autres obligations 
sociales’ (The most important expenses concern small presents at arrival and 
other social obligations during the visit) (Zongo, 2003: 119). This situation does 
not automatically guarantee a warm welcome in the case of repatriation. 
Children of migrants have even fewer ties with the village of their ancestors. 
Migration and the land question 
The flow of returnees from Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso had a chiefly rural-
rural character, similar to a substantial part of the country’s internal migration. 
These rural-rural migrants thus contributed to an increase in the pressure on 
land in southern regions of Burkina Faso. Some of the repatriates were able to 
offer money for access to land and this rapid commercialisation of the land 
market resulted in tensions between local groups and internal migrants on the 
one hand and repatriates on the other. Even intra-family conflicts occurred 
(about inheritance, between migrants and non-migrants), and disputes about the 
interpretation of the payment for land (gift or lease) contributed to tensions at 
village level in certain areas in recent years. In addition to changes in the access 
to land, several ‘new’ regulations could be identified in terms of limited lease 
periods and rents in cash for those who were not members of the lineage. 
Formalisation of the procedures did not occur. Traditional access to land 
regulations is proving to be less and less effective. In this matter formalisation 
is necessary: land registration offices need to be set up, and written proof of 
ownership needs to become the norm (Zongo, 2006).  
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The need for formalisation of the migration process 
Côte d’Ivoire passed a new law in 1998 which prohibited non-Ivorians from 
owning land. With this law the country removed all former rights that migrants 
had had in this country since independence. (Their children were entitled to 
even fewer rights.) The situation regarding the repatriation of the Burkinabé in 
Côte d’Ivoire also illustrated the consequences of the lack of any comprehen-
sive formal regulation of migration in the West-African region and showed that 
as a result of the informal character of migration, the official status of migrants 
is often unclear. Many Burkinabé emigrants have never formalised their status 
in their place of destination, sometimes due to missing official documents 
which could prove their identity. As migrants within the ECOWAS region they 
are allowed to enter and stay ninety days in any member country. If they want 
to remain longer they are obliged to formalise their presence. Ignorance of the 
laws, lack of documents, but especially the high costs of the procedures do not 
really induce people to comply with the rules. 
If migrants or their children wish to apply for the nationality of their country 
of residence, the procedure is frustrated for the same reasons: lack of official 
documents (birth certificates or identity papers of parents), and cost. For second 
generation migrants the situation is extra complicated: children of repatriates 
could not obtain Burkinabé nationality if they were unable to show official 
papers which prove their parents’ Burkinabé nationality. These children became 
migrants at the very moment they entered Burkina Faso, immigrants and not 
repatriates. 
In Burkina Faso, terms such as ‘illegal’ or ‘clandestine’ migration have not 
been used in the recent past. Flows of migrants who tried their luck by travel-
ling to other places abroad hoping to find paid work were called ‘migration 
spontanée’ and ‘migration sauvage’ (Sawadogo, interview 2006). Crossing a 
border along the way did not change the migrant’s situation or his/her behav-
iour. And except for occasional disturbances or expulsions, African host coun-
tries and employers did not put many obstacles in the migrants’ way. 
Current pressure from the European side, combined with its more rigid 
immigration legislation, is, however, forcing African states, Burkina Faso 
included, to manage their migration flow more strictly, and in addition to 
implement decisions formulated in many sub-regional (ECOWAS, UEMOA) 
conventions and agreements. The experiences with the repatriation of 
Burkinabé and their offspring has added to this necessity. Both, the state and the 
migrant have to make clear decisions about this matter. The migrant has to 
prepare for return and must invest in Burkina Faso if his sojourn abroad is 
temporary. In the case of ‘permanent’ migration, the migrant has to integrate 
and invest in the country of destination and legalise residence and establishment 
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permits (i.e. choose a new nationality). At the level of the state, the important 
question now is how to legalise the status of citizens abroad and of present 
migrants having no official residence permit. This would be a first step towards 
regulating the migration process. 
Migration policy intentions 
Except for the period 1980–1982, when the Burkina Faso government tried to 
reduce the negative effects of mass emigration by imposing exit visas, the 
approach to international migration by the successive governments can be 
characterised as laissez-faire. After independence in 1960, the government tried 
to regulate international (labour) migration by bilateral conventions and multi-
lateral agreements (mainly at the level of ECOWAS and UEMOA), but in fact – 
as in the other ECOWAS countries – most conventions, treaties and agreements 
turned out to be dead letters, without ratification by national parliaments or 
translation into national laws (Soulama, 2005). 
Burkina Faso does not at present pursue a real migration policy (Soulama 
2005, CONAPO, 2006d; Ouedraogo, 2006); but it does intend to do so soon, 
partly as a consequence of the call by countries of destination for migration 
regulation, and also because of the international migration debate and the 
country’s experiences with returnees.  
In what direction is Burkina Faso heading? The proposed policy intentions 
can be summarised as follows: 
- Facilitate the positive side-effects of international migration, not by extend-
ing emigration, but by improving the quality of migrants (anticipating future 
labour needs in the ageing developed world);  
- Establish bodies for monitoring migration and collecting appropriate data; 
standardisation and homogenisation of definitions and measurement methods 
in accordance with all other West African partners; 
- Manage internal agrarian colonisation and rural-rural migration to avoid 
future land conflicts; apply the Agrarian and Land Reform Acts (RAF: 
Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière of 1986/1991 and 1996) and the establish 
an Office for Land Registry, to enforce security of land property, which is 
expected to improve agricultural productivity; integrate migrants into local 
communities to maintain solidarity; promote a sustainable development of 
natural resources; 
- Strengthen the urban network, urban-rural linkages and the position of 
secondary cities and towns, by decentralisation processes and investments. 
Cities are seen as engines for development. 
- Manage international migration and protect migrant rights; apply interna-
tional (ECOWAS/UEMOA) conventions which guarantee the right of free 
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movement, residence and settlement. In addition allow voting rights to 
Burkinabé abroad; inform migrants before their departure about the condi-
tions in their intended host country; combat illegal migration; reinforce the 
role of civil society in migration management; invite migrants to use their 
capacities to contribute to national development; facilitate access to social 
security rights (pensions) for returnees. 
A number of points arise. Firstly, this list of policy propositions is clearly a 
result of recent experiences and shows intentions which are compatible with the 
decisions taken by heads of West African States on various occasions. In the 
framework of many conferences held on the initiative of various multilateral 
institutions (ECOWAS, UEMOA, ILO, OIM, AU), Burkina Faso supported all 
the conventions and treaties which followed from these meetings. Unfortunately 
most of the decisions taken have only partly been translated into national laws, 
either in Burkino Faso, or in any of the countries involved. 
Secondly, although the intentions are good, they are not always realistic. For 
instance the human resource base of Burkina Faso with regard to formal educa-
tion is poor. The country has one of the highest levels of illiteracy in Africa (an 
overall rate of 74 per cent in 2002). Access to well-equipped schools is not 
available to most children; schools are overcrowded, and do not have enough 
well-trained teachers, and primary enrolment is about 50 per cent for boys and 
40 per cent for girls (OECD, 2005). Besides this, the education system is still 
rather traditional, with a strong theoretical character and not very application-
oriented (van der Waals, interview 2006). All in all it is not a strong base on 
which to meet the needs of distant labour markets. 
Thirdly, these policy intentions point at a formalisation of the migration 
process and a willingness to fulfil some of the desires of the migrant population. 
Migrant organisations expressed a long list of demands. These include assis-
tance in the case of emergencies, or after expulsions by embassies or consulates; 
improvement of money transfer possibilities; regulations for social security and 
migration quotas through bilateral agreements; and information for potential 
migrants about rights and obligations in the country of destination. They also 
wanted information about investment possibilities in Burkina Faso, such as 
possibilities other than housing projects; easier procedures for buying land; 
fulfilment of international treaties by Burkina Faso (criticism of host countries 
is impossible if one’s own country is a bad example in this matter). Other 
requests are for embassies to collect and make known information about 
compatriots present in the country; for migrants’ right to vote in their place of 
origin – which would enforce the involvement of the migrant in developments 
in the home country – and for easy procedures in obtaining official documents, 
including for the children of Burkinabé abroad. 
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The intentions can be seen as an attempt to institutionalise elements of trans-
national migrant networks. We elaborate on this aspect in the following sub-
section, given its importance in the debate on migration and development. 
Institutionalising transnational migrant networks 
Optimising the possible contributions of migration to development involves the 
institutionalisation of elements of the network of transnational migrants. This 
idea can be related to the diminishing role of the government as a consequence 
of Structural Adjustment Programmes, and the emerging need for alternative 
role players to join the development efforts (Beauchemin & Schoumaker, n.d.). 
Policy in this field is still in its infancy in Burkina Faso, but a tiny start has been 
made. In 2003 a first step was taken to mobilise the diaspora by establishing the 
Conseil Supérieur des Burkinabé à l’Etranger (CSBE: Higher Council of 
Burkinabé Abroad). This institute was given the task of looking after its com-
patriots abroad and assisting them if necessary (renewing passports, delivery of 
official documents, etc.) and was put in charge of the Burkina-MIDA1 project. It 
focuses in particular on the potential of wealthier ‘permanent’ migrants, and of 
migrant associations.  
Three elements are important as a context to judge this aspect of Burkinabé 
migration policies: the changed amount of remittances, the MIDA initiative, and 
the possibilities and objectives of migrant organisations. These are now 
discussed. 
Remittances 
One of the wishes of migrants is for an improvement of money transfer possi-
bilities. Migrants expressed much criticism of the lack of services of 
SONAPOST (the Burkina postal service) and the high cost of transfer by banks. 
It was even suggested by the migrants that there should be a focus on the 
development of internet banking! However no specific measures have yet been 
taken by the government to facilitate the transfer of money between host 
countries and Burkina Faso. A clear overview of the total amount of money 
transfers (through formal and informal channels) does not exist. Migrants can 
use several official channels (banks), post offices and the services of Western 
Union and Money Transfer. During the last decade the number of banks in 
Ouagadougou has increased, but in rural areas the population still have no 
access, or very limited access, to banking facilities. 
                                                 
1  MIDA is the ‘Migrations pour le développement en Afrique’ project, launched in 2001 by 
twenty African countries. 
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The Secretariat Permanent du CSBE has announced that it will explore the 
possibilities of establishing a bank especially for Burkinabé migrants, to facili-
tate their investments in Burkina Faso, but the mobilisation of remittances for 
productive investment to support development has not yet been worked out 
(CONAPO, 2006e). This lack of initiative can be linked to the fall in the 
amount of remittances. The contribution of remittances to Burkina Faso’s GDP 
declined gradually from nearly 6 per cent in the 1980s to 1.7 per cent in 2004, 
after the expulsion of Burkinabé migrants from Côte d’Ivoire. The case of 
Burkina Faso has shown that remittances are an unstable source of income, both 
on the level of the state as well that of individual households. 
MIDA initiative 
The MIDA project, which aims to encourage and facilitate the return of quali-
fied nationals, is an example of the so-called co-development strategy and 
involves initiatives and finances from private and public parties. It is being 
carried out in cooperation with OIM (Organisation Internationale pour les 
Migrations) and consists of three elements. The first is the establishment of 
close links between the home country and strongholds of Burkina Faso abroad. 
For this goal an inventory was made of Burkinabé organisations abroad, and 
missions were planned to visit countries with substantial Burkinabé migrant 
communities. Lack of finances has so far limited these missions to one visit, to 
Ghana, Benin and Togo. 
The second element involves the establishment of a database by stocktaking 
qualified Burkinabé living in foreign countries who are willing to apply their 
expertise to projects in Burkina Faso, either during a short stay or by passing on 
their advice and knowledge through modern communication means (tele-
conferencing etc.). A first inventory has been made and compatriots are invited 
to register at a website. At the same time government institutes and agencies 
have been approached to make an inventory of their needs (in terms of knowl-
edge/skills). This inventory has been completed. The next step is to make 
matches and to find finances for the follow-up, the real transfer of knowledge. It 
is obvious that there is a price tag on the follow-up of this project. 
The third element calls for the diaspora to invest in Burkina Faso. This 
invitation contains the possibility of investing in construction projects (housing) 
through two agencies: the Centre de Gestion des Cités (CEGECI: Cities’ 
Management Centre), with its Projet Diaspora Investir au Pays (‘Diaspora 
Investing in the Country’ project), and the Societé Nationale d’Aménagement 
des Terrains Urbains (SONATUR: National Company for Urban Land 
Management). Interested persons can buy an existing house or construct one, 
either through new urban projects such as Ouaga 2000, or in their home village. 
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Cooperation with banks, such as BIB, BACB2 and Ecobank, facilitates the 
financing of such investments. Information about these projects was sent to 
Burkinabé embassies to inform possible participants. In 2004, CEGECI had 
about 250 applications, and SONATUR 500 (Hein, interview 2006). 
Migrant organisations 
Migrant organisations in host countries can act as engines to encourage good 
migration management, as they create an infrastructure for the reception and 
relief of newcomers and can act as channels of information, remittances and 
development assistance.  
Three types of migration organisation can be distinguished in Burkina Faso: 
the international and domestic varieties (both having members from a single 
place of origin), and organisations of returned migrants. During the 1970s and 
1980s, Africa witnessed an enormous growth in migrant associations. From 
approximately 1970 to 1990, the number of migrant organisations in Burkina 
Faso involved in development projects in migrants’ place of origin rose from 58 
to 119 (Diarra, in Beauchemin & Schoumaker, n.d.), with domestic associations 
in particular emerging in that period, partly as a response to deteriorating 
economic and environmental conditions (the so-called African crisis: limited 
growth of food production per capita; high debts compared to GNP; ecological 
degradation; severe drought (Harts-Broekhuis & de Jong, 1993)). International 
associations developed in Côte d’Ivoire in particular, but representations are 
also found in some other African countries (Niger, Senegal, Toga and Ghana), 
as well as in countries on other continents (France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, 
and the USA) (author’s own findings during mission). 
In view of the dominance of continental international associations (based in 
Côte d’Ivoire), Beauchemin & Schoumaker contend that international organisa-
tions have a weaker impact than their domestic counterparts in terms of 
development assistance. This hypothesis is based on the following reasons: 
incomes in Côte d’Ivoire – where most international Burkina migrants live – are 
not high, and consequently only a modest amount of remittances can be sent by 
these groups, and migrants in Côte d’Ivoire have limited access to sponsors or 
other donors (such as NGOs).  
Migrant organisations fulfil different functions for the members themselves 
and for their communities at home: financial (organising informal insurance 
between the members and rotating credit ‘tontines’3, and social and cultural 
                                                 
2  Banque Internationale du Burkina, Banque Agricole et Commerciale du Burkina. 
3  An informal group of people who regularly deposit a small amount of money which is 
allocated to one of the members by lottery. 
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(organising social and sportive events). In the case of a collective transfer of 
remittances, members of an organisation can support initiatives and investments 
in their home village. In addition, the migrant organisation can act as an inter-
mediary (broker) between potential donors (aid programmes, government 
organisations, NGOs) or sponsors (private persons) and the home community. It 
is impossible to estimate the overall development effect of these investments 
supported or started up by migrant initiatives and remittances, but positive 
results for local development identified by Bauchemin and Schoumaker (n.d.) 
concern agricultural projects (dams, irrigation pumps, mechanisation, market 
gardening), infrastructure (roads, mills, boreholes, telephones), public facilities 
(schools, health centres, mosques) and various other economic investments. 
Associations of returnees – the third distinct type of migrant organisation – 
focus on the protection and promotion of their members’ interests, and also 
function as lobby and political pressure groups (Afou, Songho, Ramde, inter-
views 2006; Zongo, 2003). Some even have the promotion of the integration of 
returnees as one of their objectives. Although the emphasis usually lay on 
financial and social support, tensions between returnees and other Burkinabé 
have stimulated these organisations to look after the political interest of the 
repatriates as well. (An example of such distinction can be seen at the Univer-
sity of Ouagadougou, where students differentiate between diaspo and tenga 
(locals).) 
The most famous and influential migrant organisation is Le Tocsin, estab-
lished in 1997, with more than a thousand members. Its focus is on South-South 
relations/ and migrants, and it lobbies for human and migrants’ rights, such as 
the right to vote. One of the statements on which the establishment of Le Tocsin 
is based is remarkable: ‘People in Burkina Faso are inclined to forget the ones 
who have left the country!’ Part of the objectives of this organisation, however, 
form a perfect match with new government policy. Le Tocsin aims at encour-
aging Burkinabé abroad to participate in the development of their country of 
origin and wants to support the relations between government organisations and 
the Burkinabé abroad.  
Migration and risks 
Migrants, in particular undocumented (illegal, clandestine) migrants and 
vulnerable groups such as children and women, are exposed to various risks. 
Burkina Faso has acknowledged some of those risks – the spread of diseases, 
and human trafficking – and interventions to minimise these negative side-
effects for the migrants as well for the country have begun. Other risks have not 
yet been dealt with, to the great annoyance of migrant organisations. These 
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include a lack of protection abroad, poor labour conditions, and financial losses 
which are often related to the informal or undocumented position of the 
migrants and members of their families. 
Migration and the spread of diseases 
The mobility of people contributes to the spread of infectious diseases, and in 
recent times the link between the spread of HIV/Aids and spatial mobility in 
different parts of Africa has been discussed in the literature. The study of Lalou 
and Piché from 1994 (cited in CONAPO, 2006c) revealed a strong correlation 
between migration and the spread of HIV/Aids in several West African coun-
tries. Older documents mention a rather high prevalence of Aids among 
Burkinabé, though recently published numbers indicate a much lower rate of 
infection, but this difference is related to different methods of measuring 
(Segbo, interview 2006). 
Infection rates are significant among people involved in international trans-
port and migration to Côte d’Ivoire. A survey of 739 truck drivers from 1999 
showed that 19 per cent of them were sero-positive and that 96 per cent of the 
infected persons who visited medical posts between 1996–1999 were seasonal 
labourers (Segbo, interview 2006; CONAPO, 2006c).  
The Aids problem is explicitly mentioned in the Burkinabé Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Paper (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2000) and a specific 
office for tackling the problem has been established (Conseil National de Lutte 
contre le Sida), a step that underlines Burkina Faso’s awareness of this threat to 
its public health.  
The majority of Burkinabé migrants go to other African countries. Accord-
ing to the views of Burkinabé officials concerned with HIV/Aids, temporary 
international migrants share a profile which makes them highly prone to 
infection: these migrants are dominantly male, young (mostly married) and not 
highly educated. Ignorance, inability to understand information campaigns and 
a trust in ‘gris-gris’4 contribute to a limited (25%) use of condoms (CONAPO, 
2006c). Moreover, the circumstances in the places of destination (Côte d’Ivoire 
and Ghana) add to the high risk of being infected. A thriving sex market, 
abundantly available prostitutes, and even sex cinemas are believed to encour-
age slack morals. If migrants have been infected during their sojourn abroad, 
the chance is great that they will infect their spouses when they return. In 
                                                 
4  Gris-gris are amulets, charms, and spells intended to ward off pregnancy. 
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addition, the systems of levirate5 and sororate as well as polygamy contribute to 
a further spread of the disease within the local community. 
In view of the lengthy analysis that has been done of the HIV/Aids issue 
(CONAPO, 2006c), the recommendations for policy are very modest and vague. 
There is a call for more international cooperation in this field, and greater 
involvement of NGOs which are expected to be closer to the people infected. 
Trafficking and child labour 
In West Africa, in particular in the Sahelian countries, it is not uncommon to 
send family members away to look for work in other places. This long-standing 
practice holds for all family members, young children included. Children in 
Burkina Faso are sent out to work by their parents for several reasons: they are 
not happy at school, their family cannot pay the school fees, or simply in order 
to have one mouth less to feed (‘eat away migrant’). Besides this, girls are sent 
to towns to work as domestic servants or as agricultural labourers to earn money 
for their trousseau. Boys are usually sent to work on cocoa, coffee, cotton, yam 
and cashew plantations in Burkina Faso or in one of the neighbouring countries 
(especially Côte d’Ivoire). But they can also work as domestic servants, as 
miners in gold mines or as wood and metal workers.  
In the West African context intermediaries are often involved in this kind of 
transaction. These intermediaries are family members, acquaintances or persons 
trusted by the village community. Traffickers, however, can present themselves 
as intermediaries and offer training opportunities in carpentry, or working as 
mechanics, or sewing, either secretly to the children (without informing the 
parents) – or to the parents. Occasionally these agents pay the parents a small 
sum of money. Malevolent intermediaries however, sell the children afterwards 
to plantation owners who are in need of cheap labour, or to other entrepreneurs 
who are interested in cheap labour. Some of the children involved in these 
transactions are exploited and are forced into hard labour, and, even worse, 
some end up as street children who have to beg, or work as prostitutes (Yaro & 
Sawadogo, 2005). 
It is difficult to estimate the number of children who suffer yearly from these 
practices.6 It is evident that the eastern and south-western parts of the country 
                                                 
5  Levirate marriage is one in which, if there were no children, a woman marries one of her 
husband's brothers after her husband's death, in order to continue his bloodline. Sororate 
marriage is one in which a man marries (or engages in sexual activity with) his wife's sister, if 
his wife dies, or if she is infertile. 
6  Data found on the internet from a study by the World Bank and Terre des Hommes, based on 
a sample of 4500 households on a national level: 165 000 children aged between 6 and 17 are 
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are important recruitment areas, and that within these areas some villages are 
more involved than others (Yaro, 2006; Yaro & Sawadogo, 2005). Besides this, 
a particular pattern of destinations can be distinguished within each region. 
Various household surveys revealed that between 13.5 and 25 per cent of the 
households had children below the age of 18 (with an average age of 14.6 years) 
who lived and worked elsewhere; on average 1.4 children per household. 
The destinations of these children are in Burkina Faso itself and in sur-
rounding countries. From the south-western region, for instance, children move 
first to Côte d’Ivoire (plantations around the cities of Divo and Bouna, sugar-
cane plantations and sugar-cane works in and around Férékéssédougou and 
Korgho), and then to Ghana. According to Kress (2006) Burkina Faso functions 
as a transit point for sending children from Benin, Togo and Mali to other 
countries in the region. 
In December 2001 all ECOWAS members agreed on a Political Declaration 
and Action Plan which aims to combat the trafficking of people by establishing 
special anti-trafficking police units and a regional task force dedicated to 
handling this problem, among other measures. In line with this agreement, 
Burkina Faso signed bilateral agreements with Ivory Coast and Mali on com-
bating trafficking, and the cooperation with Mali resulted in the repatriation of 
twenty Burkinabé child-traffic victims. In 2003 the Burkinabé anti-traffic law 
was signed, and in 2004 four child-trafficking networks had already been 
broken up and the arrested traffickers sentenced to prison. 
Formulating laws is not sufficient to combat human trafficking and child 
labour. In addition the Burkinabé government, together with donor organisa-
tions, including the German development organisation GTZ (Deutsche Gesell-
schaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit – German Company for Technical 
Cooperation), has also established Vigilance and Surveillance Committees in 
nearly all provinces and is working with UNICEF on providing transit centres 
for trafficked children. In 2005 a total of 921 children, more than half girls, 
were received in these centres. The members of the watch committees are 
representatives of organisations usually involved in child labour, such as cotton 
producers, the police, NGOs and social welfare agencies. In 1999, the 
Burkinabé government joined the IPEC (International Programme on the 
                                                 
 
involved in child labour and/or child trafficking. See Kielland A. & Sanogo, I. (2002) Burkina 
Faso: child labour migration from rural areas  
(http://home.online.no/~annekie/Africa_docs/BFEnglish.pdf); and School attendance reduces 
likelihood of child migration  
 (http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC10689.htm). 
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Elimination of Child Labour)7 programme, launched by the ILO, which aims to 
prevent child trafficking for work purposes on cotton plantations (Segbo, inter-
view 2006).  
A second additional policy is to give information on several levels. Together 
with the ILO and donors, the government organised seminars for customs 
officers against child trafficking, to train them to recognise types of transport 
used in trafficking. The GTZ-sponsored programme against the trafficking of 
children organised awareness programmes in seventy villages, with the help of 
a forum-theatre. By watching a play and participating in the re-enactment, the 
taboo surrounding the dark sides of migration was broken, and parents became 
aware of the risks their children face during their sojourn elsewhere. For parents 
watching, the enactment or the re-enactment was often the first time they 
became aware of the real experiences of their children. 
At an early age Burkinabé children conform to the unwritten rule that bad 
experiences are not talked about and that the benefits of migration have to be 
displayed. They save their earnings bit by bit to be able to buy something nice 
before returning home, such as new clothes or some gadget (Segbo interview 
2006; Le Pays 21 July 2006). 
Last but not least, policy measures to assist parents with the development, 
during the dry season, of additional economic activities (dams, small irrigation 
projects, horticulture, etc.) are important in preventing the departure of parents 
and the children. And there is some financial support for parents who send their 
children to school on a regular basis. GTZ noted positive effects of the estab-
lishment of school canteens with free meals for the pupils. 
Final remarks and conclusion 
Burkina Faso has a long history as a country of emigration, and migration has a 
positive connotation in all circles in society. Migration is seen as a free choice 
on the part of individuals and families, who are able to improve their living 
conditions thanks to remittances. At the same time these remittances contribute 
to the national income and are welcomed, despite the proven insecure character 
of such cash flow. Initiatives to facilitate the transfer of remittances and to 
diminish the transfer costs are still limited, and Burkinabé migrants encounter 
various obstacles and few possibilities if they want to invest their money in their 
home country. 
                                                 
7  Burkina Faso is one of nine countries participating in this USDOL-funded project to combat 
the trafficking of children for exploitative labour in West and Central Africa (see 
www.fisek.org.tr/atlas_index.php#burkina). 
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The Burkina Faso government hopes the country will be able to profit more 
from international migration to northern countries and takes the example of 
India as an exporter of highly qualified labour. According to officials, the 
ageing populations in Europe offer possibilities for Africans in the European 
labour market, and (temporary) South-North migration can favour fundamental 
productive investments and knowledge transfer. The risk of a brain drain is 
recognised, but this has not yet been translated into policy measures. In fact, the 
attitude of the government is ambivalent on this matter. Adequate knowledge of 
future needs of labour markets in the North was not apparent during the discus-
sions and interviews during the mission. With references only to the ageing 
process and to a possible growing demand for labour in Europe, authorities 
seem to be inadequately informed about the possibility of increased labour 
migration to the North. 
Migration to neighbouring countries is still a more important issue in the 
migration debate than migration to Europe (mainly Italy) and the United States. 
In addition to this ‘regional’ migration, the country has to deal with substantial 
internal migration streams, resulting in agrarian colonisation and urbanisation, 
which both require particular policy attention. The most important migration 
issue in recent years has been the forced return of Burkinabé migrants from 
Côte d’Ivoire and its consequences for the country as a whole and for the 
returnees in particular. The re-entry of the returnees has fuelled the national 
discussion about access to resources, especially land, and reintegration, while at 
the West African regional level the debate has centred around the regulation of 
informal migration and how to secure migrants’ rights. 
The government’s efforts in the field of mobilising the Burkinabé diaspora 
are still in their infancy. With the aid of the OIM, the first phase of a project in 
this area is near completion, so that an overview of qualified Burkinabé who 
live abroad and who are willing to utilise their skills and knowledge in Burkina 
Faso will be available. 
Migrants from Burkina Faso have established migrant organisations in 
various national and international destinations, and after their return they 
participate in migrant organisations at home. Those organisations have several 
functions, but their focus is primarily on mutual support rather than on facili-
tating local development initiatives. This somewhat limited focus on develop-
ment-related initiatives is linked to the more constrained financial means of the 
migrant organisations, which are mainly based in other African countries. 
In addition, the spread of modern communication systems not yet reached 
rural areas and for most Burkinabé the information era has yet to take off. The 
link between migration and knowledge (education, instruction, information, 
advice) was not an explicit issue during the discussions and interviews during 
the mission, but arose in many guises and with one causal relation: a lack of 
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knowledge and information. This lack limits the optimal use of possibilities for 
the development and management of migration – both at the level of the state 
and that of the individual migrant – and even exposes vulnerable migrant 
groups to unacceptable risks.  
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5 
Migration management:  
Mozambique’s challenges  
and strategies 
Inês Raimundo Oucho 
Introduction 
Limited research has been undertaken in examining migration per se, or migra-
tion and management. This chapter is concerned mainly with how Mozambique 
is handling challenges and strategies on migration management. 
In Mozambique, as well as in other countries and in other parts of the world, 
migration management has become an important issue since irregular migration, 
human trafficking and border control have increased across the world. The 
discourse of migration management seems like ‘soft idle chat to put the bull to 
sleep’ (a popular Brazilian saying), since, up till now, no strategies have been 
found to curb the massive exodus. Developing countries are impotent in 
managing these movements since poverty there has increased considerably 
(Adepoju, 1995; Boswell & Crisp, 2004), while developed countries still use 
border enforcements and highly controlled strategies regarding entry, instead of 
looking seriously at the factors that generate the massive exoduses. International 
statistics have shown that the growing number of irregulars in these countries is 
not formed solely by unskilled workers but also by the skilled (Borjas & Crisp, 
2005; Hatton & Williamson, 2005).  
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Traditional sending or receiving countries have changed their roles, so that 
many countries can no longer be defined exclusively as ‘sender’ or as ‘re-
ceiver’. A country like Mozambique cannot be held responsible solely as a 
country that sends migrants. It has latterly become a receiving country, although 
its traditional role as sender still remains the dominant trend (Covane, 1996; 
Das Neves, 1998; INE 1999).  
Several scholars have tried to define sub-Saharan Africa in terms of patterns 
and trends of Mozambican migration, and the existing data still does not show 
Europe or America as privileged destinations for Mozambicans. Apparently, 
even though the economic, social and environmental fragility that the country 
has shown in the three decades of her independence, international boundaries 
are still continuing to be crossed (UNDP, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001). That Europe 
and America are not preferred destinations is demonstrated, firstly, by the 
historical perspective showing Mozambicans following labour migration routes 
to South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Swaziland. After independence, people 
who had to flee from civil war also used these routes, as well as those to Tanza-
nia, Zambia and Kenya. Secondly, during the 1980s, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa represented the strongest economies in the region – even Portugal could 
not compete with them. Lastly, apart from labour migration studies, no substan-
tial research on migration flows, and trends, or on the survival strategies of 
migrants, either internally or internationally, have been conducted. What we 
know about migrants often depends on the information given by the local media 
when Heads of State meet people in the diaspora on their official visits to these 
countries.  
Questions that arise are: 
How did these people reach these destinations? 
What have they been doing since they got there?  
What contributions do they make to their country of origin?  
Additional information has come from recent studies undertaken by SAMP 
(the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP, 2006a; SAMP, 2006b), and 
indirectly through other studies undertaken in South Africa but with no relevant 
statistics on Mozambicans overseas.  
Formerly, migration to South Africa was highly controlled in Mozambique, 
through ‘travel permits’ (guias de marcha) issued by the Ministry of Security, 
and crossing regional borders1 was controlled by the Ministry of Labour since 
people were travelling to South Africa for work. The strategy of control did not 
succeed since Mozambique went through a civil war that left the government 
                                                 
1  The term ‘regional borders’ is used to refer to all (international) borders within the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). 
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without any control over its people who had to flee to urban areas or cross such 
regional borders for security. Most of those who fled overseas did so clandes-
tinely, since some of them were later linked with political movements fighting 
against the FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – Mozambique 
Liberation Front) government. With the end of socialism and the introduction of 
a market economy, the Mozambican government seems to have disregarded its 
role of controlling movement since it is engaged mainly with locating those 
who are ‘jumping’ regional borders, particularly to South Africa, without much 
concern about those who go overseas legally (interview: Cossa2). Unfortunately 
nobody has followed this up. What is certainly important is to have a passport, 
no matter how long people stay during their leave or what they are doing there.  
This chapter is based on empirical evidence from fieldwork that I have 
recently undertaken on migration, gender and urbanisation in Mozambique, 
together with some numerical data – from written information or from the 
Internet. Some interviews from immigration officers are used as supporting 
evidence. In ten years of university lecturing and with the experience gained 
during my research on the topic, I have learnt that from the 1990s until now 
‘migration management’ practice is still a side issue for government, since no 
one has taken the issue sufficiently seriously. This chapter seeks to analyse 
migration management strategies as well as the challenges that policy makers 
have exposed, and it also highlights the assertion that migration serves as a 
significant source of income for origin communities. The question then is: is 
poverty a driver for migration, or has migration contributed to human welfare? 
And to what extent has migration been managed by government decision-
making?  
Migration trends 
Although there is a lack of information about Mozambicans living abroad, this 
chapter aims to show that the existence of limitations on statistics can lead to 
misleading generalisations. However, experiences from other countries can 
probably tell us what situations Mozambicans face and how these experiences 
can contribute to the discourse on migration management.  
Migration is not a new phenomenon in the history of African countries or in 
the world (Adepoju 1994; 1995; Oucho 2001). People have always moved in 
times of need, and in different directions. Population movement in Mozambique 
increased during the period of armed conflict (1976–1992). Approximately 
1.5 million people fled to neighbouring countries, namely Zimbabwe, Swazi-
                                                 
2  Some detail of the interviews is supplied at the end of the chapter. 
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land, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa, and between four and 
five million were displaced internally because of natural hazards such as 
drought, floods, and cyclones (UNDP, 1998). Because of its close links with 
Mozambique from its colonial legacy, Portugal in Europe also became a main 
destination for individuals or groups of people from Mozambique, particularly 
those who were against the regime (Vines, 1991). Some left the country imme-
diately after independence and others during the worsening of the war. Several 
went to the former West Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
to a lesser extent to Kenya and the Comoros Islands. This was possible because 
the then RENAMO (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique – Mozambique 
National Resistance) had branches in countries named as being sympathetic 
towards their cause (Vines, 1991). 
In terms of migration, Mozambique has for a long time been both a sending 
and a receiving country. Some of the reasons for this are: its long historical link 
with trade with Arabic countries, colonialism, mine labour, decolonisation, civil 
war and natural hazards (Penvenne, 1982; Covane, 1996; Whitaker, 1985; Das 
Neves, 1998). The country is heavily dependent on foreign exchange earnings 
from migrant labourers working in South Africa as well as on exports from 
agricultural production. Empirical studies have demonstrated that the country 
has also survived through cross-border trade and long-distance trade with coun-
tries such as Brazil, Hong Kong, China and Taiwan (SAMP3, 2006 a). 
The character of migration in Mozambique has followed world trends. Even 
though there is a lack of study on migration, empirical evidence has shown that, 
quite apart from the migration of labour to South Africa and Zimbabwe, rural-
urban migration has grown considerably. Lack of research on rural-urban 
migration which could help to understand this typology of internal migration 
might lead to generalisation of aspects related to migration issues. As I 
mentioned earlier, well-developed research has been done on labour migration 
to South Africa and Zimbabwe, with a focus on migration from southern 
Mozambique (Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane provinces), and researchers such 
as Katzenellenbogen, Harris, Penvenne, Covane and Das Neves have made a 
study on labour migration to Zimbabwe (Manica province). But, apart from 
these, few studies have been developed in relation to rural-urban migration, in 
particular within Mozambique itself.  
                                                 
3 The Southern African Migration Project, established in 1996. It is a regional research 
organisation comprised of Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe, in partnership with Queen’s University, Ontario, Canada and 
funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the UK Department 
of International Development (DFID). 
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During the 1980s and 1990s, international labour migration was hampered 
by the South African government’s reducing the recruitment of mineworkers 
due to tensions between the two countries, and because of the consequent 
economic crisis in the mining sector (Hanlon, 1986; de Vletter, 2000). This 
situation increased the number of people seeking employment, and many had to 
find work in other markets such as urban areas, and eventually across interna-
tional (non-SADC) boundaries.4 The failure of the rural economy (mostly 
engaged in large-scale agriculture) to create sufficient employment opportuni-
ties in the rural areas, as well as the failure of communal development to 
stimulate rural development through the creation of communal villages, was 
another factor contributing to rural-urban migration (Lattes, 1990; de Vletter, 
2000; Raimundo, 2002). 
Mozambique has been defined in world statistics as the poorest country in 
the world (Republic of Mozambique, 2001; UNDP, 2001). According to the 
data from Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares (National Household Survey on 
Living Conditions of 1996 and 1997), its poverty was characterised by the 
following: slow economic growth until the beginning of the 1990s; poor levels 
of education of economically active members of households, especially women; 
high dependency rates in households; low productivity in the family agricultural 
sector; lack of employment opportunities in the agricultural sector and else-
where; poor development of basic infrastructure in rural areas. This last resulted 
in the isolation of communities due to the lack of adequate roads, and therefore 
in poor integration of rural markets – which would have allowed the sale of 
agricultural surpluses. Poverty puts people in a state of permanent vulnerability 
and migration is one of the ways they find to survive (SAMP, 2006a). 
The Republic of Mozambique,5 which achieved independence from Portugal 
on 25 June 1975, is administratively divided into eleven provinces. It is a 
country of about 19 million inhabitants, where women constitute 51.5 per cent 
of the population and are responsible for 52.5 per cent of active economic 
production (UNDP, 2001; INE, 1999). The average annual population growth 
was estimated between the first post-independence census (1980) and the 
second (1997) to be 1.7 per cent, and for the period 2000–2005 to be 2.5 per 
cent (Republic of Mozambique, 2001; INE, 1999).  
                                                 
4 The 1997 census shows more than seven million people of working age in Mozambique at the 
time of census, of whom only about 500 000 were in formal employment (SAMP, 2006b: 8, 
quoting the UNDP report of 2006). The informal economy in the cities is fed by migrants 
from the rural areas (Knauder, 2000), highlighting the importance of agriculture and the 
informal sector to household incomes and economies (see also 2006 report by the National 
Institute for Statistics). 
5 Formerly the People’s Republic of Mozambique (1975–1990). 
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Migration literature 
Much of the literature on migration in Mozambique is related to labour migra-
tion to neighbouring countries – to be mine workers in South Africa, or to work 
on plantations and in mining in Zimbabwe (Penvenne, 1982; Covane, 1996; Das 
Neves, 1998) – and general cross-border migration to South Africa, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Malawi and Swaziland. The existing literature on cross-border 
migration has explained that migration is a consequence of the civil war and the 
consequent lack of development. It has been facilitated by the opening of the 
border with South Africa in the post-apartheid era (Covane, 1996; UNDP, 1998; 
Das Neves, 1998; Peberdy & Crush, 1998; Rogerson, 1995, 1997, 1999).  
An unpublished SAMP report on Mozambique (July 2006) indicates that 
visa exemption agreements signed between South Africa and Mozambique in 
April 2005, and between South Africa and Swaziland in May 2005, have 
resulted in increased cross border movement, in particular a growing number of 
informal cross-border traders. Entrance entitles the owner of the passport to stay 
thirty days in each country, so most Mozambicans cross the South African 
border and stay for thirty days, and then travel back to the border, to have their 
passports stamped for a further thirty days. This new trend has made the life of 
many Mozambican migrants very much easier (interview: immigration 
officers).  
The factors which impel people to migrate are explained by socio-economic 
and ecological factors (Lattes, 1990; Araújo, 1997). Climatic extremes such as 
droughts and floods have forced thousands of Mozambicans to move out of 
rural areas into urban areas (Araújo, 2000; Raimundo, 2002). It seems that 
people are eager to leave their place of origin, not primarily because of the 
hazardous conditions there, but due to the high level of poverty (SAMP, 2006a). 
Management of Mozambican migration started after independence from 
Portugal in the mid-1970s with the authorisation of people coming into cities, 
and was accelerated by state nationalisation in 1976, which culminated in 1990 
with the revision of the country’s constitution (Raimundo, 2002).  
The types of Mozambican migration most publicised and studied have been 
cross-border and refugee migration. The SAMP studies (2006b) have empha-
sised that cross-border trade is a way of survival for many households in the 
region, due to the increase of poverty, as well as the general worsening of the 
economic situation (for example in Mozambique), and because of political 
instability (Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo). In this context, the 
SAMP studies emphasise that South Africa is a core country where traders do 
their businesses and constitutes the final destination for most migrants. This is 
evident in the growing body of literature examining cross-border migration to 
South Africa, which has begun to emerge (Rogerson, 1997; de Vletter, 1998; 
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Peberdy & Crush, 1998). In the case of Mozambique, the geographic situation 
facilitates the crossing of borders as well as human trafficking since South 
Africa is being targeted as the destination for migrants and as the place for 
cross-border traders because of its links to the rest of the world through its well-
established infrastructure.  
The circumstances that favour border crossing are historically related to the 
kinship that exists between people living alongside the artificial borders made 
during the division of Africa in 1885–1886 by colonial countries. As Vines 
(1991: 6) points out, ‘most African countries are defined by borders laid down 
in the European partition of Africa in 1890.’ Also the absence of employment 
opportunities, the hazardous conditions and the fragile commercial network in 
rural villages push the increase of cross-border trade (Raimundo, 2002). How-
ever, for a country that has experienced a diverse number of events ranging 
from civil war to droughts, economic destabilisation and natural disasters, as 
well as the tightening of border controls in Europe, there has been a glaring 
neglect in the literature of how these factors have impacted on migration within 
and outside the borders of Mozambique. Little is known on how people's rural 
livelihoods have been affected, or what the migration experience of urban-ward 
migrants has been, or the contribution of those who live overseas. 
A census of population and housing taken in 1997 found that internal and 
regional migration in and from Mozambique was caused by civil war. During 
the armed conflict, a large number of people moved from their home areas to 
other places, and eventually to other countries, in search of a safe place to live. 
At the same time the country experienced a long dry period that also resulted in 
people’s displacement. The migration that occurred after the civil war is the 
most complex. Many people who were living abroad during the war returned to 
the country after the signing of the General Peace Agreement (1992), but some 
stayed on in the countries of refuge. Unfortunately, data referring to people who 
moved overseas are not shown in the census, and therefore migration managers 
are not very clear about destinations, nor do they know how many people went 
overseas and how many are still living there, although the electoral registration 
in Europe in 2004 attests to about 8000 Mozambicans living in Europe, and 
indirect information indicates many others in the United States (interview: 
Cossa).  
One of the most interesting findings of the 1997 census is that migration 
often occurs over short distances, for example, between adjacent provinces or 
districts. Manica, Sofala, Maputo province and the city of Maputo had the 
highest rate of immigration. In the case of Manica, the majority came from 
Sofala province, while people who went to Sofala came from Zambezia 
province. 
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A recent national SAMP study of 1375 households undertaken on ‘Migration 
and Poverty’ (SAMP, 2006a) covers the period of the civil war where people 
concentrated by preference in three main cities. It shows little change in rural-
urban migration: the capital city is still the main destination (Raimundo, 2004). 
The survey gives figures for households with the breadwinner working in the 
home country (46.1%), followed by those who live in South Africa (5.7%). It 
found that five members of the households which were part of the survey live in 
Europe (including the UK), one in North America and two in Asia.  
Recent studies undertaken in Portugal by Portuguese researchers (whose 
work has not yet been published) have corroborated this idea of ‘lack of 
interest’ from Mozambicans in going to Portugal since it shows fewer than five 
thousand Mozambicans in that country. This is in contrast to the numbers 
coming to Portugal from Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea and Brazil – all former 
colonies. Quoting from the second national census of Population and Housing 
of 1997 there were over 90 thousand foreigners registered in Mozambique, as 
shown in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1 Number of foreigners living in Mozambique in 1997, by province and  
 gender  
Province Men Women Total 
Mozambique 58,786 32,061 90,847 
Niassa 4,239 3,877 8,116 
Cabo Delgado 1,721 1,290 3,011 
Nampula 250 157 407 
Zambezia 7,843 7,138 14,981 
Tete 10,522 9,083 19,605 
Manica 4,217 2,782 6,999 
Sofala 2,002 1,012 3,014 
Inhambane 6,666 830 7,496 
Gaza 11,865 2,063 13,928 
Maputo province 4,989 2,031 7,020 
Maputo city 4,472 1,798 6,270 
Source: INE, 1999: 99; refers to a national survey undertaken in the year of 2004 on Migration and Poverty 
where 1375 households were interviewed.  
 
Defining migration management 
According to the Oxford Dictionary (1995), ‘Management is the control and 
making of decisions in a business or similar organisation.’ It implies taking 
action to make the desired results come to pass. In this sense migration 
management, if seen as a business, can be the means that enables the govern-
ment to design and implement a migration policy. Hence for successful 
management, all involved stakeholders – the government, the general popula-
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tion, and researchers – must all play a role in defining migration procedures. So 
that their success can have legitimacy, they need to share ownership.  
Government has the role of creating regulations for the movement of people. 
These regulations must be based on what is actually happening, in terms of how 
many migrants the country has, internally and internationally, and why they 
migrated. This information comes from researchers who have analysed the 
process of migration and the circumstances under which people are leaving. The 
population becomes the ‘target’ of the immigration policy. The government 
designs immigration integration by having a long-term strategy, which balances 
the interests of all stakeholders while sharing responsibilities with every role-
player in society.  
After independence, migration in Mozambique was managed through draco-
nian rules under the socialist regime (from 1975 to 1990). Everybody was 
governed according to ‘popular power’, by Labour Agreements (made during 
the colonial period), and – since everything, including the population, was seen 
as the state’s property – regulated by strong connections to socialist countries 
such as the former Soviet Union (USSR), the former Eastern Germany, and 
Cuba (see the Mozambican Constitution, 1975). During that period people 
going abroad to study were authorised to go only to Eastern countries, and after 
finishing their studies were compulsorily sent home. There was another group 
who went to work in Eastern Germany under restricted regulations. Not every-
body had the right to possess a passport unless there was serious illness needing 
foreign treatment (preferably in the former socialist countries of Europe, and 
latterly in South Africa). It was not normal to possess a passport, and everybody 
had – as is normal – to apply through the Immigration Office, which was, 
however, controlled by the Ministry of Security through the so-called Mozam-
bique State Security (SNASP). The applicant had to explain why he or she 
needed a passport (interview: Cossa). The Mozambican State was able to 
control overseas migration through these stringent regulations. 
For fifteen years, during the 1970s and ’80s, Mozambicans were forced to 
settle internally in communal and urban villages (due in part to the civil war, 
floods and drought – see INGC (2003) – and because ‘Operation Production’, 
an unsuccessful attempt to move people out of the cities) (Hanlon, 1986). The 
authorities used to demand an internal travel permit (guias de marcha) from all 
citizens crossing provincial and district boundaries. Nevertheless, these travel 
permits were statistically useless because no-one processed the information 
contained in these forms (interview: Panachande). In fact during these years 
migration was a taboo subject since it was considered a matter of state security. 
Policy on immigration focused on enforcing borders and combating irregular 
movements, making this task the responsibility of the ministers of Security, 
Justice, Interior and Defence. Even though this occurred during the time of tight 
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control of movement, no member of the government can tell us how many 
Mozambicans lived in the so-called forbidden Western countries during the time 
of exile.  
With the advent of the multiparty system in 1990 and a market economy, 
migration became a ‘normal’ issue. This was because, according to the revised 
Mozambique Constitution, all citizens have equal rights and opportunities, 
including the right to hold a passport, hence the right to travel and to live 
wherever they want to, including living abroad (Mozambican Revised Consti-
tution of 1990). 
In the sixteen years since the introduction of a market economy, the topic of 
migration seems to have been poorly managed in Mozambique since the 
government has ‘released’ the citizens after a period of tight control. The 
institutions that deal with migration have no information on who is moving, 
where people are, how many at each place and what they do, and how many are 
moving in and out, particularly moving overseas. What exists is a general sense 
that Mozambicans cross South African borders irregularly and are involved in 
cross-border trade, even in crime gangs. In May 2006 the Television of 
Mozambique (TVM, July 2006) showed an programme about the trafficking of 
girls by an old man in Namaacha district, Maputo Province, which is bordered 
by Swaziland and South Africa. That the situation of trafficking had increased is 
difficult to substantiate since the statistics regarding trafficked people are 
inconsistent, depending as they do on personal opinion rather than hard data. 
Since the year of 2005 the IOM in Maputo has assisted eight women ageing 
between 16 and 24 years, mostly among the Mozambican southern borders with 
South Africa and Swaziland. The IOM has not assisted people in the other 
borders such as Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe (interview: 
Chimedza). 
A new direction of migration studies, namely gender and migration, was 
started in 2002 by Raimundo, who discussed the issue of gender and migration 
in southern Mozambique. But no substantial studies on migration in general 
have been undertaken by Mozambican scholars, apart from two who did their 
doctoral studies on labour migration, and one on refugee studies. This lack of 
interest, either from scholars or from the government, creates a shortage of 
information. What exists are merely assumptions and not accurate data about 
what is going on.  
Although the government requires its people to fill in immigration forms 
during entry into and departure from the country, this exercise seems to be 
useless since that information has not given us statistics, and after five years of 
storage the forms have now been destroyed (interview: Panachande). In reality 
this practice dates back to the time of citizens’ control of movement to and 
outside of the country. 
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The sad and amazing situation is that none of the ministries, neither Foreign 
Affairs nor Interior, has accurate information about Mozambican migration, for 
example, who lives overseas. During socialism it was a serious offence to live 
in Western countries. No one who dared to flee registered at the local embassy 
or consulate because they feared persecution and harassment. The conjecture 
advanced in this paper is that it therefore became a habit not to register in the 
country of destination. As stated by the Mozambican General Consul in Johan-
nesburg, the same happened with those who lived in South Africa, because most 
people came to South Africa for irregular purposes (Notícias, 1 August 2006).  
Out-migration from Mozambique  
Regional migration: Mine and plantation labour  
Out-migration, particularly to the southern African region, has been an histori-
cal feature of life in Mozambique for over a century (Covane, 1998; Das Neves, 
1998). Authors Penvenne (1982), Covane (1998), and Lubkemann (2000) all 
consider that this phenomenon was shaped by the colonial agreement between 
the then Portuguese government and the Republic of South Africa.  
Table 5.2 Number of migrant labourers working in South Africa  
Year  Workers Year Workers 
1970s 100,000 1997 52,000 
1975 118,000 2000 43,860 
1977   41,000 2001 45,254 
1982   46,000 2002 50,589 
1985   55,000 2003 52,205 
1990   42,000 2004 48,099 
1995   52,000 2005 46,256 
Sources: de Vletter, 1998; TEBA-WENELA, 2006 
Migration has latterly become a way of survival strategy and, as Lubkemann 
(2002: 193) says in a Portuguese case, ‘emigration is often considered the only 
possible route to material success.’ In fact, migrants in rural areas are sharply 
different from the other ‘citizens’ because they are able to build better houses, 
with solar panels, private boreholes, donkeys for transportation, bicycles, etc., 
as shown in a survey on Migration and Poverty in Mozambique (SAMP6, 2006).  
Studies conducted by SAMP are beginning to examine cross-border migra-
tion. They have examined the processes involved and Mozambique’s relation-
ship with South Africa based on the migration of large numbers of Mozambi-
                                                 
6  SAMP has published more than forty research reports on the issue of migration in the region. 
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cans to the gold and coal mines in South Africa (Rogerson, 1997; Peberdy & 
Crush, 1998; Das Neves, 1998; Covane, 1996). However, it is worth noting that 
the work of SAMP does not look at the flow of migrants from South Africa to 
other countries of southern Africa, nor does it investigate the socio-economic 
impact of such migration on the economies of these countries. The SAMP 
studies are faulty because they overemphasise the role of South Africa as a core 
in-migration country, which is understandable since this country has the highest 
Human Development Index after Botswana (UNDP reports, 1998, 1999, 2000; 
2001). However, data from the census of 1997 and a recent study done on 
refugees and socio-economic conditions in the Maratane refugee camps and in 
the city of Maputo in 2004 (CEMIRDE & CEP, 2004) have demonstrated that 
Mozambique (as well as other southern African countries) is not only a sending 
country but a receiving country as well, with migrants entering the country from 
Nigeria, the African Great Lakes, China, Pakistan and Lebanon (interview: 
Cossa). 
In South Africa, the genesis of the migrant labour system required large 
supplies of cheap labour. Internally this was, historically, enforced through 
various techniques such as taxation, labour coercion (Penvenne 1982; Covane 
1996, Das Neves 1998), land alienation, and ultimately rural impoverishment. 
African men from many parts of the region were involved in the labour system 
in South Africa (Hanlon, 1986). A growing body of literature examining the 
impact of the migrant labour system on the rural economies of Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique can been found in various 
literatures (Covane, 1996; Das Neves, 1998; de Vletter, 2000; Peberdy & Crush, 
1998).  
Of paramount concern in this literature is the effect of rural–urban migration 
and its implications for the economy of rural African households, and more 
significantly, for women left behind. In general, the paradigm of the successful 
migrant career is seen as a means for men to establish households and build up a 
capital base through the acquisition of land, livestock and equipment, to take 
care of their retirement and to maintain an independent livelihood (de Vletter, 
2000).  
Migration in southern Mozambique was primarily connected with masculin-
ity, especially migration for economic reasons. In her 2005 study on The Inter-
action of Gender and Migration: Household Relations in Rural and Urban 
Mozambique, Raimundo found, through focus group discussions and life 
histories, that the extent of one’s manhood was seen to be determined by 
 MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE  
 
103
migration: ‘My son, go to Joni7 to be a man.’ Because of the issue of ‘man-
hood’, the desire to go to ‘Joni’ went beyond the colonial exigency of paying 
taxes. Young men were forced by society to challenge harsh mine conditions in 
order to gain the status of manhood. Young men and adults were also attracted 
by friends and relatives who returned well-dressed and bringing goods such as 
bicycles, motorbikes, dresses, shoes, etc. However, because of their long stays 
in Johannesburg, some of these men, added, to some extent, to the responsibili-
ties of the wives they left behind. These women had to ‘become men’ since they 
had to perform the traditional duties of men, such as contracting workers to the 
fields, and mending their houses.  
Table 5.3 Remittances and deferred pay, in South African rands (ZAR) 
Year Compulsory deferred pay Voluntary remittances* Total 
1992 155,999,283 5,100,421 161,099,704 
1993 163,115,778 11,656,474 174,722,252 
1994 171,013,678 19,540,839 190,554,517 
1995 200,163,229 21,433,277 221,596,506 
2005 432,816,199   
Sources: de Vletter, 1998; TEBA, 2006 
* Refers to the money collected through mining industry channels (de Vletter, 1998: 15). 
Estimation on remittance flows 
In 2005 the contribution of Mozambican mine labourers in South Africa 
corresponded to 3.6 per cent of the country’s GDP (TEBA-WENELA, 2006). 
Part of the earnings of most migrants is sent home as ‘remittances’, either as 
cash or in the form of goods. These remittances can be sent through formal 
channels, such as banks, employers, and contractor agencies, or informally 
through friends, crew members, drivers, etc. As discussed earlier, remittance-
sending to Mozambique is usually directly linked to mine labour activity, and is 
thus constrained by the agreement between the then governments of Portugal 
and South Africa with regard to the mechanism of Deferred Pay. These 
governments agreed that the miners had to deduct sixty per cent of their salaries 
as a deferred payment. This money is then paid to them at the end of their 
contract. Annually, all foreign mine workers have remitted an amount equiva-
lent to about R432 million. That amount is for deferred pay, compensation for 
widows, pension payments, provident fund payment, and loan services awards 
payment and for ‘financial benefit’ (interview: Carimo).  
                                                 
7  The nickname that people of Southern Mozambique give to the city of Johannesburg, South 
Africa. 
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Mine workers’ remittances  
Several scholars (e.g. de Vletter 2000; Boswell & Crisp, 2004) have pointed out 
that migrants contribute to poverty alleviation and development in their origin 
countries through their investments and through the diffusion of financial and 
knowledge-based capital. Depending on the length of their stay abroad, and the 
type of work they find there, workers gain financial, human, social and other 
types of capital. Although data on remittances is insufficient, migrants’ remit-
tances to the country of origin represent a significant role in making a difference 
within the community. As Jose Carimo says, the money that comes through 
TEBA Bank Ltd. has helped many families in meeting household needs and has 
improved their standard of living. Widows have survived from this money since 
the widows’ cash compensation is for life, whether they marry again or not. In 
fact from 2000 to 2005 transactions through TEBA Ltd., amounting to millions 
of rand, have increased considerably. That money, according to Jose Carimo, is 
directly controlled by TEBA Ltd., without government intervention. Table 4 
refers to the cash that was transferred from South Africa through TEBA (which 
is a recruiting mining agency). That money is sent monthly to the spouses ‘at 
home’. It has been usual to see by the end of the month women queuing outside 
of the TEBA office in the city of Maputo. 
Table 5.4 Payment transactions (in million ZAR), remitted through TEBA, Ltd. 
 Month   Year transaction deferred 
  Number of    Amount Number of        Amount 
   miners  miners 
Deferred pay 3,434 19,493,139.81 54,463 316,046,980.65  
Cash wives  5,206 4,052,074.73 59,339 39,364,143.30 
Cash cheques  0 0.00 0 0.00 
Cash widows  2,441 3,089,145.58 25,984 32,035,850.73 
Cash IGF 
(widows’ compensation)  1,813 1,935,986.02 20,609 24,894,062.25 
Rand Mutual Insurance 1,607 2,408,208.53 12,419 16,555,055.80  
Other funeral advances  63 356,087.10 614 3,920,106.65 
Totals  14,564 31,33,641.76 17,3428 432,816,199.38 
Sources: TEBA, Ltd. 2006, Maputo; Carimo interview 
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International migration 
International migration8 has become more complex since the numbers moving 
from place to place have increased, and the media has repeatedly portrayed 
large numbers of Africans as crossing international boundaries in search of 
welfare. What worries managers, politicians and human right societies is the 
way in which much of this movement occurs. i.e. in irregular situations 
(undocumented people), and the increase in the number of people who are 
smuggled and trafficked. A number of people9 have been clandestinely trans-
ported to Maputo in ships, from China, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Lebanon. 
Their ultimate desired destination was probably South Africa (interviews: 
Cossa; Chimedza). 
Several reasons have been given (Adepoju 1995; Boswell & Crisp 2004; 
Koser & van Hear, 2005; Martin et al., 2006) to explain why people are forced 
to leave their places of origin in Mozambique: for work, to join family mem-
bers, to study, for protection and safety due to political and ethnic persecution 
or human rights violation. These movements of people pose challenges of 
integration and exploitation. Globalisation has increased the likelihood of 
international migration, and poverty in African countries, as well as insecurity, 
has also exacerbated conditions promoting migration. Furthermore, managers 
have been unable to cope with the massive and irregular movement of people 
leaving Mozambique. Hosting countries have controlled more and more of their 
borders, but the situation has not changed significantly since the media still 
show an increasing number of people moving irregularly. 
Generally, people move because they are forced to do so. No-one wishes to 
live far from her or his culture unless something strong pushes her or him to 
leave the place of origin and be exposed to new neighbours, cultures, language, 
and food. Empirical studies (e.g. Winge, 1998) have indicated that people are 
also persuaded to move if their neighbours, who have been living abroad for 
years, have remitted food and goods to those who were left behind, and eventu-
ally return, bringing back a new style of life. And to some it is a matter of pride 
to have a family member in Europe or America (Raimundo, 2005).  
                                                 
8 The reader is reminded that the term ‘international’ is used to refer primarily to countries 
outside the SADC region. 
9  The numbers varied according to the source. For example, Humberto Cossa said that nearly 
thirty of these people per week go through the Maputo International Airport. Later the same 
people were found trying to cross the borders of Swaziland or South Africa – they cannot 
travel directly to South Africa since control is strict on that side, so they fly to Maputo, get 
visas at the point of entry, and then go by road to the South African or Swaziland border. 
Nelly Chimedza’s estimate of numbers was considerably lower. 
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As explained earlier, very little data on international migration exists in 
Mozambique, partly because, in the time of repression, the movement of people 
to other countries was controlled by SNASP. This practice was abolished by the 
revised Mozambican Constitution of 1990, although, for military reasons, all 
youths aged between 18 and 30 years still have to ask permission to move from 
the Minister of Defence (interview: Cossa).  
Mozambique is one of the few African countries where international migra-
tion outside African boundaries is probably not significant. Immigration officers 
have not yet received people deported from Europe or America, unlike what has 
been reported by the media in relation to other African countries. The problem 
is the almost complete lack of information about movement in and out of 
Mozambique. According to Humberto Cossa, only one case of deportation from 
Europe to Mozambique was reported last year: two Comorians were deported 
from Portugal to Mozambique. This happened because the flight they caught to 
Portugal was from Maputo. (They were on travelling on faked French pass-
ports.) However, each week and month Mozambique reports people from 
China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Lebanon and Ethiopia who have used the country 
as a gateway to South Africa. For example, on 14 May 2006, twenty-seven 
Ethiopians aged between 18 and 25 landed at Maputo airport, with visas valid 
for thirty days, but with no idea where they were going to stay (interview with 
the Director of Immigration Office in Maputo, June 2006).  
The Instituto Nacional de Apoio as Comunidades no Exterior (INACE – the 
National Institute of Support for Mozambicans in the Diaspora) has indicated 
that in the past few years it has helped (only) one Mozambican, who had been 
living for ten years in the USA, to be re-settled, and to have access to land for 
building a house for his family, who were at that time still living in the USA 
(interview: Matavele), July 2006). Some hundred or so other Mozambicans 
have returned from Kenya where they have been living for more than forty 
years. The policy of the institute is to help Mozambicans who live in the 
diaspora to access facilities in registration at their home embassies or consu-
lates, and to protect their interests, particularly those of people who want to 
return to the country, with custom facilities, etc. (interview: Angelica).  
Some literature, and the media, have indicated that Africans are taking 
advantage of historical routes and are migrating to the ‘metropolis of the former 
colony’, painting all African migrants with the same brush by implying that 
every African goes to the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Spain or Portugal – the 
former colonial powers (Martin, Martin & Weil, 2006). However, according to 
Humberto Cossa, it seems that Mozambicans do not care about Portugal in 
particular. Even though there is no accurate data about people who live over-
seas, the Director of Immigration said that empirical evidence has demonstrated 
that Mozambicans are widely spread in South Africa, Tanzania, Malawi, 
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Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Kenya, but no significant numbers are 
found in Europe. In Portugal, for example, they are fewer than ten thousand 
Mozambicans, and in other European countries – namely Spain, Germany, 
France, Italy and United Kingdom – fewer than a hundred thousand in each 
country.  
The reason for the presence of Mozambicans in these Western countries, 
even without colonial connections, is that they hosted RENAMO and other 
groups who were against the FRELIMO regime, as described by Vines (1991). 
The Mozambicans in Germany are those who were working in East Germany, 
and, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, decided to move to West Germany, as 
their home country was still at war and with no significant signs of peace. Most 
of these people acquired permanent residence in Germany and did not care to 
register at the embassies to be identified as Mozambicans (interview: Cossa).  
Empirical data has shown that, apart from people who use Mozambique as a 
gateway, there are a considerable number of foreigners from different countries 
of Asia, especially from the middle east, China, Taiwan, and Pakistan, to name 
some (Director of Immigration, June 2006) living in the country. However, the 
USA census of 2000 (Bump & Martin, 2006) indicates that Mozambicans in the 
USA are 0.4 per cent of the Lusophone foreigners born in 2000, as can be seen 
in Table 5.5. Unfortunately the statistic quoted does not indicate Mozambicans 
born in the year of entry as shown for the other countries.  
Table 5.5 Origin of foreign-born lusophone people in the US in 2000 
Country of origin Number of migrants Percentage 
Mozambique 2,025 0.4 
Portugal  203,120 44.6 
Brazil 212,430 46.7 
Cape Verde 26,605 5.8 
Angola 4,365 1.0 
Macau 6,720 1.5 
Source: Bump & Martin, 2006 
The same source indicates that these Mozambicans are well-educated 
compared with the other Portuguese speakers in the USA, including those from 
Portugal. About forty per cent of these Mozambicans have Bachelor or higher 
degrees, with Cape Verde and Portugal being less than ten per cent (Bump & 
Martin, 2006). Despite their success in education, unemployed Mozambicans 
number five per cent compared to three per cent of Portuguese. I conclude, 
therefore, that there is what could be called a ‘brain drain’ to the United States, 
since most Mozambicans living there are well educated.  
Oucho (2006) calls the attention of scholars to two points. Firstly that there 
exist various interpretations of the phenomenon in different circles, including in 
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academia and public service, and secondly that the brain drain must be inter-
preted as the movement of highly trained and skilled people. The figure from 
the US census bureau represents the few Mozambicans with a degree higher 
than that of Bachelor, which should perhaps not be used as an example to make 
definitive conclusions about a brain drain. I do not think that we should fear to 
label that phenomenon as a brain drain since Mozambique faces a shortage of 
qualified people in a country where illiteracy is unacceptably high.  
Skills needed in Mozambique and available in the diaspora 
Data from Internet sources indicate that by the year 2004 there were 8 000 
Mozambicans living in the diaspora in Portugal (Mozambique News Agency, 
AIM reports, 2004). At the time of registration for the third Mozambican 
general election in 2004, a total of nearly 47 000 were found in the diaspora, 
with close to 45 900 Mozambicans living in Africa (South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Swaziland, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and Kenya), and only 1100 in Europe (in 
Portugal and Germany) (Mozambique News Agency, AIM reports 2004).  
Although there is a lack of information about Mozambicans living abroad I 
do not deny their presence. Rather, my work is trying to prove the limited 
nature of the available statistics, which can lead to inaccurate generalisations. 
However, experiences from other countries can probably tell us what situations 
Mozambicans face and how they can contribute to the discourse of migration 
management. 
As the management of migration remains critical in Mozambique and the 
lack of consistent data is one of the main obstacles to effective migration 
management, a national migration statistic unit is urgently needed, to collect 
information on migration. The Centre for Population Studies at Eduardo 
Mondlane University in Maputo has recently established a unit studying migra-
tion which, in collaboration with eight regional universities, conducts small 
surveys on specific issues, such as migration and poverty, migration and HIV, 
cross-border trade, etc. The unit has also tried to establish a training programme 
for immigration officers, frontier guards and staff of other related departments 
on how to deal with migration, as well as providing assistance on the systemati-
sation of registration mechanisms. Advice is also given regarding the forms 
which immigration officers require for every person who leaves or enters the 
country.  
The data regarding the skills of Mozambicans in the diaspora are the most 
difficult from which to draw a profile, due to the inability of the relevant minis-
tries to keep records of emigrants, particularly those who received scholarships 
to study abroad. Although the country has been independent for thirty-one 
years, most of the available data refers only to the 1990s. Most of the govern-
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ment officers interviewed (and listed at the end of this chapter) were not able to 
indicate how many of those who benefited from scholarships have returned 
home. Even though there has been a request for data for this study, ministries 
such as Health, Defence, and Education are still organising their information. 
This situation indicates that, for the thirty-one years of independence, state 
institutions have, in most cases, not processed the information available to 
them.  
One hypothesis that could be posited regarding migrants is that they inten-
tionally remain in the host countries because, as Oucho said10, ‘highly skilled 
people are not welcome in their countries of origin.’ A senior officer of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (interview: Tamele) said, however, that of about thirty 
people from this ministry who were trained abroad only two did not return after 
completing their studies.  
As has already been mentioned, there is very little data available, and many 
officials do not even know who from their ministry or department is abroad in 
training programmes, or in what countries, and little or no data is classified by 
gender. 
Data on human resources training programmes offered by different minis-
tries show that Mozambicans have been trained in a variety of countries, and 
have benefited from different experiences in America, Europe and Asia. 
However, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Mozambique has been 
brain-drained over the years of independence since neither the census nor the 
ministries keep records on who departs or who returns. As in every African 
country, there is no mechanism for expand the data by documenting migrants’ 
educational achievements, skills or even destination. In fact, scholars and 
government officers have only estimated the statistics. Interviews were 
conducted with the heads of Human Resources departments in different minis-
tries – but out of twenty-four ministries I was able to get information from only 
six. The information they gave is shown in Table 5.6. 
Illegal migration routes and human trafficking networks 
While human trafficking has become a hot international issue, as has already 
been pointed out, Mozambique is still a country without accurate data on 
migration. The issue of trafficking is still not taken seriously since no law has 
yet been passed to ban the practice of human trafficking in Mozambique or 
South Africa, making it difficult for law enforcement agencies in either country 
                                                 
10  At a lecture given during a training course on migration management in June 2003 at the 
Public and Development and Management School, University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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to investigate and prosecute perpetrators. However, Mozambique has signed the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially 
women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, but it has not deposited the instrument of ratifi-
cation at the UN Secretariat, so it cannot be considered party to the protocol.  
Table 5.6 Emigration for training purpose  
Ministry Number of people in training (Europe, US, Australia) 
Transport and Communications 28 
Environmental Affairs 13 
Interior 57 
Tourism 22 
Agriculture 81 
Mineral Resources 117 
Sources: Ministries, as listed at the end of this chapter 
 
Mr Adriano Ubisse, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 
said that the government of Mozambique was worried about the situation and 
efforts had been done in order to create a database on the issue (Savana11, 8 
September 2006). Quoting the same source, he said that migrants to foreign 
countries form 2.1 per cent of the total population of Mozambique.  
Data referring to human trafficking has come from inconsistent newspaper 
and Internet sources. For example, according to Eye on Human Trafficking, an 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) bulletin of news, information 
and analysis on trafficking in persons in Southern Africa (19 April 2006), 
Mozambican women and girls often approach smugglers to arrange their 
undocumented entry into South Africa. Officers from the IOM office in Maputo 
(Nelly Chimezda and Belarmino Cristos) argue that migrant-smuggling can lead 
to human trafficking and the sexual or labour exploitation of female, male and 
child migrants.  
According to Chimedza, statistics on trafficked people is erratic (see endnote 
6). Since last year (the year that the IOM Maputo office was re-established) they 
have assisted only eight women, between the ages of 16 and 24 years, mostly 
along the southern border. According to Chimedza, there are many reasons why 
it is difficult to identify a trafficked person. She says that traffickers take 
advantage of the high incidence of poverty, which makes it easier to capture 
people, particularly girls and boys. The girls are used for prostitution, while the 
boys go into plantations in Mpumalanga Province in South Africa. Once they 
                                                 
11  Mozambique’s leading independent weekly newspaper. 
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are in the hands of the traffickers most of these people do not escape since some 
traffickers convince them that they are Sangomas (traditional healers) with 
power to control their lives.  
There is a group of civil society organisations across the region mobilising to 
raise awareness on child trafficking and exploitation, and to assist governments 
to develop strategies to combat it (interview: Chimedza). 
Conclusions and migration policy 
Migration management is complex in the sense that it involves interactions 
between policy makers, civil society and researchers. Maintaining a satisfactory 
migration policy that can respond to all stakeholders’ interests is a complicated 
and difficult matter. In Mozambique this challenge has become more complex 
with the increase of poverty in the country, which affects people’s mobility, 
either on a temporary or a permanent basis. It is notable that people depend 
increasingly on crossing borders – internal, regional, or international. 
This chapter has sought to analyse migration management strategies for 
Mozambique, and to examine the problems that policy-makers have exposed. Is 
poverty a driver for migration, and has migration contributed to human welfare? 
The chapter has discussed the ways in which migration serves as a significant 
source of income for origin communities. Based on primary sources (inter-
views) and secondary sources (official statistics, policy migration and the Immi-
gration Act – Law no. 95 of 199312), the chapter explores potential relationships 
between migration, development and management. In doing so, it looks for 
trends in international and regional migration from Mozambique, which 
consists of a small exodus to Europe and North America, and – importantly – a 
massive exodus to southern African countries, namely South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Swaziland and Malawi. Even though there is no net out-migration, it is 
important to explain why this is so. How can developed countries take from 
Mozambique an example of a strategy for managing influx from other African 
countries?  
The discourse on traditional sending-countries like Mozambique has become 
outdated, since the country has actually turned into a receiving country. Hence 
the issue must be understood within a regional context and eventually at an 
international level. Although the data in Mozambique is not reliable, this is a 
trend that has been seen around the world. 
Until recently the country had been – for years – either sending labour to 
mining or plantations, or acting as a refugee sender. However it has now 
                                                 
12  República de Moçambique, Regulamento sobre imigração, Llei Número 95/1993. Maputo. 
112 RAIMUNDO 
 
become a country receiving refugees, a destination for people from different 
corners of the world, and a country where internal migration has increased, 
particularly from rural areas.  
The experience accumulated from management, the execution of migration 
and the need to reflect internally, together with advances flowing from interna-
tional conventions, have all influenced an open migration policy in Mozam-
bique.  
It seems that international migration, as well as migration per se, will not 
end. In fact current society is following what nomadic people did in the past. No 
one country is enclosed in a shell and no one country can live without migrants. 
A set of elements on current migrations still need to be clarified as follows: 
given the importance of immigration that occurs within the region and interna-
tionally, and the extent to which it affects the economy of Mozambique, the 
government should regularly undertake to collect and analyse data on these 
migrations. This task could be part of the census or of a regularly-held survey. 
In addition: 
• Migrants who live away from home should be encouraged to be registered at 
local consulates or embassies; 
• International statistics on skilled and unskilled migrants in hosting countries 
should be undertaken; 
• Regular consultations should be held with migrants themselves, to determine 
whether they want to return to their homes, and if so in what circumstances;  
• Since one of the routes of emigration is Africa, African countries must 
ensure that they have a harmonised migration policy, which implies coping 
with differences in regional development. 
Some countries with strong economies believe that if they open their borders 
they may become porous i.e. be ‘invaded’ by the poor from other countries. 
This then requires a regular monitoring of the effects of visa agreements, and 
concord of migration policy is strongly recommend in order to assess how 
things are progressing. However, none of these interventions are likely to be 
effective without collective efforts between the sending and receiving countries. 
Also important is the role that should be played by all principal participants in 
the process of migration management. Lastly, it must be acknowledged that we 
are living in critical times; it is difficult to deal with migration, since no fence or 
regulation, or even suggestions from scholars and politicians, can restrain the 
flow of migrants.  
Migration management is a collective effort and everybody is invited to take 
a closer look at the phenomenon. Such action will help all targeted people 
(migrants) not only to live as survivors but to thrive and contribute to the 
process of poverty reduction through their remittances. Managers need to define 
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an inclusive strategy that, which does not prohibit people’s movement, and 
facilitates the movement of peoples, in order to avoid irregular migration. 
Hosting countries have often criticised the increasing numbers of migrants 
without even knowing the circumstances in which they came.  
Interviews 
Ana Abreu, HR Head, Ministry of Interior. June 2006 
Jose Carimo, TEBA13 Ltd representative, Maputo. July 24, 2006 
Nelly Chimedza, IOM Counter Trafficking Program Assistant, Maputo. September 1, 
2006 
Belarmino Cristos, IOM Counter Trafficking Program Assistant, Maputo. September 1, 
2006 
Humberto Cossa, Director of Immigration of the city of Maputo. June 9, 2006 
João Cumbane, HR Head, Ministry of Transport and Communications. June 2006 
Angelica Matavele, INACE. July 2006 
Higiene Mussengue, HR Head, Ministry of Environmental Affairs. June 2006 
Marta V.J. Pecado, HR Head, Ministry of Mineral Resources. June 2006 
Carlitos Rupia, Head of Ministry of Tourism. June 2006 
Momade Panachande, former National Director of Immigration. 2004 
André Tamele, HR Head, Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo. 11 June 2006 
Chief immigration officers at the Namaacha, Ressano Garcia and Mandimba border 
posts. July 2006 
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6 
Contemporary patterns, trends  
and development implications  
of international migration  
from Botswana 
Thando Gwebu 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses patterns and trends of voluntary international migration 
from Botswana over the past half century. Migration is a household livelihood 
diversification portfolio (Kerven, 1982). The household may be viewed as 
spreading its resources, including its members, in such a way as to ensure an 
income in a risky semi-arid environment. By placing some of its money and 
time in crops, some in cattle, some in beer-brewing and some in job-seeking in 
towns or in South Africa, the household diversifies its portfolio of income-
earning activities, protecting itself against uncertainties in any single activity 
(Lucas, 1982).  
The aim of this chapter is to assess the extent to which international migra-
tion promotes the realisation of development. Development encompasses the 
progressive realisation of economic and ecological efficiency, as well as the 
fulfilment of intra- and inter-generational equity. The Government of Botswana 
has articulated its development goals, objectives and targets in various docu-
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ments, including its National Development Plans, National Millennium 
Development Goals and Vision 2016. 
Data for the chapter were obtained from secondary sources such as periodic 
censuses, sample surveys, the Botswana National Migration Study (1982) and 
the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) (Campbell, 2000; 
Mukamaambo, 2000). These sources have been complemented by information 
taken from the Internet and other listings in the References. 
A large number of people have always been able to find work in South 
Africa illegally, often with the help of close relatives living there. Compared 
with other African foreigners, Batswana people are not easy to detect because 
they blend easily into the South African socio-cultural landscape. Published 
statistics therefore tend to underestimate the numbers of migrants involved 
because they exclude clandestine Batswana migrants. In addition, in cases 
where no household members remain in Botswana, absentees cannot be easily 
identified in normal census counts. Colclough & McCarthy (1980: 253) have 
observed that, owing to hidden migration to South Africa, even population 
census estimates of outmigration understate its true magnitude.  
The chapter is divided into five main sections. After this introduction, the 
contextual background within which international migration has evolved is 
presented. Migration patterns and trends are then examined. Their development 
and policy implications are then articulated. Finally, emerging themes linking 
emigration to development are discussed, with a view to making relevant policy 
recommendations. 
Contextual background for international migration from Botswana 
Botswana, with a population of 1.8 million, is a multi-party democratic republic 
located in central southern Africa with South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and 
Zambia as its immediate neighbours. Notably, its boundaries are long and 
separate kinsfolk: for example the Babirwa, the Bakalanga and San along the 
Zimbabwe border; the Tswana along the South African border and the 
Baherero, Bambukushu, Basubiya and Bayei along the Namibian border. For 
practical purposes, these frontiers therefore remain porous and almost impossi-
ble to administer effectively. 
Botswana is a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the 
SADC, the African Union (AU), the British Commonwealth, the Lomé 
Convention, and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. 
Membership of these organisations has facilitated, to varying degrees, the trans-
national movement of persons, goods and services to and from Botswana. 
The country derives over 80 per cent of its foreign earnings from the export 
of diamonds and beef, and financial services and tourism account for the rest. Its 
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major import partners are SACU (74%), the European Free Trade Association 
(17%) and Zimbabwe (4%). The major export partners are the European Free 
Trade Association (87%), SACU (7%) and Zimbabwe (4%). Apart from formal 
trade, substantial undocumented informal intra-regional trade takes place, 
involving mostly food products, arts and crafts, foreign currency, clothing 
items, electrical goods, and so on, within the southern African sub-region.  
A succession of good rain seasons, and the discovery and exploitation of 
copper, nickel and diamonds soon after independence in 1966, gradually trans-
formed Botswana’s economic fortunes from poverty to prosperity. Since the 
1980s, economic growth (adjusted for inflation) has averaged 5.5 per cent per 
year, and there is no suggestion of a near-term economic down-turn. (Sanderson 
et al., 2001). Because of its buoyant economy, honest bureaucracy, democracy 
and political stability, the country has attracted substantial foreign investment 
and has often been cited as an ideal economic development model for the rest of 
Africa. Economic development has been accompanied by expanded employ-
ment opportunities for locals and expatriates in the public and private sectors 
and has impacted significantly on both social and spatial mobility patterns. GDP 
per capita has increased from about US$100 in 1966 to about US$5178 in 2005. 
Consequently, Botswana is now regarded as a middle-income country. 
In spite of these positive macro-economic indicators, close to a third of the 
national population live below the poverty datum line. Figure 6.1 presents 
quarterly unemployment figures from 2003 to 2004. About 52 per cent of the 
unemployed are youths. 
Figure 6.1 Recent trends in unemployment in Botswana 
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Source: BIDPA (2004) Economic Forecasts  
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The capacity to generate employment in Botswana is compromised by 
environmental hazards, managerial constraints, low labour productivity, high 
utility costs, a small internal market, protectionist government policies that 
squeeze out external competitive entrepreneurship, and foreign direct invest-
ment patterns that promote capital intensive extractive activities (LocoMonitor, 
2006). In addition, Gross Domestic Product growth is under threat from 
HIV/Aids. Expenditure on health and social welfare is set to increase by 7–18 
per cent. Government revenue could, as a result, shrink by 10 per cent. How 
these developments will impact on the international migration processes and 
patterns is still not clear. 
Patterns and trends of international emigration from Botswana 
Schapera has argued that although there were social and psychological reasons 
for labour migration from Botswana, the key to the early growth of migrancy 
was a lack of cash-earning opportunities at home, rather than the attractiveness 
of work abroad in South Africa (Schapera, 1947). 
Of the approximately 70,000 Batswana absentees employed in South African 
farms, mines and industries in the 1970s, as many as a third did not pass 
through officially-registered recruiting organisations. Although the data are not 
entirely reliable, approximately one-third of Botswana’s male labour force 
typically worked in South Africa in the early 1970s, and up to half of them 
found work in the mines (CSO, 1972). Figure 6.2 shows the trends in the num-
ber of absentees over the past three decades. 
Figure 6.2 Percentage of absentees 1971-2001 
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Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO) 1973, 1982, 1992, 2001 
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Reduction in South Africa’s recruitment of external mine workers since the 
1970s could be a major reason for the declining absenteeism of Batswana. The 
number of seasoned mine labour recruits from Botswana to South Africa 
dropped from 40,390 in 1976 to 19,648 in 1986, and the proportion of novices 
among all recruits declined from 25 per cent in 1976 to only 1.6 per cent in 
1985 (Taylor, 1990). The declining trend of overall migrants to the mines has 
continued beyond the 1990s, as is shown in Figure 6.3. 
 Figure 6.3 Migration trends to South African mines 1990-2004 
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 Source: SAMP POS database at http://www.queensu.ca/samp 
For both economic and political reasons, South Africa has been trying to 
stabilise its national mining workforce by offering better working conditions in 
terms of wages, housing, career advancement and longer contracts. However, 
when long-serving miners were given the option of applying for permanent 
residence in South Africa two-thirds of the Batswana turned the offer down 
(Crush & Williams, 1991). Those who accepted must have done so in the hope 
of benefiting from the ongoing reforms in the mining sector and in cognition of 
difficulties in transferring their mining skills were they to return to Botswana.  
With increasing affluence in Botswana – due to lucrative revenues from 
diamond exports – effective demand for goods and services has risen, and some 
South African businesses have established commercial and trading enterprises 
in the country. These have created much-needed local employment opportuni-
ties. Perhaps these declining trends in both in- and out-migration to the mines of 
South Africa also reflect that more educational opportunities are now becoming 
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locally available as a result of the establishment of secondary, tertiary and 
vocational institutions (Gwebu, 2003). 
The 2001 census on Population and Housing (CSO, 2001) registered the 
number of Batswana that had been out of the country for at least a year as 
28,210. Table 6.1 depicts the percentage of emigrants by destination and socio-
economic activity. 
 
Table 6.1 Percentage of absentees by destination and socioeconomic activity 
 Mines Farms Domestic Other 
employ
Student Visiting Official 
business
Other 
business 
Accom-
panying
Medical Other 
RSA 98.5 87.5 87.8 74.4 64.6 61.3 46.4 70.0 60.8 59.5 64.0 
Namib. 0.3 5.5 5.4 7.6 1.4 8.7 7.0 7.8 8.0 16.7 8.2 
Zimb. 0.3 3.4 3.4 5.3 4.8 16.7 7.7 13.3 11.9 11.4 15.9 
Other 0.9 3.6 3.4 12.7 29.2 13.3 38.9 8.9 19.3 12.4 11.9 
Total 100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Central Statistics Office, 2001 
Absentees target intraregional and extra-continental destinations. Globally, 
South Africa remains the single most important destination, especially for 
employment in primary and service sectors. Business-related as well as 
academically-related and social reasons also feature prominently. Next to South 
Africa, and also within the SADC region, the other main destinations are 
Zimbabwe and Namibia. These two countries are important for socio-economic, 
socio-cultural and business-related moves. Although these moves could be tied 
to formal business transactions, recent studies have shown how economic non-
competitive networking, especially among women, through informal cross-
border trade (ICBT) linkages, has helped in the progressive growth of women-
owned micro-scale enterprises in Botswana (Ntseane, 2004). Informal traders 
explained that they do not have to carry cash when conducting business in 
South Africa or Zimbabwe because, through business networks in those 
countries, they were able to open bank accounts. Moreover, their markets are 
served by female networks in host countries in the region, to minimise the risks 
associated with female cross-border trade such as rape, theft, and other forms of 
harassment experienced at border posts (Ntseane, 2004). Such informal transfers 
reduce transaction and transfer costs and minimise transfer risks across borders. 
Studies done by SAMP have revealed that the duration of visits to South 
Africa is less than one month for 80 per cent of movers, with only 2 per cent 
having stayed for over a year (Mukamaambo, 2000). For over 60 per cent of 
those who have recently visited South Africa, the three main reasons are 
shopping, visiting family or friends, and holiday tourism. The first reason might 
be related to cheaper item-costs because of the relative strength of the Pula 
compared to the Rand, coupled with the broader variety of goods available in 
 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FROM BOTSWANA 123 
 
South Africa. The second reason (visiting) could relate to the socio-ethnic 
affinities of a people with identical cultures separated by artificial boundaries 
(Gwebu, 1998). The third reason could be because of the greater diversity and 
modernity of the tourist sector in South Africa and the strength of the Botswana 
currency. 
Although South Africa is rated highly for the employment and services that 
it offers, Botswana is still rated as a relatively better country in which to settle – 
by 65 per cent – mostly due to non-tangible factors such as peace, low crime 
rates, family safety, a decent place to raise children, and relatively high levels of 
freedom and democracy (Mukamaambo, 2000). Consequently, less that 10 per 
cent of Batswana are either likely or very likely to migrate to South Africa 
permanently. A study on the ‘emigration potential’ of skilled Batswana revealed 
that about 60 per cent of skilled Batswana had never considered emigrating 
(Campbell, 2001). Nearly all professional Batswana have strong faith in their 
government and country. They are also cognisant of possible constraints against 
their relocation. It is however difficult to see for how long patriotism and 
altruism can prevent potential migrants from taking up new global job opportu-
nities, because push factors seem to be more important than pull factors in 
translating migration intentions into actual migration. 
There are other compelling factors that have encouraged Batswana to remain 
in their country, including the economic booms of the 1980s and 1990s that 
were accompanied by increased employment opportunities (especially in the 
construction and service sectors), a relatively stable and strong currency, and 
policies that ensure that locals will eventually replace expatriates, as well as job 
reservation for nationals in certain sectors of the national economy. The 
government has taken steps to ensure that jobs and positions are eventually 
taken by the locals, to the exclusion of non-nationals (van Dijk, 2002). Compa-
nies and institutions have been forced to employ ‘understudies’ for any 
foreigner. In the case of private enterprise, these understudies must eventually 
become shareholders or co-owners of the companies, and have the opportunity, 
in the near future, to take over leading positions from foreign owners or leaders. 
In addition, in certain economic sectors, it is no longer permitted to employ 
foreigners, while for others all sorts of privileges or bonuses for foreigners are 
being annulled. In 2005, Botswana announced that it would no longer renew the 
permits of expatriate teachers and drivers, and would probe the hiring of 
allegedly under-qualified southern African artisans in the mining sectors. These 
protectionist and foreign exclusion tendencies are forcing expatriates to look 
elsewhere to invest their skills and capital (van Dijk, 2002). 
According to the database for Table 1, there are, notably, no extra-regional 
African destinations for Batswana absentees, probably because of the relatively 
depressed economic and volatile socio-political circumstances in the rest of sub-
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Saharan Africa, and the weakness of historical, political and socio-cultural ties 
with north Africa. The other destination countries are located outside the 
continent: in North America, north-western Europe, Oceania and Southeast 
Asia. The main attractions there are business, education, visiting/accompanying 
or medically-related moves.  
Recent behavioural studies by SAMP, on the most-preferred destinations by 
potential skilled emigrants from Botswana, indicate that the United States 
(27%), South Africa (21%), the UK (19%) and Namibia (8%) are the most 
prominent target countries (Campbell, 2000) (see Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4 Potential destinations of skilled emigrants 
 
Source: Campbell, 2000 
The first three countries just mentioned are economically more developed 
and diversified than Botswana. Thus they are perceived as offering better pros-
pects for professional or career advancement, and as regards standard of living. 
Botswana’s student placement programme finances students to study in the 
colleges, universities and technikons in these countries. Moreover, the govern-
ments of the US and UK provide scholarships for the training of Batswana 
students in their tertiary institutions. Potential migrants to these countries could 
thus be considered to be ‘returnee migrants’ (Adepoju & Hammar, 1996). 
Geographically and socio-ethnically, South Africa and Namibia are closer to 
Botswana, and in addition the feeling is that skilled Batswana could be com-
paratively more competitive than their South African or Namibian counterparts. 
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In the order of importance, the four main reasons for moving from Botswana 
to another country, as shown in Figure 6.5, are: prospects for professional 
advancement (29%), better income (27%), lower cost of living (18%) and a 
better job (12%) (Campbell, 2000). 
Skilled Batswana are attracted to South Africa and extra-continental destina-
tions by prospects of better incomes, rapid upward mobility, and career 
advancement.  
Figure 6.5 Push factors on potential emigrants 
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Source: Campbell, 2000 
 
International migration and development 
Links with South Africa 
‘Migradollars’ have indeed been earned from emigration to South Africa. Table 
6.2 shows the extent to which migrant employment contributed to Botswana’s 
economy in the 1940s (Schapera, 1947). 
Table 6.2 Main source of income for the native population 
Source % 
Employment outside the country in South Africa 46.6 
Employment in the country 34.2 
Sale of agricultural produce 19.2 
Source: Schapera, 1947 
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According to Silitshena (1978), the total wage earnings of mine workers 
nearly trebled from P11.2 million to P32.17 million in the two years from 1974 
to 1976. Deferred payments more than doubled from P4.18 to P10.52 million, 
while remittances trebled from P0.63 million to P1.7 million, while the value of 
goods brought in by returning miners increased from P1.02 to P4.50 million. 
Cash spent in South Africa, for consumption, increased from P4.77 million to 
P13.7 million during that time. Mine labour industry wages accounted for close 
to a third of the proportion of formal personal income for Botswana (Field, 
1982). Lipton (1978) estimated that 40 to 50 per cent of Batswana personal 
income came from South African sources of employment in 1977/78. Migrants 
and their households benefited financially. From their amassed capital, they 
could purchase cattle (31%), build houses (19%), purchase food (15%) provide 
child support (10%), finance other needs (25%) including education, clothing, 
arable agriculture and hiring labour (Field, 1982). 
Certain studies have confirmed that cattle-ownership is strongly associated 
with former emigration histories (Kerven, 1976), since migrant labour has been 
the only means of accumulating enough capital to buy cattle and to start farming 
effectively. Expenditure on household welfare needs must have contributed to 
national human capital development, an important factor that contributes to 
economic growth.  
The main contribution to public finance and tax revenue was through 
customs and excise receipts, determined by quantities of taxable goods entering 
Botswana from the countries of the Southern African Customs Union. 
Migration has also been associated with local-level population-livelihood-
environment dynamics (Lucas & Stark, 1985). The argument has been that by 
diversifying the livelihood alternatives and improving the livelihoods of remit-
tance-receiving families, international migration contributes to ameliorating the 
negative links between poverty and natural resource over-exploitation. For 
example, it has been established that the worse the drought in Botswana, the 
higher the level of remittances (Lucas & Stark, 1985), thus preventing receiving 
families from over-exploiting veld products, forest products, and wildlife, just to 
stay alive. 
Any environmental and economic gains from labour emigration must, 
however, be balanced against the losses in production resulting from the export 
of such large population numbers, especially, of young men and women. Rural 
out-migration has traditionally involved a large proportion of the working-age 
population and has effectively hindered rural development (Schapera, 1971). By 
drawing on the young and able-bodied men and women who should be decision 
makers, labour migration has had a depressing effect on the development of 
agriculture by discouraging the adoption of modern farming methods. Because 
of the general shortage of men, acreage ploughed and crop yields have been 
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much lower than they would have been if the absentees had been available to 
help. For such families the migrant labour system has carried a cost in terms of 
lowered agricultural incomes. 
The Native Advisory Council (the administration before Botswana gained 
independence in 1966) observed that many young people were no longer avail-
able at their homes to attend to the routine tasks of tribal life and, as a result, 
both animal husbandry and agriculture suffered (Schapera, 1971).  
Migration was a response by Batswana to a primary industry that was faced 
with labour shortages and which came to be under-written by family-based 
subsistence production. Of the 1573 migrants who were recruited to work, 
mainly as fruit-pickers, from farms in South Africa in 1977, only 500 were male 
(Schapera, 1994). However, since the arable agricultural peak season in South 
Africa coincides with peak arable agricultural labour demands in Botswana and 
most of the arable agricultural work is performed by women, this posed a 
serious threat to Botswana’s food security. National food self-sufficiency was 
disrupted and a precedent set for the dependency syndrome of a periph-
eral/satellite labour reserve economy that Botswana has become to South 
Africa. As Massey (1977) has observed about Botswana, ‘After over 100 years 
of sending labour to South Africa little progress seems to have been made in 
agricultural development.’  
The losses caused by the migrant labour system assume even greater 
seriousness when one adds social implosion, dislocations and disruption. The 
scale and nature of migration had both immediate and lasting effects on social 
and economic gender power relations and the institution of marriage. The 
impact of migration on the roles of women in contemporary Botswana has it 
roots in the past. There is ample evidence to show that the migration of men was 
a key ideational and practical pathway to liberating women from certain 
bondages of patriarchy (Datta, 1995; Datta, 2004; Kalabamu, 2005; Larsson et 
al., 1998). The out-migration of men from the rural areas for employment in the 
modern capitalist sector made the women who remained behind de facto house-
hold heads who could now take decisions that had customarily been made by 
men. This however increased their workload and contributed to a breakdown in 
the traditional strict division of labour. 
The formation of female-headed households might, subsequently, have been 
an exercise in choice – particularly among educated women – rather than a 
product of abandonment and neglect by men (Gulbrandsen, 1986). Employed as 
clerks, school teachers, and nurses, some women gained economic independ-
ence and freedom from the control of men (Schapera, 1994). They bore and 
raised their own children outside marriage. Unmarried mothers thus became de 
jure heads of households (Kalabamu, 2005). Certain women came to regard 
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marriage with growing ambivalence, and unmarried women were no longer 
scorned but respected (Datta, 1995; Dow & Kidd, 1994). 
Perhaps all this explains why Botswana has one of the highest levels of 
female-headed households globally. Nationally, 47 per cent of all households 
are headed by women, and over 50 per cent of those in rural areas are classified 
as such. The fact remains however that the frustration of intergenerational trans-
fers of certain positive survival skills, moral norms and values, that emanate 
from the presence of a paternal figure, and the legacy of family break-up cannot 
be disassociated from the disintegration of the essential basic unit of national 
moral fabric and integrity. The failure to negotiate gender contracts, authority 
and power relations at household and national levels, and the subversion of 
gender roles, set into motion an unprecedented social perversion in the form of 
anomy and domestic gender violence (rape, incest, defilement, emotional abuse) 
that have today degenerated into what is euphemistically termed ‘passion 
killings’. 
Some of the most serious costs of the migrant labour system therefore relate 
to its detrimental impacts upon the organic structure and stability of the family. 
Some migrant men never returned makgwela (household deserters) and were 
regarded as lost. Labour migration implied long or even permanent separation 
of spouses. Due to the absence of so many males over the years, there was a 
break-down of domestic control and children were reared in socially-inappro-
priate environments (Gaisie, 1995). There was delayed average age-at-marriage, 
and an increase in the ‘never married’ category – reinforced by the missionary 
ban on polygyny. That may have tended to keep the fertility rate lower than it 
might otherwise have been, causing negative long-term effects on the threshold 
market size for sustainable industrialisation.  
The system also made sexual relationships more impermanent than they 
might otherwise be. Increasing rates of male absenteeism have also been associ-
ated with an increase in the number of children born out of wedlock and in the 
number of women bearing children by more than one man (Schapera, 1971). 
For married couples, it appears that husbands’ long absences in the mines, or 
even desertions, increased marital discord and extramarital affairs. This in turn 
has tended to increase the rates of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) 
(especially syphilis), as well as pathological sterility, and divorce (Schapera, 
1971). Untreated or partially treated STIs are today also associated with HIV 
infections, of which the country has the highest global rates among the 
economically-active population. 
An emphasis upon aggregate income benefits alone moreover masks the 
wider costs of the migrant labour system to both society as a whole and to 
particular population segments within it. Enhanced labour flows abroad must 
have increased the number of women who are unsupported and economically 
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isolated, as a result of the disintegrating traditional safety networks and absence 
of males. The problem of feminised absolute rural poverty in Botswana is likely 
to have increased rather than diminished as a result of these trends (Colclough 
& McCarthy, 1980; CSO, 2003). 
Apart from generating gender inequities, mining incomes created regional 
inequities. In the past, mine labour recruitment portrayed a distinct rural-to-
urban bias, with less than 1 per cent of recruits originating from towns (Field, 
1982). Case (1982) observed that nearly 70 per cent of Batswana recruits to the 
mine in South Africa originated from village areas. Within the country, there 
was a regional bias reflecting cost-minimisation considerations, with most 
migrants coming from the south-eastern districts of the country. The implication 
was that economic benefits from migrant labour directly benefited only this sub-
region of Botswana. 
Links with SADC and extra-continental destinations 
Recent trans-regional socio-economic studies show that poverty is endemic in 
the SADC, where an estimated half of the population lives on less than one 
dollar a day (Akinboade, 2005). This situation is more pronounced for women 
and has an added significance in a sub-region where nearly half of the house-
holds are female-headed. Women’s deprivation is manifold and ranges across 
the economic, social and political arenas (Akinboade, 2005).  
The Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission of the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization’s World Food Programme (FAO/WFP) reports 
that ICBT played a significant role in averting widespread food insecurity in 
Southern Africa during the major regional drought of 2002/2003, through the 
movement of food and agricultural goods.1 ICBT in maize, beans and rice 
imports continues to play a significant role in redressing supply/demand food 
imbalances in the region. The Southern African Regional Poverty Network 
Report of 24/5/06 however found very little ICBT in food taking place across 
the gazetted Zimbabwe/Botswana border. This was because Botswana has a 
very strict rule for agricultural products entering the country. Zimbabwe too 
imposes restrictive import laws for rice or maize trade across its borders. 
Although there was very little informal maize trade, there was some trade in 
beans and rice. In most cases, beans flowed into Botswana from Zimbabwe and 
the opposite was the case for rice. The Southern Africa Food Security Update of 
November 2004 confirmed that barriers to informal trade, specifically high 
import levies, have acted to constrain trade levels between certain neighbouring 
countries such as Botswana and Zimbabwe.  
                                                 
1 See http://www.fews.net/resouces/gcontent  
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For national economies, cross border trading is a source of foreign exchange. 
Unfortunately, state response to ICBT has taken the form of very stringent and 
restrictive regulations, forcing hundreds of informal traders to cross border 
posts with under-invoiced, mis-declared goods, or with unrecorded merchan-
dise, sometimes with the full collusion of immigration officers – smuggling of 
goods through ungazetted points has become very common. Because of this, the 
belief is that ICBT undermines local industries, distorts price incentives, mis-
guides domestic economic policies, has impacted negatively on foreign ex-
change earnings, and reduced tax revenues. The traders face major bureaucratic 
and other obstacles – despite the fact that the region is aiming for free trade by 
2008, and although trading is the key means of livelihood for many households. 
The emigration of skilled Batswana to other SADC countries characterises 
reverse technology transfer or brain circulation/exchange, otherwise referred to 
as cooperative exchange of skills – something that an integrated SADC seeks to 
promote. For the region as a whole, within-SADC brain circulation therefore 
means no net loss of human resources.  
Conversely, the brain drain, fuelled by aggressive recruiting of health profes-
sionals for Europe and North America is very problematic, coming as it does at 
a time when the country can ill-afford to lose medical staff, given the HIV/Aids 
pandemic. The country’s nursing programmes turn out three hundred nurses a 
year, of whom between one third and two thirds leave immediately after 
graduation, recruited to fill nursing shortages in wealthier nations (Hurlburt, 
2004). Few of the medical students that the government sends overseas ever 
return (Hurlburt, 2004). 
Government efforts to train enough medical doctors have turned out to be a 
nightmare for the Department of Student Placement and Welfare because those 
that have graduated are refusing to come back home. The Department sends an 
average of 65 students a year abroad to study medicine, but out of this number 
only about twenty normally return after completing their studies. Companies 
from the UK come to Botswana to recruit different cadres of medical students. 
The Department is however happy with countries like Australia, Cuba and the 
Czech Republic which give students visas specifically for study; once their 
student status ends, they are forced to leave (Botswana Guardian, August 1, 
2006). 
Foreign health-related donors such as the Harvard AIDS Institute, the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Merck Company Foundation, have 
aggravated the problem by hiring talented Batswana away from implementation 
programmes (Hurlburt, 2004). Furthermore, the remaining health staff them-
selves remain vulnerable to HIV/Aids. All this impedes the delivery of essential 
health services and undermines efforts to deliver quality and comprehensive 
health services that are essential to achieve health-related Millennium Devel-
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opment Goals. As part of a bilateral agreement signed with Botswana in 2002, 
Cuban health professionals now work in several hospitals and clinics that 
specialise in treating people living with HIV/Aids. To what extent this is sus-
tainable remains an open question. 
International migration, development and policy issues 
Although international migration has not been formally integrated into national 
development policies and programmes in Botswana, four inter-related main 
thematic issues for development emanate from the above discussion, namely: 
• Brain drain versus brain circulation  
• Pro-poor diversification of livelihood strategies 
• Negative economic, socio-demographic and epidemiological externalities 
• Appropriate data on migration and development.  
These themes relate to seven of the eight goals of Botswana Millennium 
Development Goals, namely: 
• Eradicating poverty and hunger 
• Gender equality and empowerment 
• Child mortality 
• Maternal health 
• Combating HIV/Aids and other diseases 
• The environment 
• Global partnership 
These issues and their policy implication on development will now be discussed 
briefly. 
Brain drain versus brain circulation, and development 
Botswana is becoming increasingly integrated into transnational formal and 
informal continental and regional socio-economic networks. International 
migration patterns show that emigrants from Botswana mostly target intra-
regional destinations. This pattern presents vast opportunities for the realisation 
and promotion the SADC goals on transnational interdependence and integra-
tion, retention and free circulation of human, financial, material and technologi-
cal and resources, and the achievement of collective self-reliance within the 
region.  
Extra-continental migration streams to the North are in response to the push 
factors in Botswana, complemented by the structural needs of industrialised 
markets. This net leakage of skilled human resources, over which the country 
has invested much of its scarce capital resources, is unaffordable for the reasons 
already discussed, and also because it represents significant tax losses that could 
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have been used to support government programmes aimed at poverty allevia-
tion, schooling, and other public sector investments. The current reversal of 
gains made against child and maternal mortality by the early 1990s could be 
related to weakened health delivery systems. The fight against HIV/Aids is also 
compromised. The loss of skills in general also undermines the regional social 
and economic development efforts and the achievement of collective self-
reliance to which SADC has committed itself. 
Movements to extra-regional locations must therefore be curtailed and/or 
reconfigured by attracting back, retaining and effectively utilising the highly 
skilled personnel – firstly by addressing the push factors (in Botswana and other 
SADC countries) such as the current lack of proper professional, academic and 
research conditions. The establishment of Regional Centres of Excellence, with 
competitive salaries and conditions of service, could be one way to stem the 
tide. This would help in the achievement of the SADC objective of collective 
self-reliance in human capital. At the core of the problem of capacity-building, 
retention, and utilisation are issues related to material and moral incentives and 
good governance. 
There is also an urgent need to develop a legal framework for temporary (as 
opposed to permanent) labour emigration. For example, locally, sponsored 
students need to travel on student visas and sign a return commitment and 
bonding with the Botswana Department of Student Placement and Welfare. 
Destination countries must demonstrate their willingness to conclude agree-
ments concerning temporary migration programmes in terms of facilitating free 
travel and eventual return and integration. Reintegration assistance and special 
programmes for returning migrants must ensure that their skills and experience 
are utilised to benefit the economy of Botswana. In addition, recruitment 
agencies should be levied and held accountable to ensure the return of migrant 
workers and thus help counteract brain drain. The assistance of host countries 
and the international community is furthermore required to complement the 
wages of returning professionals in order to make return programmes feasible. 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on temporary migration 
could regulate and enhance circulation and reduce brain drain. 
Cooperation between international organisations, Botswana and the North 
could be an effective means of developing temporary return programmes to 
counter brain drain. An example of such cooperation is Migration for Develop-
ment in Africa (MIDA), a capacity-building programme launched by the Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM), aimed at mobilising the compe-
tences acquired by African nationals abroad, by encouraging temporary returns 
of qualified migrants to their countries of origin. Another programme designed 
to facilitate the temporary returns of professionals is Transfer of Knowledge 
Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), facilitated by UNDP. The Interna-
 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FROM BOTSWANA 133 
 
tional Agenda for Migration Management could also serve as a framework for 
regulating international migration. Botswana needs to work closely with other 
SADC member states to seek a harmonised SADC solution to the brain drain 
problem, possibly through the International Return of Talents Program in Africa 
which is sponsored by the IOM, in collaboration with the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa.  
Botswana embassies need to engage more on a face-to-face basis with their 
diaspora on job and investment opportunities available at home. The ‘Home-
coming Summit’ called by the government of Ghana in 2001 could be a good 
example to learn from. 
Diversification of livelihood portfolios of the poor 
Intra-regional migration in Botswana has mostly involved the poor: either in 
selling their labour at their point of destination (Schapera, 1947; Colclough & 
McCarthy, 1980; Field, 1982; Harris, 1982), or in informal cross-border trade 
(ICBT) (Akinboade, 2005; Ntseane, 2004; SARPN, 2004). 
International migration had positive developmental impacts on Botswana 
when the country was poor. Migration to South Africa was central to contribut-
ing to state revenues through payment of personal taxes, customs and excise on 
remitted goods. Migrants’ deferred pay, remittances of cash and goods uplifted 
the material welfare of the and that of their dependents. Migrants also invested 
in agriculture and housing (Field, 1982). Migration has proved an alternative 
source of livelihood leading to the prevention of the overexploitation of the 
environment (Lucas, 1982). 
Rates of emigration from Botswana reached their peak when the country was 
experiencing massive unemployment and underdevelopment. However, there 
was a down-turn in emigration rates once the country’s economic fortunes 
changed with the discovery and exploitation of diamonds. This had a multiplier 
effect on the rest of the economic and socio-economic sectors such as admini-
stration, education and health. A combination of tangible economic, socio-
economic and intangible factors such as good governance, tolerance, respect for 
civil liberties, honest bureaucracies, moral incentives and personal safety seem 
to be critical controls of emigration. As a result, the number of absentees has 
been declining, and most professional Batswana are reluctant to work outside 
their country. Cognisance of this fact is important in the retention and capacity-
building of human resources both nationally and regionally. 
Special attention needs to be paid to the declining numbers of Batswana 
migrant miners because this implies the drying up of a previously reliable 
source of livelihood for a mostly uneducated and unskilled labour force and 
their dependents. Botswana needs to diversify its economy to create employ-
ment. Proactive policy has to be devised through consultation with the South 
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African Government, and with the mining industry through The Employment 
Bureau of Africa (TEBA). 
In the past, there was a guarantee by the Chamber of Mines of South Africa 
to TEBA to continue the recruitment of an agreed quota of Batswana up to a 
certain period. This provided the Botswana Government with a grace period to 
adjust to changes in the migrant labour recruitment system. Should a quota 
system for migrant labour be found mutually agreeable, efforts should be made 
to ensure more flexible, subsidised and concessionary terms for frequent visits 
for migrant family members, to minimise socio-economic implosion. 
TEBA, being a member of the Botswana Employers’ Federation, which is 
represented on the National Employment Manpower and Incomes Council, 
could be used as a forum to plan and coordinate efforts to absorb Batswana 
mine labour. The then general manager of TEBA expressed a willingness to 
cooperate with the Botswana government, should it devise such a plan for 
disengaging from the migrant labour system. 
In the light of declining labour recruitment to mines, Botswana needs to 
pursue and intensify its efforts for creating more employment opportunities in 
order both to cater for the returning migrants and retain any potential ones. The 
new Small, Micro and Medium Enterprise Policy, The New Industrial Policy, 
the Revised National Policy on Education, the Rural Industrialisation 
Programme and the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency, among 
others, are laudable policies. However capacity-building needs to be strength-
ened in order to ensure their implementation, monitoring and evaluation. State 
paternalism that tends to work against foreign investors needs to be revised to 
promote competitiveness and an efficient economy in the era of globalisation. 
International migration has been closely associated with the weakening of 
patriarchal systems through renegotiation of gender roles and contracts, and 
empowering women as decision-makers. Gender auditing and streamed policies 
and programmes need to be put in place to ensure that women live decent lives. 
Evidence has been cited to show how ICBT has assisted in the development of 
women enterprises from survivalist, through micro- to small businesses 
(Ntseane, 2004). ICBT is also an important avenue both for sustaining the 
livelihoods of the poor, who happen to be mostly women, and as a mechanism 
for redistributing food and averting regional hunger and associated mortality 
(Akinboade, 2005). Unfortunately, restrictions prevent the smooth operation of 
ICBT. 
Restrictions on ICBT should be abolished because this is an important 
avenue for sustaining the households of the poor in the in the food deficit areas. 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) aims to promote 
regional development through cooperation and integration. SADC aims to 
strengthen and consolidate historical, social and cultural affinities amongst the 
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people of the region. Those ideals of ultimate free trade and economic integra-
tion will however be hard to achieve within a climate that is not conducive to 
the free movement of persons, capital and goods. For example bureaucratic 
restrictions of ICBT on food items between Botswana and Zimbabwe should be 
removed. In a world in which borders are becoming eroded, it is difficult to 
perceive how effectively such restrictive policies will stem transnational move-
ments.  
Regional migration policies, legislation and practice that are fragmented 
along national lines do not appear to meet the objectives of SADC policies and 
NEPAD to foster African cooperation, unity and development, and need to be 
removed. On a regional level, the SADC is intent on fostering regional integra-
tion and cooperation for development and the alleviation of poverty. The SADC 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan identifies numerous migration-
related issues and concerns that the Community will have to confront, including 
the brain drain, informal trade, mobility of the factors of production, tourism, 
etc. The implication is that migration should be factored into national and 
regional development policies. 
In 2000, the SADC Free Trade Protocol was ratified. In 2003, the SADC 
Secretariat revived discussion on the Facilitation of Movement Protocol which 
not all regional governments have formally endorsed. Attempts to move 
towards the free movement of people within the SADC have not been success-
ful however. It is encouraging to note that in August 2006 Botswana became the 
eighth member of SADC to sign the SADC Protocol on the facilitation of 
movement of citizens within the region.  
The Southern Africa Migration Project (SAMP) and the IOM have com-
bined, in partnership with SADC states, to establish the Migration Dialogue for 
Southern Africa (MIDSA). During 2003, the major development was the prepa-
ration by SAMP of a report on migration policy harmonisation within the 
SADC region. This report was presented and discussed at the November 2004 
MIDSA forum on migration and development in Maseru, Lesotho. The forum 
underscored for senior officials and policy makers the important role of migra-
tion in poverty reduction. Active regional support is imperative for the success 
of such efforts.  
Negative economic, socio-demographic and epidemiological externalities 
Negative impacts of international migration have created certain negative 
externalities within Botswana. The feminisation of rural poverty derives from 
male emigration. Gender-sensitive proposals to address the resultant feminisa-
tion of rural poverty have been outlined in the National Development Plans. 
There has been a breakdown of the traditional family structure with its suppor-
tive social networks. There has been a spread of occupational diseases such as 
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pulmonary tuberculosis and sexually-transmitted infections. The economic 
benefits of migration have accrued mainly to the relatively more urban south-
eastern districts of Botswana. 
There has been a weakening of traditional pastoralism and arable agriculture 
which threatens food self-sufficiency. Traditional agriculture has been on the 
decline in Botswana over the past two decades, partly as a result of international 
migration, and partly because of recurrent spells of drought, and also because of 
un-remunerative prices paid by the Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board and 
the Botswana Meat Commission for agricultural products. The National Policy 
of Agricultural Development (1991) – which recognises the importance of 
women, who constitute the larger part of the rural workforce – should be 
supported through land capability studies, irrigation, monitoring and extension. 
Alternative employment needs to be created through the policies outlined 
above and the through diversification of the economy, e.g. through support for 
small and micro enterprises, ICBT, community-based natural resources 
development, downstream processing of raw materials such as beef, grain, 
minerals, timber, veld products and game. 
Spatial and sectoral policies need to be strengthened, through the National 
Settlement Policy, by locating and allocating resources to support self-employ-
ment in those areas now threatened by returning unemployed migrants from 
South Africa. 
The solution to the breakdown of positive social mores requires life-time 
learning, as well as relearning and unlearning of entrenched perceptions. 
Innovative educational systems must be developed to inculcate relevant knowl-
edge on gender, ethics, and moral and civic education. For example, a study by 
the US-based Horizons Program2 and the Brazilian NGO Instituto Promundo, 
examined the effectiveness of interventions designed to improve young men’s 
attitudes towards gender norms and to reduce the risk of HIV and STIs. The 
latter found that more equitable gender norms and related behaviours can be 
successfully promoted, with significant improvements in HIV/STI outcomes. 
Addressing inequitable gender norms, particularly those that define masculinity, 
can be an important element of HIV prevention strategies. These findings 
suggest that group education interventions can successfully influence young 
men’s attitudes toward gender roles and lead to healthier relationships. The 
findings also provide empirical evidence that a behaviour change intervention 
focused on combating inequitable gender norms is associated with improve-
ments in HIV/STI risk outcomes.  
                                                 
2 See http://www.popcouncil.org/horizons/horizons.html  
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Prevention, treatment, mitigation and care programmes already exist in 
Botswana for the management of occupational and sexually-transmitted infec-
tions. However, they usually lack support, in terms of financial and human 
resources. Southern Africa is at the epicentre of HIV/Aids infection. Being 
relatively wealthier and having more mobile populations, Botswana and South 
Africa have greater chances of spreading this infection through migration 
(Lurie, 2003). Research needs to be conducted on how this could be mitigated. 
Appropriate data on international migration and development 
Comparable, accurate and up-to-date migration data and operational definitions 
are required to formulate research-informed policy and programming interven-
tions to regulate international migration for the achievement of sustainable 
development, nationally, regionally and globally. This could be achieved, for 
example, through the harmonisation of the immigration/emigration forms issued 
at airports and border posts, the creation of a regional data bases on migrants 
and their profiles and identification of regional human resource needs and 
available regional personnel. 
Conclusion 
The chapter has discussed patterns and trends of international migration and 
their implications for development in Botswana. Most movements are intrare-
gional. This underscores the need for formal facilitation of the movement of 
persons, goods and services within SADC.  
Reversal in migration, especially of unskilled migrants returning from South 
Africa, presents challenges to Botswana in terms of creating employment. 
Various possibilities of how this could be done have been discussed. 
There are potential and actual migration streams of highly skilled personnel 
to the North. This represents a net loss of the human resources required to drive 
the development process both nationally and regionally. Migration policy 
regulation needs to focus on programmatic interventions that will promote 
circulation rather than brain drain. How this can be achieved has been suggested 
in the chapter. 
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7 
Governance of migration in  
Senegal: The role of government  
in formulating migration policies 
Maguemati Wabgou 
Introduction 
Current trends in policy-making have aimed at minimising the negative effects 
of migration flows, while optimising their development impacts. Migration 
policies in African countries in general, and particularly in western Africa, tend 
to be characterised by a laissez-faire way of dealing with migrations, together 
with a lack of harmonisation, efficiency, and appropriateness in management.  
The West African country of Senegal is one of the few countries in sub-
Saharan Africa to have addressed the migration of its people as a foreign and 
public policy issue and to have started dealing with these migratory flows as a 
global reality in Africa, Europe and America. Across the country, the govern-
ment has begun taking steps to promote migration policies, and to improve 
cooperation in migration management, as well as the facilitation of movement 
across borders in Africa, through a number of bilateral agreements. It has 
become increasingly obvious to policy makers that migrations from Senegal, 
both to other African countries and to the mega-cities and the industrial 
countries in the North, are related to global processes which go beyond modern 
nation-states, which are on based concepts and borders. Unfortunately, how-
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ever, the contribution of the Senegalese government in reducing the negative 
impacts of migrations on economic development has been rather limited.  
So, how does the Senegalese government set up its plans for governance of 
migration to favour reintegration and capacity-building at local and national 
levels? To what extent has migration, as a new policy domain, been inserted in 
policy agendas and activities (at the local, national and regional levels)? To 
what extent does the Senegalese government promote managed migration 
through bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements? 
In order to expand knowledge on Senegalese migration, and identify policies 
and reforms that could lead to more successful development outcomes, this 
chapter first explores briefly (in Part I) how Senegalese foreign workers – 
essentially unskilled and semi-skilled workers – work as hawkers or hustlers, or 
self-employed in their own small businesses, and in all sectors of the economy 
in the host country. These include the restaurant industry, retail, construction, 
manufacturing, hotels, food production, landscaping – all of which are neces-
sary to the economy of that country. Skilled immigrants work as engineers, 
technicians or ‘experts’, musicians, professors, computer scientists, and so on. 
The chapter then examines (in Part II) some policies and reforms that could lead 
to better management of migrations, and assesses the Senegalese government’s 
capacity and political willingness to address the control of migration flows, 
especially the brain drain. It analyses the adequacy and efficiency of existing 
initiatives in managing the positive and negative aspects of migrations. 
An overview of Senegalese migration flows: The Senegalese 
diaspora 
I believe that my people who are trained and educated should stay in their country 
… I do not invest in their education and training so that they can contribute to 
development in France … It is necessary to discuss labour migration issues jointly in 
France: we cannot allow pillage of managerial and technical elites in developing 
countries; France should assure jobs for people who are being hosted, in order to 
prevent them from living in overcrowded conditions in hovels, where they are 
exposed to fire and death … Selected immigration has to be the result of a concerted 
action between France and the origin countries. (Senegal’s president Abdoulaye 
Wade, 2006, cited in Katata, 2006) 
Immigration is a group and not an individual process because decisions to migrate 
are usually made within a collective context that includes the family and local 
community. Immigration flows through social networks uniting places of origin and 
destination. Furthermore, the overall economic ‘climate’ that affects the local group 
is likely to influence an individual’s decision to migrate even when that individual is 
not affected in the same way as are others. Tilly puts the issue succinctly: ‘Individu-
als do not migrate, networks do’. People migrate together from particular places and 
settle together in particular destinations. It is only within the context of a network of 
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social relationships that individual calculations become useful predictors of the 
direction and flow of migration. (Roberts, 1995: 45–46) 
Internal migrations 
The panorama of migratory exchanges between Senegalese administrative 
regions shows relevant contrasts regarding migrations – both temporary and 
lasting – to more advantaged destinations. Generally, the rural exodus affects 
the inner regions of Senegal, especially the areas that were economically 
successful in colonial times. These places – formed mainly by the regions of St 
Louis1, Louga, Thiès, Kaolack and Diourbel (and known as le bassin 
arachidière) – specialised in peanut cultivation. As a consequence of the inten-
sive and exhaustive character of this cultivation, the soil and farm fields have, 
over the years, been drained of nutrition. Along with this land impoverishment, 
vast regions located in St Louis and Louga have become desert, since Senegal is 
a Sahelian country that continually suffers drought. Few political initiatives 
have been taken in order to remedy the effects of the degradation of arable land. 
In this context, when all their hopeful attempts for a viable resolution of their 
problems are exhausted, many peasants undertake the way of migration, trans-
formed into a survival strategy. In the Saloum region, for example, the migra-
tory flows – made up, for the most part, of the young – are directed towards the 
cities as well as to other more developed rural areas (Diop, 1992). An example 
of internal migratory flows within Senegal is found in a town located in the 
northern region of St Louis: Fuuta Tooro. The people of Fuuta Tooro are 
remarkable in their deep sense of solidarity, both within their lineages or ‘clans’ 
(lenyol) and within their extended families (galle). 
In Fuuta Tooro, there are two types of migratory flows: temporary and 
lasting. In the first case, the town inhabitants move to other cities for profes-
sional reasons and for periods of less than a year. In the second case, the 
duration is longer than a year although the reasons for the migration are the 
same. Destinations vary but are almost always urban centres. Short term migra-
tions are towards nearby urban areas such as Richard Toll city (St Louis region) 
where sugar plantations and the biggest domestic sugar factory are located, 
attracting and making use of manpower (Guilmoto, 1997: 18–19).  
Dakar is the most significantly attractive city for temporary and permanent 
immigrants originating from Fuuta Tooro. Their position in the labour market 
falls into two distinct categories: the earlier arrivals were employed in very 
insecure jobs such as being hawkers (bana-bana), but the second wave found 
                                                 
1  During colonial times, the Saint-Louis and Dakar regions also used cheap manpower for their 
few factories and industries.  
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permanent jobs that are more socially valued. Female migration is almost non-
existent in this Fuuta Tooro town; a fact that has traditionally been explained by 
their lack of autonomy and by their being reduced strictly to their role as 
housewives. The reproduction role of the domestic unit that they perform is 
incompatible with long-duration migrations. The few who do emigrate are 
almost all single women. Married females involved in migration flows, act 
recklessly with their husbands’ consent. That explains why there has been a 
masculinisation of the migratory flows originating from Fuuta Tooro2.  
International migration 
Data on sub-Saharan migration flows provided by Nkoa (2006: 4-5) indicate that, 
in 2000, migrations from Senegal to OECD countries (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) represented 2.6 per cent of all sub-
Saharan migrants living in these countries. Followed by Ghanaians (1.9%), the 
Senegalese were – with Liberians (also 2.6%) – the third most important West 
African foreign workers group after Cape Verdeans (3.5%) and Gambians 
(3.1%). Outside Africa, Senegalese immigrants usually migrate to Europe 
(France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, and so on), North America (USA 
and Canada), Asia (Japan, China, Taiwan), and even to some rich countries of 
the Arab world (Kuwait, Bahrain, Dubai, Saudi Arabia).  
In Senegal, young people migrate to bordering countries (Gambia, Guinea 
Bissau, Mauritania, Guinea-Conakry and Mali) and to relatively more wealthy 
ones (South Africa, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, 
Algeria, Morocco). These are countries where they would find economic 
opportunities. For some of them, these are considered to be transit countries, 
since their goal is to accumulate the economic means to make sure their travel 
continues until ‘Europe’s door’ (usually Spain3).  
Also, the internal situation of displaced persons and refugees from 
Casamance (Southern Senegal) exposes aspects of the effects of international 
migration on sections of the Senegalese population. They have become refugees 
in bordering countries such as Guinea Bissau and Gambia. The flows of 
                                                 
2  This traditional concept of the women’s role, based on unequal task-division according to 
gender, indicating male protagonism (autonomy) and female subordination, was analysed in a 
previous study: The Impact of the Cultural System on African Women (Wabgou & Munévar, 
2000).  
3  After these migratory stages (some even by road through Sahel’s desert), they arrive in Spain 
via Morocco, having passed through Ceuta or Melilla. We have previously written about these 
migratory trajectories (Wabgou, 2001: 460-477): some of our Senegalese interviewees stated 
that they went by sea and by air, while others said that they came to Melilla by land, the so-
called ‘Europe by land’ route. From there they may migrate to European, North American or 
Asian countries, including some rich countries of the Arab world. 
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displaced persons and refugees, originating in the conflicts4 that pitted the 
Senegalese armed forces against the Casamance MFDC (Casamance Movement 
for Democratic Forces) rebels, increased human mobility across borders.  
Brain drain: Senegalese students, professors, technicians and professionals  
Although the data are not consistent5 regarding the number of qualified Africans 
who reside in the North, it is necessary to mention the alarming character of the 
brain drain6 phenomenon in Africa. Being a sub-Saharan country, Senegal 
suffers from the loss of its most-trained people after or during their academic or 
professional training; mainly to Europe and North America. The Senegalese 
educational system faces a very serious problem related to the development: the 
country needs these graduates7 but cannot offering them anything that matches 
the attractive work conditions which prevail in their host countries. A portion of 
those who arrive in the North are, theoretically, there to complete their higher 
studies and then return home. Most of them, however, find themselves forced to 
remain when they complete their studies since they do not see their professional 
future in Senegal (Wabgou, 2001: 481-482). 
                                                 
4  Although at the present time we live in a post-conflict period in Casamance, we consider that 
the displacements caused by internal conflicts have to be included in this study because they 
contributed to reinforcing international migratory flows in Senegal. It is worth stressing the 
Senegalese government’s efforts to force the reconstruction of Casamance, and to revitalise 
social and economic activities in order to consolidate peace in the region:  
 (http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200607310418.html).  
5  According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), some twenty thousand 
departures of highly qualified African people toward countries of the North have been 
registered. The reason is believed to be that salaries and the life style are usually more 
attractive there. In its 1998 annual report, the Bureau régional pour l’Éducation en Afrique 
(BREDA, UNESCO) states that more than thirty thousand Africans with doctorates work 
outside African continent. These figures are lower than those given by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): more than a million qualified Africans, 
with higher education diplomas, reside in their member states, viz: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States. These people’s specialisations are usually located in the health and 
the education fields, and the World Health Organization (WHO) indicates that two thirds of 
African countries do not meet the minimum rate of twenty doctors per hundred thousand 
inhabitants.  
 (http://www.jeuneafrique.com/jeune_afrique/article_afrique_dossier.asp?art_cle=LIN10075fu
itesniaci0&dos_id=142&dosweb=142).  
6  For more details on the mobility of Senegalese academics and its classification see Bassirou 
(Fuite des cerveaux) in Sud Quotidien Feb 22, 1999. 
7  The student body is not, a priori, part of the economic migratory flows. However their 
probable conversion into economic immigrants makes us take them into account. We referred 
to the ‘African brain drain’ phenomenon in a recent book (Wabgou, 2006: 90 & 187-189).  
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The migration of Senegalese technicians and professional people is usually 
to the USA or to France. In Spain, for instance, there are few Senegalese profes-
sionals: they are household heads who immigrate with all their family members. 
Their stay is usually temporary but may become permanent. It can also happen 
that the worker leaves one host country and moves to another one; thus his 
return to his country of origin becomes a more and more unlikely project. Other 
categories of young Senegalese with vocational training are obliged to emigrate 
to Spain to look for better job opportunities since the internal labour market (in 
Senegal) does not favour their integration. This phenomenon is currently under-
going a significant growth.  
As individuals and as integrants of communities, Senegalese migrants link 
their host society with their country of origin. While crossing borders, they have 
become, in a context of transnationalism, almost a commonplace in today’s 
world where corporations and ordinary people alike seek economic survival and 
benefit. Senegalese foreign workers preserve and reinvent their cultural patterns 
in their host country, where they remain linked to one another by ties of kinship, 
shared resources, and cultural exchange.  
The cultural patterns we are concerned with here are those constructed and 
based on traditional solidarities and social networks, reinforced by religious 
practices. Among the Senegalese diaspora, the solidarities and support routes 
are both informal (individual to individual, within groups of individuals, and/or 
among groups) and formal (between people but within the framework of 
specific migrant associations. In both cases, the goal of solidarity is a goal to be 
reached and is consolidated through mutual support. Senegalese migrants living 
in their destination countries nevertheless still participate in social networks and 
interactions in their home countries. For instance, remittances (the money that 
migrant people make by working abroad and send back to their homes) are 
collectively or individually sent for the realisation of social, concrete and 
collective utility projects, and a resulting difference is noticeable in the level of 
people’s individual well-being, as well as in that of the local collective group. 
So the question now arises: to what extent can national policies accommo-
date migration flows in Senegal? 
Policies and reforms for development 
Some policy ideas suggested in the past period focus on the brain drain, such as 
legal restrictions on exit or a ‘departure tax’ paid by receiving countries to sending 
countries, are now seen as archaic and unimplementable. Other ideas, such as a 
transnational community of scientists and engineers helping both the receiving and 
sending countries may be even more feasible due to globalisation. Thus while 
globalization might aggravate some old problems it might also entrain some new 
solutions… One argument is that the costs of higher public education should be 
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treated as a loan (secured in some fashion) unless the graduates satisfy certain 
minimum requirements of public service after graduation. This policy would seem to 
be fair but it may be difficult to implement. (Ellerman, 2003: 29-30). 
This way, transnationalism is considered as a key element in the role played by 
transnational communities which are built up through the pressure of international 
migration. It doesn’t only represent a novelty, but among so-called global studies it 
constitutes an ongoing theoretical field with decisive political relevance for the 
future, precisely for the future of the lower class people, of those who, being 
wrapped in the globalisation trends, have very little political power; however, their 
place in the economy is more and more decisive for its nations of origin. (Lozano, 
2003: 8) 
Senegalese government capacity-building and cooperation on migration 
policies are now analysed using four-fold data. Firstly we examine existing 
migration policies in Senegal, giving an inventory and an assessment The next 
section deals with the need to improve migratory policies pertaining to the 
homecoming of immigrants – qualified, semi-qualified or unqualified. Next, the 
bulk of remittances arriving in Senegal requires a government policy that can 
channel migrant monetary flows and strengthen their positive effects, without 
being either repressive or restrictive. Finally, domestic or local policies on 
development need to include transnational networks in their programmes since 
transnationalism is a core characteristic of Senegalese migration.  
Senegalese migration and national policy 
For decades, Senegal has been relatively liberal regarding the entry and 
residence of aliens, although there have been changes as economic conditions 
have worsened. Since 1975, Senegal has been a member of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS/CEAO) and has been fulfilling 
the demands of the protocol on free movement of persons, rights of residence 
and establishment. As a country member of ECOWAS, Senegal has been 
implementing the agreement on free circulation of people that was signed on 28 
October 1978.  
Senegal maintains bilateral agreements on labour migration with France, 
which is one of the main destination countries of Senegalese migrants. In the 
context of bilateral relations between France and Senegal, France’s Interior 
Minister Nicolas Sarkozy recently signed an agreement with the Senegalese 
government (23 September 2006), related to concerted efforts and joint actions 
focused on migration flows. Within the framework of policies for the integrated 
management of migrations, this Franco-Senegalese treaty is conceived as the 
continuation of operations plans that were previously elaborated in France and 
Morocco. On 24 July 2006, the French parliament passed a law on immigration 
and integration which establishes the fundamentals of a collaborative policy on 
immigration between France and the immigrants’ countries of origin. In 
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addition, a conference of Morocco (10 & 11 July 2006), in which Senegal 
participated actively, launched the South-North Partnerships in order to discuss 
issues related to migration and development.  
Some of the major decisions of the Franco-Senegalese agreement on migra-
tions focused on were:  
(1) Measures against the brain drain: making it possible for Senegalese stu-
dents and professionals to migrate temporarily to France, to enhance their 
professional skills and then to return home, to participate in the develop-
ment of their country. 
(2) Measures against illegal migration: allowing France to support and finance 
Senegal, to foster its capability to take control over its maritime coast. 
(This is the place from where young Senegalese people usually start their 
journey to Europe via the Canary Islands, jeopardising their life by making 
use of unseaworthy small boats that sometimes sink.) 
(3) Measures to strengthen Franco-Senegalese cooperation for economic and 
social development: aiming at supporting the Senegalese government in 
speeding up growth and development in Senegal, in order to eradicate the 
root causes of general migration through the creation of jobs and the 
enhancement of agriculture, fishing, health, micro-projects for develop-
ment – all within the framework of co-development policies. 
Thus, in respect of the migration policy’s international approaches, Russell, 
Jacobsen & Stanley (1990b: 75) state that these agreements cover: 
… not only issues of entry, residence, and departure, but also occupational and 
social rights, participation in trades unions (as members and staff delegates but not 
in administrative or management capacities), and social security rights (sickness and 
maternity insurance, disability, old age, accident and family allowance). 
These treaties have, however, not taken into account the views of the 
migrants themselves; in this sense it is an exclusive bilateral agreement between 
governments instead of being an inclusive one. Moreover, in February 2006, the 
then French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy announced a migration bill, 
focusing on the qualification of permitted migration from Africa: so-called 
‘selective migration’.  
The questions the French minister was trying to respond were: Who is 
entitled to immigrate to France? and How much inflow is allowed?  
In response to these questions, Sarkozy proposed new immigration laws, to 
curtail unskilled labour immigration in favour of skilled immigration. He 
proposed a points system to rank potential immigrants on the basis of their 
country of origin and their qualifications. The legislation would also restrict 
family immigration, which up till now has constituted by far the main part of 
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migration to France.8 This project was severely criticised by the Senegalese 
president, Abdoulaye Wade (cited in Katata, 2006), but the bill nevertheless 
became law on 25 July 2006, and was due to take effect in early 2007. 
In this context, the Franco-Senegalese agreement on migration is described 
as a new deal between the two countries since they considered that previously 
‘there was a misunderstanding’ between Senegal and France regarding the 
concept of selective immigration. Sarkozy said ‘… we’ve had discussions … 
and with this agreement, we’ll select together those who migrate, we’ll ease the 
application and granting of visas and we’ll assist our Senegalese friends who are 
working in France and Senegalese students in getting their visas (Sarkozy, 
2006).  
At this point it is especially important to highlight the unilateral character of 
such agreements – the initiative came from France, and the Senegalese govern-
ment merely ‘negotiated’ with the French one. In any case, the idea of selective 
immigration still stands, the only change being that the selection is now 
performed together with the Senegalese government or with Senegalese policy 
makers. We believe that, in order to find real solutions to the issue of migration 
from Senegal, the Senegalese government has to take its own initiatives instead 
of waiting for proposals from France, because propositions such as these are 
often approved through some kind of ‘negotiation’, performed within a context 
strongly characterised and influenced by the unequal bargaining power between 
the relational partners. As long as the Senegalese government has no proper 
proposals for bilateral agreement within the framework of its international 
relations (its policies) relating to international migration, it will remain depend-
ent on French initiatives. We believe that Senegalese authorities must be 
pragmatic and realistic (Realpolitik) while dealing with the challenges of 
migration. 
Regarding the Senegalese government’s own initiatives for the control of 
migration, it is worth mentioning their creation in 1993 of the Direction des 
Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (DES) (‘directorate for Senegalese [nationals] living 
abroad’), thus recognising the need for a rational management of Senegalese 
nationals who reside in foreign countries. It was, however, inefficient in 
protecting immigrants and supporting them in their homecoming and their re-
incorporation into the Senegalese labour market, and so a first Symposium of 
the Senegalese Diaspora (Symposium des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur) was held in 
November 1994. It aimed at deepening reflection on questions related to the 
mechanisms and strategies of the Senegalese government, to provide better 
protection of immigrants and to grant them a fertile environment for innovations 
                                                 
8  K Murphy, at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Backgrounder2_France.php 
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and investments. This endeavour received the support of the government who, 
through Decree 95–154 (of February 9, 1995), created a High Council for 
Senegalese Living Abroad (Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur or 
CSSE) with the intention of managing more efficiently the specific needs of the 
Senegalese diaspora, and to encourage them participate in the expansion of the 
government’s migration policies. However, no significant action was taken by 
this Council, so a second Symposium of the Senegalese Diaspora was organ-
ised, and took place in Dakar in July 2001. It was organised by the Senegalese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the African Union and members of the Senegalese 
diaspora, and aimed at setting up basis to extend migration policies and thus 
develop a dynamic partnership between Senegalese migrants and their country 
of origin.  
This new partnership with the Senegalese diaspora has been more developed 
inasmuch as the members of the diaspora participated in the organisation and 
celebration of the symposium. Its outcomes include the involvement of the 
Senegalese government in elaborating strategies to support those of its nationals 
living abroad who wish to return or are planning investments at home. The 
guidelines or targets through which the government has affirmed its political 
will to face efficiently the challenges of migration include:  
(1) reviewing the structure and orientations of the CSSE, and supporting the 
proposal that only a representative of the Senegalese diaspora could 
preside over the CSSE;  
(2) creating a mutual fund or insurance system for the Senegalese diaspora, to 
assist migrants and their families with health problems;  
(3) setting up a bank for migrants;  
(4) removing customs duties, taxes and fees imposed on any imported equip-
ment – especially agricultural materials – intended to create ‘joint respon-
sibility’ and/or to generate local projects; 
(5) offering and giving priority to a quota scheme for financing immigrants 
willing to participate in the construction of family housing in their society 
of origin, through housing programmes;  
(6) favouring access to financing mechanisms for co-development9 established 
between Senegal and France, and setting up a commission for the promo-
tion of projects chaired by women. 
Although these governmental initiatives are addressed to the whole Senegal-
ese diaspora, our observation is that the last of these policy guidelines (6) is 
mainly focused on the agreements it has with French government. As a conse-
                                                 
9  This involves several social players, including women, in the process of local and national 
development. 
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quence, it is more beneficial to immigrants who live in France than to those who 
reside in other destination countries such as the USA, Canada and Italy. At this 
point, the Senegalese government should make more effort to expand its initia-
tives towards these other countries, so that Senegalese migrants established 
there can take direct advantage of the governance and management of interna-
tional migration.  
There is thus a need to expand the partnership of Senegal to all the different 
countries of destination for Senegalese people. Issues on multilateral agree-
ments between Senegal and these destination countries should be addressed, 
with it being a compulsory item on migration policy agendas. However, it is 
worth mentioning a relative improvement regarding housing programmes 
(target 5): for the five years ending in June 2005, Senegalese living abroad have 
received thirty per cent of the loans granted by the Senegalese Housing Bank 
(Banque de l’habitat du Sénégal or BHS). They are considered to be ‘Very 
Important Customers’ because they contribute fifty per cent of the savings 
deposits for financing social housing. Thus, the Senegalese Ministry of Heritage 
Sites, Housing and Construction (Patrimoine bâti, de l'Habitat et de la 
Construction) considered that the involvement of Senegalese people living 
abroad in the establishment of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
their home country had to be oriented towards of construction equipment, to 
foster the housing sector in Senegal. However, our concern is that, although the 
social housing policy is not the only response to local development, the 
Senegalese government has emphasised this facet, knowing that some migrants 
involve themselves in the programme because they are motivated more by 
‘selfishness’ than by a real desire to be involved in local development.  
Some very important initiatives have arisen from the second symposium 
regarding the need to build firm relationships with international organisations 
and other institutions which are partly or wholly dedicated to migration flows 
through bilateral or multilateral agreements. These are: firstly with the IOM and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in order to conduct a 
credible statistical census on Senegalese migrant community; secondly with the 
IOM and UNDP for the production of a guide for the Consular Agent; and lastly 
with consular missions which could rely on the Senegalese government for 
social and human service assistants. One of the major problems is, however, 
that the Senegalese government has no accurate data on the number of Senegal-
ese people living abroad, although according to non-official sources, this is 
estimated as being between two and three million. It is therefore urgent that 
existing initiatives related to data collections be strengthened through Senegal-
ese migrant associations and through consular departments, while expanding the 
number of social actors involved in this endeavour –namely local NGOs and 
other institutions involved in the field of migration. Statistics are not unimpor-
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tant: there is certainly a need to build a reliable database with socio-economic 
profiles of immigrants, to test, and if necessary contest, the claims that are often 
made about the harm they cause their country of origin (by being absent) and 
the benefits (in terms of local development) that they produce for their host 
country.  
In order to expand and strengthen existing initiatives – which are, most of 
the time, unproductive and inoperative – these observations lead us to focus on 
other considerations about migration policy-making in Senegal. 
Return policies: a powerful tool for development 
Nowadays, there is an increasing interest in policies related to the development 
impact of migration on the home region. We point out the politicians’ responsi-
bility regarding the training and support of those immigrants who decide to 
return home. At the present time, a better organisation of members of the 
Senegalese diaspora is needed, so that, when they decide to return home, they 
have the state’s complete support. This is an important condition for increasing 
the benefit that the country of origin can gain from the returning migrants’ 
knowledge and experience.  
Despite this, all immigrants (qualified, semi-qualified, and non-qualified), 
when contemplating their return to Senegal, face such paradoxical and frustrat-
ing dilemmas that they become very anxious, even though they cherish return to 
the homeland as the end point of their migratory itinerary, originally conceived 
of as a round-trip process. So strong is the desire to be identified with one of the 
societies in which they live – or have lived – (origin and destination) that they 
end up justifying the lived ambiguity. They are aware of the distance that 
separates them from their society of origin but they do not consider themselves 
as thoroughly integrated members of the community of destination. This feeling 
is usually expressed in terms of ‘I am not from here, neither am I from there’, 
which we refer to as ‘double absence’.10 At the same time, they manifest the 
opposite attitude – of double presence: ‘I am here, and I am there.’ These two 
attitudes are connected since those who are aware of their presence, evidence 
ipso facto their absence; recognising also that their sense of double presence 
implicitly recognises their double absence.  
                                                 
10  We take this expression from Sayad (1999: 93-94) who has studied different stages of 
Algerian emigration-immigration to France, from the colonisation of Algeria until its 
independence – including the First World War, a crucial stage of this migratory process. 
There is also the eloquent testimony of an interviewee of Criado Calvo (1999: 593) which 
clearly illustrates the idea of double absence: ‘What I really won by coming here is: you are 
neither there nor here, you cannot go back, and you neither know if you will go ahead. It 
seems to me a mistake, but a very big mistake […] and then there is another issue: that are not 
in homeland [...] then later you return home and what do you do?’ 
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Difficulties with territorial, cultural and political entities are worsened by the 
immigrated person’s hesitation in the face of the possibility of returning home – 
feelings that are increased when he must decide on the time of his return. The 
question is ‘until when will such a situation persist?’, a question that expresses 
strongly his will to return one day to his country of origin. In many cases, a 
decision regarding the return date is put off, and becomes ever more insubstan-
tial. The continual postponement of return affects the execution of this goal 
until it is transformed into a mere dream. The unpredictability of return of the 
immigrant has been described as the ‘myth of return’11. The return to ‘the home-
land’ escapes from the migrant’s hands due to the prevailing cultural, socio-
economic and political conditions in his country of origin. In addition, the 
economic constraints that he undergoes, and the legal constraints that make a 
return to the host country at a later date seem improbable, are some of the 
causes of the endless procrastination of the worthy12 realisation of his 
homecoming.  
A major involvement of the Senegalese government in the return process 
would have very positive effects on immigrants’ decision-making and the reali-
sation of their return since it would encourage them in this aim. Currently, the 
government has proposed a wide perspective of programmes favouring migra-
tion and development. In particular it encourages the immigrants’ return to be 
linked into agriculture: Retour vers l’agriculture (REVA). Recently, undertaken 
actions by the Senegalese government with the purpose of favouring the 
development through the responsible administration for the migration flows 
include:  
– the establishment of a five-year commitment to serve their country, which 
has to be completed by all pupils and students who take advantage of a state 
scholarship (‘this will help us to prevent our skilled manpower from being 
caught by the European economy … otherwise, we should be refunded all 
tuition and fees which have been involved in their education’); 
                                                 
11 Here too we have been influenced by Sayad (1999: 59). This author considers that the 
Algerian immigrant-emigrant, who idealises France as a stable world, full of work 
opportunities and constant salaries, dreams of transforming it – in the short term – into his 
‘second homeland’. Without renouncing Algeria (first homeland), he thinks that with his 
French earnings, he could change his living conditions in Algeria, and also those of his 
family. But after his arrival, he becomes settled, he looks for a job, and as time goes on: 
months, years ‘… voilà cinq ans, voilà dix ans, voilà vingt ans, voilà la retraite … ‘, said 
Sayad’s interviewee. [‘… it’s five years, it’s ten years, it’s twenty years, it’s retirement …’] 
12  We insist on this word because the Senegalese immigrant usually has a very peculiar 
conception of the dignity or honour that he would receive if he returned home. This dignity is 
linked to the concomitant improvement in his socio-economic conditions. 
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–  the reduction in the duration of study to obtain a Bachelor's degree in 
Medicine to five years instead of seven in Senegal (‘now France can no 
longer rob us of our doctors’);  
– the introduction of a plan of action for the integration of migrants who have 
been returned or sent home into agricultural activities and rural develop-
ment; 
– all of the above-mentioned measures are being sustained by the power of 
political will, in order to implement highly ambitious policies for training, 
education and job creation.13  
However, our concern is that if immigrants are not associated (from the 
bottom) in the implementation and completion of this plan, this state endeavour 
(from above) will collapse again, as happened in the past. It is thus necessary to 
insist on the integration of transnational networks into state policies. Senegalese 
policy-makers should take into account the return and re-integration of qualified 
nationals, and focus on other related programmes in striving to facilitate the 
return, retention and re-integration of unqualified and semi-skilled migrants, in 
order to promote their participation in development. These actions would force 
the Senegalese state to take some responsibility for channelling remittances in 
order to maximise their positive contributions at economic and social levels.  
Policies on remittances channelling: A pragmatic but difficultly feasible 
recourse 
Governments should seek mechanisms for fostering productive activities 
through remittances. We agree that ‘since remittances are private transfers, they 
have tended worldwide to elude government control. A traditional mechanism 
for overcoming this difficulty has been to require that a given proportion of 
workers’ income be remitted through official channels, and to secure the assis-
tance of government and employers abroad in enforcing such provisions. This 
kind of arrangement has worked to the benefit of several parties other than the 
workers themselves’ (Russell, Jacobsen & Stanley, 1990a: 27). 
We now consider the main proposals of the United Nations, supported by the 
International Organization for Migration, in order to illustrate policy approaches 
for maximising the development impact of the diaspora’s financial resources:  
- improving baseline data collection on international and internal remittances 
and the volume of investments from diasporas to create a knowledge base to 
inform policy development;  
                                                 
13 http://www.capafrique.org/blogafrique/p=74 
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- conducting further studies of decision-making mechanisms with regard to 
the transfer and spending of remittances, as well as their macro-economic 
impact; 
- promoting the transfer of remittances through official channels;  
- reducing the cost and enhancing the accessibility of remittance services for 
migrants, by (among other things) facilitating improved access to financial 
services in cooperation with financial intermediaries, local communities, 
public and private sectors (such as banks and post office networks, credit 
unions, microfinance institutions and other rural service providers), and 
facilitating access to banking for migrants in countries of destination and 
their families in countries of origin. As irregular migrants, too, can have a 
positive developmental impact on their home country, it is important to 
assist undocumented migrants to gain access to financial services;  
- streamlining and optimising the process of remittance transfer, including the 
promotion of the better use of modern technology to reduce transfer costs; 
- promoting savings which could be used to increase the liquidity of micro-
credit institutions as a buffer against economic shocks…  
- creating investment schemes and vehicles into which remittances can be 
channelled, such as industry, education, infrastructure development, and the 
establishment of small and medium-sized enterprises; 
- creating incentives to channel remittances into development schemes …  
- encouraging migrants to establish small and medium-sized enterprises to 
ensure their self-reliance in the long run, while ensuring that their funds 
contribute to local economic growth…14 
Based on the dynamics of remittances, their intended and actual use and their 
impact at the individual, family and community levels, we believe that policies 
in Senegal should take them into account, including the ideas of second-genera-
tion immigrants who generally are more reluctant to invest in their parents’ 
country of origin – which is also theirs, with the difference that they tend to 
adopt cultural patterns of the country of their birth (their parents ‘host’ country).  
Global development policies 
Two conditions are essential for development programmes to be successful. 
First, they have to be focused on the education of the potential immigrants in 
the countries of origin and, second, they should create and promote permanent 
bridges between origin and destination societies. When these conditions are 
                                                 
14  See document prepared by United Nations as a contribution to assist states in migration 
policy-making which can be found at either of the following websites:  
 http://www.old.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/GOVERNING/EN/455593372734152471.pdf  
 http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_researc
h/policy_documents/MCINF281.pdf  
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met, state entities can, by means of transnational networks, come closer to the 
people’s needs and establish contacts with transnational communities, to 
involve them in local development plans. This way, they will have the possibil-
ity of playing an important role in the development processes. This means that 
there is a possibility of optimising the functioning of transnational networks 
(trade, association, institutions) and of improving conditions in education, 
health services and agriculture. 
One of the ways in which migration has been linked to education is through the use 
of remittances for educational purposes. In villages of Western and Nyanza 
provinces in Kenya, where 74 to 81 per cent of off-farm income derives from 
migration to Nairobi, and where investment in education is of particular importance 
for continued access to urban labour markets, nearly half of this income is used for 
school fees. (Gould, 1988: 4.1.49)  
Collective action for improvement of education has also been reported among 
Senegal River Valley migrants in France, where members of the same community 
tend to form ‘secondary villages’ that maintain strong ties with the ‘primary village’ 
at home. In addition to their individual remittances, which are used for lumpy school 
fee payments among other purposes, these migrants participate in or have total 
responsibility for social undertakings in the home village, including building and 
furnishing schools. Migrant associations in France frequently organize subscriptions 
for such projects. (Russell, Jacobsen & Stanley, 1990a: 63-64) 
Of course we are speaking of co-development which has the explicit inten-
tion of involving several social players in the process of local and national 
development. It calls for cooperation among the parties: the youth, women, 
children, successive generations, migrants, nuclear families, associations, civil 
and business corporations, local NGOs, universities, institutes of basic educa-
tion, vocational training centres, government.  
The co-development strategy was institutionalized in Europe in the second part of 
the last decade, soon after the leadership that Sami Nair provided it both in France 
… and in the European parliament. At the present time, co-development is part of 
the official policy of the European Union. In general terms, the concept emphasizes 
the necessity to include in the migration contribution, the people and the material 
resources and ideas that travel along the migratory circuits, to benefit the countries 
of origin. […] The different dimensions that this view contains have been collected 
in Pacheco (2002) [...] a concept that involves a determination to cooperate among 
diverse parties. (Escrivá & Ribas 2004, 44 & 33 (trans.))15  
                                                 
15  For further information on the co-development dimensions, see note 20 in Escrivá & Ribas 
(2004: 44). These authors (2004: 44-47) also present an indicative analysis on co-
development.  
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Similarly, policies should incorporate broadening the health services, as well 
as providing equal access to them: 
A recent bank study on the demand for health care in rural Mali … suggests that 
participation in migration may influence both the propensity to seek health care and 
the type of health services sought: the availability of remittance income was found 
to increase demand for health services and to exert a significant positive effect on 
the probability of seeking modern care. (Russell, Jacobsen & Stanley, 1990a: 73–74) 
In this context, the Senegalese government’s attitude needs to be collabora-
tive rather than indifferent, since the emigration of its natives can be interpreted 
as a ‘safety valve’ due to internal unemployment and socio-economic uncer-
tainties. Migratory movements constitute a way of escaping from these realities, 
and the political authorities not only do not take serious action to stop these 
migration flows but rather are indifferent to the phenomenon. In this sense, 
emigration is identified as an instrument for diverting civilians’ attention away 
from the implications of internal economic and socio-political problems, at the 
same time creating an apathetic atmosphere and national indifference:  
Migration often seems to work in a similar way as a safety valve to relieve the 
pressure of a pressing problem rather than to resolve it. When yesterday’s elites use 
their power to lock in their position and thus to stifle innovation which can always 
be threatening, then the economy will stagnate and young people will not be able to 
find jobs that will utilise their skills and engage their ambitions. Migration provides 
the ambitious and skilled with individual exits. It helps to ‘export’ the unemploy-
ment problem. Overall, it relieves the pressure to change the structural barriers to 
improving the business climate. (Ellerman, 2003: 16) 
Instead, the Senegalese government should develop real strategies that 
expand job opportunities, in order to reduce the emigration of their citizens: 
there is a need to promote development initiatives on the basis of job creation 
strategies in rural and urban areas, as a local alternative to international migra-
tion.  
Conclusions 
This essay has explored migration policy in Senegal, which appears to be a 
rather new policy field. The situation of internal and international migration 
flows within or from Senegal has been considered, taking into account the fact 
that migrations constitute a channel for the loss of excellence in domestic 
productive forces. The dissertation has investigated the existing initiatives of the 
Senegalese government in response to some significant challenges resulting 
from the emigration of its nationals; that is, migration and development, illegal 
migration as a result of more restrictive policies in the destination countries, 
brain drain and/or brain gain, problems related to transit migration, and so on.  
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Indeed, Senegal has been developing advanced plans and responses to help 
promote a better understanding of the roles migrants can play in national and 
local development through regional and bi-regional partnerships. The govern-
ance of migration in Senegal has focused on the need for governments at local, 
provincial and national levels to improve the domestic investment environment, 
to help promote the productive use of remittances, the lowering the customs 
duty, taxes and fees on specific imported products and services, trying to 
improve information-sharing and management on migration (data building and 
access). However, some important issues have not yet been included in these 
agendas: for example multilateral partnerships, restrictive migration policies in 
destination countries, xenophobia, the feminisation of emigration, second 
generation immigrants, the human rights of citizens abroad (including aspects of 
reintegration of their nationals forced to return), proactive association of civil 
society and migration researchers in policymaking, and so on. On this point, we 
refer to Adepojou (2006: 10) who considers that: ‘in the African context, 
bilateral relations should be forged between the countries sending and receiving 
migrants within and outside the region, as well as multilateral arrangements 
between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the European Union 
(EU), African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, and so on.’ 
Next, the paper examines policies and reforms that would lead to increased 
development outcomes, and assesses the Senegalese government’s capacity and 
political willingness to foster strategies addressing the control of migration 
flows, mainly the brain drain. Issues related to the contributions of migration in 
poverty reduction while causing brain drain in Senegal (brain gain for the host 
country and brain waste for Senegal) have also been considered. So we call for 
the Senegalese political authorities to make themselves more interested and 
engaged in the migratory phenomenon when they design policies for national 
development. Strengthening this attitude, with the integration of all social 
players, including the transnational networks will end up reinforcing authentic 
co-development processes. 
The study has explored how sufficient and efficient are the existing initia-
tives in managing the positive aspects of migration and has stated that Senegal 
policy-making should:  
(1) boost productive activities through remittances; 
(2) train and give support to immigrants who wish to return; 
(3) involve immigrants in projects of cooperation with the Senegalese elite in 
the diaspora; 
(4)  educate potential immigrants in Senegal; 
(5)  create and support permanent bridges between people in the place of origin 
and in destination countries; 
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(6) involve national and local governments, civil corporations, managers, 
universities, educational centres, training and culture organisations, and 
immigrants organisations; 
(7)  create favourable conditions of life and work for potential migrant popula-
tions and returned migrants.  
Finally, we believe that any policy approach to Senegalese migration should 
call for harmonisation and, especially, continuity of migration agendas. These 
requirements are essential to attain significant advantages in terms of global 
progress, and would have many direct benefits for the country, at both local and 
national levels. 
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International migration, national  
development and the role of 
governments: The case 
of Nigeria  
Hein de Haas 
Introduction 
As Africa’s demographic giant, Nigeria plays a key role in African migrations, 
but has surprisingly been ignored in the migration and development literature. 
Beyond the issue of trafficking, few empirical studies on Nigerian migration are 
available. With a few exceptions (Nwajiuba, 2005; Osili, 2004), studies on the 
development implications of Nigerian international migration are particularly 
rare.  
Besides giving a brief overview of Nigerian international migration, this 
chapter aims to analyse the views and policies of Nigeria-based stakeholders 
with regard to migration and development linkages. This has been achieved 
through the study of available documentation (articles, reports, policy 
documents, undocumented notes) and interviews with twenty-two people 
representing eighteen institutions, ranging from Nigerian ministries and 
agencies, NGOs, European and African foreign embassies to several multilat-
162 DE HAAS 
 
 
eral organisations such as the IOM, ILO and ECOWAS. The interviews were 
conducted from 26 to 30 June 2006 in Abuja.  
Due to the limited number of interviews, and the general lack of data and 
empirical studies, this chapter does not pretend to be comprehensive. Rather, it 
tries to throw light on the major migration trends and to identify the major 
policy issues and dilemmas from the perspective of the Nigerian interviewees. 
Unless reference is made to written sources, information in this chapter is based 
on the interviews. Because of limitations of space, the chapter will focus almost 
exclusively on international migration. 
Nigerian international migration 
During the colonial era, parallel to rural-to-urban migration, and migration to 
and from other African countries, Nigerians migrated to the United Kingdom 
(UK), principally to pursue higher education. A significant proportion of them 
have stayed. After independence in 1960 this largely highly-skilled migration to 
the UK continued, although an increasing proportion of Nigerians also migrated 
to the United States (US) for study, business and work.  
The 1973 oil crisis, with skyrocketing oil prices, caused a 350 per cent 
increase in oil revenues. The associated economic boom in oil-producing 
countries made Nigeria into a major migration destination within Africa. The 
rising incomes of the urban middle class and rapid industrialisation attracted a 
substantial number of West African labour migrants. However, the post-1981 
decrease in oil prices heralded a long period of economic downturn along with 
sustained political repression and violence. In 1983 and 1985 Nigeria expelled 
large numbers of West African migrants, including about one million Ghanaians 
(Arthur, 1991: 74).  
In fact, Nigeria has witnessed a ‘reverse migration transition, transforming 
itself from a net immigration to a net emigration country (Black et al., 2004: 
11). Nigerians have increasingly emigrated to countries such as Ghana, Camer-
oon, and particularly the wealthy economies of Gabon, Botswana and South 
Africa (Adepoju, 2000). Since the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa 
has developed as a major destination for migrants from various African 
countries, among which are numerous Nigerians. The skilled in particular have 
found the booming economy of South Africa to be a convenient alternative to 
Europe, the US and the Gulf States (Adepoju, 2000). 
Although this migration of students, professionals and entrepreneurs to 
Anglo-Saxon countries has continued, there was also a diversification of extra-
continental migration during the 1980s. An increasing number of Nigerians 
migrated to countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium as 
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well as to the Gulf states. In the 1990s, Spain, Italy and Ireland emerged as new 
major destinations of labour migrants from West Africa and Nigeria (Black et 
al., 2004: 9). There has also been an increasing tendency of Nigerian migrants 
towards permanent settlement in these countries. Increasing restrictions and 
controls on immigration in Europe have not led to a decrease in Nigerian 
emigration. Rather, migrants are more often irregular and the itineraries tend to 
be longer and more perilous.  
There is circumstantial evidence that these more recent migrants to conti-
nental European countries are, on average, less skilled, and that they more often 
work in the service (formal and, particularly in southern Europe, informal), 
trade and agricultural sectors of the economy. The UK and, in particular, the US 
(through student and professional migration as well as the Green Card lottery) 
continue to attract the more highly skilled workers (Hernandez-Coss et al., 
2007). The need to expand the UK National Health Service has for instance 
created new opportunities for professional health workers who, at home, were 
poorly paid and unmotivated. Universities in the UK have also embarked upon a 
recruitment drive to attract Nigerian students. The Gulf states, too, have 
attracted primarily the relatively highly skilled – at least until recently. Educa-
tion has remained an important cause of Nigerian emigration, and labour 
migration from Nigeria has also become increasingly feminine (Adepoju, 2000: 
386). 
A significant number of Nigerians apply for refugee status in European 
countries. In 2004, Nigerians were the fifth largest group of asylum seekers in 
Europe (Carling, 2006). Because of its size and its current relative stability, 
Nigerians have less chance of obtaining asylum status than citizens from 
ECOWAS countries directly affected by civil war.  
The issue of trafficking of female Nigerian sex workers to Italy and other 
European countries has received substantial attention (Carling, 2006). Most 
recruiting of future prostitutes takes place in the southern Edo state. The most 
important destination is Italy, where it is said that as many as 10 000 Nigerian 
prostitutes live. Secondary destinations are the Netherlands, Spain and a range 
of other countries (Carling, 2006). When Nigerians began migrating to Italy in 
the 1980s as a response to its high demand for low-skilled labour in agriculture 
and services, these women were only one of many groups that migrated. The 
first prostitutes tended to work independently, but in the early 1990s, immigra-
tion restrictions made prospective emigrants increasingly dependent on large 
loans in order to pay their journey, which provided an opportunity for traffick-
ers (Carling, 2006).  
A potential prostitute’s initial contact with traffickers is often made through 
a relative, friend, or other familiar person, who puts her in contact with a 
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‘madam’ who organises and finances the journey. The costs may range from 
US$40,000 to US$100,000. The migrants and the madam conclude a ‘pact’, 
religiously sealed by a traditional priest, which obliges debt repayment in 
exchange for a safe passage to Europe. In Europe, the women are under the 
control of another madam, a counterpart of the madam in Nigeria. Most women 
realise that they are going to work as prostitutes, but do not necessarily know 
about the arduous conditions under which (street) prostitutes have to work, nor 
the size of their debt (Carling, 2006).  
However, this work does offer some ‘career’ prospects. After repaying their 
migration debt in one to three years, women are essentially free, and it is fairly 
common for them to become a supervisor of other prostitutes and, eventually, a 
madam themselves. Carling (2006) stresses that this prospect of upward 
mobility is a incentive to comply with the pact, and that the strong element of 
reciprocity between traffickers and trafficked women makes it difficult to 
reduce this form of trafficking. According to a recent study, traffickers, espe-
cially in Kano state, successfully exploited the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to 
traffic children, men and women for different exploitative purposes, for exam-
ple prostitution, begging and all forms of domestic work (Ehindero et al., 2006). 
However, in light of the attention currently being given to trafficking, it is 
important to stress that, for Nigerian migration, trafficking seems the exception 
rather than the rule. The large majority of Nigerians migrate voluntarily, and 
even in the case of trafficking it is clear that the line between voluntary and 
forced migration is blurred.  
It is also important to make a distinction between trafficking and smuggling. 
While many previously migrated on their own initiative, increasing restrictions 
have made more and more migrants dependent on the services of smugglers in 
crossing borders. Whereas until the 1990s migrants to Europe predominantly 
used air links, visa requirements and increasing immigration controls at air- and 
seaports, seem to have led to an increasing reliance on trans-Saharan, overland 
routes to the Maghreb countries, and in particular to Morocco, from where 
Nigerians and other sub-Saharan Africans attempt to cross the Mediterranean to 
southern Europe. Another now-popular route is via the Atlantic Ocean and the 
Canary Islands (de Haas, 2006). 
Scattered evidence on the origin of Nigerian immigrants in Europe and the 
US strongly suggests that the majority originate from the relatively developed 
and densely populated southern provinces. The Ibo from the southeast and the 
Yoruba from the southwest, and, to a lesser extent the Edo and the Ogoni ethnic 
groups, seem to constitute the majority of Nigerian migrants in the UK 
(Hernandez-Coss et al., 2007). The majority of Nigerians trafficked to Europe 
seem to originate from Edo state, and Benin City in particular. Edo and, to a 
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lesser extent, the Delta states are known as the main origin areas of sex workers. 
The Hausa and other northern groups seem relatively more oriented towards 
migration to the Gulf states. The predominantly Muslim character of the north 
as well as the position of the northern city of Kano as a major air hub in the 
hadj (the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca), might partially explain this connection.  
Reliable data on Nigerian migration is lacking. Nigerian authorities do not 
register or estimate emigration, which presumably reflects a low interest in the 
issue. Also, receiving country statistics are incomplete, as many countries do 
not include naturalised and second-generation Nigerians in immigrant statistics, 
and because of the substantial presence of irregular migrants. Nigeria’s 2005 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) estimated that more than 2 million 
Nigerians (mostly highly educated) have emigrated to Europe and the United 
States (NNPC, 2004), but the empirical basis for this claim remains unclear. 
According to some embassies, at least 1 million Nigerians are living in the US 
and the UK, and another 500,000 in Germany and Canada. Hernandez-Coss et 
al. (2007) even claim that 5 million Nigerians are currently living abroad. 
However, these estimates lack empirical underpinning. 
A compilation of existing migration statistics shows that more than 300,000 
first generation Nigerian migrants were legally living abroad at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century (see Table 8.1). Although the real number is certainly 
higher if we include second and third generations as well as irregular migrants, 
claims that ‘millions’ of Nigerians would live abroad appear to be unrealistic.  
 
 
Table 8.1 Estimates of numbers of Nigerians living outside Africa  
Country Nigerians abroad Arrival of asylum 
  seekers (2004) 
US 160,000 2004; country of birth N/A 
UK 88,380  2001; country of birth 1209 
Germany 16,183 2002; nationality N/A 
Canada 10,425  2001; country of birth 589 
Ireland 9,225 2002; country or birth N/A 
Netherlands 4,564 2003; country of birth N/A 
Italy 3,575 1989; nationality N/A 
Austria 2,913  2001; country of birth 1828 
Greece 2,021 2001; nationality N/A 
Australia 1,783  2001; country of birth N/A 
Belgium 1,636  2004; nationality N/A 
France 1,425  1999; nationality 1572 
 
Total 302,130   
Source: OECD 2006 and http://www.migrationinformation.org 
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Black et al. (2004: 19) refer to sources suggesting that nearly 15,000 Nigeri-
ans enter Europe and North America annually. The UK census in 2001 reported 
almost 87,000 Nigerians living in the UK, with about 80 per cent of them in 
greater London (Hernandez-Coss et al. 2007). Between 200,000 and 300,000 
first and second generation Nigerians live in the US. According to the 2000 
census, 90,000 of the 109,000 Nigerian-born immigrants in the US aged 25 or 
over were tertiary educated (Adams, 2003). According to the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database on immigrants and 
expatriates, Nigerian emigrants living in OECD countries1 represent 8.4 per cent 
of all Nigerians (including emigrants) with tertiary levels of education. 
Nigeria has also remained a migration destination. Despite past expulsions 
and the economic decline after 1980, substantial communities of west-African 
migrants remain in Nigeria, though immigration has continued at more modest 
levels. Between 1984 and 1991, the numbers of migrants from Ghana in 
particular, and also from Mali declined, whereas the numbers of Togolese and 
Beninoise seem to show an increasing trend (Arthur, 1991; 1991 National 
census). Although official figures underestimate the true numbers of migrants, 
census data suggest that migrants from Benin, Ghana, Mali, Togo and Niger 
form the largest groups, altogether comprising 305,000 registered migrants in 
Nigeria in 1991. Until the 2006 census results are released, it is difficult to 
assess the actual numbers of foreigners. According to recent UN estimates, over 
971,000 immigrants live in Nigeria (UN, 2006). Nigeria hosts a relatively small 
number of refugees. Nigerian authorities and the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) estimate that that there are 19,000 refugees and asylum 
seekers; most refugees are from Liberia (about 7000), Sierra Leone (1700) and 
Chad (3200).  
Nigerian migration policies in regional and global contexts 
Migration relations with European states: Control and re-admission 
Nigeria has largely pursued a laissez faire policy concerning the emigration of 
its citizens. It has actively intervened only in the case of anti-trafficking 
policies. However, since European countries started to put pressure on Nigeria 
to collaborate regarding the re-admission of irregular migrants, the Nigerian 
state seems to have embarked upon more active emigration policies through 
negotiating immigrant quota in exchange for collaboration with re-admission. 
Nigeria’s own immigration policies are rather restrictive, except concerning 
                                                 
1  For a list of these (industrialised) countries, see http://www.oecd.org 
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ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) citizens who 
have at least nominally the right to settle, work and do business. Most non-
ECOWAS foreigners have to obtain a visa to enter Nigeria.  
The focus of the migration policies of European states and their embassies 
and consulates in Nigeria is on immigration control, and restrictive visa polices 
are seen as the main instrument for such control. European states see visas as a 
major bargaining chip use in negotiations, and one that they do not want to give 
up. A major problem in this process is the widespread forgery of documents 
supporting visa applications, such as false bank statements and reference letters. 
This makes Nigerians particularly suspect in the eyes of immigration officials. 
Nigerians are also thought to be regularly involved in various forms of crime, 
such as the global trade in cocaine, financial fraud, money laundering and 
internet scams. Nigerian interviewees tended to complain that their migration is 
put in a negative light through the persistent association with trafficking, crime 
and fraud, even though the vast majority of Nigerian migrants are law-abiding.  
In recent years, migration has clearly risen on the agenda in bilateral 
relations between Nigeria and European states, which specifically seek 
Nigeria’s collaboration in the readmission of irregular migrants or rejected 
asylum seekers of Nigerian citizenship. Nigeria is known as one of the most 
‘cooperative’ African states on this issue. Several European countries, such as 
Italy, Spain, Ireland and Switzerland, have signed re-admission agreements with 
Nigeria. Some countries are hesitant to concede to Nigerian demands for certain 
quotas of legal migrants in exchange for cooperation on re-admission. Although 
European embassies tend to describe Nigeria as relatively cooperative in border 
control and readmission policies, they argue that the main obstacles in migra-
tion control are the limited resources and organisational and infrastructural 
capacity on the Nigerian side. Also the sheer size of the country, with 147 
overland border crossing points, makes it notoriously difficult to control migra-
tion.  
Although expulsions from several European countries to Nigeria do take 
place, and planeloads of irregular migrants are sent back, the numbers returned 
are fairly small, and the interviewees did not tend to see them as a very effective 
way of limiting irregular migration. Several interviewees claimed that these 
repatriations are largely ‘symbolic’, to give the impression that policy makers 
are ‘doing something’. 
Although readmission agreements with European countries state that irregu-
lar migrants should be returned on a voluntary basis, some Nigerian interview-
ees saw these as having the character of deportations, in which irregular 
migrants were treated ‘as criminals’. Irregular migrants apprehended in Europe 
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are imprisoned in detention centres before being deported, and aircrafts are full 
of police and security people.2 
ECOWAS: infringing on nominal freedom of movement  
Nigeria is a founding member of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS)3 and hosts its headquarters in Abuja. The purpose of the 
ECOWAS is to have common trade, elimination of tariffs, and freedom of 
movement of people in the West African region. Freedom of movement is 
enshrined in the ECOWAS protocol of 29 May 1979 on the Free Movement of 
Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment. This protocol allows 
ECOWAS persons (1) to enter any ECOWAS state without a visa; (2) to reside 
in any ECOWAS country for up to 90 days; and (3) after 90 days, to apply for a 
permanent residence permit allowing them to start businesses, seek employ-
ment, and invest. An ECOWAS passport was established in 2000. National 
passports are gradually being phased out. 
The implementation of the protocol on free movement nevertheless leaves 
much to be desired. A major obstacle is the frequent corruption of police, 
gendarmerie and border officials in all ECOWAS countries, which hinders free 
movement in practice. In Nigeria and throughout roads in the ECOWAS zone, 
several interviewees mentioned the presence of many unofficial road-blocks 
where police, gendarmerie and border officials take bribes as a form of unoffi-
cial toll. It was also reported that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for 
ECOWAS citizens to obtain residence permits, due to widespread corruption, 
bureaucracy and a general lack of awareness among migrants of their rights. 
Migration issues have also become more important in EU-ECOWAS 
relations, presumably because of the increasingly visible presence of sub-
Saharan migrants in North Africa and Europe, and the deaths and human 
suffering of West Africans attempting to enter the EU by making illegal sea 
crossings to Europe. It is seen as a problem by Nigerian and other ECOWAS 
stakeholders that most negotiations between ECOWAS and EU countries on 
issues such as migration (i.e. readmission) agreements are done on a bilateral, 
country-to-country level. ECOWAS would prefer to have block-to-block 
ECOWAS-EU negotiations.  
                                                 
2  Because deportees are officially not allowed to be handcuffed, the number of (military) police 
in an aircraft may well exceed the number of returnees. 
3  Current ECOWAS members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
and Togo. 
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Focus on trafficking  
So far, the focus of Nigerian migration policies has been on the prevention of 
trafficking of women and children to Western Europe and other African states. 
This partly reflects domestic concerns, and in particular those of the wife of the 
vice-president, but also the priorities of international donors. Nigeria has been 
under intense pressure particularly from the US to ‘combat’ trafficking. 
Trafficking is also seen as harmful for Nigeria’s image abroad.  
The Nigerian Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation 
(WOTCLEF) was one of the first Nigerian organisations to work on trafficking 
issues. Since its inception in 1999, six hundred women and children have used 
WOTCLEF’s Abuja shelter. WOTCLEF activities focus on awareness-raising, 
through establishing volunteer clubs in each state, and by visiting schools, 
markets, and hair salons, as well as talking to local leaders, in order to raise 
awareness of trafficking. A WOTCLEF-sponsored TV programme on traffick-
ing played for a number of years.  
A national law prohibiting human trafficking was adopted in July 2003. The 
National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related 
Matters (NAPTIP) was created to implement this law. Its primary functions 
include investigation, the prosecution of traffickers, the rehabilitation of 
trafficked women, and the ‘enlightenment’ (awareness raising) of the general 
public and of institutions such as immigration, police, and justice departments. 
NAPTIP has a staff of approximately 250, located in six or seven offices around 
the country. Strategies to identify traffickers include working with paid infor-
mants in schools, motor parks, and hair salons in states where trafficking is 
prevalent. NAPTIP works with government agencies, WOTCLEF, UNICEF and 
IOM. There is a donor group on Child Trafficking headed by UNICEF.  
Between February 2004 and April 2006, NAPTIP was involved in the return 
of 520 trafficked women. This included those apprehended en route to North 
Africa, and those deported from Europe in the context of re-admission agree-
ments Nigeria has signed with several European countries, such as Italy and 
Spain. This number includes only the women and girls who admit to have been 
trafficked. The true number of returned trafficked women is believed to be 
much higher. It is estimated that of returned irregular migrants, only a small 
fraction (perhaps 5 out of 200) admit to have been trafficked, because of the 
negative stigma attached to female sex workers, and their presumed fear of 
being traced and punished by their traffickers.  
Trafficked persons enter an ‘oath of secrecy’ with their madam in Europe. 
The belief in these oaths is said to be very strong and deters trafficked women 
from seeking police support or from admitting that they have been trafficked. 
Deportees include both traffickers (madams) and trafficked women. When the 
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Italian authorities do ‘sweeps’, the traffickers are included among the returned 
irregular migrants. Upon arrival in Nigeria, NAPTIP used to hold all these 
women in one room, which decreased the chances of trafficked women being 
willing to denounce the traffickers. NAPTIP therefore now interviews expelled 
girls and women upon re-entry in Nigeria, so that it becomes apparent who are 
the traffickers.  
There is little evidence that Nigeria’s new anti-trafficking policies have led 
to a measurable decrease in trafficking, although most interviewees stated that 
Nigerians are ‘more aware’ of the dangers of trafficking. Some interviewees 
criticised the public awareness campaigns for having the character of general 
anti-migration manifestations which try to convince the youth that they should 
not migrate. As one interviewee said:  
They simply say ‘East, west, home is best’. But this is the wrong message. You 
won’t stop people from going. You should instead inform people how to migrate 
legally so as to create a balanced opinion. Migration is not really a bad thing. 
Several interviewees criticised the failure of European receiving countries, 
such as Italy, to identify the traffickers and to not deport them with the traf-
ficked women. Currently, no such differentiation is made, and all irregular 
migrants are categorised as ‘illegals’.  
The focus on improving Nigeria’s rather negative image abroad through 
anti-trafficking campaigns was the subject of criticism by several interviewees, 
because this coincides with an emphasis on repression and a lack of attention to 
the trafficked women themselves. As one interviewee said:  
The Nigerian government wants to make a good show, laundering its international 
image, rather than protecting the rights of individuals. For instance, the preamble of 
the anti-trafficking law only mentions the bad image migrants are creating for 
Nigeria. It does not address the rights of the individuals. 
Because trafficked women are not well protected in either Europe or Nigeria, 
they are generally not inclined to denounce traffickers, although is seen as 
essential to addressing the issue effectively. One interviewee suggested that 
irregular migrants should be given temporary or permanent residency status if 
they identify a trafficker, instead of being deported straight away.  
Emergent links between migration and development policies? 
Contested migration-development links 
In the first four decades after independence, international migration was hardly 
an issue in Nigerian politics, and until recently no connection whatsoever was 
made between international migration and national development strategies. In 
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comparison, the much more large-scale rural-to-urban internal migration has 
attracted far greater attention from Nigerian policy makers and development 
agencies, mostly with the aim of stemming rural-to-urban migration through 
development, rather than using this migration as a development force.  
This policy-making was based on the assumption that migration impacts 
negatively on development processes. For example, in the few instances in 
which Nigeria’s PRSP – in Nigeria better known as NEEDS (Nation Economic 
Empowerment Development Strategy, see NNPC, 2004) – mentions (internal) 
migration, it is generally seen as a force disrupting social cohesion and societal 
values in village societies, and causing urban crises. Migration is strongly asso-
ciated with trafficking, forced child labour and prostitution. In addition, 
Nigeria’s PRSP perceives internal migration as a force which potentially 
contributes to urban unemployment4, crime, conflict, failure in the maintenance 
of democracy, as well as urban pollution and waste management problems 
(NNPC, 2004: 12, 43, xix). Migration of the educated workforce to urban areas 
is also seen as increasing the ageing and deepening the poverty of rural popula-
tions (NNPC, 2004: 32). The perceived solution to these problems is to stem 
rural-urban migration through rural development schemes (NNPC, 2004: 70).  
In as far as Nigerian policy makers have dealt with international migration, 
its positive contribution to development has so far been envisaged mainly in 
strong connection with return migration (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2004: 
38). Emigrants have been seen as a drain on the country’s resources rather than 
as a potentially positive force for national development, even when living 
abroad. In most policy circles, migration, whether internal or international, is 
still seen primarily as a development failure rather than as a constituent part of 
broader social and economic transformation processes. 
In this context, it is relevant to assess what has been the actual contribution 
of internal and international migration to social and economic development. 
Because of the effects of remittances and possibly of newly-acquired skills, 
dominant policy discourses – such as voiced in the Nigerian PRSP – have put 
international migration into a more positive light than internal migration. 
However, there seems reason to question this assumption. Internal migration 
has been much more massive than international migration, and its contribution 
has possibly been more positive and redistributive. 
International migration of the elite, although numerically not impressive, is 
widely associated with large-scale capital flight, in which significant amounts of 
                                                 
4  This notion is based on the assumption that labour demand is constant, and ignores the fact 
that migrants themselves are also consumers of services and products, and hence may increase 
the size of the urban economy.  
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the country’s oil windfall are transferred to foreign bank accounts and invested 
abroad. However, the recent, often irregular, migration of people from more 
modest socio-economic backgrounds to southern Europe and elsewhere may 
have been more beneficial for national economic development.  
There is also some evidence that international remittances might exacerbate 
regional inequality. Over the past years, there has been a remarkable increase in 
remittances. A recent study on the UK–Nigeria ‘remittance corridor’ concluded 
that Nigeria received about US$2.26 billion in registered remittances in 2004, 
while in kind remittances (such as cars and electronic goods) were estimated at 
a level of US$0.51 billion. Based on the assumption that fifty per cent of the 
remittances to Nigeria are unrecorded5, Hernandez-Coss et al. (2007) conclude 
that the real level of remittances must be around US$5 billion. 
Most UK remittances are destined for cities in the main origin areas of 
Nigerian migrants, that is in the relatively developed southwest and southeast 
regions (Hernandez-Coss et al., 2007). Thus international remittances seem to 
exacerbate rather than level the income differentials between Nigerian states, 
and between urban and rural areas. Internal migration has probably contributed 
more to income redistribution from urban to rural areas, which might seem 
surprising in the light of the bad press it tends to receive in comparison with 
international migration. Back in the 1970s, on the basis of a survey conducted in 
rural Nigeria, Adepoju (1974) had already concluded that internal remittances 
enabled rural households to improve their livelihoods significantly, construct 
houses, and enable children’s education. However, there is virtually no empiri-
cal evidence to assess the development impacts of internal and international 
migration more precisely.  
A nascent interest in migration and development policies 
In contrast with earlier ‘non-policies’ or migration prevention discourses, in 
recent years there seems to be a certain (re)-appreciation of the potentially 
positive contribution to national development of international migration and 
resulting remittances. There is also growing recognition that migrants are not to 
blame for the loss of resources, but rather the rather dismal economic, institu-
tional and security conditions prevailing in Nigeria. As one interviewee said: 
‘Instead of pushing migrants not to migrate or to come back, the state should 
create the circumstances to lure them back.’ 
The formal re-introduction of democracy in Nigeria in 1999 and increasing 
freedom of speech was generally recognised as an important step forward in 
                                                 
5  The empirical basis of this assumption is not clear.  
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restoring trust in the Nigerian state among Nigerian migrants. Yet at the same 
time the high insecurity, violence and crime levels as well as the omnipresent 
corruption and the lack of economic reform were seen as massive obstacles. 
According to many interviewees, the low levels of security and the institution-
alised corruption are among the main concerns of migrants who return either 
temporarily or permanently. In addition, many migrants are said to be attacked 
and robbed when they visit Nigeria, because of their alleged wealth. The NNVS 
agency (see below) is currently trying to address this problem by providing 
police protection for returning migrants, which demonstrates how worrying the 
security situation is.  
Political change towards democratisation after 1999 also seems to have 
coincided with a shift to more positive attitudes regarding international migra-
tion and development. For instance, Nigeria’s PRSP makes a clear connection 
between democratisation and economic growth on the one hand, and the role of 
emigrants and donors in national economic development on the other (NNPC, 
2004: 13). The PRSP aims to  
continue to actively strengthen links with Nigerians and other Africans in the 
diaspora to deepen technical and business ties with the rest of the world, and 
improve export market penetration, especially in textiles, food, and cultural arte-
facts. (NNPC, 2004: 83) 
Strikingly, the PRSP also refers to attracting investments from non-Nigerian 
African migrants (NNPC, 2004: 116). It is also interesting to observe the 
contrast with internal migration, whose contribution to national development is 
still seen as negative.  
The launch of the ‘presidential dialogue with Nigerians abroad’ in 2002 
marked this shift in policies. The presidential dialogue aims at incorporating the 
Nigerian diaspora into national development policies. This also coincides with a 
stated willingness on the part of the government to establish and reinforce links 
with Nigerian migrants, as well as with the numerous associations they have 
established abroad.  
A study on the contribution of UK-based diasporas to development and 
poverty reduction conducted by van Hear et al. (2004) highlights the diversity 
of Nigerians living in the UK and their organisations. It also showed that UK-
based Nigerian diaspora organisations draw on a variety of constituencies, such 
as national or state-level interest groups, business associations, and associations 
of particular ethnic groups, whereas others are based on gender, religion, or 
political and cultural activities. Van Hear et al. (2004) also reported that, 
beyond such particular interest groups, Nigerians (and Ghanaians) in the UK 
figure prominently in pan-African diaspora development organisations, for 
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instance the London-based NGO the African Foundation for Development 
(AFFORD). 
Van Hear et al. (2004) state that the Nigeria diaspora provides a substantial 
contribution, especially by way of remittances, to the homeland, and that, in 
addition to these transfers, members of Nigerian diasporas contribute to poverty 
reduction and development in Nigeria, through temporary or permanent return 
programmes for the highly-skilled and through numerous efforts to mobilise 
Nigerians for the social and political development of Nigeria (van Hear, 2004: 
10–11).  
It is not so much the engagement of diaspora groups that is new, but rather 
the interest of the Nigerian government in their potential contribution to 
national development. While the government has focused its hope on individual 
emigrants to invest, their associations are primarily ascribed a role in running 
and sustaining development projects. As part of the presidential dialogue with 
Nigerians abroad, the president had meetings with Nigerians living abroad in 
Atlanta and London.  
The government has also established a Nigerians in the Diaspora Organiza-
tion (NIDO), with an office based in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NIDO has 
set up a network of branches in Nigerian embassies abroad as well as destina-
tion country-specific websites. The official aims of NIDO are fourfold: firstly, 
to encourage the participation of Nigerians in the diaspora in the affairs of their 
home country; secondly to provide to Nigerian international migrant organisa-
tions a forum for the exchange of views and experience; third, to enhance the 
image of Nigeria through networking; and, lastly, to build a database of Nigeri-
ans with professional skills, and make this database available for the benefit of 
government, the private sector and Nigeria’s partners. The President has also 
appointed a Special Assistant to the President on Nigerians in the diaspora. 
Nigerians abroad are officially encouraged to organise themselves and to link 
up with NIDO branches.  
The Nigeria National Volunteer Services (NNVS) is another government 
agency which was established to reinforce bonds with the Nigerian diaspora. 
NNVS attempts to mobilise Nigerian professionals living abroad for capacity 
building, through encouraging temporary visits, technical missions and sabbati-
cals to Nigerian institutions, or through giving summer courses. These contacts 
are partly established through linking up with Nigerian professional associations 
abroad. Unfortunately, it is unclear how NIDO and NNVS function in practice, 
as no independent evaluations are available.  
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Remittances and remittance policies  
Until recently, Nigerian policy makers and banks paid scant attention to the 
issue of remittances. According to interviewees, the Nigerian government and 
banks gave the impression of being mainly interested in large money transfers 
and major investments by Nigerians living abroad. Small-scale person-to-person 
remittances appeared to be of little interest to them. Although the Nigerian 
Central Bank is part of the technical committee responsible for drafting a 
coherent migration policy, it is unclear to what extent the globally increased 
interest of donors in remittances is going to change the attitudes of the Nigerian 
government and banks.  
At the 2004 G8 summit, countries agreed to engage in remittance partner-
ships. Nigeria is one of the countries with which the UK government wished to 
engage in such a partnership. Up till now, however, this has been obstructed by 
a general lack of information on remittances and migrants abroad, and also 
because very little interest has been shown by the Nigerian Central Bank in 
engaging in discussion.  
A recent UK Department for International Development DFID (2004) study 
on the UK-Nigeria remittance corridor identified the weakened Nigerian 
banking structure as a major obstacle for facilitating remittances. Due to 
decades of economic crisis, the number of Nigerian banks that have branches 
abroad has decreased. For small remittance amounts, their fixed fees are higher 
than sending money through Western Union, the main money transfer agency in 
Nigeria, which is also quicker. In addition, money transfer agencies offer the 
option to pay out in US$ instead of Nigerian Nairas, to avoid the official, low 
exchange rate. Informal systems of value transfer are common, particularly in 
Italy, where there are a high number of irregular Nigerian migrants who have 
difficulty accessing formal remittance channels (Hernandez-Coss et al., 2007).  
The main recommendation of the DFID report is to encourage the use of 
formal remittance systems, through four main methods. First, by increasing 
competition in the remittance market and facilitating the entry of more com-
petitors, including the postal service and telecommunications providers, which 
can offer remittance products through mobile phone techniques. Secondly by 
making regulations affecting remittances more transparent and predictable; 
thirdly by encouraging banks to go beyond the role of being money-transfer 
agents and to become more proactive, by designing remittance products for the 
diaspora, and offering other products, such as mortgages. The last method is by 
building confidence in and capacity of formal financial institutions. The report 
also observed that, because banks are the only institutions authorised to pay 
remittances in Nigeria, the extensive national network of post offices is 
currently underutilised regarding the distribution of remittances. 
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It was also suggested in the DFID report that, in order to increase the 
development impact of remittances in Nigeria, the government could consider 
matching the collective remittances from diaspora associations (Hernandez-
Coss et al., 2007). This proposal is apparently inspired by the Mexican Tres por 
Uno programmes.  
Elements for a coherent policy on migration and development  
Policy coherence between migration and development policies is yet to be 
achieved. As is visible in Nigeria’s PRSP, development policies are still based 
on the assumption that migration is associated with a lack of development and 
furthermore undermines development in its own right. This is somehow incon-
sistent with stated aims of creating a positive link between migration and 
development policies.  
The Nigerian president has appointed a Special Assistant to the President on 
Migration and Humanitarian Affairs. Her office has established a technical 
committee of government ministries and agencies6, which in 2006 was discuss-
ing a coherent policy on migration and development. Civil society role-players 
do not seem to be actively involved. The process is facilitated by IOM Nigeria. 
By July 2006, the committee had met six times and intended to submit the draft 
policy paper to the Federal Council by November 2006, and in any case before 
the 2007 elections.  
According to the Office of the Special Assistant to the President on Migra-
tion and Humanitarian Affairs, the main components of the migration policy are 
likely to be focused on mapping Nigerian migration and on identifying the most 
needed expatriates, how not to lose skilled labour, how to bring back the 
diaspora, and how to prevent irregular migration. It has also been mentioned 
that, as part of these new policies, migrants may be granted voting rights in the 
next elections7. 
Several interviewees expressed a fair level of scepticism about these initia-
tives. According to one Nigerian interviewee, the government’s policies still 
essentially boil down to anti-emigration policies: 
The message is still ‘do not migrate’. When the president talks to Nigerians living 
abroad he says ‘come back to Nigeria and struggle it out in Nigeria’. This is unreal-
                                                 
6  The committee consists of the ministries of Finance, Education, Justice, Science and 
Technology, Intergovernmental Affairs and Youth Matters, Women Affairs, Health, and 
Foreign Affairs. It also includes the following agencies: the Central Bank of Nigeria, the 
National Commission for Refugees, NAPTIP, the National Population Commission, Nigerian 
Labour Congress, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), the National Planning 
Commission, and the National Human Rights Commission (2007).  
7  Nigeria apparently does not have restrictions on dual citizenship.  
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istic if you take into account the enormous numbers of graduates without decent 
employment. They don’t recognise the unattractive environment that Nigeria is. The 
government is not trying to regulate it through managing migration and protecting 
migrants. It is still seeing migrants as deviants. At the same time, ministers send 
their children to study and work abroad – but they don’t call it migration. 
This sceptical view seems to be based partly on doubts about the intentions 
of the government regarding the creation of a migration and development 
policy. One interviewee feared that, just as it has been the case with trafficking, 
the issue of migration and development is being imposed by the international 
donor community and that it is predominantly ‘a fashion’.  
The Nigerian interviewees tended to criticise EU migration policies for 
being focused solely on security issues and migration prevention. The feeling is 
often that these policies fail because governments cannot control migration 
since it is a result of, or is supported by, globalisation and new technologies. 
Probably more than other West Africans, Nigerians feel stigmatised and collec-
tively treated as potential irregular migrants, criminals and traffickers. Even 
Nigerians with good jobs in Nigeria have difficulties securing a European visa.  
The international image of Nigerian migration is dominated by issues around 
trafficking, although the large majority of Nigerian emigrants are often highly 
skilled and do not cause problems (Carling, 2006). For low-skilled workers, it 
was suggested that European states should give ‘temporary stay’ permits that 
enable individuals to work and acquire skills and income, and then support them 
in returning to their countries of origin.  
Conclusions 
Although several hundreds of thousands of Nigerians live outside Africa, as a 
proportion of its total population of an estimated 130 million, this fraction is 
small compared to other African countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Egypt or 
Morocco. There is no data confirming that there is a ‘massive outflow’ of 
Nigerians. Likewise, remittances seem to be relatively low as a percentage of 
Nigerian GDP, certainly compared to oil revenues. In the same vein, claims on 
the supposedly harmful effects of the Nigerian ‘brain drain’ lack a sound 
empirical underpinning.  
However, a general lack of quantitative and qualitative research precludes 
making any definite statements. Too many facts about the nature and magnitude 
of Nigerian migrations and their relations to broader development processes are 
simply unknown. It seems to be important to put the development potential of 
migration into an empirical perspective – and to develop policies based on 
knowledge and not on trends and fashions within the international development 
community or in academic discourses. So far, policy is too much guided by 
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unsubstantiated assumptions on migration–development linkages. Therefore, 
more empirical research on Nigerian migration as well its development impli-
cations is urgently needed in order to develop more informed policies on the 
issue.  
On the basis of this exploratory study, we will try to formulate some 
hypotheses concerning policies put in place by Nigeria and European states that 
might maximise the positive development impact of migration while minimis-
ing its negative effects. Some targeted policy actions were mentioned by the 
interviewees which are seen as enhancing the development contribution of 
migration. These included granting voting rights to migrants and encouraging 
migrants to register at Nigerian embassies abroad – in order to reinforce links 
with Nigerian migrants and their organisations. With regard to remittances, 
there seems to be substantial scope for the Nigerian state, and banks, to decrease 
the costs of remitting money and to encourage the use of formal remittance 
systems through increasing competition and transparency, as well as offering 
remittance products through mobile phone techniques, encouraging banks to 
design remittance products for the diaspora, and building general confidence in 
and capacity of formal financial institutions.  
However, it seems to be important to go beyond such targeted actions and to 
address more general issues related to improving the status and rights of 
migrants, restoring the trust of migrants in the Nigerian state, and, crucially, 
create a generally attractive socio-economic and political environment for 
migrants to invest in and return to. Without such general improvements, it is 
unlikely that targeted migration and development policies will have a signifi-
cant impact.  
First, the lack of rights of many (irregular) Nigerian emigrants make them 
vulnerable and easy to exploit. This obviously diminishes their own socio-
economic mobility as well as their capacity to contribute to origin-country 
development. Most Nigerian interviewees stressed that a migration and 
development policy should therefore start by recognising and respecting the 
basic human rights of migrants. This seems to be a responsibility of both 
sending and receiving countries. Without such rights, migrants become ex-
tremely vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. The generally repressive (‘com-
bating’) approaches towards trafficking and irregular migration have limited 
effects or are even counterproductive because they deprive migrants even fur-
ther of such rights.  
The interviewees said that European employers profit from cheap immigrant 
labour, and the often irregular status of migrants makes it easier to exploit them. 
Instead of targeting these employers, states punish and stigmatise migrants, 
while denying their rights. Instead of criminalising and stigmatising migrants, it 
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was said that European states should recognise the need for immigrant labour 
through giving access to legal channels of temporary or more long-term migra-
tion. Access to visas should also be made easier. Most Nigerian interviewees 
felt deeply uncomfortable with the fact that the focus on trafficking, crime and 
document forgery obscures the reality that the vast majority of Nigerian 
migrants are not criminals. In this context, interviewees suggested that the 
Nigerian government should engage in discussions with destination country 
governments to create more legitimate opportunities for migration.  
Most Nigerian interviewees, in particular those in non-governmental posi-
tions also criticised the anti-trafficking policies of European states because they 
do not differentiate between traffickers and trafficked persons; instead all are 
collectively labelled as ‘illegals’ and subsequently expelled. They stressed that 
serious anti-trafficking policies should address trafficked men and women as 
victims and protect their rights. A blanket repressive approach works counter-
productively by actually reinforcing the reciprocal relationship between 
traffickers and trafficked persons.  
In the same vein, it was felt that the Nigerian state should liberalise its 
immigration policies and that Nigeria and other ECOWAS states should 
genuinely implement the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, 
the right of residence and establishment. Regional integration, both in economic 
and migratory terms, is seen as a powerful tool for national development.  
Second, there seems to be a general feeling of distrust among migrants of the 
Nigerian state, which makes it difficult for the government to ‘reach out’ to 
diaspora groups. This seems to be the result of years of repression and neglect, 
and is unlikely to be changed overnight. This is evident in the NIDO initiative, 
which obviously lacks a firm connection with the already very active develop-
ment associations of Nigerians abroad. Current initiatives of the Nigerian state 
(such as NIDO) seem to be rather top-down and this is perhaps an obstacle for 
their successful implementation. A more fruitful approach might be to link up 
with and build on the wealth of existing initiatives of Nigerian (and other West 
African) diaspora organisations  
Not only European states, but also the Nigerian state was seen as failing to 
defend adequately the rights of Nigerian emigrants abroad, as well as immi-
grants in Nigeria. Emigrants have often been seen as deviants or even as 
traitors, and the Nigerian state has done little to protect their rights abroad, or 
those of forced and voluntary returnees. The Nigerians embassies are not (yet) 
seen as supporting irregular or even legal migrants. One interviewee described 
going to the embassy as ‘the very last option’ in case of trouble. It was felt that 
the Nigerian state would be successful in encouraging emigrants to register at 
Nigerian embassies abroad only if it assumes a more active role in assisting and 
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defending migrant rights. Granting migrants voting rights is also seen a factor 
that would contribute to restoring trust. 
Third, the general lack of insecurity, the high prevalence of crime, high 
levels of corruption, and a generally unfavourable investment environment 
prevent Nigerian migrants from investing, circulating and returning. There was 
general agreement among the Nigerian interviewees that in order to enhance the 
development contribution of migrants, it is necessary to create a generally 
conducive environment for development and investment. Nigeria is still seen as 
too risky, and, apart from in the oil industry, few investments are being made 
which allow for a significant skills transfer. In the eyes of many interviewees, 
there are not enough assurances that entrepreneurs can invest, and make a profit 
on their investments. 
It was similarly argued that the ‘brain drain’ cannot be prevented as long as 
general conditions in Nigeria do not improve substantially. In Nigeria, basic 
rights are not upheld and there is not a feeling that the government protects its 
citizens. Besides improving investment conditions, personal security needs to be 
addressed before the brain drain can be turned into a brain gain through in-
creased remittances, transfer of knowledge and competencies, and even a rever-
sal of capital flight. This exemplifies the need to pursue general economic and 
political reform in order to restore trust among migrants. 
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The migration debate in Kenya 
Marcel Rutten & Koki Muli 
Introduction 
Migration in the East African region is not a new phenomenon. The inhabitants 
of the area, mainly Bantus, Cushites and Nilotes have settled here from both 
northern (Sudan) and south-western parts of Africa since the seventeenth 
century. In 1895, the British government formally proclaimed authority over the 
territory. The 1896–1902 building of a railway connecting Mombasa and Lake 
Victoria promoted the arrival of European settlers and of Indian ‘coolies’, 
recruited in British India as labourers for the construction of the railway. 
Ugandans could be found in Nairobi as early as the 1920s engaged in clerical 
jobs and the media (Thuku, 1970). 
Kenya was a leading refugee hosting state throughout the twentieth century. 
A major influx of refugees from Ethiopia occurred between 1936 and 1938. In 
1959, Rwandan refugees crossed into Kenya; most of them integrated and 
became Kenyan citizens at independence in 1963. In 1966 waves of refugees 
arrived in Kenya from Uganda, escaping the authoritarian rule of Milton Obote. 
These were followed throughout the 1970s by others fleeing the reign of Idi 
Amin, and from 1979 to 1985 after Obote was reinstated. By 1988 there were 
approximately 12,000 refugees in Kenya, mainly Ugandans living in Nairobi. 
These refugees enjoyed full status rights, including the right to reside in urban 
centres and move freely throughout the country, the right to obtain a work 
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permit and access educational opportunities, and the right to apply for legal 
local integration.  
Kenya experienced its largest influx of refugees from Somalia following the 
collapse of that country in 1990. Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees followed 
after the fall of the Mengistu regime. Others from DRC, Rwanda and Burundi 
who had come to Kenya from 1994 onwards still remain, mainly in urban 
centres, although some stay in camps, from where they hope to secure resettle-
ment to Western countries. Although Kenya has long been a safe haven in this 
part of Africa, the collapse of the Somali state and the increased turmoil in 
southern Sudan have greatly undermined Kenya’s capacity to deal with emer-
gencies and refugee influxes, therefore relegating disaster and emergency 
responses to international agencies. There are also no clear policies on asylum 
and the provision of services to refugees. As a result, there are inadequate 
annual budgetary allocations to address the plight of refugees hosted in Kenya. 
Kenya has also become a source, transit, and destination country for men, 
women and children trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation. Desti-
nations are the Middle East, other African nations, Western Europe, and North 
America – for domestic servitude, enslavement in massage parlours and 
brothels, and manual labour. People trafficked into Kenya are principally 
Indians, Bangladeshi, and Nepalese, coerced into bonded labour in the con-
struction and garment industries (US Department of State, 2004). In 2005 the 
Kenyan Ministry of Immigration developed draft legislation to criminalise the 
cross-border elements of human trafficking, and the Attorney General’s Office 
collaborated with civil society and other ministries to develop draft comprehen-
sive legislation and to support the establishment of a code of conduct against 
child sex tourism. Internal discussions are being held, migration conferences 
organised (IRIN, 2002b; IRIN, 2005) and efforts are underway to come up with 
a policy document. For example the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector 
Reform Programme (GJLOS) is a Kenyan government-led sector-wide reform 
programme launched in November 2003. The GJLOS programme aims at 
supporting the Ministry of Immigration in revising and reforming laws and 
legislation dealing with citizenship, immigration and the registration of aliens 
(GJLOS, 2005). The Ministry of Immigration also plans, through this pro-
gramme of reforms, to introduce a new Passport Act, which will support a 
National Migration and Immigration Policy.  
In this chapter the current state of Kenyan migration is discussed; in par-
ticular forced migration, transit migration and labour migration. There is a 
review of Kenyan policy plans and laws dealing with migration, and details are 
given of the opinions of stakeholders as given to the authors during a visit to the 
country in July-August 2006. 
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Kenyan migration policy plans and immigration law 
The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003–
2007 (MPND, 2003), a policy plan for economic recovery, hardly discusses 
issues of migration. In its 2006 Kenya Peer Review Report, the New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) urged the Kenyan government to 
enact and implement a clear policy on refugees and internally-displaced 
persons, and to streamline immigration screening procedures for the entry of 
refugees into the country (NEPAD, 2006). Although Kenya is a signatory to the 
international agreements on refugee protection, the country has no established 
national legal framework to handle refugee issues, including the management of 
their resettlement and integration in the country. Instead, the government has let 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) be at the fore-
front of managing the bulk of refugee affairs in the country. The UNHCR 
carries out Refugee Status Determination (RSD) under this mandate, while the 
Kenya government has suspended its RSD and involves itself only in registering 
those refugees who have been recognised by UNHCR. This is important 
because UNHCR provides assistance to recognised refugees, and this arrange-
ment it makes it convenient for UNHCR to focus on genuine refugees and avoid 
assistance being abused by persons who are ‘not of concern to UNHCR’ 
administratively. Unfortunately UNHCR can only provide refugees with 
Mandate Letters; it cannot bestow the full Conventional Status that the govern-
ment can. This much-coveted status enables refugees to enjoy the rights en-
shrined in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 
Immigration law in Kenya today has its roots in the Immigration Ordinance 
of 1906, which dealt mainly with the restriction of immigration into the British 
colony of Kenya, especially the immigration of unemployed persons who were 
likely to be a liability to the colony.1 The 1906 Ordinance was amended and 
reviewed at least eleven times. One of the significant amendments of 1938 
aimed at increasing the amount of security deposit for immigration into the 
colony from £50 to £500, in order to restrict people fleeing from the events 
which were taking place in Central Europe at the time. In later years, e.g. in 
1948, amendments contained a long list of prohibited immigrants. In 1964, the 
independent government of Kenya adopted the 1956 Ordinance with only a few 
minor changes.  
                                                 
1  Chapter 62 of Colonial Ordinances, Ordinance Number 17, August 1906. All legislation 
passed in Kenya during the colonial period was known as Ordinances. After independence, 
Legal Notice Number 2 of 1964 made all legislation ‘Acts of Parliament’. 
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The provisions regarding prohibited immigrants and requirements for 
permits were adopted and enhanced in the current Immigration Act2 for the 
purposes of controlling immigration into the country, around the period when 
there was an influx of aliens and refugees from Uganda (1972). The government 
enacted the 1990 NGO Coordination Act legislation in an attempt to coordinate 
the relief and emergency activities of the humanitarian organisations and NGOs 
which had responded to the 1990 Somali and subsequent Sudanese crises. The 
government’s actual participation in assistance and resolution of the refugee 
crises was therefore minimal, and was limited to oversight, the provision of user 
rights of the land where these activities were taking place, and security opera-
tions. Since 1990 attempts have been made by the government to enact Refugee 
Specific Legislation, and on 26 May 2006 revised draft legislation was 
published in the Kenya Gazette Supplement and introduced in parliament, 
which finally passed the Refugees Bill (with a number of amendments) on 29 
November 2006. The Bill calls for the government to create an inter-ministerial 
RSD Committee to adjudicate asylum applications under the Commissioner for 
Refugees Affairs. The office of the attorney-general was due to fine-tune the 
amendments to the bill, before it is signed into law by President Kibaki. 
Stakeholder views on migration in Kenya  
Forced migration: Kenya’s burden 
Kenya hosted 420,000 refugees at the height of the Somalia crisis in 1992. This 
figure fell fairly steadily to about 220,000 by the end of 2003, but new violence 
in the region, notably in Ethiopia and Somalia, led to a new rise, to an estimated 
total of 315,000 by the end of 2005 (see Figure 9.1).  
With no programmes for their permanent resettlement and integration within 
Kenya, a majority of refugees in the country are confined to camps in geo-
graphically remote areas such as Dadaab in north-eastern Kenya, and Kakuma 
in the north-west. The UNHCR’s figures of October 2006 indicate that Dadaab 
had nearly 137,000 refugees and Kakuma well over 92,000.3 In addition there 
                                                 
2  Chapter 172 of the Laws of Kenya, Number 25 of 1967 and Number 6 of 1972 (revised). 
3  The main areas of Kenyan settlement in the US include Washington, DC (where 50 per cent 
of Kenyan Americans can be found), Texas, California, and the midwest. A number of 
Kenyans have also settled in Georgia and North Carolina, two states with important 
technological centres. The high value that Kenyan Americans place on education and their 
fluency in English has allowed them to find skilled positions, especially in technology and 
nursing. The vast majority of Kenyans become naturalised US citizens; less than two per cent 
return to Kenya. See www.everyculture.com/multi/Ha-La/Kenyan-Americans.html. 
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are some 2100 convention refugees4 and an unknown number of urban refugees, 
estimated to be between 50,000 and 100,000.  
 
 
 Figure 9.1  Number of refugees and asylum seekers (‘000), Kenya,  
 1992-2005 
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  Source: World Refugee Survey, US Committee on Refugees, 1992 to 2005 
Although forced migration has been a recurrent concern for both colonial 
and postcolonial governments in Kenya, according to the Ministry of Immigra-
tion, ‘there is no coordinated approach to the issue of immigration’.5 It is note-
worthy that the government and UNHCR have played different roles since 
1992. The government, claiming a lack of resources, has been providing land 
and physical security in the camps, and has also been registering all the refugees 
in Kenya, while the UNHCR – which is better resourced – and its partners have 
been providing all the other services. As of now, refugees in Kenya either have 
full status (pre-1992 cases, recognised by the government), or they possess a 
UNHCR Mandate Letter (post-1992 cases, recognised by UNHCR). 
Kenyan officials interviewed indicated that the Kenyan attitude towards 
refugees from neighbouring countries has always been positive: ‘They are our 
brothers and sisters, how can we refuse them?’, and ‘We in Kenya accommo-
date foreigners. It is African to be hospitable.’6 However, when asked if 
immigration (in general) was a problem to Kenya, negative aspects were also 
mentioned, in particular the fact that Kenya was not able to control the influx of 
foreigners because of its porous borders.  
                                                 
4  A ‘convention refugee’ is a person who is outside of their own country and is unable or 
unwilling to return to that country because of a well-founded fear of persecution. 
5  Interview with Mr E. Kisome, permanent secretary Ministry of Immigration and Registration 
of Persons, 4 August 2006. 
6 Interview with Ministry of Immigration and Registration of Persons officials. 
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Issues of disease, crime, and cultural erosion were mentioned as drawbacks 
of immigration. In Nairobi, Somalis have gone into businesses such as taxis, 
housing and supermarkets, thus not only presenting real competition but in 
some cases pushing (mainly Asian) Kenyans out of business. If the pre-1992 
refugee regime in Kenya can be characterised as generous and hospitable, with 
emphasis on local integration, the post-1992 regime has been inhospitable, 
characterised by growing levels of xenophobia, denial of basic refugee rights 
and few opportunities for local integration. The attitude seems to be most 
negative towards Somali refugees. The Ministry of Planning indicated that ‘the 
threat of international terrorism has also recently impacted on Kenyan attitudes 
and policies towards refugees’ (MPND, 2006: 7).  
It cannot be ruled out that part of the apparent change towards refugees 
within Kenyan government circles has been triggered from outside, notably 
foreign pressure to deal with terrorists. Kenya has been the scene of several 
terrorist attacks in the last decade, notably the 7 August 1998 bomb attack on 
the US embassy in Nairobi, which killed 291 and wounded over 5000, and the 
28 November 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa and the 
(failed) attempt to shoot down an Israeli plane that same day. Twelve Kenyans 
and three Israelis were murdered by two suicide bombers in the hotel attack. All 
of these attacks were claimed by Al-Qaeda (Rutten, 2004). These threats 
resulted in the drafting of a highly contested Suppression of Terrorism Bill 
(2003), increased security measures in Kenya’s airports and the rounding up of 
Somalis in Nairobi. In May 2002 hundreds of people, including children, were 
arrested in the Nairobi estate of Eastleigh, in a police crackdown on illegal 
foreigners. Police arrested over 843 aliens, mostly from Somalia and Ethiopia, 
and recovered powerful sophisticated communications equipment used to 
communicate with relatives in their respective countries (IRIN, 2002a).  
Kenyan Muslims have also felt harassed by their own authorities. In their 
view the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit is operating illegally and should be dis-
banded (ABC News Online, 2006). Although Kenya redrafted the Suppression 
of Terrorism Bill, it has not yet been tabled in Parliament. Immigration officials, 
however, indicated that terrorist issues will be put into the Migration Act, so 
that even without the Terrorism Bill legal tools will be available to address this 
matter. 
On 1 March 2006, the government of Kenya embarked on an ambitious 
exercise registering illegal aliens in Eastleigh. The exercise was completed by 
July. According to the Ministry of Immigration, 51 000 people were registered 
in Eastleigh. Urban refugees across the country were also encouraged to 
register. The government had three main objectives: to conduct a baseline 
survey to find out the actual number of refugees in urban areas; to identify 
refugees capable of working and doing business in Kenya and give them legal 
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status, that is, ‘Class H’ permits. (These permits cost Ksh60 000 – about €650. 
Licenses would weed out illegal aliens involved in business and provide 
revenue. Those holding this type of permit are also required to pay taxes.) The 
last objective was to determine for security purposes the number of refugees 
residing in the country. 
The UNHCR aims to return to the position prior to 1991 through capacity-
building of the Department of Refugees within the Ministry of Immigration and 
Registration of Persons. The Ministry has three departments: the Registrar of 
Persons; Immigration; and Refugees. Once there is a commissioner in charge of 
refugees, there should be a budget line from the Ministry of Finance to support 
the department fully. At present this is UNHCR budget, aided by international 
organisations such as the World Food Programme and various NGOs. Donors 
support the capacity-building of the Refugee Department. Its staff is currently 
sixteen, with five administrative officers, and in July 2006 the UNHCR, through 
assistance from the Danish government, trained them for the first time. Lack of 
funds and of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) within the 
Ministry have, however, created a major bottleneck. Systems are too manual 
(e.g. at airports and borders). Better equipment and more personnel are needed. 
Transit migration: Pointing fingers in the human trafficking debate 
According to immigration officials, Kenya is a transit country for Ethiopians, 
Rwandans, Somalis, Eritreans and Asians. Harbouring foreigners is a big 
problem leading to trafficking, but it was also indicated that ‘transit [human 
trafficking] is a peripheral issue for us’.7 This statement was linked to the fact 
that the effective tackling of this problem is an impossible job, given Kenya’s 
geographical and financial position which simply does not allow for an illegal-
entrance-proof border control.  
Our borders are porous and that makes it easy to sneak in and out of the country. 
One should realise that most people do not move through Jomo Kenyatta airport, 
although it is the hub for East Africa and beyond. They simply pass overland 
towards the border and leave by public or private transport some five kilometres 
before the border town. With the help of agents they cross the border, and in this 
way they can go as far as South Africa. Somalis in particular follow this route. Our 
                                                 
7  Interviews with (a) Mr Joseph Ndathi, principal immigration officer, and three officers: Mr 
Omar Ndathe (refugee department), Mr Joseph Ngetich (refugee department), Ms Jane Oyaro, 
(immigration department), 4 August 2006, (b) Hon. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, MP for Kisumu 
Town West and former Minister for Planning and National Development, 31 July 2006, and 
(c) Dr Isaiah Akunga Onyango, Director, International Jobs Office, 2 August 2006.  
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legal framework also does not cater for human trafficking. The fines are not 
prohibitive enough.8  
The Labour Ministry pointed at Kenya being a transit for labour migrants, 
mainly from Somalia, who enter Kenya as refugees and leave as ‘Kenyan’ 
migrant workers. Labour officials called for awareness campaigns on labour 
migration and human trafficking which are considered critical for both the 
migrant and their families, and those remaining at the home place. 
Migration officials interviewed by the authors stated that lately many illegal 
transit migrants have been of Asian origin. The rate of success in detecting 
illegal entrants went up after the Netherlands Embassy facilitated equipment 
and training to detect forged passports. IOM also provides training on detecting 
trafficking. In spite of this support, Kenyan migration officials blamed foreign 
embassies for handing out visas for family reunion. This triggers human 
trafficking into Kenya, and people cannot be prosecuted since this is too costly, 
as people would have to stay longer in Kenya – at the expense of aid organisa-
tions – and in addition would not be not able to use tickets home that would 
have already been arranged by these international agencies.9  
Labour migration: Golden opportunity or a threat? 
Current discussion about migration is pointing more towards the apparent 
positive aspects of international labour mobility. It was reported by the UN 
(2006: 12, 54) that in 2005 some 191 million people were living outside their 
home countries, remitting an estimated US$232 billion back home. This is more 
than double the estimate of a decade earlier.  
In Kenyan government circles the debate on remittances is also gaining 
momentum, although the issue of migrant labour is not new. Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda used to exchange migrant labour during the heyday of the first 
thirty-year East African economic union (1948–1977). The open borders 
stimulated both documented and unauthorised migration. For nearly two 
decades of the first East African economic union, all the East African Commu-
nity (EAC) countries allowed their citizens to move freely from one country to 
another.  
When Uganda came under military rule, Kenya and Tanzania adopted a 
‘help-the-neighbour’ attitude, allowing an inflow of Ugandan refugees as well 
as job-seekers. This resulted in strained relations between Uganda and its two 
neighbours. Between 1984 and 1987 the Kenyan authorities, grappling with 
                                                 
8  Interview with Ministry of Labour officials. 
9  Interview with Mr Tom Amolo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 August 2006. 
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negative economic factors, expelled Ugandans irrespective of their residence 
status in Kenya. These events brought the longstanding free movement of East 
Africans to a halt until the second EAC Federation was established in 1999, 
which should result in the adoption of a common passport, a relaxing of 
emigration/immigration formalities for their citizens, as well as a political 
federation (Oucho, 2006; Sander, 2003).  
In the past, Kenyans who migrated outside Africa mostly did so for reasons 
of education and further training, mainly at British institutions. Many later 
returned to Kenya and emerged as the elite in the struggle for independence, 
and as leaders in crucial government and private sector management positions 
immediately after the British handed over power in 1963. In subsequent years 
many Kenyans, backed by government-financed scholarships and guaranteed 
jobs on return, left for higher education both in the West (mainly the UK and 
USA) and the East (the Soviet Union, and India). Among African countries, 
Kenya led in terms of numbers of students going to the USA, with 7097 in 
2001/02, ahead of Nigeria (3820), Ghana (2672), Egypt (2409), and South 
Africa (2232). 
In the year 2001, about 47,000 Kenyan immigrants were living in the USA, 
15,000 in the United Kingdom, and 1300 were in Sweden (Okoth, 2003). Figure 
9.2 indicates the trend of Kenyan immigrants to the two major destinations 
(USA and UK), from 1991 to 2001, and Figure 9.3 shows the number of 
Kenyan immigrants in six Western countries in 2001. Kenyan schoolteachers 
were recruited throughout the 1990s in the Seychelles, Rwanda, Burundi and 
the Congo. The Kenyan government has not yet established standards to ensure 
the adequate training and protection of these workers before their departure and 
during their stints abroad. Many Kenyans also began pursuing opportunities in 
low-skilled positions such as bus drivers, domestic servants, cruise ship atten-
dants, and security guards in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and 
Bahrain. The wave of African migrants to Spain has hit world headlines, and 
estimates are that some 20,000 Somalis made similarly perilous journeys across 
the Gulf of Aden to the Middle East – about 1000 people are thought to have 
died in this attempt. It might well be that (Muslim) Kenyans, from the coast and 
the north-eastern region, have joined this route.10  
The total figure of Kenyan external migrants will be hard to establish for 
several reasons, such as unwillingness or inability to register with a Kenyan 
mission. According to one migration official, Kenyan authorities do not have 
reliable and up-to-date figures. He said that this was because, for example,  
 
                                                 
10  X. Rice. ‘Washed up on the beach’. Drum, August 2006: 60–61. 
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Figure 9.2 
 
Source: Migration Information Source, Global Data Center (cited in MPND, 2006; Okoth, 2003) 
 
Figure 9.3 
 
Source: Migration Information Source, Global Data Center (cited in MPND, 2006; Okoth, 2003) 
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someone might ‘go to a brother for a visit and subsequently “disappear” for ten 
years, working abroad.’ However, a total of some 200,000 to 300,000 Kenyan 
migrants might be a conservative estimate, so that the neighbouring countries as 
well as countries in southern Africa and the Middle East will account for most 
of those Kenyans who did not move to the industrialised North. Besides looking 
for educational and training opportunities, a whole range of push and pull 
factors were identified by the Ministry of Planning and National Development 
explaining out-migration by Kenyans.  
Push and pull factors  
As well as the ‘push’ factors affecting migrant choices for leaving their place of 
residence – low and eroding wages and salaries; unsatisfactory living condi-
tions, lack of transport, housing, etc.; under-utilisation of qualified personnel; 
lack of freedom; discrimination in appointments and promotions; lack of 
research and other facilities, including support staff; declining quality of educa-
tional systems and perceived prestige of ‘foreign training’; social unrest, politi-
cal conflicts and wars – there are a myriad of ‘pull’ factors characterising the 
new location of settlement – better working conditions; job opportunities and 
professional development; higher wages and income; higher standard of living; 
substantial funds for research, advanced technology, modern facilities, support 
staff; political stability; meritocracy, transparency; and intellectual freedom.  
In 2002, President Kibaki called on Kenyans, especially intellectuals who 
had opted to go abroad for political reasons during the long rule of President 
Moi, to return home. At the same time the new government announced its 
intention to create 500,000 jobs annually. Estimates are that only some 50,000 
jobs were created in the first half year after Kibaki came to power. Kenya, 
apparently, was not yet in a position to welcome home its community abroad. 
Moreover, there was a growing realisation that the Kenyan diaspora was 
becoming a significant player in Kenya’s economic development through the 
remittances sent home. After being installed as the Minister for Planning and 
National Development, Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o paid a visit to the Kenyan 
diaspora. He met Frank Mwaniki, the then President of the Kenyan Community 
Abroad (KCA) (founded 1997), to talk about remittances. They discussed the 
Ghanaian example of diaspora support and agreed to look for ways to remit 
money for investment through the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). The CBK 
was interested in channelling these funds, in accordance with the Banking Act. 
The director (Dr Andrew Mulei) was very cooperative. The idea was to look 
into specific areas for investment, mortgage facilities and treasury bonds. 
However, the Ministry of Finance was slow and did not seem to be very 
interested. ‘They are more of an accounting institution and less of a strategic 
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investment entity.’11 Discussions were also held between the KCA and the 
Ministry of Planning with the Kenya Commercial Bank (with Western Union), 
Postbank and City Bank. 
The financial benefit of remittances seems for many observers to over-
shadow the negative aspects of migration. In particular the Kenyan govern-
ment’s promise to create half a million new jobs annually seems to have 
triggered new initiatives to proactively support Kenyans in finding jobs abroad. 
The Kenyan Cabinet (Minute 126/03, 18/12/2003) authorised the setting up of 
an International Jobs Office (IJO) under the Cabinet Office to carry out interna-
tional market research, in close liaison with the Kenyan embassies and UN 
agencies, to identify suitable job opportunities for Kenyan professionals within 
international agencies, to identify new employment opportunities in the interna-
tional market, and to re-advertise such jobs in the local media.  
The description of the IJO functions suggests that finding jobs in the free 
international labour market was the IJO’s key target. However, the IJO’s 
director himself indicated that initial efforts were directed mainly towards 
supporting Kenyans in acquiring high-ranking positions in the offices of the 
United Nations, especially at senior levels – where Kenya is outnumbered by 
other African countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria and South Africa. The 
IJO is compiling a database of Kenyans working in international organisations, 
to monitor when their contracts expire, and it lobbies for a similar or larger 
number of Kenyans to be employed in those organisations. Between April 2005 
and April 2006, Kenyan staff at the UNHCR increased from 19 to 33. An 
average of 120 vacancies in various UN organisations are advertised weekly on 
notice boards placed in strategic government buildings in Nairobi. At a later 
stage IJO did broaden its activities and put more effort into streamlining hunting 
for international jobs for Kenyan professionals in the private sector, because 
Kenyan society cannot absorb the human resources available. To fulfil this 
objective, the IJO acts as a facilitator for foreign governments or recruitment 
officers who come to interview professionals, and also conducts visits to 
countries in Europe, southern Africa and the Middle East.12 Other Kenyan 
government offices claim that the IJO has gone beyond its mandate by looking 
for private jobs in the international market. It was concluded that in particular 
                                                 
11  Interview Hon. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, MP for Kisumu Town West and former Minister for 
Planning and National Development (2003–November 2005), 31 July 2006. 
12  A first mission (in mid-2005) visited seven Kenyan embassies in Europe and the Middle East, 
eleven UN organisations, a private organisation responsible for placement of skilled personnel 
in the public and private sectors and two government departments. A year later another 
mission visited Kenyan embassies in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon and 
United Arab Emirates) and southern Africa (Namibia and Botswana). 
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southern Africa and the Middle East are the key destinations and best opportu-
nities for ‘quick wins’.13 A local newspaper reported that 20,000 Kenyans had 
secured jobs in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through the IJO 
(The Standard, 28 July 2006). Another 10,000 were reported to be working in 
southern Africa. 
Most governments in the Middle East have a very sophisticated network of 
recruitment agencies. In 1991 Parliament was presented with a bill allowing 
foreign employment agencies to operate in Kenya. This bill, however, never 
became law. Recently a survey was conducted among the foreign agencies and 
68 of these organisations were counted. The Ministry of Labour developed a 
code of conduct for foreign agents. It also stated the need for pre-departure 
orientation schemes for migrant workers regarding the culture, and social and 
political conditions of the host countries. Awareness campaigns on labour 
migration and trafficking in persons are also critical. Whether these efforts will 
be sufficient and able to prevent bad practices remains to be seen. In this respect 
lessons should also be learned from, for example, the experiences of Asian 
migrants. The government of Kenya countersigns the contracts signed by 
Kenyan migrant workers. But having countersigned contracts might be useless 
in cases where on arrival these are replaced with new ones with less favourable 
conditions.14 Likewise the idea that Kenyans are very welcome should be ques-
tioned. Recent reports for the Gulf region indicate that the growing presence of 
foreign labour worries these countries, especially concerning some workers’ 
rights (for example wages, education and health rights) demanded in negotia-
tions during the free trade agreements.15 This might mean opportunities for 
Kenyans, but only if they agree to certain unfavourable conditions. Unfavour-
able stories have appeared in the press concerning Kenyan teachers in the 
Seychelles. Former Minister Anyang’ Nyong’o referred to the situation of 
                                                 
13  The IJO has been instrumental in finding job opportunities for engineers and architects in 
Namibia. In Saudi Arabia 23 doctors, nurses and medical technicians were offered jobs 
through ALMACO a recruitment agency in Riyadh (IJO, 2006). Fifty positions for Kenyans 
as veterinary doctors and lab technicians were secured with ALAMARAI, a dairy products 
company in Saudi Arabia. In trying to promote Kenyan professionals, the IJO mission also 
spoke to an umbrella organisation, Waleed Al-Swaidan, which manages 382 recruitment 
offices in Saudi Arabia. Most of these recruitment agencies had limited information on Kenya 
and tended to focus on South-East Asian countries when recruiting. In the United Arab 
Emirates, 208 jobs (contractors, welders, etc.) were offered in construction companies (Grand 
Hayat, DANADA), and 200 jobs with Emirates Airlines. 
14  See http://www.smc.org.ph/amnews/amn060815/middleast/bahrain060815.htm on high rates 
of suicide among Indian migrants in the Gulf region, mostly because of financial problems, or 
from loneliness. 
15  See http://www.smc.org.ph/amnews/amn060815/middleast/middleast060815.htm. 
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Kenyan nurses in the UK, which he called appalling: ‘Long hours for little pay; 
it is slavery.’ 
Remittances from Kenyans in the diaspora  
Remittances have been associated with significant declines in poverty. In 
addition, they help households maintain consumption levels through economic 
shocks. Remittances are put to use by means of investment, education, health 
and increased entrepreneurship. The 2006 World Bank report estimated that 
remittances reduced the number of people living in absolute poverty (below 
US$1 per day) in Kenya by some 2 per cent (World Bank 2006: 128–9). In 
recent years there has been a great deal of interest in remittances as an instru-
ment for reducing poverty and promoting growth. The IJO and the Ministry of 
Planning and National Development also refer to remittances as a major source 
of Kenya’s foreign exchange (together with direct investment and donor funds). 
The September 2005 IJO report of the mission on placement of Kenyans in 
international jobs said ‘It is not surprising, therefore, that the Kenyan economy 
has continued to survive despite the freezing of Donor Funding over the last 
decade.’ 
It has been difficult to measure the impact of remittances by Kenyans in the 
diaspora because of a lack of reliable data. However, there are four channels 
through which remittances are likely to enter the country. These are: 
•  transfers through Western Union and MoneyGram 
•  remittances to bank accounts in Kenya by Kenyans working abroad 
•  remittances brought in by returning Kenyans and sold for Kenyan 
shillings at forex bureaus 
• remittances brought in by returning Kenyans and sold for shillings at 
commercial banks. 
A study by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Nairobi has estimated that total 
inward remittances through Western Union rose from around Ksh5 billion in 
2000 to about Ksh10 billion in 2005. In the case of MoneyGram, the amounts 
for inward remittances are much smaller, being in the order of Ksh50 million in 
2005. The study also estimates that, given some assumptions, remittances 
received by forex bureaux are to the amount of Ksh3 billion, while remittances 
through other media are estimated at Ksh22 billion, making a total of Ksh48 
billion in 2005, as shown in Table 9.1. 
Monica Nyamwange (2005), from William Paterson University, conducted a 
survey among five hundred Kenyans in New Jersey. She reports that four main 
categories could be found among the Kenyan immigrants: students, workers, 
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Table 9.1 Estimates for workers remittances to Kenya in 2005 
Medium Amount (Ksh millions) 
Western Union and MoneyGram 10,050 
Transfers to bank accounts 12,514 
Receipts by forex bureaux 3,094 
Receipts by banks 22,500 
Total  48,158 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Nairobi, cited in MPND, 2006) 
refugees and green card lottery winners, and that 43.7 per cent of them sent 
money home regularly. Of that group, 40 per cent sent over US$2000 a year. 
Money is mainly used for daily consumption (72.5% of receivers), school fees 
(64.9%), investment (59%), and debt payment (17.5%). From her observations, 
Nyamwange concludes that villages in Kenya with foreign connections are 
better off than those without international remittances. This last statement is 
corroborated by Black (2004), for a village in Makueni district, where half of 
the households surveyed had access to migrant income, which was larger and 
more secure than local labour income. 
Figures reported for remittances received in Kenya from migrants abroad 
vary from Ksh4 billion from all Kenyan migrant workers, to Ksh58 billion sent 
by Kenyans in the US through Western Union alone (The Standard, 28 July 
2006).16 Planning Minister Henry Obwocha illustrated the importance of remit-
tances by pointing to the initial public offer (IPO) for KenGen (Kenya Electric-
ity Generating Company Ltd): out of the US$366 million invested, some 
US$100 million was believed to have come from the Kenyan community 
abroad.17 The Minister also pointed to another phenomenon, namely Kenyans 
abroad grouping together in a company and investing directly in Kenya. Mr 
Frank Mwaniki, former president of the Kenyan Community Abroad (KCA), 
indicated that the KCA has been collaborating with the Kenya Investment 
                                                 
16  The Ministry of Labour gave an annual figure for remittances of US$56 million (about 
Ksh4 billion). But the World Bank mentions a 2004 figure of about US$464 million (about 
Ksh34.8 billion). Kenyans in the diaspora are said to contribute 3.8 per cent of national 
income through remittances. This overshadows the FDI (US$50.4 million), and the net ODA 
of about US$200 million. Remittances through unofficial channels could add at least 50 per 
cent to official figures. In 2005, the conservative estimate of Frank Mwaniki, former president 
of the influential Kenyan Community Abroad, stood at about US$600 million annually. The 
Central Bank of Kenya indicated it likely to be between US$1.2 billion and US$1.3 billion, 
leaving aside informal channels of remittance. 
17  According to the East African Weekly, 15th May 2006, the IPO realised Ksh26.4 billion 
(US$366 million) for a period of 27 days. 
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Authority in trying to identify areas in which pooled resources can be invested. 
The Ministry of Planning and National Development is coordinating an infor-
mal committee looking into the issue of remittances. Its mandate is based on a 
Cabinet Memo on diaspora issues. The newly-inaugurated Kenya Diaspora 
Remittance Facilitation Working Committee is attended by representatives from 
the CBK, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning and National 
Development, the Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development, 
Africa’s Brain Gain, the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analy-
sis (KIPPRA), the Postal Corporation of Kenya, and the Investment Promotion 
Council (IPC). Consultations were held between the Committee and financial 
institutions.18 
The KCA, through Mr Frank Mwaniki, reported that there would be two 
kinds of remittance: regular investment remittances, and transaction remit-
tances. By pooling regular remittances in a huge fund for investment, transfer 
fees would be eliminated and a flat transfer fee for ad hoc transactions can be 
negotiated, regardless of amount. The so-called Kenyans Abroad Investment 
Fund (KAIF) should allow groups of Kenyans to band together to carry out 
projects that they normally would not be able to participate in individually 
(Muraguri, 2005). Secondly, it would be easier to predict the level of foreign 
exchange coming into the country, since currently most remittances of large 
sums enter via the informal route. If a premium could be guaranteed over the 
going buying/selling rates, people would be convinced that this was the best 
way to remit money to Kenya. The amalgamated fund gives the government of 
Kenya, and the CBK specifically, leverage in controlling not only foreign 
exchange flows but also the value of the Kenyan shilling on the international 
market.  
The fund allows groups of Kenyans to band together to carry out projects 
that they normally would not be able to participate in individually. Secondly it 
will be easier to predict the level of foreign exchange coming into the country 
as currently, most remittances of large sums occur via the informal route. If a 
premium can be guaranteed over the going buying/selling rates, people will be 
convinced this to be the best way to remit money to Kenya, the amalgamated 
fund gives the government of Kenya, and CBK specifically, leverage in con-
trolling not only foreign exchange flows but also the value of the Kenyan 
shilling on the international market.  
                                                 
18  The IJO stated that it is encouraging people to return remittances to Kenya through a 
channelled structure (interview with Dr Onyango, Director, IJO, 2 August 2006). 
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Brain drain: Different opinions 
Whereas remittances are seen as a positive aspect of international migration, the 
loss of skilled labour in specific fields such as health, education and engineering 
is considered a serious setback. According to the Ministry of Planning and 
National Development, Kenya has had to replace these professionals with 
expatriates from developed countries – at a very high cost (MPND, 2006). 
Kenya continues to fund the education of its nationals, only to see them end up 
contributing to the growth of rich countries, with little or no return on their 
investment. To show the magnitude of the problem, it costs about US$40,000 to 
US$50,000 to train a doctor, and around US$25,000 to train a nurse. Gideon 
Konchella (NDN, 2004), Assistant Minister for Health, estimates the loss to 
society of an emigrant doctor to be almost US$518,000 per doctor and about 
US$340,000 for a nurse (Kirigia et al, 2006). Ann Veneman of UNICEF said 
that the brain drain of medical professionals is threatening the very existence of 
sub-Saharan Africa’s health services, with the ‘push factor’ being the underly-
ing cause of the malaise (IRIN, 2006). The Ministry estimates that the country 
loses on average twenty medical doctors each month. 
In sum, the following are the positive and negative effects of brain drain on 
Kenya’s economy: on the negative side, brain drain reduces the already low 
numbers of skilled people available and needed for development; it reduces the 
number of innovative people, whether entrepreneurs or academics; it increases 
dependence on foreign technical assistance; it slows the transfer of technology 
and widens the gap between Kenya and the industrialised countries of the north; 
it negatively affects the country’s scientific output, and results in a loss of 
income tax revenue and potential contributions to the GDP. The positive aspects 
relate to contribution of new skills when migrants return; and remittances from 
skilled migrants boosting household welfare and supporting the balance of 
payments. 
The Ministry of Planning intends to put in place policies to structure migra-
tion – not just to tap remittances but also to address the issue of brain drain, 
especially with regard to the ‘2030 vision’ and the need for manpower. ‘But of 
now we do not have a specific policy on migration. This ministry should be the 
coordinating force but it is not. A department of foreign employment looking 
into human trafficking and agencies would be a good idea.’19 The Ministry of 
Labour officials also claim that their department should take the lead in coordi-
nating issues of labour migration. In their view the current situation is one 
primarily of brain drain and wastage. Kenya lacks a policy for labour migration. 
                                                 
19 Interview Ministry of Labour officials, 2 August 2006. 
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The Ministry of Labour is supposed to vet the terms of employment of Kenyan 
migrant workers or those in any foreign employment. According to Ministry of 
Labour officials, this is now being done by the IJO – without reference to the 
ministry.  
The Ministry of Labour is concerned about the negative aspects of out-
migration and indicated that they would like to manage this process, to turn it 
into a ‘brain gain’. In particular, the even temporary return of Kenyan migrants 
as consultants (‘brain circulation’) was seen to be a promising option. But 
officials said that it would first be necessary to establish in more detail which 
sectors in Kenya’s labour force are in deficit. Manpower surveys were last 
conducted over twenty years ago. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also of the 
opinion that there is a need for an audit of skilled and unskilled labour in 
Kenya, to address the gaps and surpluses. 
The Ministries of Migration, Planning and Labour all claimed that Kenya 
does not have any bilateral arrangements with receiving countries, nor any co-
development programme that includes Kenyan returnees. The IJO, by contrast, 
explained that it is trying to secure agreements with Namibia and Sudan.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs blames the lack of a coordinated policy 
partly on the cross-cutting character of migration. There is need for a mecha-
nism which brings in stakeholders from the government of Kenya, civil society, 
the private sector and international organisations to deal with the issue.20 There 
was also a clear understanding of the limited ability – and, perhaps, the limited 
will – of the Kenyan authorities to act in this respect. In fact, as mentioned by 
the Ministry for Immigration officials, ‘the brain drain is not a major govern-
ment concern, if you get opportunities abroad then just head for these greener 
pastures, no need to involve the government of Kenya.’ A similar opinion – 
albeit in a more extreme degree – was aired by the director of the IJO. ‘The 
word “brain drain” is not in our vocabulary. We do not want to hear about it. 
We have to create 500,000 jobs per year but these are simply not here. The 
solution is to go beyond our own borders, especially to the Middle East and 
southern Africa.’ The IJO claims that brain drain will continue because of better 
working conditions and pay.  
Another advantage of the brain drain, according to IJO, is that employers 
will be forced to improve working conditions in Kenya. At present Kenya 
retires its civil servants at 55 years. There are countries that want such civil 
servants – which reduces the problem of retirees who have no retirement 
benefits. Expertise that Kenya does not want to lose is contained through the 
condition put to the applicants to bring along a letter from their Kenyan 
                                                 
20 Interview Mr Tom Amolo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 August 2006. 
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employer. This acts as an assurance that the person is of good character, and 
also allows IJO to deliberately discriminate in the selection if certain qualified 
persons should not leave the country (see advertisement for jobs in Saudi 
Arabia for Kenyan medical personnel and quality inspectors, The Standard July 
31, 2006: 25). Labour officials stated: 
IJO does not address labour deficits and only has a focus on exporting surplus 
labour. There is no integrated approach or coordination of identifying surplus 
labour, and balancing this with the concern of brain drain. The private sector needs 
to come together and look for an integrated approach and coordination of labour 
migration. International organisations also push their own interests and bring their 
agenda to the table. We also have no policy framework to facilitate compensation 
for taking away skilled labour from developing countries. 
In view of the current state of the Kenyan economy and the high rate of 
unemployment, the Ministry of Planning does not expect an immediate return of 
Kenyans abroad.  
It may actually be that many more talented, qualified and unemployed Kenyans 
willing to migrate will continue to seek opportunities abroad, and contribute to 
nation-building through direct financial remittances or other forms of brain gain. 
Hopefully, a robust private-public framework that can facilitate productive linkages 
between Kenyan academics, researchers, artists and investors at home and in the 
diaspora will emerge to consolidate the political and economic changes taking place 
in Kenya, as has been the case elsewhere’ (MPND, 2006). 
From brain drain to brain gain (the diaspora option) 
According to the ECA, strategies attempting to reverse the brain drain include 
the retention and return of skilled migrants to their countries of origin. How-
ever, many African countries have acknowledged that these efforts are not 
always well organised or effective. For example, the IOM programme to bring 
back Kenyans was a top-down programme brought to the East African Commu-
nity when Ugandans (though not many Kenyans and Tanzanians) wanted to 
return home. ‘IOM brings the agenda; we dance their tune’.21 The diaspora 
option (as the ECA calls it), which encourages highly-skilled expatriates to 
contribute their experience to the development of their country without neces-
sarily physically relocating, emerged in the early 1990s as a more realistic 
strategy to alleviate the consequences of brain drain. There are some forty-one 
formal expatriate knowledge networks in the world, six of them African, 
including the Association of Kenyans Abroad.  
                                                 
21  Interview Ministry of Labour officials, 2 August 2006. 
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In February 2003, the African Union called for the diaspora to be considered 
the sixth region of Africa, after North, South, East, West and Central Africa, 
while NEPAD wants the establishment of a database to determine the magni-
tude of brain drain and promote collaboration between Africans abroad and at 
home. NEPAD has an arrangement to top up salaries of doctors and engineers 
(Mutume, 2003). 
The Ministry of Planning and the Jomo Kenyatta University for Agriculture 
and Technology organised a conference in 2005 on the topic of brain gain. 
Among the recommendations put forward was the promotion of circular migra-
tion, that is encouraging those living abroad to come back to work for a short 
period to conduct research and/or support their community. Another way to link 
with the diaspora is to provide them with the right to vote in their country of 
origin. Calls have recently again been made to the Kenyan Parliament for this 
purpose and a positive response is expected. However, according to Ministry of 
Migration officials, ‘If you want to facilitate the return of migrants, build the 
capacity of countries of origin or transit, to stem movement: facilitate economic 
empowerment and democracy, democratic institutions and peace.’ Ministry of 
Labour personnel aired similar views: ‘The EU holds open arms towards skilled 
labour from abroad. But unless the root cause is addressed [poverty], you will 
not stop out-migration. People go to Europe because there are jobs available; 
otherwise they would not go.’  
Conclusion 
Until quite recently, Kenyan government policy documents hardly addressed 
the issue of migration. At best a few remarks were made regarding the refugee 
situation of some 250 000 forced migrants who have settled in two main camps 
in the country. This encampment policy, implemented by UNHCR, was recently 
relaxed by recognising the status of urban refugees. New legislation concerning 
refugees in the country, which has been under consideration since the early 
1990s, finally seems to be in the making. The growing importance of the 
migration debate in the country is also illustrated in the recent establishment of 
a Ministry for Immigration and a new Refugee Department.  
Apart from forced migration, attention to issues of brain drain and remit-
tances has recently been increasing. The introduction of an International Jobs 
Office and new mechanisms to transfer remittances from the Kenyan diaspora 
back home should be mentioned in this respect. Kenyan officials stressed the 
necessity to have an institutional and policy framework dealing with migration 
issues. Nevertheless policymakers have not yet agreed on which policy to 
implement, in some cases effectively opposing each other, as in the field of out-
migration. In particular, qualified people in the fields of education, health and 
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engineering are needed but are being lost to foreign countries. Kenya will need 
to deal with this issue as a top priority and harmonise its migration policies, 
both at home and in collaboration with other countries in the region and beyond. 
Interviews  
Mr Furio De Angelis, UNHCR, August 2, 2006. 
Mr Ekuru Aukot, Exec. Director Kituo Cha Sheria, August 3, 2006. 
Mr Thuita Mwangi, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2, 2006. 
Mr Frank Mwaniki, former chairman Kenya Community Abroad, interview by e-mail, 
August 9, 2006. 
Hon. Minister Henry Obwocha, Minister for Planning and National Development, July 
31, 2006.  
Mrs Grace Otieno, Director Employment, Ministry of Labour and 5 team members, 
August 2, 2006.  
Mrs Judy Wakahiu, Exec. Director, Refugee Consortium of Kenya, August 3, 2006. 
References 
ABC NEWS ONLINE (2006), Kenya muslims protest, allege police discrimination. 
September 30, 2006. http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200609/s1752530.htm. 
BLACK, R., L. MCLEAN HILKER & C. POOLEY (2004), Migration and pro-poor policy in 
East Africa. Working Paper C7. Sussex Centre for Migration Research. Brighton, 
UK: University of Sussex. 
GJLOS (Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector) (2005), Medium term strategy 
2005/06 to 2008/09 Final draft (version 5). 15 June 2005. Nairobi: Government of 
Kenya, GJLOS Reform Programme. 
IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks ) (2002a), KENYA: Hundreds of 
foreigners arrested in Eastleigh. Nairobi, May 31, 2002. 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=32214. 
IRIN (2002b), KENYA-TANZANIA: Rights groups urge tougher refugee protection 
laws. Nairobi, April 23, 2002. 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=31496. 
IRIN (2005), AFRICA: Making room under the umbrella: The legal framework of 
forced migration. Nairobi, February 1, 2005.  
IRIN (2006), SOUTHERN AFRICA: Band aid for medical brain drain. Nairobi, August 
16, 2006. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=60374.  
KIRIGIA, J., A. GBARY, L. MUTHURI, J. NYONI & A. SEDDOH (2006), The cost of health 
professionals’ brain drain in Kenya. BioMed Central (BMC) Health Services 
Research Article 6:89. 
MPND (Ministry of Planning and National Development) (2003), The economic 
recovery strategy for wealth and employment creation 2003-2007. June 2003. 
Nairobi: Government of Kenya, Ministry of Planning and National Development. 
MPND (2006), Kenyans in the Diaspora: Effects of emigration and brain drain on the 
economy. Brief for the Minister, Ministry of Planning and National Development, 
August 2006. Nairobi: Government of Kenya. 
 THE MIGRATION DEBATE IN KENYA 203 
 
MURAGURI, G. (2005), Kenyans abroad investment fund (KAIF): An initiative of 
Kenyan Community Abroad (KCA) to address the issue of Kenyans in the diaspora 
participation in economic development. Paper presented at the Second Annual 
Africa’s Brain Gain Conference, Nairobi, December 7-9, 2005. 
MUTUME, G. (2003), Reversing Africa’s ‘brain drain’: New initiatives tap skills of 
African expatriates. Africa Recovery 17(2): 1. 
NDN (Nairobi Daily Nation) (2004), Brain drain compensation. Tradequity 3(2).  
NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) (2006), African peer review 
mechanism. Country Review Report: Republic of Kenya, May 2006. Nairobi: 
APRM–NEPAD. 
NYAMWANGE, M. (2005), International migration and the brain drain of students and 
workers. National Social Science Journal 24(1): 97-103.  
OKOTH, K. (2003), Kenya: What Role for Diaspora in Development? Migration 
Information Source, August 2003. 
OUCHO, J. (2006), Migration and refugees in Eastern Africa: A challenge for the East 
African Community. In: C. Cross, D. Gelderblom, N. Roux & J. Mafukidze, eds, 
Views on Migration in Africa. Proceedings of an African Migration Alliance 
Workshop, Pretoria, South Africa, March 10-11, 2005. 
RUTTEN, M. (2004), Kenya. In: Bogdan Szajkowski, ed., Revolutionary and dissident 
movements of the world. London: John Harper Publishing. 
SANDER, C. (2003), Migrant remittances to developing countries — A scoping study: 
Overview and introduction to issues for pro-poor financial services. London: 
Bannock Consulting (now DAI Europe Ltd). 
THUKU, H. (with assistance from K. King) (1970), Harry Thuku an autobiography. 
Nairobi: Oxford University Press. 
UN (United Nations) (2006), International migration and development. Report 
A/60/871 of the UN Secretary-General.  
US (UNITED STATES) DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2004), Trafficking in persons report. US 
Office of the under secretary for democracy and global affairs. Washington, DC: US 
Department of State. 
WORLD BANK (2006), Global economic prospects 2006: Economic implications of 
remittances and migration. Washington DC: International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD). 
10 
Migration and development  
in the Philippines 
Fabio Baggio 
Introduction 
The 2006 UN High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Develop-
ment, which engaged ministerial or highest level officials of member states, has 
greatly contributed to raising international attention regarding the linkage 
between migration and development in the globalised world. Studies and 
conferences have proliferated highlighting gaps, identifying best practices, 
unmasking myths, and uncovering new realities. The aim of this chapter is to 
assess the development impact of the massive international labour migration in 
the Philippines. However, before going into further discussion, the author 
considers it opportune to define the terms of reference: migration, and develop-
ment. 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration as ‘A 
process of moving, either across an international border, or within a state. It is a 
population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, what-
ever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, 
displaced persons, uprooted people, and economic migrants.’ (IOM, 2004: 41). 
For the purpose of this chapter, the analysis will be limited to international 
labour migration and emigration for permanent settlement.  
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Over the last five decades, the definition of development has been the object 
of vigorous interdisciplinary debate, resulting in a variety of feasible approaches 
generated by different methodologies and conceptual frameworks in various 
disciplines: anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology (Trujillo-
Mendoza, 2001). The United Nations adopted the definition of development 
offered by the influential Pakistani economist, Mahbub ul Haq1, who was one of 
the founders of human development theory. According to him: 
The basic purpose of development is to enlarge people’s choices. In principle, these 
choices can be infinite and can change over time. People often value achievements 
that do not show up at all, or not immediately, in income or growth figures: greater 
access to knowledge, better nutrition and health services, more secure livelihoods, 
security against crime and physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, political and 
cultural freedoms and sense of participation in community activities. The objective 
of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, 
healthy and creative lives. (Haq, http://hdr.undp.org/hd/) 
Going beyond mere economic understanding of the concept, human 
development is about enlarging people’s choices by means of building human 
capabilities. This can be achieved by assuring people of the following ideals: ‘to 
lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access to the 
resources needed for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in 
the life of the community.’2 In this chapter, the author accepts the UN definition 
of development, stressing its connection with the eight Millennium Develop-
ment Goals adopted at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000:  
- eradicating extreme hunger and poverty 
- achieving universal primary education 
- promoting gender equality and empowering women 
- reducing child mortality 
- improving maternal health 
- combating HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases 
- ensuring environmental sustainability 
- developing a global partnership for development.3 
                                                 
1  For further information about Mahbub ul Haq see http://www.un.org.pk/hdc/Tribute per 
cent20Page.htm. 
2  What is HD, at http://hdr.undp.org/hd/, accessed 8 August 2006. 
3  See Millennium Project, at  
 http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/goals02.htm#goal1, accessed 8 August 2006. 
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Filipino international migration and permanent settlement 
In 2006 the Philippine celebrated a century of international labour migration. It 
was on 20 December 1906 when the first batch of Filipinos arrived in Honolulu, 
Hawaii to work in local plantations. However, it was only in the 1970s, due 
mainly to the impact of the 1973 oil crisis, that the Philippines launched a more 
organised approach to labour migration (Asis, 2006c). Over the past thirty-five 
years, millions of Filipinos have left the country to seek greener pastures over-
seas. Although it is not possible to have precise figures of the stock of the 
Filipino diaspora, in December 2005 the Commission for Filipinos Overseas 
(CFO) estimated that 7,924,188 Filipino nationals were living overseas. This 
figure is slightly less than the 8.1 million estimated in 2004, but it still repre-
sents nearly 10 per cent of the national population. Among the major destination 
countries, the United States led with over 2.5 million Filipino immigrants, 
followed by Saudi Arabia with almost a million overseas Filipino workers 
(OFWs). To have a clearer picture of the Filipino diaspora in the world, Table 
10.1 offers a breakdown by continent, classifying the overseas Filipino popula-
tion into three different categories: permanent, temporary and irregular. 
Table 10.1 Stock estimate of overseas Filipinos as at December 2005 
Region / Country Permanent Temporary Irregular Total 
World total 3,391,338 3,651,727 881,123 7,924,188 
Africa 318 61,525 17,160 79,003 
Asia, east & south 186,906 891,088 238,238 1,316,232 
Asia, west 2,330 1,565,726 112,750 1,680,806 
Europe 211,351 523,442 123,282 858,075 
Americas 2,758,067 304,547 357,923 3,420,537 
Oceania 232,366 57,692 31,770 321,828 
Sea-based workers  247,707  247,707 
Source: http://www.poea.gov.ph/html/statistics.html 
Turning to flow statistics: the Philippine Overseas Employment Administra-
tion (POEA) registered 981,677 Filipinos deployed abroad as legal migrant 
workers from January to December 2005; but processed employment contracts 
were over 1.2 million, exceeding the targeted one million by 20.5 per cent 
(POEA, 2006). Table 10.2 presents the major countries of destination of land-
based Filipino workers legally deployed in 2005. 
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Table 10.2 Major destinations of land-based overseas Filipino workers, 2005 
Country OFWs Country OFWs 
Saudi Arabia 193,991 Kuwait 40,248 
Hong Kong 94,553 Qatar 31,418 
UAE 81,707 Singapore 27,599 
Taiwan 46,714 Italy 21,261 
Japan 42,586 United Kingdom 16,799 
Source: http://www.poea.gov.ph/html/statistics.html 
Despite the fact that permanent emigrants represent almost 43 per cent of the 
estimated stock of the overseas Filipinos, in recent years the main outflow has 
been constituted by migrant workers engaged in the so-called ‘contract worker 
system’. The 2005 estimate of 881,123 irregular Filipino migrants represents a 
positive sign considering that the POEA 2004 estimate was over 1.3 million. 
Nonetheless, it highlights a worrisome phenomenon. Because of their 
unauthorised situation, irregular migrants are more vulnerable to abuse and 
exploitation (Battistella & Asis, 2003).  
Since the 1990s, the Filipino exodus has been more and more marked by the 
presence of women, who in 2004 constituted 72.1 per cent of all new hires 
among land-based workers (POEA, 2005). In 2005, 247,707 Filipino seamen 
were deployed on ships throughout the world, accounting for 25 per cent of all 
crewmembers working in international vessels. Many more registered Filipino 
seafarers – some 300,000 – remain unemployed on shore (Bernardi, 2006). As 
to the occupational distribution of Filipino workers deployed in 2005, the 
POEA data reveals that 47 per cent of new hires are ultimately employed in 
skilled sectors, particularly in construction work and factories, while the house-
hold sector absorbed 30 per cent of new hires. Professional and technical 
workers declined by 32 per cent compared with 2004; however, they still repre-
sent 22 per cent of the total new hires. Table 10.3 offers a breakdown of the new 
hires among the Filipino workers deployed in 2005, by selected occupational 
groups. 
The economic impact of remittances  
The economic impact of the Filipino diaspora in terms of remittances cannot be 
ignored. In 2005, overseas Filipinos remitted through legal channels about 
10.7 billion US dollars, which stimulated the country’s economic growth for the 
period. This figure marked an increase of 25 per cent over the $8.6 billion 
recorded in 2004. The top ten sources of remittances in 2005 were: United  
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Table10.3 Deployed overseas Filipino workers – new hires* – by selected  
 occupation groups, 2005 
Occupational groups 2005 2004 % change 
Professional and technical related 
workers 63,941 94,147 –32.1 
Teachers 789 542 45.6  
Nursing Personnel 674 323 108.7  
Engineers Civil 625 492 27.0  
Others 61,853 92,790 –33.4  
Skilled Workers 133,420 123,525 8.0  
Construction workers 30,078 22,039 36.5  
Factory Workers 39,477 25,486 54.9  
Others 63,865 76,000 –16.0  
Household and related workers 85,088 62,890 32.3  
Other skills 1,836 1,250 46.9  
Total new hires 284,285** 281,812 0.9  
Source: POEA, 2006 
* Data does not include workers who exited through international exit points in the regions  
 (i.e. outside Metro Manila). 
**  Data includes workers who exited through employment-based immigration schemes. 
 
States (US$6.42 billion), Saudi Arabia (US$949.37 million), Italy (US$430.07 
million), Japan (US$356.66 million), Hong Kong (US$338.89 million), United 
Kingdom (US$300.72 million), United Arab Emirates (US$257.43 million), 
Singapore (US$240.15 million), Germany (US$134.80 million) and Canada 
(US$117.06 million). In past years, it was generally assumed that 50 per cent of 
overseas Filipino remittances were conveyed through informal channels. 
However, a recent study revealed that 80 per cent of Filipino migrants use now 
formal channels to send their remittances (ADB, 2004). While one should 
recognise the substantial role remittances play in propping up the gross national 
product (GNP) in the Philippines, it seems that there is no concrete evidence 
that such huge inflows have significantly improved the domestic economy in 
recent years.  
A report presented to the Economic Planning Office of the Senate of the 
Philippines at the end of 2005 stated that remittances have huge development 
potential for the national economy (Canlas, 2005). According to this report, 
remittances may contribute to the balance of payments, raise the national 
income, increase the country’s credit-worthiness, enhance access to interna-
tional capital markets, multiply opportunities for greater savings mobilisation (if 
conveyed through legal channels), help improve the domestic economy (if 
invested in the home country), increase household incomes and welfare, 
improve the per capita gross domestic product (GDP), and reduce poverty. On 
the other hand, the report acknowledged the risks of a remittance-dependent 
economy. Firstly, such an economy may develop a culture of dependence 
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among families left behind. Moreover, it may incline the national government to 
complacency in instituting fiscal and trade policies. Also, while inflows of 
foreign currencies may strengthen the local currency, they may also jeopardise 
earnings from the export of goods, which would appear more expensive to 
overseas buyers. Concerns were raised also regarding the use of overseas-
earned money by migrant families, based on perceptions that only a small 
portion of remittances seems to be saved or invested properly. The report finally 
questioned the overall gains of labour migration since it is not clear if the 
economic benefits compensate for investments in human capital formation.  
At the microeconomic level, the positive effects of remittances on the finan-
cial situations and welfare of families left behind cannot be denied. Recent 
studies have highlighted that overseas-earned money is instrumental in 
improving the material conditions of migrant families, particularly concerning 
the ownership of houses and consumer durables (Asis, 2006a). Yang’s (2004) 
research on the impact of remittances on migrants’ households in the Philip-
pines found that the recipients learned used these resources for crucial invest-
ments such as education and entrepreneurial activities. Such optimism is, 
however, not fully confirmed by the Consumer Expectations Survey undertaken 
by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) in Metro 
Manila for the second quarter of 2006. The findings of this survey showed that 
migrant families spent their remittances primarily on food and other household 
needs. Nonetheless, 40 per cent of households indicated that they had allotted 
part of the remittances for savings. According to the survey, only 10.9 per cent 
of migrant families used overseas-earned money in education and the same 
percentage assigned some portion of remittances to ‘productive’ investment 
(BSP, 2006). Figure 10.1 indicates how migrant households in Metro Manila  
 
Figure 10.1 Household utilisation of overseas remittances: Q1 2005 – Q2 2006 
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Source: Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), Consumers’ Outlook Improves in the Second Quarter of 2006  
 and One Year Ahead, 2006 
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used remittances for the period January 2005 to June 2006. One of the much-
debated issues about remittances is the extent to which they are used for 
‘productive investments,’ which are typically viewed in terms of allocations for 
economic purposes such as purchasing stocks and setting up or investing in 
business enterprises.  
It is also important to consider what migrant families perceive as investment. 
Well-rooted in the Filipino cultural tradition, house construction and the educa-
tion of children are considered productive investments by migrants and their 
families (Asis, 2006b). Measuring remittances must also take into account the 
investments that migrants and their families pour into the migration project. 
Going abroad to work entails expenses; particularly the placement or transaction 
fees that migrants must pay to recruitment agencies and/or brokers. Findings 
from studies and surveys have not yet identified what portion of remittances 
migrants actually allot to pay loans and debts contracted before their deploy-
ment, but rough empirical data lead the author to assume that Filipino migrants 
have, at least initially, a hard time paying back the money they borrowed from 
banks or from relatives to pay the exorbitant recruitment fees and other ex-
penses related to their deployment. This is indeed another crucial element to be 
considered in future researches on the impact of remittances on migrants’ fami-
lies.  
Human development in the Philippines 
The assessment of the development impact of migration in the Philippines 
should start from the consideration of various development indicators. To fulfil 
this task, the author made use of the Human Development Index (HDI) elabo-
rated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and other 
complementary indicators. The HDI is a universal tool for measuring the overall 
achievements of a nation-state in three basic dimensions of human develop-
ment: longevity (life expectancy), knowledge (educational attainment) and 
‘decent standard of living’ (adjusted per capita income in purchasing power 
parity in US dollars). In the latest Human Development Report published by the 
UNDP in 2005, the Philippines ranked 84th among 177 countries, an honourable 
middle position in the international scenario, but still far from the ‘medium 
human development’, fixed in the 57th position (UNDP, 2005). In 2003, the 
Philippine HDI was 0.758, marking a slow but steady improvement since 1975 
(0.654). Nonetheless, one should note that the Philippines had slipped from the 
2001 HDI ranking of 70th out of 162 (UNDP, 2001). 
The contributions of the three components to the 2003 HDI were not even. 
While the Philippines was 66th in terms of education index, it ranked 103rd in the  
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  Figure 10.2 Philippine HDI, 1975-2003 
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GDP index. Between 1997 and 2000, real per capita income in the Philippines 
declined from P27,896 to P26,881, and recovered slightly to P27,442 in 2003 
(Human Development Network, 2005). In effect, this slight improvement 
concerned only forty Philippine provinces, while thirty-seven other provinces 
registered a deterioration in the GDP index. Metro Manila’s per capita income 
declined 14.4 per cent from 2000 to 2003. In the special sorting referring to 
Gender-related Development Index (GDI), the Philippines ranked 63rd with a 
value of 0.755, marking a minimal improvement from the value of 0.746 regis-
tered in 2001.  
Turning to other complementary indicators, the poverty incidence in the 
Philippines went up from 25.1 per cent in 1997 to 27.5 per cent in 2000, before 
declining to 25.7 per cent in 2003. The recent improvement affected only forty-
five provinces, while the poverty incidence increased in thirty-two provinces 
(Human Development Network, 2005). According to the Philippine Labor 
Force Survey (LFS) undertaken by the National Statistical Office (NSO) in 
January 2006, the unemployment rate was 8.1 per cent, marking a noticeable 
improvement compared with the 11.3 per cent registered in January 2005. 
Nonetheless, the 2006 figure is still higher than the 7.7 per cent recorded in 
January 1997. The same survey recorded the January 2006 underemployment 
rate at 21.4, marking a significant increase compared with the 16.1 per cent for 
the same month in 2005. Nonetheless, the 2006 rate is very similar to the 21.1 
per cent registered in 1997 (NSO, 2006). It should be noted that in 2003 a major 
change in the LFS calculation methodology was implemented; therefore, the 
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2004, 2005 and 2006 findings are not easily comparable with the previous 
ones.4 Recent surveys applying the Gini ratio5 to measure income inequality 
revealed that in the Philippines the gap increased progressively from 42.7 in 
1997 to 42.9 in 2000, and to 43.8 in 2003. Other analysis adopting different 
indicators confirmed this trend (Human Development Network, 2005). In 
conclusion, the slight progress in human development achieved by the Philip-
pines in recent years cannot be considered satisfactory. 
As far as the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals is concerned, 
the performance of the Philippines has been adjudged outstanding in the realms 
of universal primary education, the promotion of gender equality, the empow-
erment of women, the reduction of child mortality and the fight against 
HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases. As regards the eradication of extreme 
hunger and poverty and the improvement of maternal health, the Philippines is 
far from attaining its targets, and is slipping backwards in the area of environ-
mental sustainability (ESCAP, 2005). 
Looking at the reality within the Philippines, most of the indicators high-
lighted disparities between the provinces, which appeared to be a chronic 
national problem. In 2003, the provinces of Luzon (National Capital Region, 
Benguet, Laguna, Batanes, Rizal, Cavite, Nueva Vizcaya, Pampanga and 
Bulacan) were the front runners in the HDI rankings. In contrast, seven 
provinces in Mindanao (Sulu, Maguindanao, Tawi Tawi, Basilan, Zamboanga 
del Norte, Sarangani and Lanao del Sur of the Mindanao region) and three in 
the Visayas (Masbate, Western Samar, Eastern Samar) registered the lowest 
HDI rankings. To cite an example, Metro Manila’s HDI of 0.793 is twice as 
high as Sulu’s 0.301 (Human Development Network, 2005). 
Over the more than thirty years of massive labour migration, it appears, 
generally, that the different indicators of development do not show marked 
improvements. The data presented do not allow us to make conclusions about a 
causal link between labour migration and development. They may, however, 
suggest some possible associations between the two. For example, the invest-
                                                 
4  ‘Starting [with the] July 2003 round of the Labor Force Survey (LFS), the generation of the 
labor force and employment statistics has adopted the 2003 Master Sample (MS) Design. 
Using this new master sample design, the number of samples increased from 41,000 to around 
51,000 sample households. Careful evaluation must be made in comparing the results of the 
2003 and 2004 LFS with other LFS results prior to the implementation of the new MS 
design.’  
 http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2005/of04tx.html 
5  Formulated by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 1912, the Gini coefficient is the ratio of 
the area between a Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line to the area of the triangle below the 
45-degree line. The ratio ‘0’ represents perfect equality. See  
 http://www.foldvary.net/works/ineq.html. 
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ment of migrant families in health and education might have contributed to the 
slight improvement in the life expectancy and education attainment indexes. 
The almost unchanged rate of unemployment – from 1997 to 2006 – reveals that 
overseas employment has not notably contributed to improving the country’s 
employment rate. Related to this, it should be mentioned that over sixty per cent 
of the 2005 land-based deployments were re-hires, i.e. migrant workers who 
were on their second (or higher) contracts (POEA, 2006). Also, many of those 
who leave for overseas employment are employed at home before they leave.  
Though remittances buoy up the economic growth, the billions of dollars 
poured into the country have not clearly increased productivity. They have 
enhanced the purchasing power of migrant households, but have not contributed 
to improving the per capita income, reducing poverty incidence, or narrowing 
income inequality at the national level. A 2002 study concluded that migration 
even enhanced inequality in the country (Go, 2002). On the negative side, 
migration might have added to the chronic disparity among regions, since, 
according to the 2000 census, over 60 per cent of Filipino migrants originated 
from Luzon provinces (Ericta, 2003) and it is likely that their remittances would 
favour their home localities.  
Enhancing the benefits: Best practices and gaps 
The development impact of international migration can and should be mobilised 
through the participation of all stakeholders, namely the Philippine government, 
international organisations and civil society. Some good examples have already 
been set and deserve special mention. From the government side, the Commis-
sion for Filipinos Overseas (CFO) is the agency mandated to assist the execu-
tive and legislative departments in the formulation of national migration 
policies. The Commission, established in 1980, is also committed to nurturing 
ties with overseas Filipino communities. To foster the sense of national 
belonging in the younger generations of overseas Filipinos, CFO has, since 
1983, implemented a special programme titled Lakbay Aral (Travel Study). A 
similar programme, Lakbayan sa Pilipinas (Travel in the Philippines), is offered 
to adults. The Commission is also actively involved in promoting the sharing of 
resources by Filipinos overseas, especially in terms of knowledge, technology 
and capital transfer. To further this aim, CFO has, since 1989, developed a 
programme called LINKAPIL or Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino (Service to Fellow 
Filipinos). Details of this programme are offered on CFO’s website: 
The Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino (LINKAPIL) Programme or Link for Philippine 
Development seeks a broader and deeper partnership between overseas Filipinos and 
Filipinos on the home country, based on a common desire to promote the collective 
good of people and contribute to national development. Conceptualised by CFO in 
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1989, LINKAPIL was developed as a mechanism to tap the potentials of overseas 
Filipinos to support education, health and welfare, livelihood, and small-infrastruc-
ture projects. Assistance through the LINKAPIL Programme may be monetary or in-
kind, in the form of donations, grants or subsides.  
(http://www.cfo.gov.ph/linkapil.htm) 
To support LINKAPIL, CFO developed another programme, PHILNEED or 
Philippine Sectoral Development and Needs Profiling System. This programme 
features various projects from provincial and local government units and NGOs 
in response to identified Minimum Basic Needs (MBN), and offers them to 
overseas donors. In 2004, LINKAPIL and PHILNEED were able to raise 2.5 
million US dollars for local projects. The Washington-based Filipino charity 
Feed the Hungry was the top donor in the same year (Powers, 2006). With the 
aim of promoting the investment of overseas Filipinos’ capital in the Philip-
pines, in 2004 CFO published the Investment and Business Guide for Overseas 
Filipinos.6  
The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), established in 
1977, is the government agency tasked with upholding the interests and welfare 
of Filipino migrant workers and their families; it implements special assistance 
programmes both in the Philippines and abroad. OWWA is the main agency 
responsible for the development of reintegration programmes for returnees. In 
recent years, the focus of such programmes has been the social reintegration of 
returned OFWs, providing them with assistance in coping with psychological 
difficulties they may encounter on their return home. The programmes are 
implemented in coordination with local governments and NGOs. There are also 
two other programmes aiming to support OFWs and their families in their 
entrepreneurial spirit: the OFW Grocery Programme, which offers loans of up 
to 50,000 Philippine pesos to start a grocery store or a drugstore, and the Liveli-
hood Development Programme for OFWs, with loanable amounts from 200,000 
to 1 million Philippine pesos for entrepreneurial initiatives promoted by 
OWWA’s members or their families. However, a complex application process 
and strict eligibility ruleshave jeopardised the success of both initiatives. New 
positive developments have, however, been prompted by the recent massive 
repatriation of OFWs from Lebanon.7 
From the civil society side, the Ayala Foundation USA, established in 2000, 
provides a mechanism for US-based Filipino migrants to fund projects in their 
home country. Like CFO, the Foundation is committed to matching offers of 
assistance by overseas Filipinos and to projects that need resources in the 
                                                 
6  See Filipino Ties, May-August 2004, Vol. XI, No. 2: 1. 
7  See PGMA outlines reintegration plan for returning OFWs from Lebanon, at  
http://www.gov.ph/news/?i=15803, accessed 14 August 2006. 
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Philippines. The Foundation also provides continuous monitoring of these 
projects and regularly updates donors regarding developments. In 2005, the 
Ayala Foundation USA disbursed almost half a million US dollars’ worth of 
projects in the Philippines (Powers, 2006). According to the Philippine Dias-
pora Portal (www.filipinodiaporagiving.org), there are at least 129 overseas 
organisations involved in so-called diaspora philanthropy in the Philippines. 
The great majority of them are based in North America.  
Some Philippine NGOs actively promote migrants’ savings and investment 
to support small enterprises: among others the Unlad Kabayan Migrant Services 
Foundation, Atikha, and the Economic Resource Center for Overseas Filipinos 
(ERCOF) (Asis, 2006a). The Episcopal Commission for Migrants and Itinerant 
People (ECMI) of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines recently 
initiated two programmes to promote financial literacy among migrant families 
and to give reintegration assistance to returned migrants. The Development 
Action for Women Network (DAWN) runs a programme which provides alter-
native livelihoods to Philippine women who have worked as entertainers in 
Japan.8  
There are supposedly some thousands of Filipino migrants’ associations all 
over the world, spanning a variety of purposes and objectives. Their solidarity 
with Philippine concerns is highly visible in times of natural disaster or during 
critical periods in the Philippines. Initial studies that have been done on the 
general subject of overseas Filipinos engagement with the home country 
suggest that many more may be involved in supporting development projects. 
Some of these organisations have formed regional and national networks such 
as the Solidarity Philippines Australia Network (http://cpcabrisbane.org/) and 
the Philippine European Solidarity Centre (http://www.philsol.nl/).  
As regards knowledge exchange, the Philippine government does not have a 
policy of encouraging knowledge exchange from skilled migrants, but a few 
initiatives have been initiated by professional associations or individuals (ADB, 
2005). For example, the Brain Gain Network, started in 1992, is an online 
facility which aims to involve talented professionals and students in the Philip-
pines and overseas in increasing the global competitiveness of the Philippine 
high-technology economy (http://www.bgn.org/bgn/).  
To date, there are still many gaps in enhancing the beneficial impact of 
migration on development in the Philippines. From the government side, the 
programmes implemented by the various agencies are very limited, not inter-
linked, difficult to access, and mostly focused on solidarity contributions 
                                                 
8  See Alternative Livelihood, at http://www.dawnphil.org/livelihood.htm, accessed 14 August 
2006. 
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proceeding from overseas Filipino communities. The development potential of 
remittances and the advantages of knowledge exchange do not seem to be a 
priority on the Philippine government agenda.  
International organisations dealing with migration issues (IOM, ILO, UNDP, 
etc.) have not been very visible in promoting discussion on the migration-
development nexus in the Philippines. The UN High Level Dialogue invited 
attention to this topic, and will hopefully produce some good results in the near 
future. From the civil society side, a lack of resources and coordination seem to 
constitute the main gaps. Moreover, the positive impact of diaspora philan-
thropy is limited to some provinces (migrants’ provinces) which can contribute 
to overall disparity among regions. There is a need for more research and 
further studies on the migration-development nexus – a deeper involvement of 
academe in the field. 
Minimising costs: Best practices and gaps 
Another way of enhancing the benefits of international labour migration is to 
minimise its costs. It should be recognised that many sectors of Philippine 
society have contributed to this objective, some of which we now discuss.  
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 was passed with 
its aim being ‘to institute the policies of overseas employment and establish a 
higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, 
their families and overseas Filipinos in distress’ (Republic Act 8042). In 2003, 
the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act was passed, aiming to eradicate trafficking 
in persons (especially women and children), to penalise all violations and to 
grant protection and support to trafficked persons (see Republic Act 9208). To 
enhance the active participation of overseas Filipinos in domestic politics, the 
Overseas Absentee Voting Act (Republic Act 9189) and the Citizenship Reten-
tion and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act 9225) were passed in 2003. 
Moreover, the Philippines has signed and ratified the International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families, and signed ILO conventions C97 and C143.  
On the implementation side, four specific government offices are mandated 
to promote the welfare of Filipino migrants. POEA is actively engaged in 
monitoring respect of national labour standards, and curbing illegal recruitment. 
OWWA organises pre-departure orientation seminars (PDOS) and offers special 
assistance programmes to families left behind. CFO tenders education and 
counselling programmes for immigrants and Filipinos marrying foreign nation-
als. The fourth is the Office of the Undersecretary for Migrant Workers Affairs 
(OUMWA), established within the Department of Foreign Affairs, to provide 
legal assistance to Filipino migrants. 
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International organisations are also contributing their share. The IOM has 
produced some educational resources for migrants. IOM Philippines also assists 
Filipino immigrants bound for Canada and Australia with special orientation 
programmes (www.iom.org.ph/). The International Labour Organization (ILO) 
has been instrumental in the ratification of the above-mentioned ILO conven-
tions on migrant workers. Moreover, over the last two years, the ILO Manila 
Office has engaged in a special project aiming to uphold the protection of the 
household sector – both in the Philippines and overseas.  
In the Philippines, civil society groups have traditionally been very proactive 
in minimising the costs of migrations. In recent years, three big networks of 
different inspirationshave been actively campaigning for migrants’ rights: the 
Philippines Migrants Rights Watch, the Migrant Forum in Asia, and Migrante. 
More than fifty Philippine foundations and NGOs are devoted primarily to the 
welfare of Filipino migrants and their families, implementing a vast range of 
direct-service programmes. Several religious groups have also engaged in 
assisting troubled migrants, and children and spouses left behind. The Catholic 
Church has set up a network of ‘migrant desks’ nationwide to inform, assist, 
educate and protect migrants and aspiring migrants and their families. It should 
be noted that there is a tradition of fruitful partnership between the Philippine 
government and civil society groups in the provision of many of the services 
mentioned above. Based on the initiative of some NGOs, in 2001 the Consulta-
tive Council on Overseas Filipino Workers (CCOFW) was officially estab-
lished. It is a forum of government and migrant advocates who discuss and 
clarify policy issues and concerns of OFWs and their families. After a promis-
ing start, there were some problems because of disagreements between the NGO 
community and government agencies over some policy questions. Hopefully, 
this impasse will be resolved soon. 
Despite the array of initiatives from the different sectors, there are signifi-
cant gaps to consider. The Philippine legal framework for the protection of 
migrant workers is indeed one of the best in Asia, but there are chronic 
problems at the implementation level, since the rule of law is generally fragile. 
Illegal recruitment, irregularities, exploitation, abuses and even human 
trafficking are still part of the daily experience of many overseas Filipino 
workers. The Philippine government’s strong reliance on foreign employment 
has frequently led it to concede to the labour conditions imposed by receiving 
countries – at the expense of migrants’ rights. The admirable initiatives under-
taken by the different agencies are seldom coordinated, resulting in avoidable 
overlapping of activities and endeavours. Moreover, such initiatives are rarely 
based on scientific research. A comprehensive and empirically-based assess-
ment of the social costs of migration in the Philippines has yet to be undertaken.  
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The response to the brain drain phenomenon and to the increasing exodus of 
professionals (especially in the health sector) is largely inadequate. The evident 
loss of human resources for sustainable nation-building should be effectively 
addressed. In minimising the costs of migration, the role of international organi-
sations is vital, since they are engaged in promoting a regional and global 
understanding of the phenomenon. In this regard, there is not much insistence 
on the need for transnational co-responsibility in the governance of international 
migration. Moreover, international organisations are not very proactive in 
advancing cooperation among the different stakeholders. As to civil society 
sector, a quick assessment of the many good initiatives shows a lack of coordi-
nation and sometimes ‘competition’ in service provision. Inspired by different 
ideologies, NGOs have to overcome partisanship to cooperate and work 
together.  
Some policy recommendations 
To conclude the discussion, the author would like to highlight the lessons for 
African countries which can be drawn from the Philippine experience. There are 
indeed some feasible policy recommendations addressed to the different stake-
holders in the countries of origin. 
To policy makers: 
• As Asis (2006b) noted recently, the examples of Taiwan and the Republic of 
Korea may help the Philippines in shaping its development policies. Despite 
significant outflows of people before the 1980s, remittances have not been a 
major driver in the home country’s economic development. While there 
could be economic benefits from international labour migration, to generate 
real and sustainable development, the policy makers of the countries of 
origin should focus on building a strong and vibrant domestic economy. 
• The Philippine emigration policy is often proposed as an effective model to 
other countries of origin, including African countries. Nevertheless, the 
author is convinced that an international labour deployment strategy cannot 
substitute for a long term plan to reduce unemployment though the genera-
tion of domestic jobs. Within such a plan, remittances and skills of overseas 
workers, if properly valued and channelled, could contribute to increasing 
job opportunities in the country. The government has a critical role to play in 
creating a sound economic and political environment. 
• Despite the increasing interest of professional researchers on the matter, the 
long-term impact of Philippine international labour migration, as far as 
benefits and costs are concerned, is still uncertain. In Africa, such assess-
ment has not yet begun. Policy makers should seek the cooperation of 
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academe in developing better and more proactive migration policies and in 
promoting (as well as supporting) more research and further studies on the 
different migration-related issues. The constitution of a permanent think-tank 
could be a fruitful initiative. 
• The establishment of four government agencies to assist, support and protect 
Filipino migrants and their families reveals the real concern of Philippine 
policy-makers towards the current exodus of nationals. While the author 
emphasises that more coordination among the various Philippine govern-
ment agencies dealing with migrants is strongly required – through the 
establishment of an inter-agency committee responsible for designing and 
implementing good migration policies – the good example of the Philippines 
should be followed by other countries of migrant origin.  
• The idea of offering PDOS to departing migrants is undoubtedly opportune 
and wise. It has to be recognised that the Philippine government took an 
enlightened decision in initiating such a project in the 1970s, and in involv-
ing NGOs as PDOS providers. The partnership between Philippine govern-
ment agencies and NGOs in PDOS provision should be catalogued as a ‘best 
practice’ which can be presented as a model for other sending countries. 
• At the institutional level, the CCOFW represents a natural venue for the 
government agencies and NGOs committed to the welfare of migrants and 
their families, to shape and assess the implementation of the different 
programmes. Similar mechanisms assuring regular cooperation between 
governments and NGOs should be enacted by all countries of origin.  
To international organisations: 
• International organisations should be more proactive in their essential role as 
mediators or bridge-builders among nation-states, in the pursuit of co-
responsibility in the governance of migration, and in building transnational 
solidarity in promoting sustainable development and the welfare of migrant 
workers. They should also assist national governments in the formulation of 
good migration policies and denounce human rights’ violations abuses. 
• International organisations should promote dialogue between government, 
academe and civil society for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of 
migration, and for developing more effective responses to the opportunities 
and dilemmas that it poses. They should also provide support for facilitating 
the exchange of knowledge, training and resources to enhance the benefits 
and minimise the costs of international labour migration. 
To civil society: 
• In addition to responding to gaps in services and in the protection of mi-
grants’ rights, NGOs should never lose sight of the long-term responses to 
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the challenges posed by the complex migration-development nexus. The 
elimination of the root causes of migration and the promotion of human 
development should be always part of their agenda. 
• Going beyond their ideological divide, civil society groups should better 
coordinate their advocacy and service provision among themselves, with 
government agencies, and with other relevant organisations. To ground their 
endeavours with evidence-based analysis, they should foster links with 
academe. Regional and international networking may be the key to success.  
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11 
The new heroes and heroines  
of North America: Remittances 
and local development in Mexico 
Marianne Marchand 
Introduction 
In this chapter1 I wish to focus on the complexities of migration and how it is a 
highly gendered process and related to development, or – to speak in an out-
dated language of the 1970s – ‘maldevelopment or underdevelopment’. What I 
intend to present is the ways, often contradictory, in which migrants are being 
portrayed and the discrepancies with the everyday realities of migrants and their 
families.  
As the topic is highly politicised, especially in the United States and Europe, 
and – in reality – not less so in Mexico, I want to define from the outset what 
                                                 
1  This chapter has been written as part of the research project Apizaco y Huamantla: Estudio 
comparativo entre comunidades expulsoras de migrantes. Modelo para el análisis de las 
causas e implicaciones de los flujos migratorios para solucionar la falta de desarrollo 
sustentable social en la región Apizaco and Huamantla: A comparative study of migrant 
sending communities. A model for the analysis of the causes and implications of migrant 
flows in order to remedy the lack of socially sustainable development in the region, financed 
by el Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT) and the state government of 
Tlaxcala. 
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the scope of this chapter will be. I am less interested in current debates on 
migrants in the US, which tend to focus on issues such as the attempt to 
construct a wall all along the southern border of the US, the portrayal of 
migrants as possible terrorists, and discussions around a ‘guest worker’ agree-
ment. I have commented on these issues in other contexts. The main argument 
presented here is that the government of Mexico – in its role as a sending state – 
and the international community, have constructed a discourse about migrants 
and their potential role in (local) development which is problematic and contra-
dictory.  
Some of the information for this chapter has been taken from my ongoing 
research project about the implications of migration for one of the non-tradi-
tional sending regions of Mexico. The project focuses on the implications of 
migration for local or community level development and incorporates a gender 
perspective. 
I focus here on a few key concepts or terms: migration-development nexus, 
transnational communities, and remittances. The chapter is divided into three 
parts: background, i.e. migration and (lack of) development; the state, and 
changing discourses on migrants, and related discourses by international organi-
sations on remittances and development; and, finally, lived realities in local 
communities. 
Migration and (lack of) development 
Mexico is a country that for a long time has been sending migrants to the United 
States, a practice that can be traced back to the nineteenth century. The 
Mexican–US border reflects a very interesting but complex set of interrelation-
ships. One defining moment in the construction of this border was the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) through which Mexico ceded half of its territory to 
the United States. From that moment onward Mexicans living in the ceded 
territories2 automatically became American subjects and in most cases US 
citizens. However, despite the Mexican-American war which preceded the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, no border controls where enforced until much 
later – in the 1920s. And very few statistics are available to provide reliable 
information about the extent of Mexican migration to the United States during 
this early period.  
The US government’s relative neglect of its southern border changed with 
the Great Depression. As Joseph Nevins comments: 
                                                 
2  In particular, Mexicans living in what have since become the states of California, New 
Mexico and Texas. Arizona was mostly populated by American Indians. 
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The onset of the Great Depression of 1929 greatly changed the parameters of the 
debate as restrictionist sentiment further intensified, with organizations ranging from 
the American Federation of Labour to the American Legion and the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars leading the charge. Mass deportations of people of Mexican origin 
ensued, often using methods that even a 1932 U.S. government commission charac-
terized as ‘unconstitutional, tyrannic and oppressive.’ According to one study, U.S. 
authorities forcibly expelled an estimated 415,000 Mexicans between 1929 and 
1935, with another 85,000 leaving ‘voluntarily,’ usually under intense pressure from 
local authorities. (2002: 33) 
After these massive deportations, Mexican migration to the US reduced 
significantly. It was not until the introduction of the famous bracero (manual 
labourer) programme in 1942 that a steady flow of Mexican migrants started up 
again. The bracero programme was initiated because of the increased need of 
American employers, mostly in the agricultural sector, for manual labour. As 
many young Americans were being drafted into the army and sent abroad as 
part of the war effort, manual labour was really scarce. The bracero programme 
was terminated in 1964, in part because of increasing opposition from organised 
labour and from religious groups, and also because mechanisation in the agri-
cultural sector had decreased the need for pickers (Nevins, 2002). According to 
Jorge Durand and Douglas Massey, the bracero programme can be seen as the 
first contemporary period of Mexican migration to the US. After it ended we 
see a second period of – undocumented – migration which ended with the 
adoption of the Simpson-Rodini Act in 1986 (Durand & Massey, 2003). 
Both through the bracero programme and as undocumented workers, many 
Mexicans, primarily male, from the north-western part of the country (Jalisco, 
Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Michoacan) came to the US as temporary workers, to be 
employed in agriculture. And, although the bracero programme was terminated, 
Mexican workers kept on going to the US, because of the ever-increasing 
demand for cheap labour, continuing developmental problems in the Mexican 
countryside and, increasingly, because migration was becoming a way of living. 
Much of the migration was circular: people would return home after while to 
see their family, celebrate the community’s patron saint or to work their land 
back home. After a while they would return to work in the US. However, from 
the 1970s onward, people also start to settle in the US – which has brought an 
increasing flow of women migrants and children, for reasons of family reunifi-
cation 
Reliable statistics about the extent of Mexican migration to the US are 
difficult to find, in part because so many Mexicans cross the border undocu-
mented and are therefore not registered by the immigration authorities. In 
addition, many undocumented Mexicans lie about their status when census 
authorities interview them. However, academics in both Mexico and the US 
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have done extensive research into migration flows since the late 1960s, their 
composition, origin, changes and continuities.3  
Table 11.1 presents some data concerning Mexican migration to the US. It 
should be noted that the information for the first five periods has been taken 
from Durand et al. (2001) and for the year 2000 from Durand & Massey (2003), 
which explains some of the discrepancies. The most important information that 
can be gleaned from these statistics is the change in region of origin, especially 
between 1992 and 2000 (rather than percentage changes). It is important to note 
that the surveys asked Mexican migrants whether they were going to the US in 
order to work. This therefore does not take into consideration those people, 
mostly women, who intended to cross for reasons of family reunification. 
Table 11.1 Mexicans migrating to look for work in the United States, by region  
 and sex (%) 
Year of departure 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1992 2000 
Region of origin       
Historic 47.8 57.4 56.1 49.5 48.8 50.5 
Border 33.7 26.3 27.4 24.8 29.7 10.8 
Centre 17.0 13.8 15.2 24.6 19.8 31.7 
Periphery (SE) 1.5 2.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 7.09 
Sex       
Male 77.3 81.7 81.7 82.3 87.4 n/a 
Female 22.7 18.3 18.3 17.7 12.6 n/a 
Sources: Durand et al., 2001; Durand & Massey, 2003 
According to the United States census of 2000, about nine million Mexicans, 
born in Mexico, are living in the US, and about 20 million Hispanics in the US 
are of Mexican descent, which is 58.5 per cent of all Hispanics in the country 
(Durand & Massey, 2003: 56). This makes Hispanics of Mexican origin or 
descent the largest minority in the US.  
With the 1986 Simpson-Rodini Act (commonly known as the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act, or IRCA), the tendency toward family reunification 
has only been reinforced – many Mexicans take advantage of the amnesty 
provision under IRCA to regulate their status in the US and have family mem-
bers join them. 
However, around the same time – and one could argue that the Simpson-
Rodini Act is an exponent of this – US policy toward its southern border started 
                                                 
3  Two extensive academic projects are the Encuesta sobre Migración a la Frontera Norte 
(EMIF) administered by the Colegio de Frontera Norte, Tijuana, and the bi-national Mexican 
Migration Project, under the co-directorship of Jorge Durand (Universidad de Guadalajara) 
and Douglas Massey (Princeton University). See Durand & Massey (2003) for more 
information about the problems related to statistics on Mexican migration (63–70). 
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to become stricter. From the mid 1980s onward, and especially since the early 
1990s, increased attention has been focused on keeping migrants out: Operation 
Gatekeeper (San Diego area) and Operation Hold the Line (El Paso area) are 
two well known examples. Both were initiatives by local authorities to stem the 
tide of migrants flooding across the border. In the face of what the media tended 
to portray as a crisis of illegal Mexicans coming into the US, the Border Patrol 
in the El Paso area (Texas) reacted in 1993 with a policy of blocking people 
from crossing the border – through increased deployment of border patrol 
officers and the use of high tech surveillance equipment – instead of appre-
hending them once they had crossed the Rio Grande. This example was 
followed a year later in the San Diego area (California), where local authorities 
started with the construction of a wall4 along the border and, as in Texas, the 
installation of high tech surveillance equipment (Nevins, 2002: 63-94). Taken 
together, these measures implied a securitisation of the border, with several 
negative side effects. 
 What these increased controls accomplished was not so much reducing the 
flow of Mexican migrants entering the US, but rather ensuring that once they 
crossed they would stay for extended periods of time, because circular migra-
tion would increasingly become too costly and too risky. In addition, the 
hardening of the border also meant that more and more migrants needed to rely 
on polleros (traffickers) or coyotes (smugglers) in order to cross the border. 
This is when we can witness the onset of an increasingly professionalised 
‘migration industry’ (Castles & Miller 2003: 114-115). According to Castles & 
Miller ‘this term embraces the many people who earn their livelihood by 
organising migratory movements as travel agents, labour recruiters, brokers, 
interpreters, and housing agents’ (114). 
In other words, measures to keep migrants out are not necessarily stopping 
the northward flow of migrants. Such flows are rather the result of a set of 
related macro-structures (structural forces) or so-called push and pull factors: an 
increasing demand for cheap labour on the pull side, and economic crisis and 
concomitant structural adjustment policies on the push side. However, as 
already mentioned, migration is a complex phenomenon and structural explana-
tions alone do not provide the entire picture. Other factors influencing the 
nature of migration flows – their direction, composition and so on – include the 
existence of transnational social networks, a culture of migration, and expecta-
tions among migrants and their families in both sending and receiving states 
regarding the future as far as living conditions are concerned. 
                                                 
4  Most of the materials used for the construction of the wall were recycled from the first Gulf 
War. 
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Since the mid-1990s significant changes have occurred in patterns of 
Mexican migration to the US, in part due to the peso crisis of 1995, and also to 
the effects of trade liberalisation on the Mexican countryside. The restructuring 
of the Mexican political economy started with the introduction of structural 
adjustment policies to deal with Mexico’s debt crisis of 1982. The implementa-
tion of neoliberal economic policies and the concomitant deregulation, privati-
sation and liberalisation of its economy culminated in the signing of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. In part, this economic 
restructuring has seriously affected small farmers in Mexico, who are unable to 
compete with products imported from the US, such as beans and corn (maize), 
which have been their traditional staples. 
As a result to the profound economic crisis, non-traditional sending regions, 
such as the states of Hidalgo, Puebla, Tlaxcala, and Veracruz, and metropolitan 
areas, in particular Mexico City, have, since the mid-1990s, started to see a 
significant part of their population migrating to the United States. And, because 
of changes in the US economy, migrants not only found jobs in the agricultural 
sector, but also in the service sector, in the construction and meat-packing 
industries, as well as in gardening and landscaping. At the same time the 
average level of education of migrants was increasing, especially among 
migrants from urban areas. 
Since the early 1990s a global transformation has been taking place, which is 
reflected in Mexican migration flows to the US. It concerns the feminisation of 
migration In addition to these specific changes in Mexican–US migration, 
(Ramírez, Domínguez & Morais, 2005). According to a recent INSTRAW5 
report by Ramírez et al., entitled Crossing Borders: Remittances, Gender and 
Development (2005), the feminisation of migration can be traced to a crisis in 
the reproductive model in both sending and receiving states. Sending states 
have tended to suffer from structural adjustment policies affecting the liveli-
hoods of poor families, which has not only brought about a decline in small and 
medium businesses (the source of many jobs) but has also caused unemploy-
ment for many men who could no longer perform the role of ‘breadwinner’. 
Many of these men have, however, shied away from their reproductive respon-
sibilities6 rather than take on non-remunerated reproductive tasks, thus leaving 
women to provide for the family and take on the role of de facto household head 
(Ramírez et al., 2005). 
                                                 
5  United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, 
located in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. 
6  Responsibilities which encompass so-called care tasks aimed at ensuring the continuing and 
future existence of households and communities. 
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In receiving states another reproductive crisis has occurred, due to several 
factors: an aging population, women joining the labour market, and insufficient 
public provision for the care of dependents. This has resulted in what sometimes 
is referred to as the ‘transfer of care’, with 
those households with more resources contracting women, who are probably 
migrants, in order to externalize part of the work. Unresolved gender tensions within 
developed countries are thus being addressed through the transfer of gender and 
ethnic inequalities between women. (Ramírez et al., 2005: 9)  
The ones who are losing most by the existence of the ‘global care chain’7 are 
the children of migrant women who are left in the care of aunts and grand-
mothers (Ehrenreich & Hochschild 2003; Sørensen 2005). 
It is estimated that about half of all migrants worldwide are now women8 and 
that their percentage is increasing more rapidly than that of men. In the Mexi-
can-US context this is also the case; and, although evidence is scarce, the 
percentage of women who are migrating independently is on the rise as well. 
Clearly, migration is a development issue as mal-development (or under-
development) is one of the major reasons for households deciding that one or 
more of its members need to migrate as part of a survival strategy. However, it 
should also be emphasised that migrants tend not to come from the most vulner-
able or marginalised sectors of society: one needs substantial resources in order 
to migrate, especially to pay for the journey (Andreas, 2000: 109; Nevins, 2002: 
124). It is in this context that migrant social networks are invaluable: they tend 
to reduce costs and risks, and help migrants getting settled and finding a job. 
The state, international organisations, remittances and local 
development  
Over the years, the Mexican government’s discourse on migrants has changed 
significantly. For a long time, migration was an issue not discussed openly (no 
formal public policies) by Mexican governments, although the exodus of 
Mexicans northwards was seen as an important ‘safety valve’ to alleviate possi-
ble social tensions because of a lack of economic development – in particular 
the lack of sufficient jobs to accommodate a young and increasing population. 
                                                 
7  A series of personal links between people across the globe, based on the paid (or sometimes 
unpaid) work of caring for the children of other people. 
8  In the case of Mexican women, the gap between numbers of male and female migrants started 
to close with the implementation of IRCA, mostly because of family reunification. However, 
in the case of migrants coming from non-traditional sending regions, migration is still 
dominantly male. There are some suggestions (not yet substantiated) that one of the effects of 
the changes in US migration policies since 9–11 is a reduction in female migration. 
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Formally, however respective governments did not broach the issue with their 
counterparts in the United States. At the same time, migrants were seen by the 
government and by a large portion of the public in general, as ‘traitors of the 
nation’. This portrayal was based on the nationalistic idea that migrants were 
not fully supporting the (developmental) project of nation-state building, and 
that they were choosing instead to join the US, Mexico’s ‘enemy’ since 1848. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the attitude of the Mexican govern-
ment started to change. Firstly, various politicians began to look north for 
political support. The first Mexican politician to approach Mexican migrants in 
the US was Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. As the most important opposition presiden-
tial candidate, Cárdenas understood the need to look for political support 
outside Mexico’s PRI-dominated9 authoritarian system. Campaigning in the US 
among the Mexican community assured him of many votes10 during the elec-
tions of 1988. Even today many people believe that he received more votes than 
the PRI candidate, and that Carlos Salinas de Gortari became president as result 
of electoral fraud. With subsequent elections, the practice of campaigning in the 
US became ever more widespread. One could argue that this was the beginning 
of a ‘rapprochement’ between Mexican political elites and migrants living ‘al 
otro lado’ (on the other side).  
From the early to mid-1990s such practices were copied by the government 
when it embarked upon a relatively coordinated strategy – known as ‘transna-
tionalism from above’ – for reaching migrant communities and organisations in 
the US (Portes et al., 2003). For example, president Ernesto Zedillo followed in 
the footsteps of his predecessor Carlos Salinas and adopted legislation permit-
ting Mexicans to hold dual nationality, which was intended to strengthen and 
formalise ties of belonging to the Mexican nation for those living in the US.  
The interest in migrants and migrant communities culminated with the presi-
dency of Vicente Fox (2000–2006), who called migrants ‘heroes’ in his inaugu-
ral address. Under his presidency the State has been most active and systematic 
in its attempts to establish close relations with Mexicans abroad. Initiatives by 
the Fox government have included a range of measures, for instance the Secre-
tary of Foreign Relations created El Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior 
(IME – the Institute for Mexicans Abroad) in order to have a formal, institu-
tional structure to stay connected to Mexican hometown associations (HTAs). 
                                                 
9  Partido Revolucionario Institucional, the ‘Institutional Revolutionary Party’, which was in 
power – under a succession of names – for seventy years, until its defeat in 2000. 
10  The strategy was to convince Mexicans in the US that they should contact their family 
members back in Mexico and persuade them to vote for Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. The idea 
behind this strategy was that Mexicans living in the US would be much more critical of the 
PRI and remain outside of its cooptation practices. 
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The general format used is that HTAs are represented in the IME and provide a 
sounding board for policies of possible interest to them, for instance, the IME 
helped to pave the way for adopting legislation allowing Mexicans abroad to 
vote in the presidential elections of July 2006. This legislation was adopted in 
the face of strong opposition by the three main parties which feared that 
migrants’ electoral preferences would differ significantly from those of the 
general population. As the 2006 presidential elections demonstrated, very few 
migrants took the trouble of registering and casting their vote, especially since 
bureaucratic procedures were extremely cumbersome and time-consuming. 
Another measure was the establishment of the now famous Programa 
Ciudadana 3 × 1 (3 × 1 Programme) to channel collective remittances into 
infrastructural projects. This programme was started in the early 1990s as a 
state-level initiative in Zacatecas, as the 2 × 1 (Dos por Uno) programme. The 
general tenet of the 3 × 1 (Tres por Uno) programme is that the three levels of 
government (local, state and federal) will match dollars collectively remitted for 
a local development project. The next section discusses in more detail the 
effects of the 3 × 1 programme on local communities. 
Finally, the Mexican State has been active in trying to improve conditions 
for migrants sending remittances home to their family members. One such 
measure was the adoption and improvement of the ‘matricula consular’ 
(consular ID), so that undocumented Mexicans in the US would have some 
form of identification. This is now being accepted by an increasing number of 
banks in the US for opening an account. In addition, the state has exerted 
pressure on the banking system to lower transfer costs related to remittances. 
The result of these two measures is an increasing number of migrants using the 
formal banking system to remit their dollars.  
The question one might ask here is why this change in attitude by the 
Mexican government or, rather, its representatives? Without going into depth, it 
can be said that there are two main reasons: one political and one economic. 
Starting with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in 1988, Mexican political leaders became 
aware of the political potential of migrants – primarily in terms of their influ-
ence on family members still living in Mexico and their negative attitude 
toward the ruling party, the PRI. It is, therefore, opposition politicians in 
particular who seek migrants’ political support, at both federal and state levels.  
Migrants also became economically interesting to the government because 
their remittances constitute a major source of foreign currency, and because 
they represent a potential outlet for (national) products – the so-called nostalgic 
market. It is this economic dimension which has received much attention in 
recent years from the international community. An important galvanising point 
for this was the Monterrey Consensus of March 2002.  
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During the International Conference on Financing for Development 
(Monterrey 18–22 March 2002) it was established that remittances by migrants 
could be (and should therefore be targeted as an important source of develop-
ment financing. Although the Monterrey Consensus suggests the facilitation of 
migrant workers’ remittances as just one measure among many, in its aftermath 
a record number of international organisations, government agencies and inter-
national non-governmental organisations have identified remittances as poten-
tially one of the most important alternatives for financing development.11 To 
this end, numerous studies, workshops, expert meetings and conferences have 
been organised to consider the development potential of migrant workers’ 
remittances.12 When one takes a closer look, there are a number of commonal-
ities among the different reports by international organisations such as the 
World Bank, IMF, IADB, ILO, and OECD (see footnote). In other words, a 
discursive consensus appears to have been constructed around some central 
tenets, which in the case of Mexico strengthens the state’s discourse.  
The central tenets of this discursive consensus on remittances are as follows: 
• remittances help to stabilise and improve the macro-economic situation of 
the receiving country, for example by increasing national income and foreign 
currency reserves, helping stabilise the balance of payments, supporting 
entrepreneurial activities, stimulating savings, and creating more demand for 
local goods and services (Ratha, 2003; Ramírez et al., 2005: 16); 
• remittances are more stable than other sources of external financing such as 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA), 
in particular because they are counter-cyclical (Ramírez et al., 2005);  
• remittances have become the second most important source of development 
financing for many countries; 
• remittances are a very efficient form of poverty reduction as they reach the 
poor directly and help to circumvent corrupt government officials. 
                                                 
11 These include international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB), the International Monetary Fund; organisations such 
as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM); various 
United Nations sections such as INSTRAW and Sistema Economico and Latinoamericano 
(SELA); governmental organisations (USAID, DFID, NORAD), and INGOs such as the 
Inter-American Dialogue. For a good cross section of organisations interested in migrant 
remittances, see participants at the International Conference on Migrant Remittances held in 
London in October 2003  
 (http://www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/docs/RemitConfFinal). 
12  To get an idea of the amount of information available on remittances: a Google search for the 
term remittances yields approximately 1,980,000 results (February 2006).  
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Next to these positive dimensions of remittances most analyses do recognise 
the complexities involved, as well as their potentially negative impact. Remit-
tances are said to increase the demand for and consumption of imported goods, 
to cause inflation, increase inequality, raise the costs of land and housing, 
provoke dependency, and to discourage the search for other income-generating 
activities. It is also said that international migration drains the available labour 
force, an instability that consequently discourages foreign investment (Ramírez 
et al., 2005: 16-17). 
In general, the discourses of sending states – and now increasingly also 
receiving states interested in codevelopment schemes – and those of the inter-
national community (particularly of international organisations) have tended to 
reinforce one another in two ways: in the identification of migrants’ remittances 
as an important, stable and alternative source for financing development, and in 
terms of economistic bias. Such discourses have become a very powerful source 
for defining policies on the topic and delimiting their scope. As their focus 
tends to be narrowly economic and financial, critiques have started to emerge 
suggesting that remittances involve a complicated set of interpersonal relation-
ships and are not merely economic in nature. In other words, non-monetary 
social remittances, including ideas, images and discourses have tended, until 
recently, to be ignored (Ramírez et al., 2005: 22-23).  
Another critique suggests that gender dimensions have so far mostly been 
absent in discussions about remittances. The earlier-mentioned INSTRAW 
report suggests that current policies on remittances tend to be gender-blind. As 
the authors of the report suggest, remittances are ‘inserted into social, economic 
and political contexts that are rooted in patriarchal ideology and organised 
around the sexual division of labour. Therefore, each one of these elements 
influences and is influenced by the different roles that each society attributes to 
men and women’ (2005: 28). One possible reason for this oversight is that 
discourses on remittances have emanated primarily from those sectors of the 
international community – international financial institutions (IFIs) in particu-
lar, as well as economic and financial ministries – which tend to be concerned 
with economic and financial issues and have been notoriously resistant to incor-
porating a gender-sensitive approach (O’Brien et al., 2000).  
So, despite an extensive body of literature on gender and development, in 
discussions about the nexus between remittances and development, there has 
been almost complete silence on the gender dimensions of development. 
Recently this gap has been challenged by civil society and international organi-
sations focusing on gender issues (Suárez & Zapata Martelo, 2004; Ramírez et 
al., 2005). Their contributions reveal that adopting a gender perspective 
involves asking a set of questions which reveal the social embeddedness of 
remittances and their ‘gender differences operating at the macro and micro-
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structural levels’ (Ramírez et al., 2005 21). Issues which need to be raised 
include: 
• who is sending and who receiving remittances? 
• with what frequency are remittances received? 
• what amount is received? 
• how is this affecting household and gender dynamics at sending and receiv-
ing ends? 
• what are the transnational family dynamics and how are remittances affect-
ing those? 
• who decides on ‘spending patterns’ or the use of remittances? 
These are questions that may reveal the gender-related nature of remittances 
and their differential gender impact. However, these questions focus primarily 
on so-called familial remittances, which indeed constitute over ninety per cent 
of remittances sent by migrants. They do not address the gendered dimensions 
of collective (including productive) remittances which, as we have seen, are 
strongly promoted by governments and international organisations alike. As 
part of our research project into the effects of remittances on local communities 
and their (lack of) development, we have included the gendered dimensions of 
the nexus between micro and macro-structures, in particular the (discursive) 
framing of who is the migrant, who receives the money, and how decisions 
about how remittances are to be used are being made – at both intra-household 
and collective levels. In the next section I provide some preliminary research 
results. 
Discursive framing of remittances’ development potential versus 
lived realities 
The state of Tlaxcala is, together with Nayarit, one of the smallest states in 
Mexico. It has about one million inhabitants and is located in the central-eastern 
part of the country. Tlaxcala is in the bottom third of the nation in terms of GDP 
per capita, inequality and poverty. In terms of its Human Development Index 
(HDI) and its Gender-related Development Index (GDI), Tlaxcala is ranked 
between 20 and 25 out of 32 states, although its performance on the HDI is 
better than its GDP. Huamantla and Apizaco, the two municipalities in which 
we have been doing field research, by and large reflect these statistics. These 
municipios were chosen because of their respectively more rural and more 
urban character, which permits a comparison with respect to the migration-
development nexus. 
In terms of international migration, Tlaxcala is one of the recent-sending 
states. It has, however, been a sending state for internal migration since the 
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1950s: both men and women migrated to Mexico City, and to other relatively 
nearby urban areas such as Puebla. Women, especially those residing in the 
western part of the state have been involved in migration on a daily or multiple 
day migration since the early 1970s – mostly to sell food in Mexico City or San 
Martin Texmelucan (a large regional market, located on the border between 
Puebla and Tlaxcala). Also, Tlaxcala has been one of the states which have sent 
most temporary workers to Canada. Since 1996 Tlaxcaltecas have made up 
between 18 and 23 per cent of Mexican temporary workers in Canada (Vanegas 
García, 2004: 12). 
Although Tlaxcala follows the general pattern of most sending states, there 
are a few ways in which it departs from the norm. Most important in this respect 
is the dispersion of migration flows: Tlaxcaltecas are migrating to a large 
number of different states in the US, although there are marked concentrations: 
in particular from Pilares to the Los Angeles area, and from Morelos to 
Houston, as people take advantage of established social networks. Because 
international migration from Mexico is still rather recent, the ratio of male to 
female migrants is high, although women are now migrating with their partners, 
or to join them – as part of family reunification strategy – as well as independ-
ently. Another important difference has already been mentioned: Tlaxcala is 
still one of the top three states sending migrants to Canada. 
We have also found, from our field research, that within the same municipio 
there can be significant differences in disposition to migrate – one can find one 
community with a high incidence of migration, and an adjacent one with barely 
any. It appears that some of the reasons for this can include the economic 
specialisation of the community in question, as well as how it may have been 
affected by recent politico-economic changes – in particular globalisation, and 
the effects of NAFTA on the Mexican countryside.  
While most people interviewed indicated that their family members migrated 
for economic reasons, the surveys done at some of the secondary schools also 
show the onset of a culture of migration (Kandel & Massey, 2002). A minority 
of students indicated that they were interested in migrating because they wanted 
to get to know other countries (both the US and various European countries 
were mentioned), or for the ‘adventure’. The majority suggested, however, that 
their decision to migrate in the future would be related to economic reasons: to 
provide for their family, to build a house, or to buy certain luxury goods. Over-
all, girls tended to be more hesitant about migrating than boys were, in particu-
lar because they perceived it to be a hazardous enterprise. 
The remittances that migrants from Tlaxcala send home vary, but it appears 
that most families receive between 50 and 150 US dollars per month, with peak 
periods around Mother’s Day and during the December holiday. People inter-
viewed also suggested that these remittances constitute around 15 per cent of 
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the household income, and that (as part of the household income) most of the 
remittances help to pay primarily for sustenance (31%), health (19%), home 
construction or maintenance (19%) and education (15%). 
In response to the question of whether or not migration is beneficial for the 
family, many of the people interviewed suggested that it is both beneficial and 
harmful: beneficial because the family tends to be better off economically due 
to the remittances they are receiving, and harmful because the family is being 
broken up. Quite a few mothers suggested that their children were showing 
signs of depression13 or profound sadness with their fathers being away for long 
periods of time. This scenario is obviously worse for children whose parents 
have both migrated to the United States. 
The effects of migration on local communities go beyond separated families 
and psychological effects on both migrants and family members who stay 
behind. Our research confirms the existence of social problems found in other 
studies of migrant-sending communities (Smith, 2006 ; Marchand, 2006). These 
include the creation of so-called ghost-towns where only children, women and 
senior citizens are living. Moreover, the inequality between families with 
migrants and those without is a serious problem and a source of tension within 
communities. As most migrants and their families tend to invest in the con-
struction or improvement of their homes, the difference between haves and 
have-nots is translated to the physical environment and made very visible 
(Binford et al., 2004; Cordero Díaz, 2006). 
All the factors mentioned briefly above seriously affect the possibility of 
using remittances for local development projects. First of all, many migrants are 
really only interested in helping their own families, and the sacrifices they and 
their families make are done in order to improve their living conditions. In other 
words, migrants and their family members are in general not interested in 
making such sacrifices for the entire community. Moreover, social tensions 
within local communities created because of migration tend to prevent the 
development of social capital. (The question here is what comes first: lack of 
social capital as a stimulus for migration, or vice versa?) At any rate, our 
research has shown that most migrants and their families are not very interested 
in collective remittances, and if they were to spend some of their remittances on 
collective projects most of it would go to the local church. 
                                                 
13  This is of course not a clinical diagnosis. 
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The 3 × 1 Programme and lived realities in local communities 
As suggested earlier, there has been significant publicity around the develop-
ment potential of remittances, in particular since the Monterrey summit of 2002. 
As far as remittances are concerned, the Mexican government has been a 
prominent and active player, as well as a frontrunner among sending states in 
developing co-financing or co-development schemes.14 As has already been 
explained, in 2001, under the presidency of Vicente Fox, the Mexican govern-
ment appropriated a co-financing scheme which had already been implemented 
at the local level in Zacatecas State (as Programa 2 × 1), and started Programa 
Ciudadana 3 × 1. This co-financing or co-development programme entails a 
matching funds scheme under which, for each dollar invested by migrants, the 
local municipality, the state, and the federal government, each invest one dollar 
as well.  
The 3 × 1 Programme is generally praised for its innovativeness and is used 
as an example which should be followed by other sending states. However, a 
closer look reveals that some fundamental issues need to be resolved. These 
range from social and ethical concerns to the economic viability of using 
remittances to finance development projects. 
As suggested earlier, very little consideration has been given to non-
economic remittances. This is also true for Programa 3 × 1. The focus of the 
programme is on financing infrastructural projects, while other dimensions of 
development are neglected. However, for the programme to work well, more 
attention needs to be paid to these non-economic issues. There are, however, 
some serious ethical problems that the Mexican government needs to overcome. 
One of the comments made by people we interviewed is that they distrust the 
authorities and are not very interested in cooperating with the government. In 
the next excerpt, which contains many colloquial expressions, a migrant is 
complaining about the attitude of migration officials at the border who are 
looking for a bribe:  
With all that, I tell you, the authorities in Ciudad Juárez a border town, across from 
El Paso, when one crosses the border over there – with your permission – what 
assholes! And it makes me sad and angry at the same time because we are among 
Mexicans. As I told them, well if you treat me like this, while being a paisano a 
Mexican living abroad and visiting the country, imagine how they treat a person 
from El Salvador, how you treat a Guatamalan? What kind of money they will take 
from him? … 
                                                 
14  Most discussions about co-development concentrate on projects which are co-financed 
between receiving states and migrant organisations. Examples include Spain and France. In 
the Mexican-US context, the US government has not shown any interest in co-development 
schemes, although the Mexican State has. 
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But you can be assured that if I, for example, because I like a dress for the virgin 
over there in the US, when I cross the border they are going to say to me: ‘Hey, why 
are you bringing that?’ ‘Well, I am bringing it for myself.’ ‘Well, you know that will 
cost you so much in taxes?’ So, how are we going to do it organise? How are we 
going to unite, eh? Too bad we are the United States of Mexico, it is really the other 
way around he is referring to the ‘Disunited States of Mexico’. How are we going to 
unite? Really, all the borders are like that (Marchand, 2006: 71, our own transla-
tion). 
This mistrust is the result of repeated experiences in dealing with corrupt and 
paternalistic officials, but is also related to a more fundamental problem: people 
are angry with the state because it has failed to provide the necessary means, or 
create a supportive environment, for them to build a decent life in their commu-
nities in Mexico. For that reason migrants are very reluctant to enter into co-
financing projects with the government. In the state of Zacatecas where the 
3 × 1 Programme is supposed to work successfully, just over 1 per cent of total 
remittances are being spent on community projects. The remainder is still 
familial in nature.  
Another issue is that most discourses on migration and remittances are still 
gender-biased. This is also the case for the 3 × 1 Programme. Although its 
objectives stipulate the inclusion of a gender-sensitive focus, in practice this is 
not the case. From the agenda-setting stage to the formulation and implementa-
tion stage there is very little, if any, evidence of gender-mainstreaming. No 
attempt is being made to include gender experts in the process or to distinguish 
between possible target groups (women and men; male and female adolescents). 
Moreover, priorities for 3 × 1 projects are being set by the government, and 
primarily involve infrastructural works such as installing a water pump, paving 
roads, and building a clinic or school. In the formulation of these projects no 
attention is given to future maintenance (who is responsible, and who pays? – 
including who is to pay for medical personnel or teachers), nor is it made clear 
to the people in the community that they will – for example – have to pay for 
water and electricity once a pump has been installed. This tendency by the state 
to prioritise infrastructural projects raises another ethical issue: should the state 
not be held responsible for infrastructure? And, if so, is the use of migrants’ 
remittances not unethical (Marchand, 2006)? 
A third problem with the 3 × 1 Programme is that it does not necessarily 
correspond either with the needs of people in the community or with the objec-
tives of migrant organisations based in the US. A number of the people we 
interviewed were interested in productive projects which would help them 
increase their household income. And, although there are now some productive 
projects funded by the 3 × 1 Programme, they are still a minority and, even 
when geared toward income-generating projects, mostly tend to increase sub-
stantially the workload of those involved, who are primarily women.  
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Finally, there are some fundamental economic issues to consider. It has been 
argued that remittances are counter-cyclical and a reliable, long-term source for 
financing development. However, this assumption presupposes that migrants 
continue to be willing to send remittances to their communities of origin and 
that this willingness will be transferred to second generation migrants. This 
assumption is untenable, as many reports and scholarly contributions have 
shown: second generation migrants are interested in building their lives in the 
receiving country and are hence reluctant to engage in a long-term commitment 
toward the communities of origin of their parents (Portes, 2004). Thus, for 
remittances to be a reliable long-term source for financing development 
projects, a continuing flow of migrants from countries in the South is needed. 
And this is precisely what receiving countries are trying to curb, through co-
development schemes! 
Another economic problem is that, as part of the ‘remittance hype’, sending 
states have started to use remittances as collateral for loans on international 
capital markets – a practice accepted by these markets. The idea is that if the 
sending state defaults, remittance flows can be used to partially cover the 
interest (and principal) payments. Of course, this would entail the implementa-
tion of restrictive monetary and convertibility policies, to allow the channelling 
of remittances toward such purposes. Something that is not being taken into 
consideration, however, is that remittances are in origin private funds, con-
trolled by citizens residing outside the country. Therefore, any policy negatively 
affecting the transfer of money through formal channels, such as banks and 
money transfer agencies, will very likely result in a deviation of the remitting of 
such funds into informal channels. This was the practice of many migrants until 
a few years ago and involved sending money back with a family member or a 
trusted member of the community, or bringing it themselves when visiting the 
family during patron saint’s fiestas or holidays.  
Conclusions 
To put things into perspective: remittances have become a survival strategy for 
many households in poor countries and are likely to be an important form of 
poverty alleviation for individual households in the foreseeable future. How-
ever, any long-term planning in terms of development financing by sending or 
receiving states will have to take into consideration the economic, political and 
social dimensions of remittances, as well as their ethical and economic limita-
tions. In the end we are talking about migrants’ hard-earned money for which 
they and their families have made many sacrifices.  
What lessons then can be learned from the analysis in this chapter? First of 
all it is important to understand the multidimensionality and complexities of the 
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migration-development nexus. When significant migration flows are starting to 
emerge, as in the case of Tlaxcala, people tend to migrate due to a lack of 
opportunity – usually generated by mal- or under-development. Later on such 
flows may persist due to the evolution of a culture of migration, when it has 
become part of peoples’ life cycles, especially in the case of young men. Clearly 
the different conditions under which people decide to migrate require different 
policy interventions by governments. 
 In the case of migration being a household survival strategy, remittances 
become a very important element in improving the socio-economic situation of 
family members who stay behind. As our research shows, a significant part of 
remittances is being used for consumption, and a lesser amount for construction 
or home improvement. If migrants are successful enough to send large amounts 
of money home, people will consider additional options, such as savings, setting 
up a small business, or organising fiestas for the local church’s patron saint. 
Given this situation, to what extent can remittances be used to finance local 
development projects, as sending states (as well, sometimes, as receiving states) 
and international financial organisations are suggesting? As the chapter has 
revealed, this will not be easy. For one thing, remittances are private funds 
earned by migrants and they will use them according to their own priorities – in 
which providing for the family takes first place. Additionally, states and inter-
national organisations tend to have priorities different from those of migrants, 
sometimes resulting in a situation where migrants increasingly mistrust state 
authorities whom they fear will ‘steal’ their hard-earned money.  
States and international organisations will need to face these realities and 
deal with them in a transparent and inclusive manner. For instance, migrants 
and their families in sending communities need to be involved in all stages of 
the formulation of development projects and have a real say, or even a veto, in 
the matter. It should also be made transparent, through a clear identification and 
involvement of all stakeholders, whose priorities will be honoured in each case, 
and how compromises could be forged. Mexico’s 3 × 1 Programme does not 
comply with such basic requirements since it still gives preference to state 
priorities and provides very little space to negotiate any compromise which 
might incorporate, at least partially, the priorities of the migrants, their families 
or other stakeholders in the communities of origin. The programme’s non-inclu-
sion of differentiated priorities according to gender affects in particular the 
stakeholders in the country of origin, most of whom are women. 
Many migrants use part of their remittances to set up a small shop, restaurant 
or a workshop when they return to their community of origin. Unfortunately, 
such investments are often not very profitable and many of these little micro- or 
small enterprises end up being closed down, thus resulting in the loss of the 
money invested. It is precisely in this area that the state can (and should) play a 
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key role, through providing technical advice and support in terms of how to 
formulate, design and implement a viable, productive project. Such a role may 
be more modest than envisioned by the authorities, but may well result in a 
better or more efficient use of remittances and foster practicable small-scale 
local development.  
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Migration, diaspora and  
development: The case of the  
People’s Republic of China 
Maggi Leung 
Introduction 
Since China adopted its reform and opening up policy in the late 1970s, overseas 
Chinese and foreigners of Chinese origin have played an irreplaceable role in 
China’s efforts to exchange and cooperate with foreign countries, introduce large 
amounts of overseas funds, enter the international market, and sell home-made 
goods to different parts of the world. 
Li Ruihuan, former Chairman of the 9th National Committee of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference, made the above remarks in 2001 to 
welcome delegations from the overseas Chinese communities. Indeed, no 
observer would argue against the fact that overseas Chinese investment in the 
People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘China’) has been one of the most crucial 
impetuses for its breathtaking economic growth over the past three decades. 
This chapter provides a discussion on the contribution of ‘overseas Chinese’ in 
the economic development in China over this time period. An analysis of this 
development – sometimes referred to as ‘diaspora-led development’ – illustrates 
the importance of the Chinese state in shaping the nature and pattern of the 
development process.  
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The chapter begins by giving the historical background of Chinese interna-
tional migration, and the relationship between the Chinese state and the 
diaspora. An analysis of the magnitude and pattern of investment by overseas 
Chinese in recent decades follows. Illustrations highlight the role of the state as 
an active agent in wooing the financial, social and human capital ‘stored in the 
diaspora’. The chapter concludes with some policy suggestions that might help 
in tackling the challenges of out-migration.  
International migration of Chinese people 
Chinese people have been involved in international migration for centuries.1 As 
early as the tenth century, maritime traders began to settle in the outlying posts 
of their trade empire throughout Southeast Asia. The Chinese diaspora is 
composed of individuals, families, and whole communities who have decided, 
or have been compelled, to move to other places, for a wide variety of reasons. 
These movements are estimated to have involved some 36 million persons 
(Government Information Office, Republic of China, 2004). It is however 
necessary to note that a significant proportion of the Chinese diaspora are 
people who were born outside China and Taiwan – members of families which 
have been established overseas, often for several generations. They are there-
fore, strictly speaking, not Chinese migrants. 
Migration from China has been a geographically diverse phenomenon. The 
coastal provinces Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang have been the major sources 
of Chinese migrants, though out-migration has also become more common from 
other provinces in recent years. Spatial concentration is again found in some 
counties and villages in these provinces, which are known as qiaoxiang, literally 
‘sojourner’s villages’ – a Chinese term denoting areas where a substantial 
number of inhabitants either have had experiences of migrating abroad or have 
family members overseas. In the Chinese case, the geography of out-migration 
has had a great impact on the geography of diaspora-led development; I shall 
return to this point in a latter section in the chapter. 
It was not until the mid-nineteenth century, when European influence inten-
sified in China, that Chinese people began to move overseas in large numbers. 
Between 1868 and 1939, some 6.3 million Chinese were estimated to have 
departed from Hong Kong alone, and considerable numbers also began their 
journey in Xiamen (in Fujian) and Shantou (in Guangdong). These migrants 
were predominately men going overseas to work as indentured labourers or so-
                                                 
1  My discussion here focuses on the migration of Chinese people from China. For a more 
detailed account of the migration of ethnic Chinese people from Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Southeast Asia, refer to Pan (1999). 
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called coolies. Others migrated more independently to seek their fortunes in the 
gold mines on the west coast of North America, as well as in Australia and New 
Zealand. When the Communist Party rose to power, over a million people, 
mainly supporters of the defeated Nationalist Party, fled to Taiwan. Also during 
that period about the same number of migrants went to Hong Kong, followed by 
a continuous flow over the subsequent three decades. Out-migration was, 
however, strictly controlled soon after the establishment of the People’s Repub-
lic of China in 1949. 
With the onset of economic reform in China in the late 1970s, control over 
population movement was also relaxed. From the mid-1990s, significant 
numbers of Chinese have migrated to different parts of the world, for various 
purposes and for different lengths of time. The movement of low-skilled 
migrants on short-term labour contracts continues to be important in the migra-
tion system. Such labour movement is mostly regulated by central or provincial 
government units. By the middle of 2005, some 547,000 Chinese workers were 
working on contracts overseas. And over the previous two decades, 3345 
million Chinese workers had served in well over a hundred countries or econo-
mies. According to the Ministry of Commerce, China’s foreign labour coopera-
tion had generated a turnover of US$2.85 billion in the first eight months of 
2005, representing an annual increase of 31.6 per cent.  
The major destinations for Chinese contract workers have been Japan, 
Singapore, South Korea, Macau, Hong Kong and Taiwan, Algeria, Russia, 
Mauritius, Jordan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates. These workers are 
mainly engaged in the manufacturing, construction, farming, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fishery, communications and transportation sectors, as well as in 
catering and service (People’s Daily Online, 2005).  
As regards non-contract based migration, the contemporary migration 
system displays a new spatial pattern. Southeast Asia has ceased to be popular; 
the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and, increasingly, Europe 
have become the preferred destinations. In addition, current Chinese migration 
is demographically characterised by a more balanced sex ratio. Students and 
skilled workers represent an increasingly important subset of migrants from 
China. Depending on immigration policies and job market situations in the 
destination countries, some of these students and guest workers might eventu-
ally become longer-term or permanent migrants.  
Some Chinese migrants also move in irregular conditions. These migrants 
are either smuggled into the destination country or overstay after the expiry of 
valid temporary visas. The majority of those smuggled are young men, and a 
high proportion of these irregular migrants come from Fujian. The province’s 
long tradition of migration, the availability of information and networks, and the 
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ability of its residents to pay the substantial fees charged by smugglers help 
explain the prevalence of the phenomenon in this area (Skeldon, 2000).  
The Chinese state and the diaspora 
The relationship between the Chinese motherland and the diaspora has changed 
tremendously over the past two centuries. In the nineteenth century, migrants 
were officially considered to be deserters, traitors, rebels and conspirators. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the century, imperial Qing administrators recog-
nised the potential economic and technological potential of ‘modern Western-
ised’ overseas Chinese, thus granting them a more favourable position. Towards 
the end of the imperial era, political actors from different backgrounds com-
peted for the support of China’s overseas communities. The importance of 
financial and moral support from overseas Chinese in ending the imperial era 
prompted Sun Yat-sen, ‘Father of the modern China’, to dub them ‘Mother of 
the 1911 Revolution’. Overseas Chinese invested and donated significant sums 
in post-1911 China, both in their ancestral areas (mainly in south-eastern China) 
and in urban centres such as Shanghai. Overseas Chinese nationalism and 
transfer of investment and other financial support reached its climax during the 
Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 brought some drastic 
changes to the relationship between the Chinese homeland and its diaspora. On 
the one hand, continuity remained in Taiwan where the nationalist government 
sustained its overseas Chinese policy; on the other hand, the Communist 
government was less consistent in its views on the diaspora. The Anti-Rightist 
Campaign in 1957 marked the beginning of the prosecution of individuals with 
overseas contacts, who were viewed as bourgeoisie and agents of imperialism, 
thus class enemies. Returned overseas Chinese were considered as traitors 
linked to foreign conspiracies and were harshly discriminated against during the 
Cultural Revolution. Overseas Chinese relations officially came to a halt at the 
end of the 1960s.  
The adoption of economic reform in 1978 marked a new era for comradeship 
between the Chinese state and the diaspora. Deng Xiaoping was forward-
looking in recognising that overseas Chinese represented a ‘unique opportunity’ 
for China’s development and therefore gave instructions that they be invited to 
invest in the country. Deng particularly welcomed and trusted overseas Chinese 
investors as they were now perceived as patriots who wished to contribute to the 
development of the socialist motherland, as opposed to investors from non-
Chinese backgrounds, who were seen as only profit-seeking (Deng, 1983). 
Subsequent Chinese leaders have maintained this positive attitude towards 
overseas Chinese capitalists and professionals. Current President Hu Jintao 
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reiterated the importance of overseas Chinese in China’s modernisation and 
reunification processes (Xinhua, 2004). 
Diaspora and development in China 
As is the case in many other diasporas, the Chinese diaspora has contributed to 
the national development of China by bringing in financial, human and social 
capital for various development efforts of their home communities or of the 
national economy at large.2 This chapter focuses on diaspora-led or diaspora-
enhanced economic development in China, providing a more comprehensive 
discussion on the financial capital offered by overseas Chinese. It is however 
important to note that the different types of capital are often mutually constitu-
tive and should not be considered as unrelated. I shall now discuss the contribu-
tion made by overseas Chinese to various aspects of the economy, namely (i) 
financial capital (ii) trade partners (iii) input for economic reform and (iv) 
functioning as bridges and ‘cultural adaptors’.  
Financial capital 
Capital flow can be broadly divided into remittances and investment. It is, 
however, often difficult to separate the two clearly, since remittances can also 
be used for investment. Remittance has been an important means of livelihood 
for migrants’ families and communities ever since Chinese people began to 
work overseas. This is especially true for the qiaoxiang. Even during the Cold 
War, the flow of remittances from overseas Chinese continued, and financed the 
bulk of the trade deficit experienced by the new communist China. Nowadays, 
remittances remain an important and most reliable source of income for many 
families in the traditional migrant-sending communities in Fujian, Guangdong 
and Zhejiang Provinces, and increasingly in Jilin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, 
Shandong and Hebei Provinces, and in Tianjin. According to the World Bank 
(2006), China received US$21.3 billion in remittances in 2004, making it the 
second-highest receiver of remittances in the world after India (US$21.7 
billion). While it is difficult to generalise the impact of remittances, for many 
migrant families they are crucial in sending children to school, paying for health 
care and meeting basic consumption needs – similar to the cases in many other 
developing countries. For better-off households, remittances may provide 
capital for small businesses and entrepreneurial activities. In addition to remit-
tances directly transferred to families and kin, overseas Chinese have also been 
                                                 
2  Diasporas also contribute to the political and cultural changes in their homeland. It is, 
however, beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss these aspects in any detail. 
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important an source of funds for disaster relief and for social development in 
regions outside of the migrants’ ancestral villages. 
In addition to sending remittances, overseas Chinese have also long been 
investors in China. Between the nineteenth century and 1949, overseas Chinese 
contributed to a total financial flow of about US$128.74 million (based on the 
US dollar value in 1937) (Lin, 1988: 53). Guangdong and Fujian (the two main 
migrant-sending provinces) and Shanghai (not a notable source of migrants but 
an attractive location for foreign investment) were the destinations of the largest 
volume of such investment. Even during the early years of communist China, 
the Chinese state did not cut the ties with these potential ‘patriotic investors’. 
Overseas Chinese Investment Corporations were established in the 1950s to 
draw their investment. Although the corporations guaranteed annual dividends, 
China’s communist political orientation put off most investors (Pan 1999) – a 
good example of how overseas Chinese do not invest in China simply because 
of their ethnicity. It was not until the adoption of the Open Door Policy that the 
political-economic environment became conducive to the ‘patriotic’ act of 
investment ‘back home’. 
Foreign investment has been important for China’s economic reform, to 
overcome the shortage of domestic funds, especially at the beginning of the 
reform period. In addition, such investment is valued as a means of readjusting 
China’s management practice, improving the economy’s productivity and com-
petitiveness, creating job opportunities, and increasing exports in exchange for 
foreign currencies. Overseas Chinese capitalists were among the pioneer foreign 
investors venturing into China.  
The exact amount of overseas Chinese investment is however not known. 
Estimations can vary considerably, depending on how investments from Hong 
Kong are categorised, and the assumptions made regarding the magnitude of 
‘round-tripping’ of Chinese capital (the return of capital that had ‘gone abroad’ 
to escape foreign exchange controls). Cheng (2004) estimates that 70 to 80 per 
cent of foreign direct investment (FDI) to China since 1978 originated from 
overseas Chinese investors (including investment from Hong Kong). According 
to the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (2006), among all the overseas-
funded projects registered in China by the end of 2005, 45.9 per cent were tied 
to Hong Kong interests. Utilised capital inflow from Hong Kong amounted to 
US$259,5 billion, accounting for 41.7 per cent of the national total.  
Table 12.1 shows the major origins of cumulative FDI in China from 1979 to 
2005. The data are, however, difficult to interpret. For example, much of the 
financial capital coming into the country from the Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands and Western Samoa tax havens is believed to have originated mainly 
from investors in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia – and increasingly so. 
Similarly, the overwhelming dominance of Hong Kong as a source of FDI in 
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China is also exaggerated since a portion of the FDI coming nominally from 
Hong Kong in fact originates from other sources. Many investors, including 
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and non-Chinese investors, have used Hong 
Kong and, to a lesser degree Taiwan and Macau, as springboards for investing 
in China, especially at the beginning of the reform period. This exaggerates the 
amount of ‘patriotic capital’. 
Table 12.1 Major foreign investors in China: 1979-2005 (US$ billions and % of total) 
 Cumulative utilised FDI: 
1979–2005 
Utilised FDI in 2005 
Country Amount 
(US$ billions) 
% of total Amount 
(US$ billions) 
% of total 
Total 632.8 100.0 72.4 100.0 
Hong Kong 259.5 41.8 17.9 29.7 
Japan 53.3 8.6 6.5 10.8 
United States 51.1 8.2 3.1 5.1 
British Virgin Islands  45.9 7.4 9.0 14.9 
Taiwan 41.8 6.7 2.2 3.3 
South Korea 31.1 5.0 5.2 8.6 
Source: Ministry of Commerce of PRC 
‘Round-tripping’ of Chinese capital poses another complication in data 
analysis. According to the World Bank (2006), as much as half of recent Hong 
Kong investment is actually ‘recycled’ money from mainland China, while 
others have estimated it to be as low as 20 per cent (Smart & Hsu, 2004: 549). 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming dominance of overseas Chinese investment 
cannot be disputed, justifying the state’s honouring of these investors as 
‘engines in the motherland’s efforts to build a modern and affluent society’ 
(Chinadaily, 2003). Though to a much lesser extent, overseas Chinese from 
Southeast Asia have also been an important source of capital, as well as 
providing technology and trading experience for China. Their investments are 
estimated to have made up about 15 per cent of all FDI in the 1990s (Tefft, 
1994) and, according to data from 2002, they contributed an average of some 
eight per cent of all FDI to China, making up US$7 billion each year (Phar, 
2004). 
Table 12.2 summarises the sectoral distribution of FDI in China. Reflecting 
the comparative advantage of the Chinese economy, investments from overseas 
Chinese have hitherto been concentrated in labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries (e.g. clothing, furniture, stationery, sports goods, leather, fur etc.), 
real estate, hotels and infrastructure. Upon closer examination, FDI from 
overseas Chinese can also be seen to display noticeable changes. Hong Kong 
investment has increasingly moved from traditional low-technology manufac-
turing to large-scale infrastructure and real estate projects (Smart & Hsu, 2004). 
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Among Taiwanese investors there has been a change from footwear, toys and 
light consumer goods manufacturing to higher technology and yet labour-inten-
sive and price-sensitive assembly of personal computer power supply units, 
keyboards and scanners in 1990s, and more recently to higher value-added 
activities such as the production of motherboards, video cards and even laptop 
computers (Saxenian, 2005). 
Table 12.2 Distribution of foreign direct investment by aggregated sector, 2002–2004 
Year Aggregated sector Actually utilised value % of total 
  (billion US$) 
2002 Total 52,743 100 
 Primary sector 1,028 1.95 
 Secondary sector 39,465 74,.83 
 Tertiary sector 12,250 23.23 
2003 Total 53,505 100 
 Primary sector 1,008 1.87 
 Secondary sector 39,710 74.22 
 Tertiary sector 12,794 23.91 
2004 Total 60,63 100 
 Primary sector 1,114 1.84 
 Secondary sector 45,463 74.98 
 Tertiary sector 14,053 23.18 
Source: China Commerce Yearbook, 2005 
Trade partners 
Overseas Chinese have been China’s most important trading partners, again 
especially during the earlier years of the reform. Hong Kong has been China’s 
third largest trading partner after Japan and the USA, accounting for 9.6 per 
cent of its total trade (US$136.7 billion) in 2005. In addition, Hong Kong is the 
most important entrepôt3 for China. It is important to note that China’s trade 
with Hong Kong is to a great extent related to the outward processing activities 
of Hong Kong firms. According to Hong Kong statistics, more than 80 per cent 
of Hong Kong manufacturers have set up factories in China, contributing to the 
high level of ‘imports’ and ‘exports’ of materials and goods between the two 
economies. In 2005, 38.4 per cent of Hong Kong’s total exports to China were 
related to outward processing activities. Meanwhile 65.9 per cent of Hong 
Kong’s imports and 79.3 per cent of Hong Kong’s re-exports from China to 
other countries were related to outward processing (Hong Kong Trade 
                                                 
3 A centre where merchandise can be imported and exported without paying import duties. 
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Development Council, 2006). Though sharing a sensitive political relationship, 
China and Taiwan have also been close trading partners. According to customs 
statistics from Taiwan, indirect trade between China and Taiwan increased over 
100 times between 1984 and 2004 – from somewhat more than US$500 million 
to over US$ 61.6 billion.4 
Input for economic reform 
As China implemented the Open Door Policy in the late 1970s there was a lack 
of well-functioning market institutions and a business culture – both necessary 
for its growing connection with the world market. Chinese reformers, led by 
Deng Xiaoping, looked upon the economic success of Hong Kong and Singa-
pore as models, and established of many of the market institutions practised in 
these economies. As Zhang (2000) concludes, overseas Chinese have provided 
crucial institutional substitutes for many of the deficiencies in China, including 
those in laws and regulations, trading networks, managerial skills, and business 
culture. In Zhang’s words, the overseas Chinese have been important actors in 
this process of ‘organic assimilation of Western market institutions in China’ 
(Zhang, 2000: 77).  
Overseas Chinese have also been invited to manage new projects in China. 
Many of the Economic and Technological Development Zones, for instance, 
have been developed and managed by joint ventures between domestic business 
and partners from Hong Kong and Singapore. Furthermore, overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs, scholars and officials have also served as consultants for policies 
and projects. Overseas Chinese economists are more able to provide useful 
advice to the Chinese state than are non-Chinese economists. Last but not least, 
overseas Chinese press, media and other archives offer the Chinese state vast 
amounts of information about the world economy in the Chinese language. 
Diaspora as bridge and cultural adaptor 
The diaspora has historically served as bridges between China and the rest of 
the world, the linkages being economic, political, social or cultural. Many 
foreign firms hire overseas Chinese, who are considered to be more appropriate 
‘cultural adaptors’, as managers for their operations in China. More recently, 
overseas Chinese business networks have also served as channels for Chinese 
firms to invest in foreign countries, and for raising funds on the Hong Kong or 
US stock exchanges. 
The input from overseas Chinese in the recent rapid development in China is 
indisputable. How can one explain this phenomenon? Is this a sign of patriot-
                                                 
4  Actual figures: from US$553.3 million to US$ 6,639.1 million. 
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ism, or capitalism? Cultural affinity undoubtedly plays a role. Many overseas 
Chinese investors retain a cultural and emotional attachment to the country, as 
well as having contacts with their ancestral communities. Such affection is 
translated to investment in their birthplace or the birthplace of their ancestors. 
Shared language, customs and familial ties also became cultural and social 
capital that facilitates smooth operation in business. But the political-economic 
framework also plays an important role. In my opinion, perhaps more important 
for most overseas Chinese investors than love of their homeland are the 
competitive production costs and the expanding domestic market in China. As 
Lever-Tracy et al. (1996) argue, there is an economic synergy between the 
parties. In order to navigate in a reforming economy that is yet to mature, over-
seas Chinese capitalists transform their cultural capital (such as cultural and 
language skills) into social capital (networks) and consequently into economic 
benefit.  
The importance of these informal methods and personal relationships in 
economic transactions has inspired scholars and analysts to study the nature and 
functioning of what is seen as a peculiarly Chinese way of doing business 
(though I do not see it as that) through personal relationship networks, the 
‘guanxi economy’5 (see, for example, Chu and Ngan, 2000: 231-256; Haley et 
al., 1998; Mitchell, 1995; Smart, 1993, 1998, 2000; Yang, 1994), making use of 
the so-called bamboo networks (Weidenbaum & Huges, 1996; Phar, 2004) to 
create a kind of ‘Chinese empire’.  
Personal relationships and informal practices are particularly important in 
any society if the national legal infrastructure for guarantees is fluid and lacks 
transparency. Compared to foreign investors of non-Chinese ethnic back-
grounds, overseas Chinese capitalists are more equipped for gaining vital 
information on how to operate a successful business in China, for speeding up 
bureaucratic procedures and for avoiding paying official fees – often by con-
ducting corrupt practices.  
By highlighting the fact overseas Chinese investors make use of their social 
capital to reap benefits in China, I do not intend to imply that they cannot be 
patriotic. Rather, I would like to debunk the often over-romanticised, cultural-
deterministic arguments that Chinese people are more patriotic than other ethnic 
groups, and are thus more ‘willing’ to return to, invest in or trade with China. 
Being patriotic is particularly feasible and attractive when economic benefits are 
to be reaped at the same time. 
                                                 
5  ‘Guanxi’ are personal ties. 
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The role of the state in diaspora-led development 
Far from simply being led by the diaspora, the Chinese state has played an 
active role in orchestrating the nature, extent and geography of overseas 
Chinese investment in the country. As mentioned before, Deng Xiaoping 
particularly welcomed overseas Chinese when he first orchestrated economic 
reform. Having recognised the power of relational ties between the diaspora and 
migrant-sending regions, in 1980 Deng tactically identified four places as initial 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (Figure 12.1). These include Shenzhen, the 
border city adjacent to Hong Kong; Zhuhai, the area next to Macau; Xiamen, 
across from the strait from Taiwan; and Shantou, the (ancestral) home of many 
overseas Chinese. In addition, Deng also implemented an array of policies to 
court those who had left because they feared the communist regime. These 
included returning properties that had been confiscated after the 1949 revolution 
and installing various tax and regulatory advantages to ethnic Chinese investors, 
particularly those from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.  
  Figure 12.1 Special Economic Zones, open coastal cities and open economic  
 regions in China 
 
   Source: Author 
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Smart (2000) also considers the political significance of Deng’s plan. 
According to him, these SEZs were strategically positioned, not only to facili-
tate the mobilisation of the resources of the overseas Chinese, but also to serve 
the goals of the eventual reunification of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau with 
the mainland.  
 Figure 12.2 Industrial zones in China 
 
 Source: Author 
The success of the initial SEZs encouraged the central government to 
proceed in the opening up of the economy. An additional fourteen coastal ports 
were allocated for foreign investment in 1984, and three open economic regions 
designated in 1985. These were the Yangtze River Delta Economic Region 
(centred around Shanghai), the Pearl River Delta Economic Region (centred 
around Guangzhou), and the Minnan Delta Economic Region (centred around 
Xiamen). The establishment of these open regions spread the benefits of 
economic growth to the areas surrounding the ports or SEZs. As the reform 
progressed, the central government set up further economic zones of various 
natures to attract and guide investments in different regions. These include the 
Industrial Zones (Figure 12.2), Economic and Technology Development Zones 
(Figure 12.3), and the Hi-Tech and New Technology Development Zones (Fig-  
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  Figure 12.3 State-level Economic and Technology Development Zones 
 
  Source: Author 
 Figure 12.4 State-level Hi-Tech and New Technology Development Zones 
 
  Source: Author 
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ure 12.4). As shown on the maps, the industrial zones are still geographically 
very concentrated, but it is apparent that the newer technology development 
zones are spatially more dispersed, reflecting the state’s intention of steering 
investment into the interior regions of the country. The importance of such 
state-level planning cannot be underestimated, as investment often tends to be 
concentrated in areas where infrastructure is already available, thus creating 
further imbalance in the geography of development.  
The state’s ‘go-west’ policy also fits in with the needs of many foreign 
investors who have been finding production costs in the older development 
zones too high. Indeed, many traditional low-technology manufacturing indus-
tries have recently moved northward and westward. While the coastal provinces 
are still well in the lead in absolute terms, the increase in land, labour and living 
costs in these areas, and the potential domestic consumer market in the inland 
regions provide good reasons for foreign investors to set up their production and 
sales operations in the interior provinces.  
As the Chinese state proceeds to diversify its industrial base, it has been 
increasingly proactive in encouraging foreign investors to venture into the new 
and high-tech industries. In this effort, the state has continued its usual practice 
of initiating special programmes to encourage Chinese scientists and profes-
sionals overseas to be involved in the development. Top-level political leaders 
have branded returnees as ‘irreplaceable’ and as playing an ‘outstanding histori-
cal role’ in China’s technological development. Despite such blandishments, the 
return rate of Chinese trained overseas has been low. According to data from the 
Chinese Ministry of Education, over 700,000 Chinese students and scholars 
went abroad for further education between 1978 and 2003, of whom about a 
quarter (173,000) had returned to China by 2004 (Yao, L., 2004: 8). Political 
instability, low salaries, poor research facilities and work environment, as well 
as the prevalence of the ‘guanxi work culture’ have been cited as some of the 
common reasons for professionals deciding against returning to China.  
Recognising the negative consequences of a brain drain, the Chinese 
government has striven to make the return to China more attractive by offering 
preferential treatment to returnees. The Ministry of Personnel published the 
‘Opinion on Encouraging High-Level Overseas Chinese Students to Return to 
Work in China’ in 2001, which states that in addition to privileges in housing, 
social insurance, jobs and schools for their families, and procedures for visiting 
overseas relatives, policies were also set up to guarantee intellectual property 
rights such as copyrights and patents, and rewards established for those who 
make significant contributions. The returnees’ mobility is also assured as they 
are allowed to have their long-term or permanent right of residence abroad 
preserved while they work in China. These measures do seem to have had an 
effect; the number of returnees has recently increased significantly. By 2005, 
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198,000 had made their way back to China, either to join existing companies or 
to establish their own. Many of these returnees have graduate degrees, with a 
high percentage of PhDs and MBAs (Vanhonacker et al., 2005; Zhongguo, 
2005). Perhaps more important than these fringe benefit packages are the 
macro-economic changes in China since the late 1990s – characterised by 
increasing market liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation – which have 
made a return more attractive. 
Overseas Chinese Scholars Pioneering Parks have been set up reserved 
exclusively for companies started by returnees. In addition to offering the 
standard package shared by other science parks in China – including low rent, 
tax relief, loans for start-ups, shared infrastructure and other financial benefits, 
these Pioneering Parks also address the special needs of overseas Chinese 
returnees. They provide special services such as speeding up the bureaucratic 
process involved in establishing residency, and guaranteeing access to high-
quality housing and prestigious, often bilingual, schools for returnees’ children 
(Saxenian, 2005). In order to provide opportunities for overseas Chinese experts 
to meet and explore investment options in China, the Shenzhen Foreign and 
Overseas Affairs Office of the Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Association, organ-
ises a ‘China Hi-Tech Fair’ every year. Over a hundred specialist entrepreneurs 
and overseas Chinese students, mainly from the USA, the UK and Southeast 
Asia, attended the Fair held in 2004 (Yao, D., 2004).  
These efforts are showing results. Overseas Chinese scholars, scientists and 
professionals are finding China more interesting. Twenty-four state-level 
pioneering parks have been established, in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, 
Shenyang, Harbin, Dailian, Xian, Xiamen etc., in addition to over 110 other 
kinds of pioneering parks, hosting over 6000 firms and operated by over 15,000 
returnees (China.org.cn, 2005). According to a survey conducted by Zweig and 
Rosen (2003), who interviewed 65 returnees in high-tech zones in Hangzhou, 
Guangzhou and Wuhan, nearly half of these entrepreneurs had imported 
technology to their operation, of which 71 per cent was state-of-the-art and 23 
per cent was new for China. These authors also concluded from their interviews 
that returnees are raising the technological level of China’s domestic economy. 
In additional to technological gain, 23 per cent of those interviewed have 
brought in foreign capital, and 28 per cent were maintaining overseas contact on 
a daily basis, thus linking the Chinese economy dynamically and organically 
with the outside world. 
Having come to terms with the fact that objective framework conditions in 
China might not be enticing enough to keep talents in the diaspora at their old 
home for long, Chinese officials have also modified their attitude toward ‘brain 
power stored overseas’ – a metaphor coined by Zhao Ziyang in 1987 when 
General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Since the mid-1990s, the 
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Chinese state has been proactive in encouraging Chinese overseas to serve their 
motherland from abroad, by investing or establishing companies in China, 
serving as links between China and other economies, offering lectures and 
training, acting as consultants or participating in other forms of knowledge, 
technological and financial transfer – all ‘patriotic acts’ that do not require 
moving back to China on a long-term basis. 
Financial incentives have also been made available for ‘super talents’ in 
research areas. The Seed Fund for Returned Overseas Scholars was established 
as early as 1990, followed by others, including the Cross Century Outstanding 
Personnel Training Programme, and the National Science Fund for Distin-
guished Young Scholars. The Chinese Academy of Sciences hosts the Hundred 
Talents Programme through which successful candidates are granted as much as 
two million yuan (about US$240,000) and world-class research facilities for 
their projects. The Cheung Kong Scholars Programme jointly established (in 
1998) by China’s Ministry of Education and Hong Kong’s Li Ka-shing Foun-
dation provides another example for initiatives that aim to attract natural scien-
tists to contribute to the upgrading of China’s education and intellectual com-
petitiveness by temporary return.  
In addition to materialistic incentives, the Chinese state has also deployed 
softer measures to improve their rapport with overseas Chinese investors and 
talented members of the diaspora. Overseas Chinese are often presented as 
‘national treasure’ and heroes (Nyíri, 2001). By encouraging transnational 
practises among these new migrants, the Chinese state expresses support and 
good wishes towards those who aspire to leave the country, and prepares these 
potential migrants for contributing to modern transnational nation-building, 
often by means of ‘virtual returns’, making use of advanced telecommunication 
technology.  
In addition, the Chinese government also acknowledges the achievements of 
overseas Chinese professionals who have returned, and presents awards in order 
to encourage more to follow suit. The ‘Chunhui Cup Pioneering Competition 
for Overseas Chinese Scholars’ was initiated in 2006, aiming to ‘explore [the 
participants’] independent creative abilities, single out excellent projects high in 
technological content and carrying pathbreaking potential with good future 
market value, and inspire their passion to build their careers back in China’.6 
‘Model’ returnees are also often celebrated and promoted to high social status 
through invitations to meet high-ranking government officials and attending 
important functions. Though rather indirectly, the Chinese state has also been 
more active in sponsoring cultural institutions and activities overseas, such as 
                                                 
6  See http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/pressroom/200701/t20070115_39641.htm 
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Chinese language schools, festivities and the so-called ‘root-seeking pro-
grammes’ for overseas Chinese. While the future economic impact of these 
cultural efforts is hard to estimate, diasporic states all over the world seem to 
believe that such activities are worthwhile as they help to promote a sense of 
belonging within the diaspora.  
Efforts to establish and maintain links with the diaspora are not conducted 
only at the central state level. In fact, provincial, county and municipal govern-
ments have also been creative and active in making links with their brothers and 
sisters overseas. Provinces or cities are in contest to access overseas capital and 
talent. In addition to competing to provide more benefits to potential returnees 
and investors, numerous institutions based on kinship, birthplace and university 
affiliations etc. are being set up and delegations sent to strategic destinations for 
‘marketing’ purposes. In strategic areas such as Silicon Valley in California, 
there is an almost continuous flow of company and government ‘head hunting’ 
representatives from all over China. Many municipal governments have also set 
up their own Overseas Chinese Scholars Pioneering Parks (similar to the state-
level parks, but drawing upon local means) to lure Chinese scholars from over-
seas. 
Summary and policy recommendations 
Drawing upon experiences in China, this chapter has discussed the relationships 
between migration, the diaspora and economic development. As the first section 
explains, Chinese people have been involved in international migration for 
centuries. The demographic composition and direction of these migration flows, 
as well as the relationships between the diaspora and the Chinese state, have 
evolved over time. Like migrants from other places, Chinese migrants have 
always been an important source of human, social and economic capital for 
their home communities and homeland state.  
Even during the years of political and economic isolation during the cold 
war period, overseas Chinese served as bridges between China and the outside 
world. This chapter has focused on conditions in China since the adoption of the 
Open Door Policy in late 1970s. Overseas Chinese have been praised by top 
Chinese officials as engines for economic development in the country. The 
contributions made by the Chinese diaspora have been discussed above in 
detail, in four categories. Overseas Chinese are an important source of financial 
capital, and valuable trade partners, for China. They also provide other forms of 
input, such as acting as institutional substitutes and in consultations regarding 
Chinese economic reform. Finally the Chinese diaspora has functioned as 
bridges for valuable economic, political, social and cultural linkages between 
China and the outside world.  
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This chapter emphasises the role played by different levels of the Chinese 
state in shaping the timing, extent, nature and geography of investment by over-
seas Chinese in China. Important decisions include Deng Xiaoping’s choice in 
locating the initial SEZs in those areas with the strongest connections with the 
diaspora, and a gradual geographical expansion of the various investment zones 
(such as Industrial Zones, Hi-tech and New Technology Development Zones) to 
areas in the northern and western part of the vast country. 
In order to tap the growing pool of skilled Chinese scholars and profession-
als overseas, the Chinese state – ranging from national to municipal levels – has 
also, sometimes in competition, offered incentive packages to potential return-
ees. Having confronted the fact that the political-economic conditions in China 
might not entice resourceful overseas Chinese to return permanently, the 
Chinese state began in the late 1980s to adopt a new attitude toward the brains 
‘drained’, seeing them as ‘brain power stored overseas’. Such a concept has 
been implemented in proactive policies and programmes both in China and 
overseas, which work, either directly or indirectly, to establish and maintain a 
growing network of Chinese professionals and potential investors around the 
world. 
Certainly the involvement of overseas Chinese investors and professionals in 
the Chinese political economy has not brought only benefit to every person in 
every place of China, as their investment activities are based, to varying 
degrees, on the exploitation of labour and natural resources. At the same time, 
their aggregate contribution to the remarkable economic growth in Chinese 
recent history is obvious and widely acknowledged. What kind of insights does 
the Chinese experience offer? Before I conclude this chapter with policy 
suggestions, it is important to stress that the relationship between migration and 
development, both in sending- and receiving-societies, is highly varied and 
context-specific. It would be naïve to suggest any one-size-fits-all policies for 
other contexts. Nevertheless, an analysis of the Chinese case can help identify 
favourable factors and policy options for other diaspora states.  
Perceiving migrants as potential contributors  
The Chinese case aptly demonstrates that considering migrants as deserters and 
viewing migration only as a brain drain process is an obsolete way of thinking. 
Migrants can make valuable economic, social, cultural and political contribu-
tions to the communities and societies they have ‘left behind’. When the 
framework conditions are favourable, migrants maintain close connections in 
both host- and home-countries, utilising their networks to trade, invest and 
exchange knowledge between them, often without planning for a permanent 
return to the ‘homeland’. 
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Policy recommendations 
• Liberalise freedom of movement for members of the diaspora in entering and 
exiting the country. This might include simplifying the procedures for visa 
application or granting visa-free entrance. 
• Introduce dual citizenship, which can eliminate problems for diaspora mem-
bers travelling to and from their different ‘home’ countries and is likely to 
simplify bureaucratic procedures in investment in business and trade. 
Furthermore, dual citizenship could contribute to sentimental and psycho-
logical linkages and foster a sense of belonging to the motherland, which 
could consequently encourage later generations in the diaspora (i.e. descen-
dants of migrants) to maintain links with their diasporic homeland. 
Capturing remittances 
• Remittances are an important and most reliable source of income for many 
families in the traditional migrant-sending communities. The impact can be 
very positive when remittances are used productively. 
Policy recommendations 
• Reduce the cost of fund transfer to encourage remittance from the diaspora. 
• Provide matching funds from public sources or through development agen-
cies, to encourage remittance. 
• Allow foreign currency accounts. 
Improve the investment environment 
• In order to attract investment from the diaspora or foreign investors, a 
healthy local business environment is important.  
Policy recommendations 
• Plan and make available funding for productive infrastructural projects, for 
example transportation, communication networks, basic facilities such as 
power and water supply. 
• Improve financial systems and banking services. 
• Build an investor-friendly, transparent and stable legal environment. 
• Promote local human resources to meet (both foreign and local) investors’ 
needs and expectations. 
Depending on the migration history of the country concerned, governments 
might plan infrastructural development, considering the preferred locations of 
migrant investors, as the Chinese government strategically planned the initial 
SEZs in areas with strong connections with the diaspora. 
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Provide productive fiscal incentives to attract foreign investors or professionals 
from the diaspora  
As is the case in many other states, the Chinese government and administration 
at different levels have been proactive and generous in providing fiscal incen-
tives of various sorts to attract investors and professionals from the diaspora. 
Policy recommendation 
• Offer appropriate and affordable incentives, in the form of tax concessions, 
cash inducement or seed money for housing, company establishment or 
research activities. 
While fiscal incentives work to attract foreign investors, they have also been 
criticised for systematically disfavouring domestic capital and consequently 
exacerbating domestic economic weaknesses (Huang, 2003). Similarly, prefer-
ential treatments favouring professional returnees can act as a double-edged 
sword. While they are effective in luring talent overseas to return, they also 
widen the differences between returnees and local professionals. This prefer-
ence for foreign experience increases the appeal of migration as a step for rapid 
career advancement. It is therefore crucial for states to be cautious about 
balancing interests and opportunities between foreign and domestic investors, 
and among returnees and local professionals. 
Establish and strengthen linkages and partnership with members in the  
diaspora 
The Chinese case demonstrates the importance of outreach and partnership-
building with the diaspora, and especially, in recent years, among students and 
young professionals.  
Policy recommendations 
• Establish extensive policy frameworks and institutions to mobilise members 
in the diaspora. Good coordination and cost effectiveness are also important. 
A certain degree of duplication and lack of coordination among the multiple 
ministries, departments and agencies in China has been observed and should 
be avoided. 
• Involve of high-level and specialised governmental agencies to handle 
migrant affairs – to show the state’s commitment. 
• Encourage or subsidise the establishment of institutions that provide 
intermediary functions (e.g. community and hometown associations, alumni 
networks and professional associations). 
• Initiate programmes and policies that encourage knowledge- and informa-
tion-exchange, business, investment and diaspora philanthropy (e.g. visiting 
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delegations, information exchange forums, trade fairs, scientific conventions 
etc.). 
• Improve regular information dissemination using appropriate technology 
(e.g. printed materials or the Internet). 
• Adopt softer approaches as a ‘long-term investment’ by establishing and 
maintaining rapport with the diaspora (e.g. support for language schools, 
communal events overseas and home visit tours for migrants overseas). 
Conclusion 
The Chinese case indicates that the impact of out-migration can be more multi-
fold and sometimes more positive than it is depicted in most brain-drain 
scenarios. However, since the relationship between migration and development 
is complex and dynamic – since it is mediated by a whole array of historical, 
contextual, cultural and individual elements – the Chinese ‘fortune’ might not 
be reproducible elsewhere. By focusing on the positive side of Chinese migra-
tion, I do not claim that negative effects of migration do not exist or can be 
easily corrected; indeed loss of talent threatens, in varied degrees, the sustain-
able development of many economies. Nevertheless, since migration is inevita-
ble and likely to increase in the increasingly globalising world, it is important to 
come up with ways through which migration can be harnessed to benefit 
economic and social development in the home country.  
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International migration policies  
and the fight against poverty:  
Some final reflections 
Annelies Zoomers & Aderanti Adepoju 
Introduction 
This book has focused on achieving a better understanding of the implications 
of international migration for national development from the perspective of the 
sending countries (with an emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa). More specifically, 
it is concerned with the question of how a coherent international migration 
policy can contribute to the fight against poverty. 
In the various chapters, we have presented the reasons why – as opposed to 
in previous times – migration is currently seen as one of the more important 
issues on the development policy agenda, and we have analysed, for different 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America, how governments 
develop their own strategies for maximising the benefits of migration, while 
attempting to minimise its negative implications. In this chapter we bring 
together various issues that we hope will help in the design of migration policies 
relevant, or beneficial, to development.  
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The characteristics of international labour migration:  
Towards a typology 
Our research project has focused in particular on international labour migration 
– the movement of persons (non-nationals or foreigners) across national borders 
for purposes other than travel or short-term residence (Messina & Lahav, 2006). 
Little attention is paid to other groups, such as refugees, internationally dis-
placed persons and/or asylum seekers (Skeldon, 1990; Mafukidze, 2006) al-
though it is difficult in practice to make a clear division. 
The number of international labour migrants is currently estimated at 
between 175 and 200 million (GCIM, 2005; Farrant et al., 2006), which is about 
3 percent of the world population. If we try to obtain a picture of the direction 
of international migration flows, we find that there is a limited number of 
dominant destinations: the classical immigration countries (the United States 
and Canada), a number of countries on the Persian Gulf (such as Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates) and, lastly, a number of European 
countries (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy). Viewed 
from a distance, migration streams seem to flow from the poor South towards 
the richer northern countries, although there are considerable differences in 
types of migration and in opportunities for integration and upward mobility.  
Some basic facts regarding migration to these countries are as follows:  
The USA and Canada 
Migration flows to the United States (US) and Canada derive, as one might 
expect, mainly from Mexico and the Caribbean (over 20 million Mexicans and 
Cubans live and work in the US), although there has recently been a marked 
growth in migration to these countries of highly skilled people from China and 
India. After being granted an H1 visa, migrants can quite easily settle with their 
families and, as long as they have work, there is a good chance that the visa will 
be extended. 
The Gulf states and the Middle East 
Migration to the Persian Gulf region originates mainly from south and southeast 
Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand), but also increasingly from north, central and east Africa. It consists 
mainly of the temporary labour migration of unskilled men, but increasingly 
also of other groups, for example, a growing migration by women, particularly 
from Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. In addition, Saudi Arabia 
conducts searches in countries such as Nigeria and Ghana for highly-skilled 
labour (especially for female nurses and doctors). Recruitment takes place 
mainly among Moslem populations, and there is a considerable flow of Somalis 
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and Ethiopians across the Gulf of Aden to the Middle East (van Moppes, 2006), 
as well as migration from West Africa (Burkina Faso) to the Gulf States 
(Broekhuis, 2006). There is no possibility of visa extension in the Gulf States, 
so that each time a migrant’s contract expires, he or she must leave the country. 
There are therefore no opportunities to settle permanently and migrants enjoy 
no right of family reunification. Recently, the growing presence of foreign 
labour appears to be leading increasingly to problems, especially in relation to 
worker’s rights, for example in wages, education and health, as demanded in the 
free trade agreement negotiations (Rutten & Muli, 2006: 24).  
The European Union 
A large part of the migration flows to countries of the European Union (EU) 
derives from North Africa and Turkey and is a direct consequence of migrant 
worker programmes (up to 1974) and subsequent family reunification (Lucas, 
2004). After a period in which immigration was largely determined by refugees 
and asylum seekers, the EU has recently been confronted with migrant flows 
from sub-Saharan Africa (especially Nigeria – 72,000, Senegal – 77,000, and 
Cape Verde – 43,000), Asia, and Latin America. Most of the migrants enter 
Europe via Spain and Italy (once emigration countries themselves), but the 
influence of the colonial past and/or cultural ties appears clearly in their ulti-
mate destinations: West African migrants go mainly to France; Latin Americans 
migrate relatively frequently to Italy and Spain; and Asians migrate proportion-
ately rather more to the United Kingdom. The majority of EU countries occupy 
an intermediate position in comparison with the US/Canada and the Gulf States. 
Where restrictive policies operate, possibilities often exist for family reunifica-
tion and settlement, but not in all places: each country employs different defini-
tions and pursues a different policy. The situation is thus heterogeneous as far 
as the circumstances of migrants (including integration and deportation policies) 
are concerned. 
 
Viewed from the receiving countries, there therefore appears to be, at first sight, 
a relatively comprehensible situation in which globalisation has been translated 
into a worldwide migration system, with richer receiving regions (receiving 
countries) on one side, and poorer sending countries (countries in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America) on the other side. Thus from the perspective of the receiving 
regions there appears to be a situation in which the migration flows follow a 
relatively fixed pattern. An international migration system generally includes a 
core receiving region, which may be a country or group of countries, and a set 
of specific sending countries linked to it by unusually large flows of immigrants 
(Fawcett, 1989; Zlotnik, 1992). These migration flows are usually matched by a 
reverse flow of remittances. 
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If we look at international migration from the perspective of the sending 
countries, however, a different – more diverse – picture emerges (Zoomers, 
2006). The majority of migration flows are found to be directed not towards the 
core receiving countries just referred to. Only a limited number of countries are 
characterised by South-North migration. By far the majority of emigration 
countries are found to be the subject of South-South migration. In other 
instances we encounter diasporic states (states with a large migrant population 
fanning out over many countries).  
South-North migration 
Examples of countries with South-North migration directed at one of the above 
core regions include Mexico (to the US), Morocco (to France, Germany, etc.), 
Senegal (to France or Spain), and Ecuador (to Spain). In the case of the EU, 
there is a limited group of sending countries with a clearly structured flow 
towards specific receiving countries, with the majority of migrants entering via 
Spain and Italy and settling in the former colonial mother country.1 
Countries with directed South-North migration enjoy the advantage that, 
thanks to migration, they have been able to strengthen their negotiating position 
with EU countries and gain access to additional resources.2 Negotiations are 
increasingly taking place between sending and receiving countries, especially 
regarding readmission and migrant quotas, and historical ties are being selec-
tively re-established. Compared with other countries, the ex-colonies sit close to 
the fire and are able to benefit from new, though as yet modest, work opportu-
nities in the core regions. The migration makes them a noticeable – and noticed 
– part of the situation.  
What is interesting, though problematical, is the fact that countries with 
strong South-North migration (such as Senegal, Morocco, etc.) – but also 
diasporic states like Kenya or Nigeria – are often seen in their own region as 
desirable destination and/or transition areas, and perform an important function 
as reception areas for South-South migration. In order to satisfy the demands 
imposed by northern countries (admission and deportation policies), these 
countries are often constrained to act more stringently against the inflow from 
                                                 
1  Other examples of countries with important South-North migration are Kenya and Nigeria; 
but given the dispersal of the population ‘overseas’ we have classified these countries as 
diasporic states (see below). 
2  Where international organisations (such as OIM, ILO) are currently undertaking initiatives – 
through programmes such as MIDA and TOKTEN – to increase the development effects of 
migration (though reduction of transaction costs of remittances, encouragement of brain gain/ 
limitation of brain drain, combating illegality, etc.) these are often highly concentrated in 
countries with south-north migration. 
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their neighbours than would otherwise have been the case. Mexico, for example, 
is obliged by the US to keep its southern border closed and to act against illegal 
immigrants, which has immediately negative consequences for intraregional 
relations and is also at odds with the striving for free mobility within the region 
(Mercosur etc.). In this sense, many of these countries have a northern agenda. 
South-South migration 
In many countries – notably in sub-Saharan Africa – there is mainly South-
South migration. These are usually relatively poor, and often landlocked, 
countries. Examples include Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (with migration 
mainly to Ivory Coast, but also to Nigeria and Senegal); Lesotho and Mozam-
bique (with migration to South Africa and Botswana); and Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Burundi, Congo and Rwanda, where continuing conflicts have caused a 
large part of the population to seek refuge in neighbouring countries (such as 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). In Latin America examples include such 
countries as Paraguay and Bolivia, from where, until recently, large numbers 
emigrated to Argentina; Nicaragua (with migration to Costa Rica); and Hondu-
ras (migration mainly to Mexico). Asian examples are Indonesia (with a 
population of more than one million in Malaysia) and Myanmar (with one 
million living in Thailand). There is also considerable migration from Indone-
sia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam to destinations within the region 
(Lucas, 2004).  
A high proportion of the migrants being discussed here are not well-treated 
in the receiving countries. Compared with migration to the northern countries, 
the possibilities for earning remittances are often limited in south-south migra-
tion. People migrate on a temporary basis in order to earn a supplementary 
income in the event of a crisis (circular migration); they often do not have the 
necessary documents, are illegal and have generally to be content with low-paid 
work. Sometimes they take up the places left by the emigration of the country’s 
own population (see for example Broekhuis 2006 on Burkina Faso). Migrants 
enjoy very little protection, either by their own government or by the govern-
ment of the receiving country, and cases of disguised slavery are regularly 
found (such as the treatment of Bolivian migrants by an Argentinian business, 
recently come to light). Migrants are often the victims of discrimination and 
xenophobia, even in their own region (as has happened recently in Ivory Coast, 
and also in Botswana, Argentina and South Africa). The migrant population is 
sent back with great regularity from the neighbouring countries to the country of 
origin (as with Burkinabé from Ivory Coast, and Ghanaians from Nigeria). 
Many Bolivians and Paraguayans have also returned from Argentina to their 
own countries as a consequence of the economic crisis (Zoomers, 2006). 
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Diasporic states and regions 
‘Diasporic states’ are countries with a large number of expatriates dispersed in 
other countries. Many migrants originate from diasporic states. As a result of 
outmigration over a long time – covering several generations – a substantial part 
of the population of these states (including the elite) has now become dispersed 
over a large number of countries throughout the world. This diaspora includes 
refugees and is partly composed of South-South migrants, and the numbers 
involved are many times greater than the flow of South-North migration. The 
Asian diaspora alone is estimated at more than 70 million. The largest of these 
is the Chinese diaspora – over 35 million, widely dispersed over South East 
Asia, but also across the rest of the world. The figure for India is 20 million, 
that for the Philippines over 7 million, and Korea has a diaspora of over 
3.5 million. Other examples are Malaysia with a diaspora of 5 million, Vietnam 
(1 million) and Pakistan. The Latin American diaspora is estimated at over 
25 million. If we ignore Mexico and the Caribbean (which are oriented mainly 
to the US) and Argentina and Ecuador (relatively strongly oriented to Italy and 
Spain), we find that the countries mainly concerned are Colombia, Brazil, Peru 
and Venezuela, from where a group of over 8 million has fanned out over a 
large number of countries: not only the US, UK, Germany, Spain, Italy, Israel 
and Japan, but also over neighbouring countries in their own region (Germana 
et al., 2005). African examples of diasporic states are South Africa, Nigeria3 
and Kenya, and, on a more modest scale, smaller countries such as Ghana, 
Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia and the Cape Verde islands (Sheffer, 2003: 
104–105.).  
In contrast to the group of South-South migrants described above, these 
diasporic migrants relatively often constitute a well-off elite, including a 
considerable group of transnational entrepreneurs (van Naerssen et al., 2005). In 
a growing number of countries, including China, the Philippines, India and 
Mexico, the national government is pursuing an active policy to involve the 
diaspora in national development. In many countries, however, policy in this 
field has not yet crystallised out clearly. Although it is customary to speak of 
migrants, we are referring here to what is often a consolidated group of well-to-
do expatriates, the majority of whom have lived for many years outside their 
                                                 
3  Nigeria, with 140 million inhabitants, plays a key role in African migration. It was for a long 
period an immigration country, but is now an example of an important emigration country, 
with a considerable diaspora in the EU, UK and USA, as well as important populations in the 
Gulf states and South Africa. The expatriate population in these countries is relatively well-
educated and established. It is also characterised by emigration to Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon 
and Botswana (de Haas, 2006). At the same time, it is an important destination and transit 
area for its own neighbouring states, and is an important member of ECOWAS and the AU.  
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own countries – in some instances even for several generations – and many 
have succeeded in building up a successful new livelihood in the originally-
receiving country. However, many countries have very little information about 
their diaspora and it is only relatively recently that they have been seen by 
receiving-country governments as development potential (Adepoju et al., 2006). 
The above classification makes clear that, where migration is concerned, it is 
no longer sufficient to divide the world into ‘origin’ and ‘destination’ regions 
and to connect the two groups with arrows to indicate migrant and capital flows. 
There is a wide variety of ways in which countries are incorporated into the 
migration system. This has direct consequences for the possibilities of profiting 
from migration. Diasporic states and countries with directed South-North 
migration generally find themselves in a relatively favourable position, while 
the countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with 
fresh restrictions. 
The most favourable circumstances are those of the diasporic states: thanks 
to migration over many generations, they can call on a considerable overseas 
population to use as development potential. They have to suffer less under 
restrictive policies; the majority of their migrants are already living in the 
reception region and are, on the whole, successfully integrated, with relatively 
good possibilities for investment. Countries with South-North migration enjoy 
the advantage that they are clearly ‘in the picture’ and can relatively easily 
negotiate about projects, readmission or migrant quotas. They are very visible –
have strategic positions compared with other countries- and so are able to profit 
from temporary requirements for migrant labour. 
This stands in contrast to the countries with mainly South-South migration, 
which are largely at the mercy of the policy of receiving countries in their own 
region – often therefore neighbouring countries – where conflicts are relatively 
quickly translated into inter-state problems, and where problems of discrimina-
tion or xenophobia (which also arise in the north) remain relatively invisible, 
because the media pay attention mainly to tensions in the northern countries. 
Migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa and recent trends  
The heterogeneity of migration finds expression in a great variety of migration 
routes. Because of rapid changes in the volume and direction of migration, there 
is a growing complexity which is difficult to capture in a typology of migration 
countries. 
If we analyse the dominant migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa to 
‘Fortress Europe’ (van Moppes, 2006), just as the route through Mexico is the 
main route for most Latin American migrants on their way to the United States, 
there is a restricted number of gateways to the EU. There are currently three 
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major departure areas in sub-Saharan Africa, leading to a number of transit 
destinations (van Moppes, 2006):  
• A large stretch of Africa’s west coast, including northern Mauritania (nota-
bly Nouadhibou), Western Sahara and southern Morocco. The Canary 
Islands, especially Fuerteventura, are the main transit destination for 
migrants arriving from these areas.  
• Northern Morocco. In this area are located the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla, which form direct transit destinations on the African continent. 
In addition, the northern and north-western shores of Morocco are the main 
departure areas for small boats heading toward the Spanish mainland, 
notably Andalusia. 
• The Tunisian east coast and western parts of the Libyan coast. From these 
shores the boats head for Italy (Lampedusa, Sicily), or Malta, and/or further 
north. 
The Spanish and Italian territories in and near Africa are thus the main 
migrant destinations on the way to the EU. Arriving in one of these territories 
means actually being in the European Union, which opens up a broad range of 
possibilities of other countries to go to. However, before migrants arrive in 
departure areas such as airports, seaports and the coasts of different African 
countries, they have usually been on a long and arduous journey on the African 
continent in order to get there (van Moppes, 2006; Spaan & van Moppes, 2006). 
Migration destinations are to a large extent determined by historical factors 
(colonial ties) and there is thus some degree of consolidation. Migration 
patterns, however, are becoming increasingly less transparent and are changing 
rapidly. 
Radical changes have recently occurred in directions and volumes of migra-
tion. In the first place a reversal of migration has occurred in many countries: 
former emigration countries, such as Spain or Italy, and also Botswana (Gwebu, 
2006), now act as both immigration and transition areas. Other examples are 
Nigeria and Kenya, which have developed from immigration into emigration 
areas – often in combination, assuming the role of transit area (de Haas, 2006; 
Rutten & Muli, 2006). An increasing number of countries (for example 
Morocco) are affected, not only by emigration or immigration, but by being the 
subject of both at the same time. Another example is Senegal, with about two 
million Senegalese abroad (in France, Gabon and Ivory Coast), but at the same 
time the number of foreigners within the country is estimated at 800 000 
(Broekhuis & Ndione, 2006). Countries such as Rwanda, Kenya and Senegal 
increasingly act as transit areas. 
As a direct consequence of restrictive policies in the core regions (EU, US, 
etc.) new transition zones and more specific migration hubs have arisen between 
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places of origin and places of destination (van Moppes, 2006). Cities along the 
Sahara route, or places with direct boat and flight connection are attractive 
locations for people specialising in the migration business. Examples of 
important transition cities – where people stay temporarily to earn money – 
include Agadez (Niger), Bamako (Mali) and Tamanrasset (southern Algeria). 
Other important migration hubs include Accra (Ghana), Banjul (the Gambia), 
Casablanca (Morocco), Dakar (Senegal), Ndjamena (Chad), Douala (Camer-
oon), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Tripoli (Libya), and Sal (Cape Verde). Finally, 
the cities of Lagos (Nigeria), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Cotonou (Benin), and 
especially the capital of Guinea, Conakry, are named as places where travel 
documents can be easily forged, or where one can buy stolen travel documents 
(van Moppes, 2006).  
Migrants are confronted with rising costs and are often forced to pause to 
earn extra money on the way (en route to Europe or the US), to finance the last 
part of their journey. Many linger en route, having rid themselves of their old 
identity, and remain temporarily at an intermediate location as quasi-migrants. 
They have been forced to break the journey en route, but can often not go back, 
because they fear loss of face or are unable to repay the sum that relatives and 
friends helped to advance.4 The migrants often find themselves in poor circum-
stances, particularly in the transition zones. These groups are extremely vulner-
able to exploitation, especially to North Africa (Collyer, 2006). 
Transit migration 
Restrictive policies (in the US, Europe, but also within the migrants’ own 
regions5) have led to an increasing diversity of origin and destination areas. For 
example, migration from Nigeria to the EU was initially directed at the UK, but 
more recently an increasing number of Nigerians have migrated to countries 
such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium as well as to the Gulf 
states. In the 1990s, Spain, Italy and Ireland emerged as new major destinations 
of labour migrants from West Africa (Black et al., in de Haas, 2006: 3). 
Migrants from Kenya (originally focusing on South Africa, the UK and USA) 
nowadays also migrate not only to the Gulf states (lowly skilled labour), and the 
Middle East, but also to Germany (Rutten & Muli, 2006). The Burkinabé 
                                                 
4  According to the theory of the new economics of labour migration, the decision for 
(international) migration rested traditionally with the family: the family decided which 
member should go. Nowadays migration can also be an individual decision (Broekhuis, 
2006). 
5  Examples of sub-Saharan African countries with restrictive migration policies are Nigeria, 
Kenya, South Africa and Botswana, where there seems to be a tendency to restrict or at least 
control immigration. 
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(inhabitants of Burkina Faso, referred to above as a country with predominantly 
South-South migration) are also migrating increasingly to Italy. Bolivians, who 
for a long time migrated to Argentina in search of work, are now migrating in 
large numbers to Spain. There is also increasing intercontinental migration 
within the South (for instance Chinese who migrate to Europe or the US via 
Kenya). Where migration previously occurred along more or less well-known 
routes, travel now preferably takes place to less conventional destinations, in 
order, as far as possible, to evade tightened border controls.  
Along with more restrictive policies, there seems to be a rapid increase in 
human trafficking and illegality. According to de Haas (2006: 3), increasing 
European restrictions and controls on immigration have not led to a decrease in 
emigration rates from Nigeria. Rather, migrants are more often undocumented 
and their itineraries tend to be longer and more perilous. According to a recent 
study in Kano State (Nigeria), traffickers successfully exploited the annual 
pilgrimage to Mecca to traffic children, men and women for different exploita-
tive purposes such as prostitution, begging and all forms of domestic work 
(Ehindero et al., in de Haas, 2006: 4). This increase in restrictions has made 
Nigerian migrants more vulnerable to exploitation and marginalisation. It has 
also made migration more permanent, because people no longer take the risk of 
leaving or even of returning home temporarily (de Haas, 2006).  
In reaction to restrictive policies, changes have occurred in the manner of 
migrant travel. People now travel less often by air – that is the preserve of the 
relatively well-to-do and to those travelling as tourists or students. Less well-off 
migrants prefer to travel overland (cheap) or by boat (they cannot be immedi-
ately sent back) (van Moppes, 2006). From Nigeria for example, labour migra-
tion and trafficking to Europe in the past predominantly used air links, but visa 
requirements and increasing immigration controls at air and seaports seem to 
have led to an increasing reliance on trans-Saharan, overland routes to the 
Maghreb countries (in particular to Morocco). From there Nigerians and other 
sub-Saharan Africans attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea to southern 
Europe, or the Atlantic Ocean to the Canary Islands (de Haas, 2006), and from 
there they move in various directions. From Senegal, too, migrants originally 
travelled mainly by air and now increasingly by boat (if necessary via Maurita-
nia). The journal ‘Nouvel Horizon de Dakar’6 gives an appropriate summary of 
the situation: ‘Après avoir utilisé l’avion, le bateau, le chemin hasardeux des 
caravanes sahariennes, la traverse suicidaire du détroit de Gibraltar, les 
barbeles de Ceuta et de Melilla, il ne reste plus que la voie la plus directe: la 
                                                 
6  Courrier International, number 814, of 8th June 2006, page 38. 
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mer, et le moyen de transport le plus inattendu: la pirogue’7 (Broekhuis & 
Ndione, 2006: 5). 
Important changes have also recently occurred in the composition of migrant 
flows. Whereas migration was for a long time a matter for men, now it is 
increasingly women who take the challenge, whether or not accompanied by 
their family. In the past, if women migrated it was for reasons of family 
reunion, but significant numbers of females now migrate independently to fulfil 
their own economic needs (Adepoju, in van Moppes, 2006). Their proportion is 
currently estimated at over 50 per cent of all migrants (UNFPA 2006; Usher, 
2005.). As a result, radical changes are occurring not only regarding the roles of 
men and women, and in parenthood in general, but also in relations between the 
generations. In the case of migration, the grandparents often play an important 
role in bringing up the children who remain behind. Increasingly, however, it is 
also the children themselves who decide to migrate, sometimes even before they 
have completed their schooling. Thus there is not only feminisation, but also 
juvenation of migration flows (Adepoju et al., 2006).  
Lastly, changes have occurred in the occupations and levels of skill of 
migrants. While formerly many migrants were wage-earners, now a consider-
able proportion are self-employed entrepreneurs. As a result of recruitment (by 
universities and companies), there also appears to be a shift towards higher-
skilled migrants, although a large proportion are still poorly skilled (van 
Moppes, 2006). The heterogeneity of the migrant population can be illustrated 
by drawing on the example of Nigeria (de Haas, 2006). There is circumstantial 
evidence that more recent migrants to continental European countries are less 
skilled on average, and that they more often work in the (formal and, particu-
larly in southern Europe, informal) service, trade and agricultural sectors of the 
economy. The UK and also, in particular, the US (through student and profes-
sional migration, as well as through the Green Card lottery) generally continue 
to attract relatively more highly skilled workers (Hernandez-Coss et al., 2006). 
The Gulf states have also started to attract the relatively highly skilled (in 
addition to the low-skilled labour). 
Compared with earlier times, people are now much better able to cross great 
distances in a short time and to maintain close contact with the area of origin. In 
a certain sense the world has shrunk. Where travel formerly might well have 
meant years of absence, today’s migrants can travel quickly and maintain 
contact with several places at the same time. Migration is increasingly transna-
tional and consists of an ongoing series of cross-border movements in which 
                                                 
7  Having used air, boat, the hazardous route of Saharan caravans, the suicidal Gibralter 
crossing, the barbed wire of Ceuta and Melilla, there is nothing left but the most direct route: 
the ocean, and that most neglected form of transport: the canoe.  
276 ZOOMERS & ADEPOJU 
 
immigrants develop and maintain numerous economic, social and cultural links 
in more than one nation (Jackson et al., 2004.). In the case of transnationality, 
people no longer find themselves based in one place: they find themselves in 
several places at the same time, as it were, and try to make strategic use of the 
differences which exist between countries (Portes, 1996). Thus there is a 
growing group of transnational entrepreneurs who commute intensively in an 
attempt to profit from the economic opportunities which present themselves in 
several countries at the same time. They belong both to their region of origin 
and to their reception region (see Maas, 2005 for the Philippines). 
Viewpoints in the areas of origin: Common issues 
In analysing the characteristics of migration in the various countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, we found a number of common features that can be summarised 
under the following headings: 
Migration is not new: Traditional types of population mobility  
The population of most sub-Saharan countries has always been one of the most 
mobile in the world. There are many examples of nomadism, and livelihood 
systems are based on people’s ability to move in response to seasonal variation 
and variability of natural resources. International borders imposed during 
colonial times were often not in line with natural conditions, nor did they 
coincide with the territorial claims of different ethnic groups. Some of today’s 
international migration forms part of indigenous patterns of mobility – tradi-
tional, seasonal movements within one and the same eco-region (see de Haas 
for Nigeria, Rutten & Muli for Kenya, and Broekhuis for both Senegal and 
Burkina Faso). Much international migration in sub-Saharan Africa is therefore 
a product of the colonial era – a reflection of the introduction of artificial 
boundaries.  
Migration patterns reflect colonial patterns of forced labour 
During the colonial period, large flows of Europeans moved in the direction of 
Asia, Latin America and Africa, and introduced systems of forced labour in 
order to have sufficient workers in the colonial economy (on mines and agri-
cultural estates). In addition to the deportation of slaves to South America and 
the Caribbean – the basis for the creation of one of the earliest African diasporas 
(Mafukidze, 2006: 109) – there were important population movements to 
mining areas and the coastal plantations (circular migration). In particular, taxes 
imposed by the French stimulated many Burkinabé to migrate to Ghana to 
escape French colonial rule (Broekhuis, 2006). After independence, some of the 
colonial population left these countries, to be partly replaced by the arrival of a 
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new group of Europeans who moved voluntarily in search of fresh opportunities 
overseas. But the dominant migration routes remained the same, with mines and 
agricultural estates still being important destination areas for African migrants. 
In Nigeria, the dominant movement of internal migration is still towards the 
densely populated coastal areas, although Abuja in the centre and Kano in the 
north are also major destinations for internal migrants (de Haas, 2006). 
Rapid urbanisation and brain drain 
In the 1950s and ’60s most sub-Saharan African countries had to cope with 
rapid urbanisation (internal migration) and where Africans decided to leave 
(international migration) it was often the elite who left. In countries such as 
Nigeria, there was a large outflow of the elite to Europe and the US – as a 
response to political change, conflicts and disparities in economic opportunity – 
which resulted in a rapid brain drain. 
Anti-migration policies  
Where national governments made an attempt to reduce urbanisation or to 
counter the negative effects of mass migration (brain drain) they usually did so 
by introducing exit visas – for example in Rwanda, Mozambique, and Tanzania, 
as well as in Burkina Faso (Broekhuis, 2006: 8). In Rwanda, and elsewhere, 
people were obliged to pay guarantees (deposits in bank accounts) and family 
members had to sign before would-be migrants were allowed to leave the 
country. Governments did their best to root people in the countryside, often as a 
part of socialist policies, as happened in Tanzania, and in Mozambique 
(Raimundo, 2006). This has, however, now changed, and freedom of movement 
is permitted. 
Alternations between recruited immigration and expulsion 
In many cases, countries have experienced reversal of migration, in response to 
economic booms or to stagnation. Countries like Nigeria and Ivory Coast, as 
well as South Africa, Kenya and Ghana, attracted migrant labour during times 
of rapid economic growth, followed by crisis and economic decline, which 
often went hand in hand with the expulsion of foreign populations. In Nigeria, 
after a period of rapid growth between 1973 and 1981, economic decline led the 
government to expel large numbers of West African migrants in 1983 and 1985, 
including one million Ghanaians (de Haas, 2006). Other examples – often 
combined with political conflict – include Ivory Coast and Ghana (expulsion of 
large numbers of Burkinabé) and Kenya (Ugandans and other groups in 1984 
and 1987) (Rutten & Muli, 2006). Migrants in Kenya and South Africa, and 
also in Botswana (Gwebu, 2006), now have to cope with – sometimes unbridled 
– discrimination and xenophobia. 
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Root causes of migration 
The history of migration cannot be seen in isolation from poverty and other 
push factors that are often described as root causes of international migration. 
Because of harsh environmental conditions (droughts, less fertile land) and a 
low technological level, the agricultural sector is unable to provide employment 
and income for constantly increasing population numbers (Broekhuis, 2006: 7, 
writing about Burkina Faso). Similar factors are mentioned for central and East 
Africa: ecological degradation, disasters such as droughts, a lack of economic 
prospects, and conflict are among the principal causes of migration from these 
areas (Spaan & Moppes 2006; Rutten & Muli, 2006).  
Recruitment programmes, family reunion and asylum policies 
In various countries (Nigeria and Ghana, but also relatively rich South Africa) 
emphasis is given to the fact that international migration has recently intensified 
as a direct response to recruitment programmes. Universities and enterprises in 
the Gulf states and the Middle East, Canada and the US, and different EU 
countries play an active role in ‘cherry picking’. Current migration patterns 
cannot be understood without taking into account the history of guest worker 
programmes, consolidated by subsequent family reunifications. Later migration 
is also a reflection of northern asylum policies. It is stressed that core countries 
have, for a long time, played an active role in shaping migration flows. The 
introduction of restrictive policies occurred relatively recently. 
Lack of comparable data  
Much emphasis is placed in many countries on the lack of data and deficient 
information about international migration. Within sub-Saharan Africa (but also 
elsewhere) a comparison of statistics is very complicated. A first factor which 
should be taken into account when trying to make an assessment of the impor-
tance of international migration is that of differences in population size. In a 
country like Nigeria, with its large population, international outmigration is 
relatively modest in comparison with massive internal migration, but it is still 
considered one of the most important sending countries, with large numbers of 
Nigerians concentrated in the US and the UK.  
Although there is a clear distinction between internal and international 
migration, they do not necessarily represent significantly different experiences. 
In many cases, the impact of internal migration (short distance) is not necessar-
ily less than that of long distance, international border crossings. In the case of 
Nigeria, for example, taking into account the huge ethnic, linguistic and 
religious variety, as well as the fact that non-indigenous inhabitants of states 
face considerable legal institutional discrimination, the characteristics and 
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personal impacts of inter-state migration may resemble those of international 
moves, especially within Africa. It is important to observe that differentials in 
development within Nigeria are at least as important, if not greater, than 
between various West African countries. The difference between international 
and internal migrants is not always clear, and in many cases conflicts occur in 
relation to internal, short-distance migration.  
Definitional problems 
An important distinction made in statistics, which is not always visible in 
reality, is that between labour migrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 
refugees. Different groups live in different situations. Refugees who went to 
Burkina Faso (a restricted group of 1200 people from Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, 
Eritrea, Somalia and Chad) are allowed to live dispersed in the cities and are not 
concentrated into camps (Broekhuis, 2006). This is the opposite to the situation 
in Kenya, where people are forced to live in camps and are not allowed to take 
paid work. Refugees in Kenya become illegal aliens as soon as they leave the 
refugee camp (Rutten & Muli, 2006). In addition, however, refugees are some-
times better off than native groups living in the same area: in Kenya, the 
Turkana living near a refugee camp receive less support and experience more 
insecurity than the foreign groups who are supported by UNHCR (Rutten & 
Muli, 20068). Depending upon the definition (migrant, refugee, IDP) or 
nationality, people have varying chances of receiving support from international 
organisations, as well as permission for buying land or getting a job in govern-
ment.  
Conflicting images and tensions 
In addition to definitional problems, there are complications related to the image 
of migrants, and how people look at each other from different sides. 
In host countries, migrants are often seen as strangers who are different from 
local people, who have different habits and attitudes, and who have come to 
profit from better living conditions in the host country. In their country of origin 
they are often seen as money makers, a positive image based on the remittances 
brought or sent home. In addition it is expected that migrants will acquire 
specific skills and/or knowledge during their sojourn abroad which can be used 
in their own or their family’s interest after their return, or applied in the interest 
of their country of origin. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the image of 
migrants is not so positive at home (Broekhuis, 2006) and tensions can arise 
between migrants and non-migrants. In Burkina Faso, for example, there is 
                                                 
8  See also Horst 2006, for the situation of Somali refugees. 
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increasing competition between the tengas (native people) and the diaspos 
(children of previously emigrated Burkinabé, who have returned from Ivory 
Coast to study in Burkina because of lower costs and better job opportunities).  
Remittance corridors and geographical restrictions 
In the case of international migration, it is acknowledged that the impact of 
remittances is spatially defined, because most migrants originate from particular 
areas and are concentrated in a limited number of destination areas. This means 
that migration not only generates patterns of dependency, but also creates 
patterns of spatial and social inequality. 
In Nigeria, for example, most of the migrants who moved to the EU or the 
US originated from the southern provinces. The Ibo from the southeast and the 
Yoruba from the southwest, and, to a lesser extent the Edo and the Ogoni ethnic 
groups constitute the majority of Nigerian migrants in the UK (Hernandez-Coss 
et al., 2006). In the destination regions, too, the areas involved in international 
migration are rather restricted. Fifty per cent of all Nigerians and Kenyans who 
migrated to the US are to be found in Washington, with the rest distributed 
between Texas, California, Georgia and North Carolina (Rutten & Muli, 2006). 
International migration thus involves only a limited number of areas, and the 
majority of the population will not be able to benefit from it. 
The ageing population of Europe – new labour opportunities  
International migration is now viewed in nearly all sending countries as some-
thing necessary and positive if there are insufficient work opportunities in the 
migrants’ own country. Partly as a result of demographic growth, international 
migration is a logical response and a human right as long as no better alterna-
tives exist. It is expected that Europe will need extra labour in the years to come 
as a result of the ageing of its population, and that Europe, like the US and 
Canada, will turn to a more selective migration policy (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003). Europe’s need creates opportunities for labour 
migration, in particular, for doctors, nurses and technical experts (Broekhuis, 
2006: 5). Despite this, little information is currently available about Europe’s 
future labour needs. 
The criminalization of migrants 
In most sub-Saharan countries, illegal or clandestine migration and human 
trafficking are regarded as undesirable, and many countries are prepared to 
cooperate with each other in combating them. Besides programmes aimed at 
combating trafficking in women and children, the combating of illegality, 
including the forging of documents, is high on the agenda.  
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A great problem, however, is that migrants (including illegal immigrants and 
the victims of human trafficking) are being criminalised – people are increas-
ingly wrongly treated as criminals. In most countries there is understanding of 
European attempts to counteract unauthorised immigration: the more stringent 
admittance of migrants is usually not a point of general discussion, nor is it 
thought of as undesirable, even. A point of concern, however, is the treatment of 
migrants in Europe. There is a call from many sides for a more respectful 
treatment of migrants and the avoidance of indignity, and many sending 
countries blame the northern countries for not ratifying the ILO Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Family Members 
(Broekhuis, 2006: 5). There has been criticism in many countries of current 
deportation policies, including the way in which victims of human trafficking 
are sent back to their countries of origin in the same aircraft as the traffickers 
themselves (Broekhuis, 2006; de Haas, 2006). 
Concluding remarks 
International migration is nowadays reshaping the world in a selective way, 
contributing to a global reallocation of development opportunities for the 
various countries in the world. Some countries play important roles at the centre 
stage, while other countries are hardly involved or play only marginal roles. 
Some countries in sub-Saharan Africa benefit from migration as a new source of 
financial capital, or use it as a source of negotiation power. Other countries are 
less successful in attracting remittances and/or establishing agreements that 
might contribute to development. Bilateral and multilateral migration agree-
ments are flourishing, but it is not yet clear to what extent this will help 
countries – or not help them – to maximise the benefits of migration while 
minimising its negative effects. There is a large number of commonalities in 
migration, but it is the differences in particular that need to be taken into 
account when searching for new development strategies. Current policy initia-
tives will be dealt with in the final chapter.  
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A summary of concrete policy initiatives 
In this final chapter we reflect upon the operational aspects of policy making, 
and in particular those questions that have to do with policy implementation and 
designing (new) migration strategies. 
Reviewing migration as a policy issue, it becomes clear that the stimulation 
and/or controlling of migration has, since colonial times, been an important 
strategy for encouraging economic growth – for example, through systems of 
forced labour. Since independence, African states have tried to respond to 
labour migration, brain drain and urbanisation by issuing exit visas and by 
obliging people to remain in the countryside (Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
etc.). In some countries, especially South Africa and Namibia, it is only recently 
that the majority of the people have been free to move, and this should be taken 
into account when trying to assess international migration. Where volumes of 
international migration have increased, this is the result partly of the neo-liberal 
reforms, and partly of the technological revolution and processes of regional 
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integration, which have stimulated the free movement of capital and goods. 
Neo-liberal policies have also resulted in the collapse of local economies which, 
together with ecological problems, have reduced opportunities for local 
development in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa. 
In spite of the growing concern of governments with migration issues, and 
the large range of topics currently on the policy agenda, most sending countries 
have no consistent migration policy. In most instances there is a laisser faire 
approach, with no systematic way of limiting international migration or 
measures to promote emigration. In recent years there have been great efforts at 
the regional level to secure rights of free movement, residence and establish-
ment (in Africa ECOWAS, UEMOA, AU; in Latin America Mercosur, ALCA 
etc.), but their implementation has been subject to many restrictions. Most 
conventions, treaties and agreements have proved to be dead letters without 
ratification by national parliaments or their translation into national laws 
(Adepoju, 2000a; Broekhuis, 2006; Soulama, 2005). In sub-Saharan Africa 
efforts to achieve the free movement of persons have led to reduced possibilities 
for controlling migration, and human traffickers have been able to profit from 
this (Adepoju, 2005).  
In recent years many arrangements have been made by northern countries (in 
particular the EU) with individual sending countries, for example, between 
Nigeria and Italy; between South Africa and Namibia, Botswana, Tanzania and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo; and between Senegal and France and Spain 
(Rutten & Muli, 2006). There is a growing number of bilateral arrangements to 
control migration, in some cases combined with co-development programmes 
(Adepoju, 2004). At the same time, there has been some intensification of 
recruitment, not only from the US/ Canada, the EU and the Gulf States, but also 
within sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya, high school and elementary school 
teachers were recruited throughout the 1990s in such places as the Seychelles, 
Rwanda, Burundi and Congo (Rutten & Muli, 2006: 19). 
As regards concern at the level of individual countries about the link 
between international migration and combating poverty, international migration 
is referred to only to a very limited extent in the context of poverty reduction 
strategy papers (PRSPs) (van der Veen, 2006). There is generally no systematic 
policy. Migration is either referred to as a negative force, or related to positive 
developments, but there has been no systematic approach and international 
migration has not so far been cited as a structural element for combating 
poverty. Migration is still seen primarily as a development failure rather than as 
a constituent part of broader social and economic transformation processes (de 
Haas, 2006).  
Summarising the types of programmes currently under way, we can say that 
they are usually a combination of the following measures: 
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• Policy priorities in the sending countries (also prioritised on the migration 
and development agenda of receiving countries and/or donor agencies) 
• Increasing the flow of remittances and/or ensuring a more productive invest-
ment of money through forms of co-financing (for example co-development 
in West Africa, and Tres por Uno in Mexico).  
• Measures aimed at encouraging brain gain and limiting brain drain; encour-
agement of return, often linked to northern programmes (MIDA, TOKTEN 
in Senegal, Ghana, and also Burkina Faso). While in many sending countries 
there is an interest in how brain gain can be given impetus (without the 
expectation of migrant return), many donors and receiving countries place 
the emphasis mainly on return and/or limiting brain drain. Donors try 
through programmes such as MIDA and TOKTEN to create possibilities for 
bringing expertise back to the region of origin, although numbers are thus far 
very modest and success has been limited (and the number of beneficiaries is 
not in proportion to the total number of migrants and/or expatriates). 
• Capacity strengthening for the improvement of border controls, intended to 
limit immigration. Investments are made within the framework of this 
policy, with financing from northern countries for training customs officials 
and supplying equipment, to sharpen border controls. Kenya has recently 
strengthened its border control, in order to keep a better check on internal 
migration (for example by Asians) and to keep out ‘undesirable aliens’. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, however, borders are highly porous, and migrants 
respond to strengthened border controls by taking alternative routes (at a 
higher cost and greater risk), lingering for a longer time in transition zones. 
This approach thus does not generally lead to a reduction in the number of 
illegal immigrants, partly because it does not solve the problem of overstay-
ing (people entering legally on a tourist or student visa, and staying longer 
than permitted). As soon as the ‘stamp’ expires, the holder becomes illegal, 
so often there are no possibilities of leaving a country legally.  
• Combating human trafficking (mainly of women and children, partly linked 
to the problem of forced labour). Many anti-trafficking policies are financed 
and carried out in collaboration with donors and/or receiving countries. 
Different emphases are placed by the sending and receiving countries: 
sending countries are critical of receiving countries because they find that 
illegal migrants are not treated with respect. Most Nigerian stakeholders, in 
particular those in non-governmental positions, criticise the anti-trafficking 
policies of the European states, because they do not differentiate between 
traffickers and their victims, who are collectively labelled as illegals and 
subsequently expelled. They stress that serious anti-trafficking policies 
should address trafficked men and women as victims and protect their rights. 
A blanket repressive approach is considered as working counterproductively 
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because it increases the reciprocal relationship between traffickers and their 
‘victims’, who in fact have relatively good career prospects once they have 
paid off their debts, with the potential of improving their livelihoods in the 
longer term. 
Since policy priorities can differ greatly, depending largely on whether the 
perspective is that of a sending or receiving country, we now give a summary of 
such priorities, from the different perspectives: 
Policy priorities in sending countries (together with the diaspora) which are 
partly supported by receiving countries/donor agencies  
• Instituting a Ministry of/for Diaspora (there are new initiatives in this direc-
tion in Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Rwanda and Argentina); intensifying contacts 
with the population overseas).  
• Starting programmes, such as cultural programmes, in the host countries; 
disseminating information, for example about the host country; granting the 
franchise to the population in the diaspora (these are currently being dis-
cussed in several countries, including Kenya and Nigeria) 
• Setting up programmes aimed at attracting investment in the sending coun-
tries by improving the investment climate, e.g. by offering tax concessions 
(examples are China, India and Korea, and this is starting in Senegal).  
Policy priorities in sending countries which are not on the migration and 
development agendas of receiving countries/donor agencies 
• Protecting the rights of migrants; complying with the ILO Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Family Members 
(not ratified by most of the northern countries) 
• Examining ways of creating youth employment (this is happening in Senegal 
and Burkina Faso). This is part of conventional development policy, but is 
not on the migration and development agendas of either receiving countries 
or donor agencies. 
• Encouragement of immigration and return, as in Rwanda. Migration forms 
part of the refugee agenda, but usually only from the perspective of the 
reception region. 
• Exporting any labour surplus and/or developing remittance corridors. In 
different countries active attempts are made to facilitate emigration (provid-
ing services and/or institutional reforms) and to maximise its positive effects 
(as in the Philippines, Kenya, and Ecuador); examining ways to capitalise 
best on future labour needs, and to prepare migrants better, so that they can 
improve the quality of the work they are likely to do. In countries such as 
Kenya there is an active policy aimed at exporting highly skilled labour, with 
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a special office for outplacement. In the Philippines, too, there is a tendency 
to target the training of professionals for work abroad. These initiatives are 
not supported by receiving countries; they are not on the agenda because 
they are associated with ‘threatened invasion’. 
• Reducing the dependency on remittances and/or promoting a greater stability 
(Cape Verde, Kenya). Again this is not on the migration and development 
agenda of donors. 
Policy priorities in receiving countries, or of donors, which are not sufficiently 
in line with priorities in sending countries 
• Encouragement of circular migration: this is presented as a win-win situation 
by sending countries – because it makes migration possible without the 
threat of an invasion. From migrants’ experiences with circular migration to 
the Gulf States (which have strongly regulated migration with temporary 
labour contracts) it can be stated that there are nevertheless increasing 
tensions. There is a demand for this form of migration (as a means of 
supplementing income), but it offers no solution to those who are mainly 
interested in career migration. The thought of return migration plays in the 
background of discussions on circular migration. This leads many sending 
countries to react with suspicion. 
• Anti-migration campaigns and/or information, designed to make people 
aware of risks and dangers. In discussions held in receiving countries, and by 
donors, emphasis is placed on the need to stop the brain drain, and the need 
to inform people about the risks of migration – in the sense of anti-emigra-
tion policy. (In most sending countries these issues do not stand very high on 
the agenda, although it is acknowledged that many people lack information 
about what to expect at the other end and are therefore vulnerable to exploi-
tation.) 
• Policies for improving migration data. It is mainly from donor circles that 
resources (such as migration statistics) are currently being provided for 
access to reliable information. Senegal is a pilot country in this respect 
(Broekhuis & Ndione, 2006). At the same time it can be noted that insuffi-
cient attention is being paid to problems relating to the definition of migra-
tion (or more specifically the paradigms underlying such concepts as new-
comer, alien, IDP, refugee, circular migrant and so on), and the conse-
quences which a particular designation may have for a person’s development 
chances. This less statistical and more qualitative dimension remains under-
exposed, but is of great importance – probably more important than the 
precise quantification of numbers of migrants. 
• Involvement of migrants’ diaspora organisations. There has recently been a 
growing interest from the sending regions in making contact with their 
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diasporas. Governments in reception zones, and donors, are trying to involve 
migrants actively in the formulation and/or implementation of policy in their 
regions of origin, addressing migrants and such diaspora organisations as 
exist in the given reception region. By doing this, they are trying to benefit 
from the ‘overseas’ development potential, but the problems should not be 
underestimated. Many migrants in diaspora organisations are not expert in 
the field of development, and are often not representative or politically 
oriented. Indeed they are sometimes seen from the perspective of the sending 
countries as defectors. Whether a contribution can be made to development 
through the support of diaspora organisations depends on the quality of the 
available expertise, and – in some cases – on the degree to which the activi-
ties of diaspora organisations can be harmonised with each other – in the 
Philippines, for example, there are about a thousand diaspora organisations 
(Baggio, 2006). In the worst case, projects carried out by such organisations 
actually interfere with the mainstream policies carried out by the national 
government or local organisations. 
Final reflections and recommendations  
This brings us to the final question: How can consistent migration policies 
contribute to combating poverty? At this moment, several ‘sending’ countries 
are looking at ‘migration and development’, but there are a number of reasons 
why international migration will not automatically result in poverty alleviation 
or sustainable development. 
Much will depend on the type of destination. Migrants moving to the Gulf 
states will have fewer possibilities for upward mobility than those, for example, 
who migrate to the US/Canada or the EU, where conditions are better for estab-
lishment, family reunification, and so on. Within the EU there are wide differ-
ences between countries in the possibilities for integration and becoming full 
citizens, which will determine to a large extent whether migrants will be able to 
benefit from migration or not. The Netherlands, for instance, is not viewed by 
many migrants as an ideal destination, partly because of the language, but also 
because of the current integration policies. Where people do arrive in the 
Netherlands, this is sometimes transit migration: there is currently an exodus of 
Somalis from the Netherlands to the UK.  
At the country level, the development potential of migration will greatly 
depend on the way in which countries are incorporated into the migration 
system, with direct consequences for the possibility of profiting from migration. 
Diasporic states and countries with directed South-North migration generally 
find themselves in a relatively favourable position, while the countries with 
South-South migration appear to be increasingly faced with restrictions. In the 
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case of South-South migration, migrants often travel without the required 
documentation and are vulnerable to exploitation; they do not receive protection 
of the receiving state; job opportunities – as well as salaries – are usually 
unfavourable in comparison with the northern destinations; the flow of remit-
tances is small in comparison with the flow of money coming from the northern 
states. Much of the suffering of these migrants remains invisible. 
To the extent that receiving states and donors are currently implementing 
‘migration and development’ policies, these are aimed mainly at controlling 
dominant patterns of South-North migration. The areas of origin are treated as 
‘sending states’ without taking into account that many of these countries also 
play a role as immigration and/or transition areas. The EU countries and a 
selected group of emigration countries are currently negotiating readmission 
and migration quotas (in bilateral agreements) – often without taking into 
consideration the negative consequences for intra-regional relations (i.e. the 
restriction of migration from neighbouring states).  
There is another paradox: regional organisations, such as ECOWAS and the 
AU, aim at facilitating ‘the free movement of persons’, but also acknowledge 
the need to control migration. Processes of regional integration seem to have 
given more space to human traffickers and have restricted the ability of states to 
control migration. 
The likelihood of international migration helping to combat poverty is less 
favourable than it used to be – at least in receiving countries. Migrants are 
increasingly attracted to criminal activities (to earn large amounts of money in a 
short time), and so the migration agenda has become mixed up with anti-terror-
ism; and human trafficking has intensified. 
International migration may have helped people escape from poverty, but we 
should not forget that, in many cases, the impact tends to limited, even in the 
most favourable circumstances. Where migrants do manage to send remittances 
to their areas of origin, these flows are usually geographically concentrated, and 
benefit only small numbers of people. Flows of remittances thus help to create 
‘islands of wealth’, and will in many cases not contribute to national develop-
ment. Another problem is the variability of remittance flows and their lack of 
sustainability. Even if remittances are stable in the short run – with first-genera-
tion migrants sending home significant amounts of money on a regular basis – 
this often declines in the course of time, as second or third generations lose 
interest and feel less committed. Experience shows that migration streams from 
particular areas will usually not last longer than about twenty years, and that the 
intensity and direction of migration will depend very much on economic 
growth, which will vary in time.  
Even though migration is nowadays described as a strategy aimed at 
spreading risk (common in the ‘new economics of migration theory’), it often 
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results in new vulnerabilities. There is a considerable group of migrants who – 
due to their migration – suffer downward social mobility: they fall ill, are 
involved in accidents, or became victims of robberies or exploitation; and well-
educated women working as domestic servants will often not be able to exploit 
their capabilities to the full. Another negative dimension of migration is the 
intensification of land conflicts, and rising land prices due to the use of remit-
tances for purchasing land. International migration – along with the liberalisa-
tion of land markets and the use of Internet – has opened the door to a real 
estate boom. International migrants are increasingly appearing as a new cate-
gory of absentee landowners. 
Where attempts have been made by policymakers to maximise the positive 
impact of international migration or to restrict its negative implications, most of 
the sending countries in sub-Saharan Africa do not yet have well-established 
policies. It is a new policy field, and there is a wide variety of issues – depend-
ing very much on the particular position of each country. In our analysis we 
showed that there is some overlap between the ‘migration and development’ 
agendas of northern and southern countries (increasing the flow of remittances, 
combating human trafficking, improving border controls, stimulating brain gain 
etc.), but this is again very dependent on the country under consideration, and 
within the South there are considerable conflicts of interests between countries. 
We also showed that – where northern countries or donors invest in ‘migra-
tion and development’ programmes (such as MIDA and TOKTEN) – the 
number of beneficiaries is small in comparison with the total migration flow. 
From the perspective of the sending countries, it seems unrealistic to expect 
migrants to be willing to return as long as there are no comparable employment 
and/or educational opportunities at home. In many sending countries, the focus 
is not so much on ‘return’; instead, policymakers are searching for ‘long 
distance’ types of support from migrant populations. They accept that people 
should have a right to move freely, and aim to get the diaspora involved by 
inviting them to send money or make investments.  
In general terms, in donor policies there is a bias in favour of countries with 
South-North migration and little is done for the countries experiencing South-
South migration. 
Recommendations 
In order to improve the development impact of international migration and to 
make international migration more relevant to development, we have the fol-
lowing recommendations: 
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Improvement of current policies (supported by donors and northern countries): 
• Anti-trafficking measures (programmes to stop the trafficking of women and 
children) should continue to receive high priority. This is supported by both 
sending and receiving countries, but sending countries are unhappy that 
victims and traffickers are treated equally as criminals. Priority should be 
given to stopping the criminalisation of the victims, and more to focusing on 
the traffickers. Legalisation of the victims is seen as an important require-
ment in making anti-trafficking more effective. 
• Anti-migration policies and the intensification of border controls are not 
effective in restricting illegal migration and lead to increased vulnerability of 
migrant groups. Whereas governments of receiving countries try to combat 
the problem of ‘illegality’ by strengthening border controls (through capacity 
building, technology etc.), most migrants become irregular by ‘overstaying’. 
• Where receiving countries show an interest in facilitating circular migration, 
it is necessary to examine critically previous experiences (such as guest 
worker programmes), and the development implications of current migration 
towards the Gulf states. The ageing population in Europe might offer 
opportunities for Africans on the European labour market, but little is known 
about the particularities of future labour needs, and how such migration 
could help to promote essential productive investments and knowledge trans-
fer. A better orientation towards the international labour market is needed if 
countries wish to profit more from international migration. It is also impor-
tant to anticipate better the growing competition between different migrant 
groups: how is it possible, for instance, to guarantee that migrants from sub-
Saharan Africa will be able in the long run to compete with migrants arriving 
from Asia and Latin America?  
• It is recommended that an analysis be made of the extent to which MIDA-
TOKTEN initiatives (aimed at brain gain and brain circulatio form part of 
mainstream development policies (PRSPs and sectoral plans). An analysis 
should also be done on the extent to which these initiatives are in conflict 
with ‘traditional structures’. Questions should be asked, such as: What is the 
capacity of local institutions to facilitate ‘reintegration’ and/or the return of 
people, and what is the impact of ‘foreign expertise’? What kind of institu-
tional adaptations are necessary (e.g., property rights, inheritance rights 
etc.)? Who is responsible for the people moving in and out, and what are the 
social security implications for these groups? What are the rights and obli-
gations of circular migrants and who is responsible for them (the government 
of the sending or the receiving country)? 
• Where support is given to migrant and diaspora organisations, it is important 
to consider also supporting such organisations in the countries of origin (in 
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Burkina Faso, for example, there are numerous migrant organisations). 
Northern governments and donors could continue to help migrant organisa-
tions in establishing contacts, not only with areas of origin, but also with 
diaspora organisations in other countries, thus facilitating communication 
and information flows. 
New orientations: 
• Greater priority should be given to the problems of countries with South-
South migration, and to those which are transition areas and/or migration 
hubs; in other words how the situation of transit migrants could be improved. 
In doing this, sufficient attention should be paid to the Asian-African (and 
potentially Latin American) connection.  
• More emphasis should be given to supporting both national governments and 
local groups (in sending countries) in establishing links with their diaspora. 
Many sending countries are interested in intensifying relations with countries 
with substantial migrant groups, but the financial means of their govern-
ments are limited.  
• More attention could be paid to the worldwide problem of discrimination 
and xenophobia (including in the South). Rather than continuing data collec-
tion –and in so-doing deepening the problems between migrant and non-
migrant populations (as is currently done by different donors) – it is neces-
sary to make a critical review of the paradigms used (aliens, ‘immigrants’, 
expatriates, etc.) and to assess how, in different countries, this categorisation 
contributes to stigmatisation, exclusion etc. 
• More attention should be paid to the negative implications of the boom in 
bilateral agreements (on readmission, migration quotas, etc.) for intra-
regional patterns of collaboration and/or interstate relations within the South. 
• Given the growing interest in circular migration (see above), it would be 
interesting to collect more concrete information about how to monitor 
‘urgent labour needs’, not only in the North, but also within the South in 
relation to HIV/Aids etc. Ways of matching demand and supply need to be 
found, to make circular migration more relevant to African labour require-
ments. 
• Priority should be given to providing more and better information to differ-
ent categories of migrant groups. Migrants need to be informed before their 
departure about conditions in their intended host countries; women and 
children need information so that they do not become victims of traffickers, 
Aids and other diseases; people need to know about visa requirements, and 
the need to formalise their presence once they have arrived in the host 
country, and so on. Information is also required concerning economic 
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investment possibilities, assessing future labour needs, obtaining information 
about new laws and international treaties, etc. 
• It is urgent that discussion be initiated regarding the new role of embassies 
and consulates. They currently provide visas and passports, but what is their 
future role in distributing information, in providing assistance in cases of 
emergency or expulsion, and in preparing agreements to improve social 
security etc.? 
• More attention should be paid to the problems of internally displaced per-
sons and refugees, in particular ‘ecological refugees’ (together with political 
conflicts, this is one of the causes of migration forced by human factors). In 
addition, early warning systems and spatial planning could help to prevent 
geographically-forced migration such as that caused by floods or droughts. 
• It is important to mainstream ‘migration and development’ policies in the 
direction of anti-poverty strategies. The current emphasis on ‘migration and 
development’ should not result in the reallocation of money in favour of 
migrants (as distinct from those who remain in their places of origin). The 
majority of the population (97%) is geographically stable; they are quite 
reluctant to leave their homes and villages or towns. More explicit attention 
must be paid to ways of controlling population growth, as well as to im-
proving local employment opportunities, especially for the youth. 
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